Select Committee on Defence Minutes of Evidence


Examination of Witnesses (Questions 200-219)

WEDNESDAY 26 MARCH 2003

MR ROGER CHING, MS SHEILA CLARK, CAPTAIN MARTIN PUTMAN, CHIEF CONSTABLE PAUL KERNAGHAN QPM, MR RICHARD MAWSON, COMMODORE AMJAD HUSSAIN, MR MALCOLM EASTWOOD AND MAJOR SIMON ANDREWS

  200. How well equipped are you for communicating with each other? We in our report referred to communications equipment that I think the Fire Service wanted to opt out of. When is this kit going to come in and are you going to communicate across and down in any way that you think you will be required to do?
  (Mr Eastwood) That is a very good question in respect of the communications element. We fought for a long time to get funding. The Police did receive funding from central government in respect of the Airwave project. There was no indication we were going to get funding and we pushed it through our professional body. We are still awaiting confirmation in respect of that. You must be aware that the Police have taken on board Airwave and it is an out-to-tender situation and Airwave may or may not win the tender. We will wait and see. There will be a communications aspect in the specification where we have got inter-operability, a term I am sure you are very aware of in terms of your previous inquiry. There is more need for fire-fire and police-police communication than for me to be able to talk to individual colleagues. If we want to do that we get together round the Gold, Silver and Bronze Commander type environment. I am quite convinced that the communications network will be in place.

  201. If the MoD offer you surplus Clansman kits, please decline.
  (Commodore Hussain) That is a tad unkind, Chairman.

Patrick Mercer

  202. We have touched on this already to a certain extent but if an emergency of a sufficient scale comes upon you, where are your reinforcements going to come from and how are you going to deal with it?
  (Mr Kernaghan) Let's pick Portsmouth for example, initially, depending on the scale, I would mutually reinforce Portsmouth from the Greater Hampshire Constabulary family. At a certain tier of response or because of limited capability for CBRN, I would then go to my colleagues initially in surrounding counties and then there would be a ripple effect and theoretically, I stress the theory, I could see people from Strathclyde reporting for duty in Portsmouth if we were dealing with that level of disaster or emergency. In essence, you look after it and you get a better grip on the situation, you go to mutual aid and we are geared up, Richard made the point, and we have standardised equipment in terms of the police as well for chemical and biological so every force has a capability of be it one, two or three police support units. I would simply task them and they would be despatched down here to assist my officers in dealing with the problem.

  203. In this emergency and assuming you can get all of your trained personnel, and I appreciate some will be on leave, how many CBRN trained officers can you put on the spot in short order from within your own command?
  (Mr Kernaghan) Let's be realistic and honest, it would take me six hours and I would have a maximum of 50 officers and that is my capability, that is it. I will defer to other people more qualified than I am, and you may have that knowledge yourself, but there is a limit to the amount of work people can do in full personal protective equipment. When my 40 or 50 officers have done their term of duty there is not another group of Hampshire officers to replace them. I would have to look to mutual aid. It really does reduce their capability.

  204. Can I ask the same question of Mr Eastwood.
  (Mr Eastwood) The same thing, we have a cascade arrangement nationally where we can bring resources in from anywhere in the country. In respect of the resources we have got trained, the majority of our personnel are trained in civil defence aspects. You have got people going forward dealing with the actual incident themselves and you have got people working at the tactical and strategic level. You have a sliding scale in respect of numbers of them. As Paul said, once you have exhausted your own people, which you do very quickly you are then looking for capacity from other organisations working to you.

  205. The same question, assuming all is well—there no strikes on, people are not on leave or sick—how many bodies can you put on the problem in their kit?
  (Mr Eastwood) In their kit? Looking in terms of the kit and equipment, we have got 60 gas-tight suits and chemical protection suits on top of that and as far as specialist personnel go we have sufficient Gold and Silver commanders to keep a rolling brief in respect of that and also at tactical level sufficient officers for command. Like I said before, we can draw in very, very quickly, we are that sort of organisation.

  206. My recollection, having gone through this with Nottinghamshire Fire Service, is depending on the conditions in which you are operating you have got about 45 minutes of air; is that right?
  (Mr Eastwood) About that. 45 minutes of air but 20 minutes' duration depending on the ambient temperatures and the effect on the individual inside the suit.

  207. This is not a criticism but they can only operate for a very short period before you need reinforcements.
  (Mr Eastwood) No, you replenish, turnover, you carry sufficient spare cylinders. It depends on how physically exhausted people get. In general terms it depends whether they are handling people or excavating to get to people. After 20 minutes you replenish and replace.

  208. Turning to 145 Brigade, I do not know if there is a spokesman from the brigade here, what discussions have you had with the Commander of 145 Brigade about this sort of emergency?
  (Mr Kernaghan) The Commander of 145 Brigade is Brigadier Richard Morris based at Aldershot, I have a close working relationship with Richard Morris probably facilitated by cross-training in the past in other guises. He was very much involved in our multi-agency exercise in February. He is bringing on line the Civil Contingency Reaction Force concept, building up their ability to go live, etc. He has taken proactive action to engage myself and other chief constables to get support for his own training exercise. He wants to cross-train so my junior commanders are working with his personnel and vice versa. The 145 Home Counties Brigade and Hampshire Constabulary have a very positive working relationship even at this early stage.

  209. Have the other agencies been in consultation with the Brigade Commander?
  (Mr Eastwood) For the obvious reasons that have been alluded to already through the industrial dispute we work in very close liaison.

  210. On the CBRN side, on the civil emergency side you have been in constant contact?
  (Mr Eastwood) Not constant, frequent.

  211. May I turn to the Brigade.
  (Major Andrews) I am Simon Andrews, Chief of Staff of 145 Brigade. I speak on behalf of my Brigade Commander, I have been selected as the regional liaison officer. With regard to CBRN the direction has only just come down from MO2 via land with regard to the operating environment that servicemen will be involved in in conjunction with the police and fire services. I do not know if you are acquainted with the concept of the hot, the warm and the cold CBRN environment, but servicemen would be able to work within the cold and warm environments with operational IPE. The operational capability has been delivered as of Monday and it is delivered on a divisional basis. There are within the United Kingdom three regional divisions, the Fourth Division covering effectively the South East over to East Anglia, the Second Division, which covers beyond to the north of East Anglia up to and including Scotland, and the Fifth Division which includes the North West moving down through Wales into the South West of the United Kingdom. The fourth division therefore has its central location in the siting of individual protection equipment based in Reading which is central to the divisional area and is controlled by a territorial unit which we command which is in our particular case the focus, the core for our Civil Contingency Reaction Force. There are 500 sets of individual protection equipment. There is redundancy within those amounts—

  212. May I interrupt, 500 sets for your brigade?
  (Major Andrews) No sir, for the division, held by the regional division for whatever forces are allocated by MO2 to react to a MACC or MACP event. It may be regular forces who are assigned and therefore as a consequence those regular forces may get that operational equipment, bearing in mind that regular troops do not hold operational IPE as a norm. Your comment about your respirator being in your loft—

  213. Not my loft.
  (Major Andrews) In your ready room at home, your canister of course is not operational. Your respirator might be but your canister is not up-to-date. You would be issued that as you were mobilised.

  214. Could I finish, Chairman, how are you getting on with the Civil Contingency Reaction Force? How close to readiness is it?
  (Major Andrews) It reached the designated initial operational capability at 31 December last year. An element of command and control has been put in place. We had identified some elements of not just the infantry and the Territorial core unit but the other reserve forces that are going to reinforce it and provide the maximum numbers as far as the capability goes, so we have achieved that and that pretty much nationally was the case. We are required to achieve what is called a full operational capability by 31 December this year. If necessary I can give you those details as to what that represents.

  215. Is it fully recruited?
  (Major Andrews) No sir, the aspiration is that each of the Civil Contingency Reaction Forces would be 500 personnel. That is entirely dependent on the regional brigade and the number of reserve forces within that regional brigade. We at our estimate at the moment would say 300.

  216. When do you reckon to be fully operationally ready?
  (Major Andrews) 31 December 2003 is our fully operational capability due date.

Mr Hancock

  217. When we were taking evidence on this, the Minister gave us an assurance, I think it was him or your boss, suggesting that the 500 people would not be predominantly Territorials.
  (Major Andrews) They will be a mixture of all reserve forces. The Civil Contingency Reaction Force will be based around the corps of a TA infantry battalion and therefore it is likely that the TA will provide most of the numbers because it is simple to do so. However, it was never the aspiration that the Civil Contingency Reaction Force was going to be entirely formed from Territorial Army troops, whether infantry battalion, royal electrical or mechanical engineers or anybody else. It was always the aspiration that it should be comes from the reserve forces, the Royal Auxiliary Air Force, the Royal Naval Reserve, the Royal Marines Reserve.

  218. Is it satisfactory that the kit should held by the Territorial Army at Reading?
  (Major Andrews) The reason for that, sir, is the United Kingdom Commander-in-Chief Committee (Home) that is effectively Commander-in-Chief (Land) has been designated as the focal point for the armed forces for what we call integrated contingency planning, consequent management tasks if you like, and he is the focal point for that and he has designated that the Army's regional chain of command, that is the regional division—Fourth, Second and Fifth Divisions and the regional brigades, of which mine is one of three within the Fourth Division, are responsible for the focus for integrated contingency planning within the United Kingdom for the armed forces and consequently we as regional brigades and regional forces support the civil authority whoever the lead civil authority is.

  219. What is the target call-out time then from a decision being made for that kit to be released into wider use? What is the target?
  (Major Andrews) I think there were two questions there, the first with regard to the ability of the Civil Contingency Reaction Force to react, the anticipated timescale. Although we have yet to prove it (some other divisions have exercised this already), it is six hours for what is called the reconnaissance group, that is the commanding officers and his company commanders, to assess the task and think through the planning prior to issuing orders to troops, and it is anticipated that in 12 hours we would hope at least 100 people would be available.

  Patrick Mercer: Is that six plus 12?

  Chairman: Sorry to interrupt but perhaps you could write to us on these figures.


 
previous page contents next page

House of Commons home page Parliament home page House of Lords home page search page enquiries index

© Parliamentary copyright 2003
Prepared 10 July 2003