Letter from CAFOA to the Committee (2
June 2003)
RECOMMENDATION 34
The establishment of a mutual aid agreement
has taken rather longer than expected. However, it is anticipated
to have a single national agreement in place this Summer. This
is being managed by the Office of the Deputy Prime Minister (ODPM)—HM
Fire Service Inspectorate, with the support of the Chief and Assistant
Chief Fire Officers Association (CAFOA).
RECOMMENDATION 49
The initial delivery of interim mass decontamination
equipment to Brigades on a regional basis by the ODPM, which includes
properly constructed decontamination facilities, commences later
this month. However, the continuing industrial dispute in the
Fire Service is causing problems and the Fire Brigade Union's
(FBU's) refusal to co-operate with this new role in some areas
provides a threat to our ability to protect the public should
a terrorist attack on the United Kingdom occur.
Additional funding has recently been made available
to improve training facilities and equipment. However, this remains
short of what is needed to equip the Fire Service in the capability
to play a full role in the post September 11, 2001 world.
This Association continues to press the Government
to make the necessary resources available. Whilst playing its
part to provide the necessary levels of protection to the public
in the event of a CBRN incident.
Supplementary memorandum from the Cabinet
Office (June 2003)
The purpose or aim of the capabilities programme
is to ensure that a robust infrastructure of response is in place
country-wide to deal with the consequences of massive civil devastation
and widespread disaster inflicted as a result of conventional
or non-conventional disruptive activity. This programme is overseen
by the Ministerial Group on Consequence Management and Resilience,
DOP(IT)(R), which the Home Secretary chairs, and was most recently
considered at a meeting of the Ministerial Group on 15 May.
The Civil Contingencies Secretariat works closely
with the lead Policy Departments to deliver the programme, and
is supported by the Prime Minister's Delivery Unit under Professor
Michael Barber.
The Programme is currently divided between a
total of twelve capabilities, [9]of
which three (central or national, regional and local) are functional
and the remainder operational, as follows:
— Central response capability.
— Supply for essential services.
— Regional response capability.
— Local response capability.
— Treatment of a significant outbreak
of infectious disease.
— Treatment of mass casualties.
— Assessment of risks and consequences.
— Inform, warn and alert.
Each of these 12 capabilities is the responsibility
of a lead Government Department. Within the Department, a member
of the Department's senior management team is nominated as a capability
owner with the responsibility for oversight of the relevant work,
and in particular for ensuring that the necessary resources are
allocated and that the systems are in place to ensure delivery.
A dedicated project manager, also at Senior Civil Service (SCS)
level, has responsibility for ensuring that the work is delivered
on time and on budget in accordance with an agreed delivery plan.
Within the Cabinet Office, the Head of CCS has responsibility
as senior owner for the programme as a whole, reporting to Sir
David Omand as Security and Intelligence Co-ordinator and Chairman
of TIDO(R), and supported by a programme director at SCS level.
Delivery plans are agreed in each case with
the programme director. Progress against the agreed delivery plan
is monitored through a monthly report to TIDO(R) and a quarterly
report by the Cabinet Office Minister to DOP(IT)(R), chaired by
the Home Secretary.
Further information on the documents referred
to in an article in the Independent on Sunday on 8 December.
Consultation on the Civil Contingencies Bill
process has reflected the wide range of stakeholders inside and
outside central Government. A range of key external organisations
took part in working groups and steering groups and were given
access to policy documents as part of this process. These documents
covered background, objectives, policy options, recomendations
and new lines of enquiry as part of the usual policy development
process for any Bill.
These unclassified documents were therefore
fairly widely circulated amongst those groups with interests in
the Bill, and evidently some were shown to the media and were
reported. No leak inquiry was instigated since the material was
not sensitive in terms of national security.
Observers at contingency plan exercises.
We will continue to look for suitable opportunities
in circumstances where the presence of external observers would
not be likely to constrain the conduct of the exercise and therefore
reduce the effectiveness of the exercise in question in testing
our preparations.
Contactswith the private security sector and the
transmitting of threat information to the professionals who are
responsible for protecting their own property.
The Security Service works both to protect the
Government's assets and the UK's critical national infrastructure,
and to reduce vulnerability to terrorist threats. Protective security
guidance, in place before the attacks on America on 11 September
2001, and updated frequently covers the threat from Islamist extremists.
The Security Service works closely with the Cabinet Office, police
and other Government Departments to identify potential new companies
which would benefit from protective security advice.
Individual Departmens work closely with industries
in the areas in which they have responsibilities on issues of
security. Many of these industries use private companies to provide
security on the ground and there are rules and standards to which
these sub-contractors have to adhere.
Part of the relationship between Government
and industry includes briefings on the current security situation.
For example, Transport Security (TRANSEC) within the Department
for Transport give regular briefings on the threat (as well as
on response and appropriate security measures) to industry contacts
usually through security managers. But the nature of the briefing
that we have to give (which is often on a restricted basis) means
that cascading threat information requires special care. We want
security staff to understand the threat so that they have an accurate
context for their work. But not everybody can be told everything
and there in an inevitable selection of information as it is cascaded
down.
The Security Service also works closely with
the Security Departments of a wide range of critical industries.
This work includes the provision of threat assessments, threat-based
security advice and security training.
The Government agrees that any moves to use the
resources of the private security industry in the fight against
terrorism should be made within the context of a regulated and
increasingly professionalised industry.
The Security Industry Authority (SIA), which
was launched on 1 April 2003, will lead on the raising of training
and performance standards in the industry within the framework
established by the Private Security Industry Act 2001. The Authority
will also provide a new framework under which the industry, the
police and other stakeholders can better collaborate and exchange
ideas and proposals.
As the SIA develops its role, the Government
will work closely with them to ensure that appropriate information
is made available and to address the issue of what we can offer
in terms of training for the security industries.
9 When the programme was initially scoped in the spring
of 2002 there were only 10 workstreams. One of these, mass casualties,
was subsequently split into separate workstreams covering mass
casualties under Department of Health leadership and mass fatalities
under Home Office leadership respectively. A twelth workstream,
the regional response capability, was added in April 2003 following
the enhancement of the emergency planning and crisis response
responsibilities of the Government Offices for the Regions. Back
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