Examination of Witnesses (Questions 320-337)
WEDNESDAY 2 APRIL 2003
RT HON
NICK RAYNSFORD
MP, ASSISTANT COMMISSIONER
DAVID VENESS
CBE QPM AND MR
ZYG KOWALCZYK
Jim Knight
320. I assume that works in reverse, that the
outcome of the various capital exercises goes out to others?
(Mr Veness) Yes.
321. I just want to touch on international arrangements.
Yesterday we had the UK/US Tom Ridge, David Blunkett press conference
and meeting to tell the world about the extent of co-operation
between those two nations and allies. What does that bilateral
agreement mean in practice for us and what strengths have we got
that the Americans are looking to learn from and vice versa?
(Mr Veness) I have not as yet the seen the detail
of that document so it would be inappropriate to comment precisely.
In terms of the generality, I think one of the key lessons of
the last 18 and a half months has been the necessity for us to
drill deep in terms of international co-operation. It has always
been desirable and it has always been the most effective means
of operation but there is not a single counter-terrorist line
of enquiry relevant to the threat of international terrorism in
the United Kingdom that does not have a dimension outwith the
United Kingdom, and therefore the need for us to be working in
a much more detailed way, particularly with European neighbours,
is absolutely critical. It is in a way and requiring a degree
of disclosure and candour that is of a different scale than has
existed before. In relation to our American linkages on counter-terrorism,
they are amongst the closest and there is a very significant degree
to which the British experience of counter-terrorist development,
not all of which translates into the post 11 September era, is
of value for our colleagues in the United States. We have got
a great deal to learn from them because their endeavours and investment
in home land security, particularly the scale of resource they
have devoted to that, has some obvious benefits for the United
Kingdom.
322. Do you think, Mr Veness, it is appropriate
for us to focus on a bilateral partnership (as was done yesterday)
as opposed to a multi-lateral one with Europe? You have just mentioned
the importance of arrangements with Europe.
(Mr Veness) We have got to do both. If you want the
benefits on a case-by-case basis of the real detail of knowing
what you are discovering in a flat in Paris or Madrid, in reality
you will only achieve that through effective bilateral development.
That is absolutely critical. However, there are broad areas of
development where the multi-lateral arena is an effective way
ahead. You have got to be multi- faceted in the advance you are
making on this.
323. I appreciate that I bounced you into this
because it is current but one of the things which was talked about
yesterday was joint exercising. Can you enlighten us any further
on that and then in general terms on any joint exercises that
you may have done internationally?
(Mr Veness) By definition there are issues relating
to the United Kingdom where there are very obvious vulnerabilities
which would involve us in an international dimension. The Channel
Tunnel is the classic example where it would have been foolhardy
for us not to have addressed those issues. There are a variety
of others—aircraft hijack, maritime hijack, indeed international
terrorist financing where there have been endeavours and indeed
continuing mutual exercise possibilities. If one of the products—and
as I say I am not aware of the details of this agreement—is
the opportunity to do that on a more sophisticated level that
would be much welcomed.
324. So sophisticated international exercising
has yet to take place?
(Mr Veness) I think that is an accurate statement.
It has been focused on particular challenges and dealt with particular
themes but bringing that together across international borders
is a real opportunity.
Syd Rapson
325. Could I ask about the stocks of personal
protective equipment, how much of it you have and in which emergency
service would it be housed?
(Mr Raynsford) All the emergency services have stocks
of protective equipment. I mentioned earlier the Fire Service
have a substantial amount of gas-tight suits but we are augmenting
those and a further 4,000 are being procured nationally, a substantial
proportion of which will be available in London. The Health Service
have also procured protective equipment and the Police Service
have operational equipment for personal protection in similar
circumstances, so all the emergency services have PPE. The review
which we conducted a while ago indicated the need for a substantial
increase in the number of kits available particularly for the
Fire Service and those are being procured and we will go on reviewing
the appropriateness of that kit to ensure that the emergency services
have got the means to do their job and be protected against the
kind of eventualities that might arise.
326. You use the word "substantial".
It is always a bit of loose word to say you have got substantial
stocks, but have you got enough now? Clearly if you are increasing
the numbers coming on-stream you have not got enough and you need
more. Is there a great difference between what you have got and
what you really need?
(Mr Raynsford) At the moment every single one of London's
170 fire engines carries two gas-tight suits. There is an additional
stock of 260 gas-tight suits held centrally. Mr Kowalczyk can
confirm that is right. We are procuring at least another 400 in
the immediate future. That is the scale so it is a significant
addition but it is not from a low base, there is already a good
supply.
327. If there is an incident there is a zone
around the incident called the hot zone and then there is a warm
area around that and a cold area further on. At the moment it
is only the Fire Service that is allowed to operate in the hot
zone. Have you planned for other emergency services to be able
to do that, the Police and Ambulance, for example, to work in
the hot zone?
(Mr Raynsford) The operational protocol between the
emergency services is designed to ensure that there is the best
possible working relationship between them and one of the things
that we have been particularly keen to do is to ensure that the
Fire Service have got the means to operate more effectively in
the hot zone. There are certain restrictions on the use of personal
protective kit. It is heavy, the breathing apparatus does not
allow very long periods of operation and we are looking closely
at ways in which that can be enhanced and improved and the approach
will continue to be one that is designed to use the particular
expertise of the particular emergency services within the right
context. So the answer to your question is if there were a need
for other emergency services to be trained to operate within the
hot zone and to be equipped to operate within the hot zone then
that would be done, but for the moment we believe the right arrangement
is in place to ensure the balance between the work of the respective
services. David Veness might wish to add.
(Mr Veness) There are certain experts who are necessary,
for example bomb disposal officers, who require that same facility
to enter the hot zone. We are certainly reviewing critically because
the critical distinction is between the contained extended breathing
apparatus as worn by Fire Service colleagues and effectively what
is battle field protection kit that will be worn by a police officer
or a colleague from the Ambulance Service. There may well be,
and we are looking at those eventualities, occasions where the
skills of other parts of the emergency services may be necessary
in the hot zone and we are reviewing that critically.
328. It is being reviewed in the future. Could
I talk about the decontamination units you have. How many have
you got as opposed to PPE?
(Mr Raynsford) There is a facility for decontamination
both within the National Health Service and using existing fire
equipment but there are serious deficiencies in that. In the first
place in the case of fire equipment it would use cold water and
that could be particularly problematic at a very cold time of
the year, so we are seeking in the short-term to remedy that by
the procurement of water heaters that can be used, but the longer-term
solution is the procurement which is very much in train at the
moment and will come on stream over the next few months of much
more sophisticated equipment which will allow people to be decontaminated
in a discrete way within an environment which is much more satisfactory
than the ad hoc arrangement to which I was referring.
329. Can I go on to biological attacks. There
is a real problem of identifying the pattern of disease which
might be the result of a biological attack. You have got to read
into what has happened to find out what particular disease it
could be. We have recently been given an information sheet from
the Public Health Laboratory about the latest disease—Severe
Acute Respiratory Syndrome—which is not a biological attack
but it is something which is in the minds of people. The information
sheet from the government is clearly wrong. It has been changed
dramatically in recent days. The spread of the disease is jumping
from floor to floor in buildings as opposed to close personal
contact. One wonders how you can prevent or be prepared for a
biological attack based upon the pattern of movement it has to
identify it when the information we are getting from the main
source is incorrect to start with?
(Mr Raynsford) I am a lay person and I am obviously
not qualified to comment on some of those technical issues. What
I can say is that the key challenges in the case of a biological
attack would be, firstly, identification and, secondly, ensuring
an appropriate response. We are doing a lot of work to ensure
that we are better prepared to identify as quickly as possible
items that might pose a threat. This will usually depend on specialist
advice, whether from Porton Down or elsewhere, and will also require
a medical response through the National Health Service to enable
people to be treated in the most appropriate way. That is the
basic principle on which our arrangements depend but obviously
the response in a particular incident depends entirely on the
type of threat that might be posed.
330. I know it is frightening and we do not
want to scare the public as such but the spread in the phenomenon
before you can identify what it is, how do you try and contain
the spread of a disease without knowing what the pattern is? It
is a reactive thing. Can you prevent the spread of the disease
or only react after it has spread?
(Mr Raynsford) I think the key challenge, as I have
already mentioned, is to ensure the earliest possible identification
so that appropriate responses can be put in place. As I said,
we have been doing a lot of work to try and ensure that we are
able to get the quickest possible analysis of any substances found
that might constitute a particular biological threat.
331. What agents have you taken particular steps
to identify to tackle in London? What particular agents have you
looked at?
(Mr Raynsford) I do not think it would be appropriate
to give that sort of detail.
332. That is okay.
(Mr Raynsford) I am happy to write privately to the
Committee.
Chairman: We understand fully.[6]
Syd Rapson: That is fine.
Chairman: Just a few more questions now.
David Crausby?
Mr Crausby
333. Some specific questions on the radiological
threat and perhaps you might wish to write to us on that. First
of all, a dirty bomb, I guess, could be initially seen as a conventional
terrorist attack, so how quickly would you determine whether an
explosion in London contained radiological material?
(Mr Raynsford) This again is the same principle as
I was describing in response to Mr Rapson's question, the key
is early identification. There are various steps in train to ensure
that we do improve the existing arrangements for testing both
air quality and the nature of the environment in particular cases.
That will help us to identify at an early stage the nature of
the threat that is posed, then clearly there are a range of possible
responses. In the event of a serious radiological or nuclear threat
then the issues of mass evacuation become very relevant indeed
and I have described what steps we have put in place to ensure
that we are able, if necessary, to do that. It is a very extreme
response and there are some very unhappy consequences obviously,
but all of those need to be considered.
334. We heard in Portsmouth last week that the
Navy carry out checks on submarines for leaks. The officer made
it clear to us that whilst the risk might be very low the consequences
were very high and for that reason they kept a full stock of antidotes.
I guess that is not possible for a city the size of London so
what stocks of antidote are held in London? Again, you may wish
to write to us.
(Mr Raynsford) Could I write to you on that[7]
335. Just finally, Chairman, and I am sure you
will want to write to us on this one, what classes of potential
radiological sources are there in London? What precautions have
been taken to prevent them falling into the wrong hands?
(Mr Raynsford) Again, if you do not mind, I would
prefer to write.[8]
Mr Howarth
336. Can I just ask you, Minister, to sum up
and tell us where you think we are at now. You have talked a lot
about the committees, sub-committees, working groups and seminars
and all the rest of it. Given that our report last year suggested
that really there was a long way to go before we were in a position
to deal with the threat of an attack on London, if there were
such an attack today how would you sum up your ability on the
basis of the progress made so far to meet that threat?
(Mr Raynsford) A great deal obviously would depend
on the nature of the threat itself but what I can say as a general
comment is that London is certainly significantly better prepared
than it was 18 months ago to cope with a very wide range of incidents,
including catastrophic incidents, on a scale far greater than
we were previously equipped to respond. The involvement of a very
wide range of agencies, which we have talked about in the course
of this afternoon's discussion, has in my view greatly reinforced
London's resilience and will make it possible to cope with a much
more serious range of possibilities than we would have been able
to cope with 18 months ago. Obviously I cannot give you a guarantee
that London will cope in any situation, that would be very foolish
indeed. All I can say is that we have made significant progress
and we will go on doing so because this structure, although it
may sound complex, has got a strong focus on results. This is
not a bureaucratic structure, this is a structure designed to
bring together all the people who need to be involved with a strong
focus on getting action and putting in place preventative arrangements
that hopefully will cope with the kind of situation with which
we might have to deal. I think we are better equipped to do that
than we were but we will need to go on very, very carefully checking,
double checking, taking remedial action, involving all those who
need to be involved, and that is on-going work.
337. In terms of the gaps, and I pick up specifically
on the decontamination unit which you mentioned which is a rather
Heath Robinson arrangement available at the moment, when we were
in New York outside the United Nations we saw the sophisticated
facilities they had there. You are suggesting that will be put
right within a matter of months. In terms of the gaps like that
would you say that it is a matter of months away for securing
most of them?
(Mr Raynsford) For most of them. There will be some
that will inevitably take longer. We have talked about the communications
issue and we will need to go on working on that to get nearer
to the 100% coverage that we want to achieve. What we have done
so far has ensured that there is a range of different media in
play which will ensure much more effective communication than
the era of the air-raid warning siren which was the response of
our grandparents to a similar threat 60 or 70 years ago. We are
fine-tuning our responses, we are trying to make them more thorough,
but we are going to have to go on doing this and in some cases
it will go far beyond the next few months.
Chairman: Thank you. Gerald's question
to you reminded me, having been to a dinner last night and seen
a portrait of Lord St Vincent, Staffordshire's most famous sailor,
when asked in the House of Lords: "Can the French invade?"
he replied, "My Lords, I do not say they cannot come; I only
say they cannot come by sea." That was quite an open answer,
shrewdly expressed. We fully appreciate that you cannot give a
definitive response that would give absolute assurance to London's
citizens or the country's citizens, but I think you have done
a great deal this afternoon to give an assurance that we are better
placed that we were and we hope we never find out how much better
placed we are now than we were. Thank you very much to you all.
You have spent a lot of time with us and we appreciate it.
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