Local responder bodies
40. Schedule 1 of the draft bill lists the bodies
to be included in each of the two categories of responder. The
consultation document canvases views on the content of those lists,
and in particular on whether other NHS bodies should be included.
These are issues which we are sure the Joint Committee will want
to explore with the bodies concerned. We have a number of suggestions.
In some cases the bodies we put forward may be represented on
the proposed Regional Resilience Forums. But in the absence of
any statutory entrenchment of RRFs we have not taken that as a
reason for excluding them from LRFs. Under the bill as it is currently
drafted inclusion as a local responder body is also the only way
in which such bodies can be given a statutory responsibility to
co-operate in civil contingency planning.
41. We find it surprising that Primary Care Trusts
are not included, since responsibility for emergency planning
in the NHS rests with them. We would also have expected the Health
Protection Agency to be in Category 2. Its core functions are—
- Surveillance of infectious diseases and of chemical
and radiation hazards;
- Support for services provided at local level,
principally through assistance to the primary care trust; and
- Advice and support at the national level, for
example on health emergency planning policy.
There may also be arguments for including certain
relevant specialist hospitals in Category 2.
42. Voluntary organisations are not included, because,
in the words of the consultation document, they "rely on
the goodwill of their members and supporters to provide the services
that they do, and because those services are not in themselves
based on statutory obligations."[33]
We accept that voluntary organisations should not be Category
1 Responders, but the option of including certain of them in Category
2 should be further explored. Several of the larger organisations,
such as the Salvation Army, St John's Ambulance and the Women's
Royal Voluntary Service, are capable of providing a valuable and
predictable level of support in response to emergencies. As we
have noted, the roles of Category 2 Responders are to be defined
in regulations. We believe that it would be possible to draft
those regulations so that they allowed relevant voluntary organisations
to be involved in civil contingency planning without placing any
unreasonable burdens upon them. We recommend that the Joint
Committee explore this issue with the organisations concerned.
43. The Armed Forces will be represented at the regional
tier. This seems logical since the Civil Contingency Reaction
Forces (CCRF) are being established in each regional Brigade area
and those areas with two exceptions match the Government Office
regions which will be the basis for the regional tier. Similarly
the improved mechanisms for contingency planning, liaison and
command and control will be placed in regional Brigade headquarters.
On the other hand, if the CCRFs are to be, as we described them
in our report A New Chapter to the Strategic Defence Review,
the "predictable element" of military assistance to
the civil authorities, there would be an argument for including
Armed Forces representation also in the LRFs where local plans
are to be prepared. The Armed Forces are also, as we have seen,
regularly involved in the existing local arrangements. Also, if
military assistance were to be required during an emergency, particularly
if that emergency was the result of a terrorist attack, the request
for assistance would normally come from the local chief police
officer. If chief officers are to know what resources the military
may be able to provide, there would seem to be sense in having
the military present on planning bodies which are after all to
be based on police force areas. We believe that there are strong
arguments for including the Armed Forces on Local Resilience Forums.
44. The private sector bodies listed in Category
2 are those "such as utilities and transport companies that
will be involved…because of the nature of their role in the
local area, that is the provision of services vital to the community
and to businesses."[34]
In some cases, such as the water and electricity companies, we
would expect them in practice to assess risks and draw up plans
in much the same way as will be expected of Category 1 Responders.
We can understand that they might be reluctant to have such tasks
made a statutory obligation, but we would expect Ministers to
make clear in the regulations setting out their responsibilities
as Category 2 Responders that they will be required to be active
partners with the Category 1 Responders and to play a full part
in the Local Resilience Forums.
45. Category 2 Responders "will be under a duty
to co-operate with [Category 1 Responders] and to share information
with them only."[35]
The practical extent of that duty will presumably be defined in
the regulations. As we have noted, the consultation document describes
this happening through the Local Resilience Forums which will
"bring together core and co-operating responders."[36]
The implication is that the membership of the forums will include
all the locally appropriate Category 1 and 2 Responders. If that
is the intention, there may be an argument for limiting the number
of bodies included: too many and the forums may become unwieldy
and inefficient. Equally there will presumably be no obstacle
to forums inviting other bodies to attend their meetings. Indeed
the existing multi-agency groups, from which the forums are in
many cases expected to develop, operate entirely on the basis
of such informal co-operation. The purpose of the draft bill,
however, is to give the "organisations that form the core
of the local response a clear and consistent set of expectations
and responsibilities in relation to civil protection"[37]
which is intended to "ensure consistency of activity across
the local response capability, delivering improvements in performance
and communication, which in turn will deliver practical benefits."[38]
46. In our view there are strong arguments for
substantially increasing the membership of Category 2, although
it might not be necessary that all the additional bodies be members
of Local Resilience Forums. A wide range of companies in the
private sector, for example, might be expected to play an important
part in the civil contingency planning process. The consultation
document states that LRFs will be expected to determine what relationship
they want with existing, statutory arrangements for managing major
accident hazards at industrial sites, or on oil and gas pipelines
or radiation emergencies. Such accidents, however, particularly
if they involved a major chemical or radiation release, would
clearly constitute a major emergency. Some of the sites may also
be potential terrorist targets. We therefore believe that bodies
owning or operating such sites should be included in Category
2.
47. In Defence and Security in the UK we expressed
the view that the prospect of a statutory licensing regime for
the private security industry created the opportunity to increase
their involvement in counter-terrorist reinforcement. In April
Assistant Commissioner David Veness told us that, as part of the
training requirements being introduced with the new licensing
regime—
the Police Service will be contributing counter-terrorist
awareness as part of the basic competency framework that is going
to be developed within the [Security Industry Authority]. We will
also be asking that those who are engaged in that training are
effectively our eyes and ears.[39]
We welcome the progress being made in this area
and urge the Joint Committee to consider whether a private security
industry which is governed by a statutory licensing regime should
be included among those bodies given a statutory responsibility
to co-operate in civil protection activities.
48. An issue which the draft bill does not address
but which has been represented to us as a serious cause for concern
is the lack of any legislative framework in respect of the security
of private sector buildings. Comparisons are drawn with the fire
regulations which place clear duties and responsibilities on the
owners of commercial buildings. Commercial and private property
has historically been the target of the majority of international
terrorist attacks. It may not be appropriate to include these
matters in this draft bill, but we urge the Government to recognise
that the lack of legislative certainty has the capacity to undermine
the ability of the owners of such buildings to take appropriate
steps in the face of a prospective threat and thus that legislation
in this area should be a priority.
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