Memorandum from the Ministry of Defence
(May 2003)
SDR NEW CHAPTER
Origin and aim of the New Chapter
The SDR New Chapter was the MoD's policy response
to the Al Qa'ida attacks in the USA on 11 September 2001. It analysed
the implications for the Armed Forces of the emergence at the
global strategic level of the asymmetric threat which international
terrorism now poses. Its aim was to consider at all levels whether
and how we needed to amend policy planning, force development,
doctrine, resource allocation and operations. It has now established
the policy framework for Defence's contribution to countering
terrorism at home and abroad, to ensure that the Department plays
its part in this aspect of achieving UK and international security.
Process
Internal working groups, inter-departmental
consultation and public discussion produced advice which under-pinned
the Ministry of Defence's Spending Review 2002 (SR02) bid and
the New Chapter White Paper. But the New Chapter was neither fully
defined nor completed with the publication of the White Paper.
Further work was needed to:
— identify the implications of the
New Chapter analysis and proposals for the parallel revision of
the Defence Planning Assumptions, and
— confirm that the working groups'
suggested equipment solutions represented the most cost-effective
way of achieving the desired capability gains within the additional
provision allocated in SR02.
The Defence Council also decided explicitly
that the highest priority should be accorded to items of new investment
that had utility beyond the terrorist threat. This work is being
undertaken within the annual re-costing of the Defence programme.
New Chapter outcomes
The outcomes of the New Chapter (from the White
Paper and internal advice) were a series of decisions in three
categories: Policy, Military Strategic, and Capability. These
are laid out in Annex A.
Counter-terrorism activity is spread widely
across the Department. It exists in parallel with other Defence
activities because the contributions are essentially instruments
of force of wide applicability. The Armed Forces' primary contribution
is operations overseas to prevent, deter, coerce, disrupt or destroy
threats before they can manifest themselves in attacks on the
UK, undertaken using potentially any of the entire range of military
capabilities with the exception of nuclear weapons.
The New Chapter found no significant mismatch
between the military capabilities needed for counter-terrorism
and those needed for many other types of operations. Militarily
identical operations can be mounted for a range of different purposes—for
example, operations to interdict oil sanctions-busting, narcotics
smuggling, state exports of illegal missile technologies, and
terrorist movement of weapons are no different in military terms
but only one is within the ambit of the New Chapter. The Military
Strategic and Capability decisions were thus underpinned by the
conclusion that we did not need to re-structure our capabilities
fundamentally in response to 11 September.
Capability proposals
The bulk of the proposals relating to home defence
and security were approved for immediate announcement and implementation
in advance of the resolution of SR02 (covering air defence of
the UK and the enhancement of military support for civil contingencies).
The working groups identified a larger set of
potential additions and improvements for counter-terrorism operations
overseas. These were essentially aspirational because of their
scale and impact on other areas of planning. They were presented
in support of the SR02 bid as illustrative and subject to further
work. The final selection of the measures to be implemented is
being carried out in the annual MoD planning round.
Network-enabled capability and "transformation"
The New Chapter White Paper contained few specific
equipment capability announcements although it flagged up a number
of aspirations. In particular it emphasised the concept of network-enabled
capability1 (NEC). This is the application of modern information
technologies to military operations, bringing together all of
the parts in an effective co-ordinated whole and enabling Armed
Forces to deliver precise military effects, more rapidly and reliably,
and at will.
The benefits of NEC are significant and a rudimentary
networked capability is a reality for the USA already. The first
true example was the US ability to maintain constant coverage
of a target area in Afghanistan and transmit a stream of real-time
imagery back to decision-makers for subsequent attacks by stand-off
weapons.
Delivery of network-enabled capability is neither
an overnight process nor a discrete objective. NEC is applicable
to most types of operations and in the long term is likely to
drive fundamental changes in the doctrine and structure of the
Armed Forces. We had already begun to make a shift in the balance
of investment in both sensors and network connectivity: the New
Chapter reinforced the necessity of doing so and provided resources
to accelerate the process.
The Annual Planning Round
The Defence programme is re-costed in detail
each year and recommendations made to Ministers in the four-year
Short-Term Plan and the 10-year Equipment Plan. The process tests
the affordability of existing assumptions and new options on a
Defence-wide basis. This year it encompassed the options identified
by the New Chapter work.
The Spending Review settlement included some
one and a half billion pounds across the three-year period for
the New Chapter. It was not hypothecated in any way, neither allocated
to particular projects nor divided among the potential areas for
improvement. These resources were not treated as either a ceiling
or a target for expenditure on counter-terrorism. The New Chapter
conclusions are a major criterion in considering the relative
priority of the various demands on our resources, but not the
only one. Items attributed to the New Chapter have no automatic
priority.
New chapter measures
The re-costing is considering more than 200
separate new measures within the ambit of the New Chapter. Those
which are ultimately taken into the programme will represent the
final decisions of the New Chapter and its impact on defence capability.
A proportion of the proposals will be unsuccessful because either
their overall utility is insufficient alongside other demands
on resources or because the New Chapter capability is to be provided
by alternative means.
Existing items
In addition many existing programmes are very
significant for future counter-terrorism operations. For example,
the ASTOR airborne radar and BOWMAN communications for the Army
are both key parts of network-enabled capability. As existing
projects they were not tagged as New Chapter items against the
additional provision in SR02. Similarly, the two future aircraft
carriers will become a vital part of the capability to mount counter-terrorism
operations overseas.
Overseas Capability
Six areas for improvement relate to our capabilities
for operations overseas:
— precision of applying force;
— overseas infrastructure and support
for operations; and
— assets for concurrency.
Current work in the planning round is shaping
these as follows.
Precision of Control: This encompasses intelligence
and the network. It aims to improve and accelerate the process
of converting raw data into intelligence which decision-makers
and commanders can use to take action. Our further work has shown
that this gives even more value than the New Chapter working groups
had concluded. It is likely that this area will have the largest
proportion of New Chapter spending and the largest number of separate
items. It includes the WATCHKEEPER UAV, which is now in its assessment
phase following the down-selection to two contractors, and a very
wide variety of communications and connectivity measures and network-based
tools and applications.
Force Protection: The wide-ranging importance
of measures for force protection has come through in our further
work, not least because it is applicable to all types of operations,
not just those of counter-terrorism. This includes the ability
to deploy and operate in the face of NBC threats.
Rapidity of Effect: Here we are aiming to create
forces capable of more rapid deployment with improved mobility
and firepower. This is critical to all overseas operations, not
just counter-terrorism. The family of air-deployable armoured
vehicles known as the Future Rapid Effects System (FRES) is likely
to be the most significant component: the project's Initial Gate
approval will be considered shortly. In the same context, we are
making enhancements to Special Forces capabilities.
Others: In the other three areas we have found
that, relatively speaking, there appears to be less value in immediate
investment although there are still gains to be had as the New
Chapter working groups suggested.
Overall the addition of one and a half billion
pounds in the next three years will allow us to make a significant
move forward in the evolution of our forces as the New Chapter
indicated. The benefit is not just in countering terrorism. The
emphasis on networks, force protection and rapid deployment has
emerged precisely because of the wider utility of these capabilities
in scenarios beyond counter-terrorism. The network is a fundamental
enabling capability for the way we wish to conduct operations
in future. Substantial early investment in it is dictated by the
long-term nature of its development and the need to adjust and
expand programmes in train now to ensure that new equipment in
development can exploit information superiority on entering service.
The network also enables the precise application of force using
existing weapons systems.
Home Defence and Security
Four of the areas are related to home defence
and security: air defence, maritime integrity, the resilience
of our information infrastructure and HQs, and military assistance
to civil authorities. The Committee explored these issues in its
Sixth report of 2001-02, "Defence and Security in the UK".
In air defence, we doubled the number of Quick-reaction
Alert aircraft from two to four after 11 September 2001 and are
now establishing alternative operating locations to give them
increased operational flexibility. Works at RAF St Mawgan and
RAF Marham will be completed in the summer and option studies
are in progress for the more elaborate works needed at RNAS Yeovilton.
The progressive integration of additional low-level radar information
into the systems in air defence command and control centres began
last September.
In maritime integrity we have improved our capability
to intercept rogue shipping by improving the readiness of some
of the units involved. Options for the resilience of our information
infrastructure and HQs are being addressed in the planning round
and ongoing business continuity planning.
The final form of the improvements to the capability
to provide military assistance to the civil authorities was announced
in the House of Commons on 31 October 2002. Initial operating
Capability was declared on 31 December 2002 and we are on target
to achieve Full Operating Capability by 31 December 2003.
Recruiting for the 22 Joint Regional Liaison
Officers is healthy. The 300 new posts for Brigade Reinforcement
Teams and Divisional posts are proving more difficult because
officers of the rank of Captain and Major are required for these
posts to provide the necessary experience. Thus they must either
be drawn from existing personnel or "grown on the vine"
over time.
Recruitment for the fourteen Civil Contingency
Reaction Forces is encouraging, to about one-half of establishment
by the end of February. Nonetheless, depending on the size of
the parent TA infantry battalion, the availability of volunteers
from the RNR and RAuxAF, and the local recruiting climate, achieving
the target CCRF strength of 500 will still require considerable
effort in some areas. Procurement of new communications equipment
and infrastructure for two (National Communications) Signal Brigade
is on schedule.
| 
