Supplementary memorandum from the Ministry
of Defence (23 June 2003)
FRAMEWORK AGREEMENT/DOP
The Committee's first two questions concerned
the current position on the ratification of the Six-Nation Framework
Agreement, and progress with the measures proposed under the Framework
Agreement and the US/UK Declaration of Principles. In view of
the range of issues that are covered here, we have attached at
annex separate notes on each of these agreements.
NIMROD
As Minister (DP)'s statement in the House of
Lords on 19 February 2003 made clear, the Nimrod MRA4 contract
has had a history of financial loss and delay. As a result of
the Agreement that has been struck with BAE SYSTEMS to re-structure
the current contract, we have acknowledged the need for there
to be a controlled stop to production to minimise the volume and
cost of change that has occurred as a result of the overlapping
development and production programmes. Design maturity must be
established before further production work for aircraft 4-18 can
re-commence. The first three aircraft will be used for trials
to prove the MRA4 design; this is the optimum number of aircraft
to carry out a range of trials in a reasonable timescale (some
36 months).
The Agreement also acknowledges an undertaking
to conduct a study of the potential capability enhancement of
Nimrod as an "adaptable aircraft". In addition to the
potential to carry other munitions (such as Storm Shadow) and
to undertake other roles, such as Deep Strike and Intelligence,
Surveillance, Target Acquisition and Reconnaissance which are
mentioned in the memorandum, there is also initial activity to
look at Network Enabled Capability Open Systems Architecture.
Concept work is currently under way, and the Assessment Phase
is planned for this autumn. Until this Assessment Phase has been
completed we will not know whether the MRA4 platform is the most
suitable way to fill the prospective capability gaps nor, if so,
what the nature of the capability changes to the aircraft will
be.
FRES
The Initial Gate Business Case is currently
being considered by the Department. We hope to make an announcement
shortly.
A400M ENGINE
Airbus Military Sociedad Limitada (AMSL) ran
a competition for the A400M engine between Euro Prop International
(EPI), a European consortium comprising Rolls Royce, SNECMA, MTU
and ITP, and Pratt & Whitney Canada (PWC). EPI offered the
TP400-D6 three-shaft turboprop engine, while PWC offered the PW180
turboprop. AMSL conducted an exhaustive evaluation, which included
a number of rounds of bidding in the early part of 2003. Informally,
AMSL indicated to the Department that PWC were winning in terms
of cost and compliance with contract terms and conditions, but,
following a final offer from EPI, AMSL announced on 6 May 2003
that the TP400-D6 had been selected. This was done prior to notification
of the A400M Prime Contract.
The UK was not involved in the running of the
sub-contract competition though, in conjunction with our partner
nations, we sought advice from AMSL about the final selection
prior to launch of the Prime Contract. Because of the commercial
approach adopted and the fact that the prime contract specifies
airlift capability at a fixed price, the UK did not make a formal
assessment of either the relative technical performance or the
cost of the bids. However, the DPA did carry out a limited internal
technical analysis, which concluded that both engines could provide
a feasible solution for A400M, and that AMSL had performed a very
thorough and high quality assessment of the engine bids. On the
information available the DPA views the selected engine as representing
the lower technical risk—an important consideration in achieving
progress on the overall aircraft programme.
|
