Letter from Rt Hon Nick Raynsford MP to
the Clerk of the Committee (11 June 2003)
I hope the Committee will find the attached
information, in response to the five points set out in your letter,
helpful.
The Security Service Review includes details
of the more likely biological agents that may be employed as part
of a terrorist attack. Identification of specific agents will
depend upon the current assessment, but it would focus on those
that are relatively easy to manufacture or obtain, and dispersal
would not be problematic.
Biological agent identification and monitoring
is technically more difficult when compared to processes employed
for chemical or radiological detection, resulting in a greater
percentage of false positives and false negatives, and a time
delay in obtaining data because results have to be confirmed by
laboratory analysis.
There are two systems currently under evaluation
by PSDB and DSTL which will test for a range of agents including
anthrax, ricin, tularaemia, botulinum toxin, plague and SEB. User
handling trials are being undertaken by British Transport Police,
City of London Police, and the Metropolitan Police Force, with
the outcome expected by the end of June.
Detection of a possible biological release in
London will, without specific information, largely depend upon
information from recognition of symptoms within the NHS and from
health surveillance systems being passed to the Anti Terrorist
Branch at New Scotland Yard.
The London Fire Brigade has responsibility for
maintaining a database of the full range of radiological sources
throughout London. Processes are being developed to ensure those
locations have a heightened level of security, and theft or loss
is immediately communicated to the relevant agencies.
Event specific profiling is undertaken as part
of the generic security assessment package dictated by the threat
and risk to those occasions, by utilising specialist resources
from AWE there is a capability across the full range of emissions.
There are standby response procedures in place to support appropriate
events, and standard operating practices to enable detection of
radioactive material following an explosion.
Department of Health hold stockpiles of potassium
iodide tablets to counteract the effects of radioactive iodine.
Hospitals are equipped to deal with casualties from a radiological
exposure.
Annex B
London Resilience Forum—Terms of
Reference & Achievements
LONDON RESILIENCE
FORUM
Terms of reference
The London Resilience Forum will provide a senior
level central focus for co-ordinated and effective emergency planning
in London, bringing together national government, the Mayor, and
London's emergency services, other key public services and business
community. The London Resilience Forum will form an overarching
steering group and provide practical supervision and strategic
guidance to London's emergency planning. Its role will include
the supervision and regular scrutiny of:
— Major threats to safety and public
order;
— London's security preparations;
— London's preparedness to respond
to major disasters,
— Strategic emergency planning for
London;
— A generic pan-London emergency response
plan;
— Command, control and inter-agency
communication;
— Fall-back and consequence management
arrangements;
— Inter-community relations;
— Capacity to respond to threats and
resource issues;
— Communication with the media.
Key achievements
1. Pan-London Strategic Emergency Planning
Regime: One of the strongest messages from the LRT review
was the need for an overarching strategic emergency planning role
to support the planning of the London Boroughs and other key agencies
by co-ordinating their roles, responsibilities and capacities.
A pan-London strategic emergency planning regime
was established in May 2002 with the inaugural meeting of the
London Resilience Forum, chaired by Nick Raynsford with the Mayor
as deputy chair and high level representatives of London's emergency
services and other key organisations. Of particular significance
is the formal inclusion for the first time of London's health
services, utility companies, transport operators and business
community in London-wide emergency planning, which had previously
been fragmented and focussed on the emergency services and local
authorities.
2. Development of catastrophic incident
command and control structures: The overall conclusion of
the LRT report was that London's command, control and communications
arrangements were well tried and tested for major incidents, but
that a step change was required if London were to be as well prepared
as possible to deal effectively with a catastrophic incident.
A new command, control and communication structure
has been developed to include all key agencies. It builds on the
existing command structure for a major incident, as set out in
the LESLP manual, which would initially focus on the emergency
services, drawing representatives of other agencies as appropriate.
The catastrophic incident command and control structure recognises
the involvement of a wide range of agencies would be required
in managing the consequences of the incident, and looks to pull
in representatives of all those agencies at an early stage.
The protocol, was put to the test and is now
being reviewed in the light of Exercise Capital Focus, which took
place on 8 March 2003, and will be revised accordingly.
3. Pan London Exercises: A theme
running through much of the 2002 LRT report was the need for exercises,
especially at a London wide level. The testing of roles, response
plans and the links between organisations was identified as key
to the successful delivery of resilience in the capital. Considerable
progress has been made in this area.
Three major pan-London exercises of the developing
command and control structures have taken place. Two tabletops
in 2002 (Exercises Capital Spring and Capital Response) were followed
by a command post exercise in March 2003 (Exercise Capital Focus),
which aimed to test not only the functioning of the Gold Co-ordinating
Group but also the functioning of Government situation monitoring
and decision making through COBR and the relationship between
the two. Lessons from the exercise are currently being drawn out
and the command and control structure will be revised as appropriate.
A series of multi agency exercises is also taking
place in London to test specific elements of the co-ordinated
response to a CBRN incident. This includes two live training exercises
to check emergency services interaction of personnel and equipment,
including mass decontamination (in May and August 2002) and a
tabletop exercise in November 2002, looking specifically at emergency
services response and information flow to government, in the event
of a CBRN incident on the London Underground. A live exercise
to test rescue from the tube in the event of a chemical attack
was planned for 23 March 2003, but had to be postponed as a result
of the international situation. The exercise is being rescheduled
for later this year.
4. Local Government Gold: Widespread
concern was expressed in the LRT report, not least by the London
Boroughs themselves, about their capacity to respond in a corporate
way to a London-wide situation and their linkages into London
command, control and communication systems. It was recommended
that a chief executive should be nominated to be present at the
command and control centre and empowered to speak for all the
Boroughs and direct their support in a pan-London way ("Local
Authority Gold").
Significant progress has been made on this issue.
"Local Government Gold" is up and running, with six
chief executives (including one from each of the fie mutual aid
areas) discharging this role on a rota basis. Work is underway
to consolidate this function, to ensure resilience in the appropriate
support arrangements and to promulgate the role across London's
Local Authorities.
5. Evacuation framework: A generic
operational framework for the transportation of people out of
parts of central London, including detailed work on routes and
capacities, has been produced. Complex communications issues are
urgently being considered in order to develop a communications
strategy that will have national application. Work has been initiated
in relation to evacuation of vulnerable groups including prisons
and hospitals.
6. Site clearance: An action plan
for the clearance, removal and disposal of debris has been produced
and circulated to relevant departments, agencies and authorities.
It is regularly revised and updated and there are certain areas
that require further work, particularly regarding the handling
of contaminated debris, but a framework for action is in place.
Sites have been provisionally identified for disposal of non-hazardous
debris and the group is awaiting central government guidance on
dealing with hazardous waste.
7. Mortuary provision: Proposals
for expanding three existing mortuaries have been developed. Plans
for a temporary disaster mortuary facility in a hangar at RAF
Northolt are well advanced and have recently been exercised. The
final specification for the works to adapt the hangar is now being
drawn up.
BLUE LIGHTS
SUB-COMMITTEE
Terms of reference
The Blue Lights sub-committee will provide professional
joint emergency services input to the London Resilience structure,
and will progress relevant elements of the London Resilience work
programme.
Key achievements
1. The Blue Lights Sub-Committee has played
a central role in the development of the new catastrophic incident
command and control protocol and arrangements.
2. The Police Main Back-up Station (PMBS—accommodation
for the command centre) has been tested, and all Blue Lights agencies
and the PMBS all have fall backs in place.
3. The Blue Lights Sub-Committee has helped
deliver the series of pan-London command and control exercises
that have taken place over the past year.
4. Gold cadres have been reviewed and strengthened
to allow for the greater depth required by a sustained catastrophic
incident.
5. Business continuity arrangements have
been reviewed.
BUSINESS COMMUNITY
SUB-COMMITTEE
Terms of reference
The Business Community Sub-Committee will bring
together representatives of the business sector in London to provide
a co-ordinated input into emergency contingency planning in London.
It will be a focus for both input into overall emergency contingency
planning and a route for onward dissemination of information within
the business sector.
Key achievements
1. Bringing together key aspects of business
into a committee, integrated into the wider London Resilience
framework with direct access to HM Government.
2. Identification of the London Prepared
website as the main portal for business continuity advice.
3. Ongoing work to extend the fast-time
business communications system across London, with the police.
4. Work to promote awareness of the importance
of business continuity planning to London businesses.
COMMUNICATIONS SUB-COMMITTEE
Terms of reference
The Communications Sub-Committee will bring
together Communications Officers representing the Government,
Greater London Authority and London's key public service organisations
to provide a co-ordinated media handling input into emergency
contingency planning in the capital. It will be a focus for both
input into overall emergency planning and a route for onward dissemination
of information to organisations.
Key achievements
1. Establishment of a broadly based forum
and liaison structure on communications including emergency services,
local authorities, health, central government departments and
the private sector.
2. Establishment of the London Prepared
website as a portal for information on all aspects of resilience
in London.
3. Drafting of a media handling protocol
for catastrophic incidents.
4. Drafting of plans for a media village
to accommodate up to 7,000 media personnel (including provision
of adequate telecommunications).
5. Development by partner organisations
of CBRN briefing for staff and sharing of that work to promote
staff education across key sectors of London's workforce.
6. Increased recognition of communications
as a central strategic issue.
7. Advice on development of fast time (alert)
and slow time (guidance) communications to business.
HEALTH SUB-COMMITTEE
Terms of reference
The Health Sub-Committee will:
— Ensure adequate regional, sector
and local response for health service planning and delivery in
the event of a major incident in London. Its key tasks will be
to:
— Scope the delivery of mutual aid
both across and to/from outside London;
— Scope the delivery of Department
of Health and Social Care—London (DHSC—London) command
and control function for London;
— Establish and maintain effective
internal NHS and inter agency communication;
— Coordinate the health response to
planning for mass evacuation;
— Scope the capacity for the provision
of general and specialist beds within and outside London to appropriately
treat mass casualties;
— Ensure a strong link to the emergency
services sub-committee in relation to ambulance services and decontamination
facilities;
— Ensure smooth transition of the health
protection and emergency planning function to the Health Protection
Agency, to come into existence April 2003.
Key achievements
1. Health service recognised as part of
the core agencies involved in all emergencies
2. Health GOLD arrangements in place with
a rota of senior chief executives
3. Mutual Aid plan in place within London
4. New health command and control protocol
in place
5. Five Pan-London Health exercises carried
out, at chief executive level, involving 80 organisations, to
support strategic health service response
6. Mass distribution centres in place
7. Hospital evacuation work comprehensively
underway
LONDON LOCAL
AUTHORITY EMERGENCY
PLANNING SUB-COMMITTEE
Terms of Reference
The Local Authority Emergency Planning Sub-Committee
will:
1. Promote fully integrated cross agency
working.
2. Ensure full interaction between plans
and organisations.
3. Establish and maintain effective inter
agency communication.
4. Provide a forum to discuss, evaluate
and recommend improvements to the existing procedures.
5. Propose ways of responding to operational
situations.
6. Promote pan-London training and exercise.
Key achievements
1. Familiarisation training and exercising
of the Gold and Gold Support roles.
2. Raised profile of the role, assets and
requirements of local authorities in emergency planning and incident
management.
3. Recruitment of a cadre of Chief Executives
to act as Gold nominee for local authorities at the Gold Coordination
Group.
4. Agreement in primary form of a Gold Protocol
for Local Authority Chief Executives.
5. Development of a rota and support arrangements
for Gold.
6. Inclusion of Local Authority representatives
on all relevant sub-committees and working groups.
7. An independent review of the mutual aid
arrangements and initial implementation of those recommendations.
TRANSPORT SUB-COMMITTEE
Terms of reference
The Transport Sub-Committee will bring together
key transport agencies serving London to provide a co-ordinated
input into emergency contingency planning for catastrophic incidents
in London. It will be a focus for both input into overall emergency
contingency planning and a route for onward dissemination of information
within the transport sector.
Key achievements
1. Inclusion in London's Command, Control
& Communication structure.
2. Significant input into development of
evacuation protocols/procedures.
3. Participation in multi-agency exercises.
4. Taken the lead in developing Staff Briefing
guidance on CBRN attack.
5. Formation of Crowd Control working group
and issues identified.
6. Review carried out of state of preparedness.
7. Risk assessments carried out for key
roads, bridges and tunnels and follow-up action taken.
8. Model of transport capacities being developed.
9. Substantial work on planning and fall-back
arrangements for loss of termini, or other significant parts of
the system.
UTILITIES SUB-COMMITTEE
Terms of reference
The Utilities Sub-Committee will bring together
the key utility and associated organisations serving London to
provide a co-ordinated input into emergency contingency planning
for major incidents in London. It will be a focus for both input
into overall emergency contingency planning and a route for onward
dissemination of information within the utility sector.
Key achievements
1. Inclusion in London's command and control
structure.
2. Cadre of Gold Officers for all Utilities
in London with initial training.
3. Establishment of Telecoms Working Group
and review of frontline services' telecoms resilience.
4. Joint planning and working between Utilities.
5. Command and Control cascade systems in
place across industries.
6. Data back up systems in place across
industries.
Annex C
The principal strategic headings employed by
the Communications Sub-Committee are designed to mesh with terminology
defined by Sir David Omand for the purposes of public communication.
They are:
Preparatory or "slow-time" communication—This
is communication in relation to "threats" and education
prior to events occurring.
Special circumstances short of an actual incident—This
covers "alerts".
Communications in the event of a catastrophic
incident or a "warning"—This is sometimes
dubbed "fast time" communications, although that term
can also be relevant to other headings.
consequence Management and Recovery—Covering
potential needs in the phase beyond the immediate response.
PREPARATORY OR
"SLOW-TIME"
COMMUNICATION
The sub-committee established the following
strategic aims for this field of work:
1. To sustain public confidence so that
in the event of a catastrophic incident the public will have faith
in official "fast-time" messages.
2. To assist London's general preparations
for a catastrophic incident by disseminating appropriate information-especially
among and through key partners.
3. To ensure that normal public life is
not unnecessarily disrupted by fear of catastrophic events.
4. To ensure that contingency plans and
counter terrorism work are not compromised.
The main thrust of the preparatory communications
strand is development of information materials and publicity campaigns
for the general public and for specific target groups. A key factor
is the inter-relationship with public information policy at a
national level. That relationship and the question of resources
are the two central ongoing issues.
London communications activity
London Resilience partner organisations deliver
a considerable range of communications work within their own respective
spheres. The sub-committee provides a liaison structure and forum
to promote co-ordination of these efforts and sharing of best
practice. This includes:
— Co-ordination between the public
information or marketing arms of partner organisations;
— Co-ordination between press offices
and policy functions to try to ensure coherent messages are delivered
in dealings with the news media.;
Websites and other Internet media
The most significant issue in this area of work
is to improve integration between established websites. The sub-committee
is concerned to avoid problems that might arise from a proliferation
of different websites and brands being established by organizations
working in isolation on common themes.
The name "London Prepared" was agreed
as an umbrella brand for preparatory communications and a website
(www.londonprepared.gov.uk) was set up as a central vehicle for
publishing information and providing a central set of links to
relevant material that might be posted on existing official sites.
Co-ordination with national public information
activity
London has sought to link with national co-ordination
mechanisms, in particular the Counter Terrorism Co-ordination
Group within GICS, which is part of a structure, agreed by ministers
under the chairmanship of the Home Secretary, to co-ordinate media
handling, publicity and general briefing on all terrorism related
matters.
SPECIAL CIRCUMSTANCES
SHORT OF
AN ACTUAL
INCIDENT
The sub-committee established the following
strategic aims for this field of work:
1. To address heightened public anxiety
so as to reduce the chance of panic and other counter-productive
behaviour.
2. To encourage or facilitate any additional
preparations that might be appropriate to cope with a catastrophic
incident.
Co-ordination arrangements
The sub-committee is working to improve stakeholder
briefing and communications. There is provision for the sub-committee
to be convened for briefing sessions in urgent circumstances.
Business Briefings and e-mail and pager alert
systems
The City of London Police and Metropolitan Police
operate a range of briefing and alert services targeted at businesses.
There is ongoing work to build on lessons learned from these arrangements
to develop capability in all parts of London.
COMMUNICATIONS IN
THE EVENT
OF A
CATASTROPHIC INCIDENT
OR A
"WARNING"
The sub-committee established the single aim
in this eventuality as being: "To assist London's response
to a catastrophic incident so as to help minimise fatalities,
injuries, damage and disruption."
Foundations
In-depth resilience of the press and public
information functions within London's key organisations was established
as a prerequisite for an effective response to a catastrophic
incident. Issues have included staffing, training, call-out systems,
technological resources, fall-back locations and staff welfare.
The current agenda includes the development and staging of exercises
to test and refine arrangements.
Co-ordination of the communications response
Work on co-ordination of the communications
response builds on the long established and well-tested structures
developed in London to deal with major incidents. However, issues
related to a step change in magnitude have emerged from the work
of the national Media Emergency Forum and its report "9/11
Implications for Communications". The sub-committee
established a working group to examine the London implications.
The outcome was the drafting of a media handling protocol for
catastrophic incidents.
A London MEF
London Resilience is promoting the setting up
of a Regional Media Emergency Forum to deal with issues specific
to local and ethnic media, which might not be addressed by the
national MEF.
Media facilities
The sub-committee set up a working group under
the leadership of the Metropolitan Police to plan the logistics
of accommodating the very large number of media personnel that
could be expected to arrive very quickly at the scene of a catastrophic
incident.
Direct communication with the public
Work is ongoing to look both at extension of
existing systems and deployment of new ones.
Work on existing messaging systems
As noted the City of London Police operate a
"fast-time" alert service using pagers and SMS and aimed
at business. The system works satisfactorily in relation to the
specification under which it was established, however a vastly
increased range of requirements have now been identified. Work
is ongoing to establish where the existing service best fits into
the new spectrum of requirements.
Deployment of new integrated broadcast messaging
systems
Work is ongoing to find new systems to meet
"fast-time" public information requirements that emerged
from the London Resilience Report, in particular the need for
systems capable of reaching large proportions of the general public.
The London Resilience Team is working with the Police Information
Technology Organisation (PITO) and the Met Police on deployment
of an SMS and e-mail based service to be delivered through the
national Police Portal.
Websites
The sub-committee considers websites to be a
useful tool in the event of an incident but not a replacement
for other areas of work because of infrastructure issues as demonstrated
on 9-11. work is ongoing to ensure sites can be updated with relevant
information in an emergency.
Call centres
There are a range of potential requirements
for helplines and similar telephone based services as part of
the response to a catastrophic incident. The sub-committee is
concentrating on establishing available capacity and ensuring
that services operate in a co-ordinated manner.
Language issues
The sub-committee is concerned to ensure there
is appropriate capacity to communicate with non-English speakers
within London's resident communities and among foreign visitors.
Ethnic and foreign language media are felt to have a significant
role to play and are to be invited to be part of a regional media
emergency forum.
National Work
These work streams are taking place in concert
with the national Cabinet Office Group on Warning and Informing,
which will contribute to the London capability where national
solutions are being developed or may be beneficial.
CONSEQUENCE MANAGEMENT
AND RECOVERY
Consequence management is a relatively new area
of work that is just beginning to be fully opened up. It has been
designated as a separate category within communications in case
specific needs are identified by the recently established Consequence
Management Working Group.
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