APPENDIX VIII
Memorandum from the Foreign and Commonwealth
Office: Follow-up to the Government response to the Committee's
most recent report (CM 5141)
(Questions from the Committee are in italics)
SALES OF
DEFENCE EQUIPMENT
BY UK GOVERNMENT
AGENCIES TO
OTHER GOVERNMENTS
The Government's response to the Committee's recommendation
(a) (paragraph 20) states that the F680 form `can act in place
of an export licence for sales of defence equipment by UK Government
agencies to other Governments. These Government to Government
exports are considered against the consolidated criteria.' Would
the Government consider publishing in future Annual Reports on
Strategic Export Controls information detailing F680 applications
of this type during the year in question? If the information cannot
be published, can it be provided to the Committees, in confidence
if necessary?
Since 1999 information on Government to Government
transfers and sales of surplus major equipment has been included
at Table 6 in Part III of the Annual Report on Strategic Export
Controls.
THE LICENSING
PROCESS
The Government's response to the Committee's recommendation
(n) (paragraph 92) states that "we have made considerable
progress against both targets", referring to an ECO internal
target "to process 90% of cases within 60 working days and
100% within 120 working days". What progress has been made
against these targets during 2002?
In response to the same recommendation, the Government
notes that it is currently undertaking "a review of the licensing
process. Conclusions are expected for the first half of 2003".
The Committee would like to be provided with a copy of the conclusions,
when these are issued.
In 2002, 90.1% of Standard Individual Export
Licence applications were processed by the ECO within 60 working
days and 97.4% within 120 working days.
The Government will provide the Quadripartite
Committee with a copy of the conclusions on its review of the
licensing process.
END-USE
MONITORING
The Government's response to the Committee's recommendation
(p) (paragraph 97) states that "the Government does not operate
rigid rules governing the circumstances in which checks are made
on end-users of proposed or past defence exports". Bearing
this in mind, the Committee would nonetheless appreciate a clearer
statement of the circumstances in which end use monitoring can,
in the Governments judgment, make a real contribution to the responsible
use of equipment exported from the United Kingdom. Case studies
of successful end-use monitoring would also be appreciated.
It is not possible to give a comprehensive answer
to a hypothetical question. As previously stated, the Government
believes that the surest way to prevent UK arms ending up in the
wrong hands is to examine export licences applications carefully
at the pre-licensing stage and to refuse an export licence when
there is an unacceptable risk of diversion or misuse. Proactive
monitoring of defence exports after delivery is only carried out
in those cases of greatest concern, and will not be possible or
appropriate in all cases. Nevertheless, our Overseas Posts have
standing instructions to report on any allegation of misuse of
any UK-origin defence equipment. Political officers or Defence
Attachés may do this during the course of normal political
duties, travel through their host countries, or routine contracts
with defence/security force interlocutors.
As an example of end-use monitoring, our Defence
Attachés in Tel Aviv tour the Occupied Territories, often
in difficult and dangerous conditions, to assess the situation
on the ground and on the activities of the Israel Defence Forces,
including the equipment they use, and they report their findings
to London. Such rigorous checking was responsible for the discovery
of the information, which the then parliamentary Under-Secretary
of State (Mr Bradshaw) disclosed to the House on 11 March 2002.
SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT
The Government's response to the committee's
recommendation(v) (paragraph 134) drew the Committee's attention
to the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry's announcement
on 31 July of "a clear and agreed framework for providing
advice on export licence applications where sustainable development
. . . is an issue". This involved a two-stage process: "first
a non-exhaustive list of countries identifies those where sustainable
development is most likely to be an issue. Second, in cases involving
exports to those countries, the Government will look in more detail
at the possible impact of relevant proposed exports on the economy
or the sustainable development of the recipient country".
The first stage of the process identifies
the countries where sustainable development is a concern. The
list of countries published on the DTI website is that of the
countries currently eligible for concessional loans from the World
Bank's International Development Association. The Committee would
also appreciate an explanation of whether there is scope within
the procedures to consider sustainable developments as an issue
not only for the very poorest countries, but also whether levels
of military spending are proportionately high to per capita
income and social expenditure.
The Secretary of State for Trade and Industry
has also outlined the indicators used to help assess whether a
particular proposed export ought to be refused on Criterion 8
grounds. The Committee would like to know whether thresholds have
been set or will be for these indicators, which if reached would
give rise to particular concern, and, if so, what these thresholds
are.
Criterion 8, like all of the other criteria,
applies to strategic exports to all countries. Those countries
eligible for concessional loans from the International Development
Association (IDA) have been identified as destinations where the
prevailing macro-economic and development conditions mean that
an export is most likely to trigger concern about economic impact
or sustainable development as defined in Criterion 8. It is therefore
in relation to these most vulnerable countries that ELAs are normally
circulated to DFID for advice against Criterion 8.
This does not represent an exhaustive list however.
At the request of DFID or any Government Department involved in
the licensing process, any ELA may be examined for its impact
on the economy or sustainable development of any recipient country
as defined in Criterion 8, should this be considered appropriate
in the light of the individual circumstances of that application.
The use of indicators is designed to help form
a judgement on how to advise on a licence application in each
case against Criterion 8. Indicative thresholds have been agreed
for some indicators, in order to make them more useful in coming
to a judgement. However, no number or combination of indicators,
or their degree, will predetermine the judgement in a particular
case. The Committee will understand that the sensitivity of these
thresholds means that they cannot be published.
CO -OPERATION
BETWEEN THE COMMITTEES
AND THE GOVERNMENT
In its response to the Committee's recommendation
(gg) (paragraph 171), the Government cites Lord Sainsbury of Turville,
who stated during Third Reading of the Export Control Bill that
"the Government will . . . continue to work with the Quadripartite
Committee to see whether we can take additional steps to achieve
greater accountability and transparency in the export licensing
process through greater co-operation with the Committee".
What is the Government's view as to how it can achieve greater
co-operation with the Committee?
The Committee will be aware that the Government
has offered in previous exchanges to provide confidential briefings
for the Committee. It continues to consider other possibilities
for improving co-operation. The Government would also be happy
to help avoid a repeat of recent misunderstandings over the resource
implications of dealing with questions from the Committee, to
offer a briefing and tour of the departments involved to the Clerk
and Members of the Committee.
TORTURE EQUIPMENT
Has the Government implemented the undertakings
about torture equipment given by Robin Cook? If so how?
As the then Foreign Secretary announced on 28
July 1997, Official Report, column 65W, there is a complete
ban on the export or transhipment from the UK of leg-irons, gang
chains and shackles and electric-shock belts designed for the
restraint of a human being. Also included in this export ban are
portable devices designed, or modified, for riot or control or
self-protection purposes, to administer an electric shock. This
includes electric-shock batons, electric-shock shields, stun guns
and tasers, and specially designed components for such devices.
The necessary amendment to the Export of Goods Control Order came
into force in December 1997. The export ban has a significant
economical effect on any British company manufacturing these torture
items for the purpose of sale. Since the relevant amendments to
the export Control Act, HM Customs and Excise have discovered
no evidence of attempts to illegally export instruments of torture
from the UK.
The number of Standard Individual Export Licence
(SIEL) applications and Open Individual Export Licence (OIEL)
applications that have been issued and refused are published in
the Government's Annual reports on Strategic Export Controls.
Having further considered the issue of the manufacture
of the specified items it has been decided that there would be
little reason to ban the manufacture or sale of equipment covered
by the ban. There is no market for leg-irons and shackles. British
police do not use them and their export is banned. Any misuse
would give rise to a separate offence such as assault. The acquisition,
purchase, possession, manufacture, sale and transfer of electric-shock
weapons is already regulated by the Firearms Act 1968, as amended.
20 February 2003
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