6. Parliamentary oversight
69. We have discussed the wide-ranging scope of the
powers to make regulations given to Ministers by the bill. We
have expressed a number of concerns in principle over their scope,
but additional to the question of whether they are too far-reaching
in themselves is the question of whether they are subject to the
proper parliamentary procedures. The wider the scope of such powers,
the greater the need to ensure that their exercise is subject
to adequate parliamentary oversight.
70. We would expect the Delegated Powers and Regulatory
Reform Committee of the House of Lords to take a close interest
in this bill and it may be that the Joint Committee will wish
to seek that committee's advice to assist its own deliberations.
We do not pretend to be able to match its expertise in this area.
But, in addition to the comments we have previously made,[61]
we do have a number of specific concerns.
71. In Part 1 regulations placing duties on bodies
to assess, plan and advise in respect of emergencies (Clause 2)
are to be made by statutory instruments which will be subject
to the negative procedure. These regulations include such matters
as—
- The definition of what kinds of emergency the
bodies are to assess the risk of and plan against, and which they
are not;
- How detailed those plans should be and what they
should contain;
- The extent to which different bodies are permitted
or required to collaborate; and
- The requirements to be placed on Category 2 Responders.
In other word these regulations will define the structure
and content of that civil contingency planning which is statutorily
required. We believe therefore that these regulations should
be subject to affirmative resolution by both Houses of Parliament.
The Government may argue that because of the unpredictable and
fluid nature of emergency planning, the regulations may be expected
to be subject to frequent updating and amending and to require
such amendments to be approved by affirmative resolution would
be both cumbersome and excessive. That may be true, but the answer,
in our view, would be to set out the framework—ie the core
regulations—on the face of the bill rather than reduce all
parliamentary oversight to the level appropriate for those amendments.
72. The procedures for declaring a state of emergency,
or as the consultation document calls it, declaring that special
legislative measures are necessary, are very much the same as
under existing legislation. Parliament is to be informed "as
soon as is reasonably practicable." Emergency regulations,
which have immediate effect, must similarly be laid before Parliament
as soon as possible, and will lapse seven days after their laying
unless they are approved by both Houses. The Joint Committee will,
no doubt, want to explore whether these parliamentary procedures
which were first set out in a 1920 Act remain appropriate for
today.
73. The proclamation of an emergency itself lapses
after thirty days, although a new proclamation may be made, if
the emergency requires its continuance. Parliament, as we noted
above, must be informed of the proclamation, but has no role in
confirming or approving it. We believe that consideration should
be given to whether the proclamation of an emergency, or its renewal,
should require to be approved by Parliament, perhaps in the same
way as the regulations made under it.
61 See, for example, paragraph 37 Back
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