Select Committee on Defence Seventh Report


5. Provisions relating to emergency powers

60. Part II of the bill as drafted contains sweeping powers for Ministers to declare a state of emergency (although that phrase is not used) and then introduce emergency legislation (termed 'special legislative measures' in the draft bill). The potential scope of that legislation is very much the same as in the Emergency Powers Act 1920—the existing legislation. The 1920 Act was introduced "in the face of what was seen as the growing threat of nationally disruptive industrial action and the risk of civil unrest."[51] It has been used only twelve times, the most recent in 1974, and only ever in response to industrial unrest.[52]

61. The first question therefore must be whether the Government needs such powers at all. The consultation document states—

Some disruptive challenges are of such a nature or scale they may require extraordinary measures to be taken to deal with their effects and aftermath which would not be appropriate in normal circumstances. States therefore have legislation in place that enables such measures to be taken to deal with emergencies that exceed the capacity or authority of the usual systems or cannot be dealt with most effectively under any existing legislation.[53]

The document, however, gives no examples. We recommend that the Government list in respect of each of the major emergencies of the last ten years or so (eg floods, fuel crisis, foot and mouth, 11 September 2001) whether they would have used the powers in Part II had they been available.

62. The definition of an emergency is, as we have noted, very widely drawn in the draft bill. It is considerably wider than the definition under the existing emergency powers legislation.[54] The consequences of different types of emergencies may be very different and the powers which are required to deal with them should reflect those differences. Under the draft bill Ministers undoubtedly have the scope to make different regulations for different circumstances, but it may also be appropriate that for different types of emergency different powers should be available. Not all types of emergencies which may in extreme cases require special legislative measures will require the full range of powers provided by the draft bill. Parliament should not give Ministers powers in excess of what they need. We believe that the Joint Committee should consider whether for certain types of emergency Ministers might require access to only some of the powers set out in Clause 21 and, if so, whether the bill should limit access to certain powers for certain types of emergency. It may be that, if the Government provides the list of major emergencies which we have recommended, discussion of possible responses to them may offer instances where this would have been appropriate.

The triple lock

63. Although the draft bill does not limit by scale or extent the emergencies in respect of which Ministers could use the emergency powers, the consultation document describes what it calls a 'triple lock'to prevent possible misuse. The three elements of this are—

Whether the three tests are met will be a matter for the Government to determine.

64. In principle, these tests seem sensible. We are concerned, however, that they do not appear on the face of the draft bill. The consultation document claims that before using the emergency powers, Ministers "must be satisfied" that the triple lock criteria are met.[56] But no such requirement appears in the bill and the consultation document does not ask for views on this point. We believe that it should. Powers of this type should only be used when absolutely necessary. There is clearly scope for these powers to be misused. It seems to us that the bill which provides the powers should also provide the necessary safeguards on their use.

Territorial extent

65. Under the draft bill an emergency can be declared either in respect of the entire UK or in respect of one or more of the English regions and/or the devolved countries. The consultation document explains—

The declaration of a sub-UK need for special legislative measures would allow for these to be used within a specified part of the UK. This would demonstrate proportionality of response.[57]

Under existing legislation the territorial extent of a declaration can only be Great Britain or Northern Ireland wide.

66. It seems sensible and welcome to target measures, which may be intrusive and disruptive, only on those areas where they are really needed. We have one concern, however, which is to do with the boundaries of the English regions. These are not always well known to members of the public and there must be a risk that people will not know whether or not they are subject to the special legislative measures or will not be aware that they have crossed a boundary into a region where they apply. An example might be a special legislative measure restricting the movement of animals. This is not an argument against the provision, but it does place a responsibility on Government to ensure that the public are clearly and properly informed about the geographical extent of any emergency.

Human rights

67. Clause 25 of the draft bill provides that emergency regulations under Clause 21 shall be treated as primary legislation for the purposes of the Human Rights Act. This means that the regulations could not be suspended or struck down by a court if they were challenged on human rights grounds. Under the Human Rights Act secondary legislation is subject to injunction and can be quashed. Primary legislation can be challenged, but if a court upholds that challenge it may only make a declaration that the legislation is incompatible with the claimant's rights under the European Convention on Human Rights.

68. The Government recognises that this is a controversial provision and admits that "the case for its inclusion in the final Bill is by no means certain."[58] We discuss below the parliamentary procedures to which the emergency regulations are subject. In effect this provision gives Ministers the power to deprive people of protection for their human rights. The Government argues that "it is not desirable for any emergency regulations to be held up by injunctions, especially where delay may prevent effective resolution of an emergency which threatens the safety of the community."[59] The proposition that the alternative is "not desirable" seems to us to be a insufficient argument for undermining the protection of people's human rights. A procedure already exists under which many of the rights protected by the Human Rights Act may be suspended in the event of a public emergency which threatens the life of the nation.[60] We therefore conclude that this new provision should not be included in the bill unless the Government can demonstrate a clear and compelling need for the additional powers which it provides.


51   Consultation document, p27 Back

52   Ibid Back

53   Ibid Back

54   Ibid, p13 Back

55   Ibid, p28 Back

56   Ibid, p30 Back

57   Ibid, p29 Back

58   Ibid, p 30 Back

59   Ibid Back

60   By derogation from Article 5 of the European Convention on Human Rights Back


 
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