Examination of Witnesses (Questions 220-228)
WEDNESDAY 26 MARCH 2003
MR ROGER
CHING, MS
SHEILA CLARK,
CAPTAIN MARTIN
PUTMAN, CHIEF
CONSTABLE PAUL
KERNAGHAN QPM, MR
RICHARD MAWSON,
COMMODORE AMJAD
HUSSAIN, MR
MALCOLM EASTWOOD
AND MAJOR
SIMON ANDREWS
Patrick Mercer
220. Could I turn now to the naval base, Commodore,
on what occasions has assistance from the naval base been required
under MACP please?
(Commodore Hussain) It was before my time but the
major fire at Farlington, the fuel crisis, a flooding. I cannot
be specific whether there was a formal approach right through
the chain but I know this support has been provided. The Wester
Till cargo ship, an unexploded bomb in the naval base where there
was co-ordination, and of course the Fire Brigades Union action
itself.
221. It is interesting that with so much NBC
expertise inside your base that none of that seems to be motivated
or trained towards assistance for this type of incident. Has any
thought been given to that?
(Commodore Hussain) This is an issue where 145 Brigade
should be aware of our capabilities. One must differentiate between
the capabilities contained within ships which are usually not
there and targeted at protecting the ship. Clearly there are some
specialties there but they are not designed necessarily for civil
contingency work and our focus which is on internally on the nuclear
spill incident so they are not ideal capabilities. We could certainly
be trained and provide additional support but that is an approach
that 145 Brigade I think would be the key to deciding on how they
wanted to deliver that and why would Portsmouth be different from
the rest of the area. They have taken the approach to centralise
this on a regional basis.
222. I am disturbed by your statement earlier
on about the fact you perceive there is no threat and therefore
you have left your respirator in the loft. It strikes me that
you command a substantial amount of expertise which could be used
and with some imagination the training could be motivated in such
a way to assist. We have been told there are 50 policemen and
60 firemen as our best case for an area—unless I am on a
different planet from you—that must be a primary target
for a terrorist threat. What is your thinking behind that?
(Commodore Hussain) Let me take your first point.
It was a foolish throw away remark in hindsight not but for the
reason I think you would argue. Whilst the respirator might be
in the date, the canister is not. Whilst I may have been trained
personally, to wander around the naval base personally protected
whilst all my civilian workers, thousands of them, are not, would
be pretty perverse. Unless I have a formal role in protecting
the community in that way it would be pointless for me to look
at my own personal protection without looking at the personal
protection of the many thousands around me. Let us please dispense
with that. Secondly, the threat. We have concentrated locally
with considerable effort and resource and centrally with resource
being taken from other issues to protect against the risk of an
incident, and I think that is where my foremost attention has
been applied. I do not wish to sound cavalier about post incident
action. But when it comes into considering how we deter the threat,
I think I have a very valuable role in that and we have been exercising
that role particularly in the management of the waterway where
responsibility falls to the Queen's Harbour Master. I do not think
anybody who has been involved in the harbour area would say we
have not forcefully taken that role on and formed committees and
worked with agencies to make sure we have significantly reduced
the risk of Portsmouth being targeted and being the subject of
the sort of incident we have in mind. When it then comes to dealing
with an incident that primarily rests with my colleague Mr Kernaghan
as the Chief Constable and on the resources they wish to draw
and then through 145 Brigade. Should 145 Brigade conclude that
naval resource amongst all the resources they have in their area
would be the one they would choose to be trained they would direct
us to be so and we would prepare more fully to do that, I think.
223. Do you have a disaster relief capability?
(Commodore Hussain) We have capability just by virtue
of being military that could be brought to bear. We also engage
in exercises on disasters within the Solent area. We have Solfire
and there are well rehearsed plans and for instance should there
be an incident on waterway then we do have capabilities to deal
with that.
224. My understanding is that each ship has
a disaster capability and exercises it from time to time.
(Commodore Hussain) Yes, that is true and certainly
if one were to do hurricane relief or bridge building, each and
every ship has its capability. When it is parked alongside in
Portsmouth, it may not have that full capability, it may not have
all that equipment. If it were deployed to a region at a time
when we expected a hurricane disaster we would supplement that
ship and make sure it was equipped.
225. When they are there for a long time are
they keyed into the overall effort you might be able to offer?
(Commodore Hussain) We know that they are there and
we would make those resources available. We have a complex hierarchy
of allocating resources through Director of military operations
in London, and he knows what is available and he allocates resources
to the brigade. Yes, those resources are known but I do not personally
allocate them.
226. How is seaward responsibility for security
of the naval base and the ferry and cargo port co-ordinated?
(Commodore Hussain) Through the Port Security Committee
on which all the local players are involved the ferry companies
are involved, the Commercial Port Harbour Master is involved,
and we look at security as an issue. We have a range of improvements
that we are making or have made and we continue to address that
in a co-ordinated form through the committee.
Chairman: Mr Hancock will ask the last
question and we will disappear in three minutes.
Mr Hancock
227. My last question relates to how you would
inform the public of a major terrorist alert and how that would
be co-ordinated and what would be the method for each of you to
deal with that.
(Mr Kernaghan) We use the phrase terrorist alert.
If there were a terrorist incident obviously we do generally for
alerts or a heightened period of tension, that would be using
the Home Secretary or the appropriate Chief Constable to issue
something to the wider community. If you had an incident, you
are right, the key is to retain public confidence so they know
in the immediate area we have plans to look after them and if
they are not involved they have confidence that the state is protecting
them. We would set up a fairly well-staffed media operation looking
very much to the commercial media, the print media, and particularly
the electronic media to get the messages we would want over to
the wider community. That would also be in liaison with our colleagues.
Again we exercised that in February. If it is a health issue I
do not believe it is very reassuring if somebody wearing this
uniform tells you, so we would be very much looking to our colleagues
from the Health Service. I have to emphasis that one of the key
planning and strategy roles for any senior commander is to retain
public confidence and provide appropriate information to you.
Mr Cran
228. The question is how would you communicate
to the wider community? It may be you would have to do it very
speedily indeed. How would you do that?
(Mr Kernaghan) At the crudest level it might well
be—and I am not going to expose my officers to unacceptable
risk—a police car with a loud speaker system advising people
to move away from the area. It could be an officer saying, "Do
not go into that shopping centre, we believe there is a device
there." That would, depending on the scale, ramp up. You
are quite right, it would take time but we would go to the media.
It starts off, as it always does, with individual officers deciding
there is a threat and he or she telling the wider community to
move away and we would upgrade it as time went on.
(Mr Ching) We have the document Media Civil Emergency
Planning and we will send you a copy of that.
Chairman: Thank you so very much. If the media
were present they might have believed you that the increase was
devoted exclusively to our modest but very good repast and it
would be distorted and used against both you and ourselves. Thank
you so very much for coming to us at very short notice, and to
the City of Portsmouth for making the arrangements. Please do
not think your responsibilities have ended because I would like
to write to you perhaps seeking a memorandum of some form if you
would not mind. If there is anything you would not like printed
indicate it to us. If there is any documentation you have in furtherance
of support for what you have said, any documentation you feel
we ought to be looking at, then we would gratefully receive it.
Thank you so very much for talking to us.
| 
