Future Rapid Effects System
99. The MoD memorandum boasts that FRES,
another project cited as a key component of the SDR New Chapter,
"will be the first land combat vehicle able to exploit fully
the capabilities of command and battlespace management" and
will have network-enabled capability.[241]
FRES is intended to be a suite of armoured vehicles lying between
heavy armour and light forces, which can have some of the reach
and endurance of heavy armour and the air-deployability of light
forces.[242] In a recent
speech touching on the need to rebalance force structures following
the New Chapter and Iraq war, the Secretary of State singled out
the importance of FRES for land forces operations, which would
be part of a "more graduated and balanced structure of light,
medium and heavy forces".[243]
100. The New Chapter White Paper puts the
in-service date at 2009, and the MoD memorandum states that its
in-service date will be finalised at its 'initial gate' approval
which was due in "spring 2003".[244]
Press reports had recently speculated that at that initial gate
stage the MoD might opt for a UK consortium of Alvis-Vickers/BAE
Systems/General Dynamics UK, rather than launch an international
competition. Other reports now suggest that the assessment phase
will be split into two components, each of 18 months, one before
and one after the 'main gate' decision point. The first, it has
been reported, would refine customer requirements, and the second
would be focussed on risk reduction and trade-off studies, aimed
at bringing forward the planned in-service date.[245]
101. We sought an up to date estimate of
when the initial gate decision for FRES would be taken, given
that the "spring 2003" target for the initial gate has
been missed. CDP told us that he now expected the 'customer' for
FRES to have to take stock of the lessons of Iraq before completing
the FRES assessment phase.[246]
Lord Bach emphasised the need to bring the sometimes "pretty
cutting-edge technology" in FRES to a sufficient stage of
maturity before it is applied, and "it is more important
that we get it right than that we rush it in".[247]
Indeed, Lt Gen Rob Fulton told us that—
…there is a case which says that [a planned
in-service date of] 2009 is actually almost too soon for some
of those technologies because…it may well be that actually
they cannot be delivered in that timescale.
…What gives me confidence that we are not
dragging our feet is the very, very close link that we have with
the American [Future Combat System] programme which is asking
precisely the same questions at precisely the same time, and there
are other countries doing the same, for example Sweden's CEP programme…
We, in conjunction with the Americans and the Swedes, clearly
have an interest in producing something that is very, very similar...The
FCS programme is a very close one and the American team are in
the country at the moment and I have a session with them this
afternoon [25 June].[248]
102. Nevertheless, CDP told us that he sees
it as one of his priorities to address how agility in procurement
can be improved.[249]
He wants the MoD to use as benchmarks "equally complex projects"
in the civil sector "in order to find out…why it is
that they are so much faster than we are".[250]
Part of the solution lay in greater use of 'incremental acquisition',
to reduce project slippage—
…if you allow yourself to be driven towards
meeting very, very demanding bits of requirement, and actually
spend far too long meeting the last little bit of requirement…you
will overrun and you will waste a lot of time.
… it is absolutely fundamental to me that
we stop the slippage, and that we may need to be more pragmatic
than we have been in the past about precise definitions. So long
as something has an initial operational capability…and the
scope to be improved economically through an incremental acquisition
process, then we should be driving to meet those dates.[251]
103. We are impressed with Sir Peter's
determination to make Smart Acquisition truly agile and responsive
to equipment customers' needs. He appears to share Sir Richard
Evans' view, and our own, that "we need to be prepared periodically
to refresh Smart Procurement",[252]
telling us that he saw it as one of his short term goals to
do what he called "a sort of 'policy evaluation'…on
the extent to which the Smart Acquisition changes are actually
delivering…asking how far we have come and where we go now."[253]
In that context, however, the Watchkeeper and FRES programmes
are instructive. They are interesting case studies, beyond their
increased relevance following the New Chapter, on two counts.
First, they both exemplify the MoD's efforts to explore opportunities
to bring important new capabilities into service more quickly.
Second, and to some extent in conflict with that desire to speed
up their progress, the MoD has maintained a cautious approach
in both with a view to reducing project risks. In the case of
Watchkeeper, the caution has been directed at reducing the likelihood
of fielding a UAV platform unable to contribute fully to 'networked'
capabilities; and in the case of FRES, to deal with the "cutting
edge" technologies involved and to explore opportunities
to take advantage of US experience in developing very similar
capabilities in a similar timeframe. As such, these programmes
demonstrate that the MoD is still finding some difficulty in balancing
increased agility against decreased risk, and it may continue
to do so unless, to pave the way, it facilitates greater investment
in technology demonstration research.
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