Select Committee on Defence Minutes of Evidence


Examination of Witnesses (Questions 100-104)

THURSDAY 20 MARCH 2003

SIR DAVID OMAND KCB AND MS SUSAN SCHOLEFIELD CMG

Chairman

  100. If the electricity is working.
  (Sir David Omand) Coming back to our basic message about "Go in, stay in, tune in", that is about the only simple advice we can give to people until there is information available to give them. You questioned me earlier about the range of circumstance that we might face. Hypothetically if we, for example, face a biological attack then that is something which will not be apparent at the moment of attack, it will only become apparent because of a pattern of reporting of cases through the medical system. If we take the circumstance, again hypothetical, of a serious chemical attack, it may be some time before the agent or agents involved can be identified and therefore the right advice given to the public as to what to do. I am very confident that we have well practised and rehearsed arrangements for informing and warning the public, but the key to it will be the early identification which will come from the first responders of the police and specialist services of exactly what we are dealing with and the judgments that will need to be made about how best to protect the public in those circumstances.

  Chairman: A brief question from Kevan.

Mr Jones

  101. Obviously one of the key things is that there is a difference between general awareness and, like you say, a specific attack which might take place in Central London—James' flat in Westminster—I think the radio is an under-valued tool in terms of the number of radios there are in people's houses as opposed to television sets. Have you looked, for example, at new technology and things like text messaging and also direct dialling phones where you can ring umpteen phone numbers in an area with a message on them? Have you explored technology like that?
  (Sir David Omand) Yes and we have had advice from the committee that was referred to earlier about ways in which we could do this. There are already operational systems like that in use between the police and commercial organisations, for example, in the City of London.

  Jim Knight: Flood Watch is very successful as a civil defence system.

  Chairman: We have ten minutes to go because there is a statement on events in Iraq. I am very interested and have been for a long time in the private security industry, not just Securicor but security managers, head of security, security directors. They complain bitterly that they are not getting the right information from government on the threats. What they need is, as one said to me, "to have the kind of information that I can relay very quickly to my facilities manager". Have you given any consideration to a conference session with representatives of security not just in the City of London, of which there are many, but within the industry that seems to be an untapped resource and now it is under the process of being licensed at long last, it will be a major asset. I know David Veness is keen to develop the private sector security. Two questions really to be answered later. Firstly, is have you got into a decent discussion not just with emergency planners but with the different sectors of the security industry because, frankly, they will be of enormous importance should there ever be a disaster. Secondly, have you consulted generally and would you look at ways of talking to the intelligence services and the police so that better information can be transmitted up and down the country to the professionals who are responsible for protecting their own property, which I think is really very, very important. If you would not mind, Sir David, could you drop me a note? Syd?[3]

Syd Rapson

  102. Just quickly on the national attack warning system, the previous report we had showed that the old system of warnings was taken down and dismantled and the new report recommends that we should not have a national siren system reintroduced because it is not necessary, but how do people know they have got to turn their TVs and radios on because they are not going on with it on all day listening to broadcasts? How do they know they are going to need to turn on the radio or TV or Ceefax to get the information unless there is some system of warning that can be given out?
  (Sir David Omand) I do not have a ready answer to that. My observation of the tragic events of 11 September was that it was astonishing how quickly everyone was watching the media and following events. The news of that spread like wildfire. Neighbours rang up and called on each other to say, "Have you seen what is happening?" The ability of the bush telegraph to transmit that kind of message is very powerful. I do take the thrust of your question that we need to continue to work on this question of alerting the public to something that may be happening or has happened so that we can then get specific warning information to them. We will continue to work away on that.

  103. Eleventh September was a very visible thing and people could see it. If there were a release of chemical agents in a subway perhaps in central London people would not see that as such. It could be quite a serious situation before anyone realised.

Sir David Omand) I think if we are in this area of terrorism then there will be the national interest as well as specific local concerns. The local media, particularly local radio, is a very powerful means of giving information, but I would not under-estimate the national interest which there is, as we have seen when we have taken various precautionary measures here in London. It certainly hits the headlines.

  104. You mentioned that the colour-coded system that we have in government departments is not going to be used for the general public. Why? Why can the public not be informed if in various places, there is a Bikini Amber alert in Tesco's and we should be aware of what that means?
  (Sir David Omand) The system we have in government buildings' for colour-coding has very specific meanings which are understood by the security staff and by those who work in those buildings so that if that alert state changes then everybody knows exactly what to do and that is in the confines of a single building. It is harder to see how you could extend that to a big area, let alone at a national level when the range of circumstances could be so great. My judgment is to keep that form of specific alerting for very limited areas where everyone involved can be trained. If you were to take a major retailer or a public utility you would find they do have graduated alert states but they have chosen the levels to suit their particular circumstances so they would know when to evacuate the store or move people out of the car park or whatever. I am hesitant about trying to generalise that across the country.

  Chairman: Thank you so very much. Before you leave perhaps I can ask your Department to clarify some of the figures—I know they were listening frantically without complete success—if you would not mind. Thank you very much for coming. I understand we are in negotiation over our visit to see your place. I hope we will be able to visit London Resilience and we appreciate what you have said to us, so thank you very much.





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