Examination of Witness (Questions 40-59)
RT HON
GEOFFREY HOON
14 MAY 2003
Q40 Patrick Mercer: It was not meant
to be. It was merely for ease of reference. The connection between
Baghdad and al-Qaeda has not come up again yet. We see organisations
such as Ansar al-Islam, which was widely thought to be responsible
for the ricin attacks in north London, driven off, killed and
captured. My colleagues and my friends tell me that many of the
people that they have killed and captured in their words are hardened
terrorists, not necessarily Iraqis, in some cases Chechens, others
who clearly have had Jihad training and, notwithstanding the recent
events in Riyadh, Muslim extremist terror seems to be at a low
at the moment. This strikes me as being an extremely convincing
argument for the connection between the regime and international
terrorism and yet nothing is being made of it. Why?
Mr Hoon: Can I just correct your
premise? I would not want to be accused of having agreed with
your initial observation because the sole justification has always
been Iraq's possession of weapons of mass destruction. There has
never been a statement that I am aware of by any member of this
Government suggesting that the reason for military action was
anything other than to remove from the Iraqi regime their control
of weapons of mass destruction. Notwithstanding your premise,
we indicated our concern about links between al-Qaeda and Iraq
and the presence of a known senior figure in al-Qaeda in Baghdad
from time to time was a matter that was made known. Certainly,
as your question very properly indicated, there were other terrorist
organisations operating broadly in the territory today comprising
Iraq, and coalition forces reported in various parts of Iraq determined
from resistance by non-Iraqi military forces, who very often proved
to have a diverse range of nationalities, with some indications
surrounding their presence there, that they had had the kind of
training which you describe, and certainly that they were there
in order to attack coalition forces in a way that was far more
determined and far more ruthless than that demonstrated by Iraq's
own forces. Whether they were there for the long term or whether
they arrived in Iraq shortly before the conflict began I am not
entirely in a position to judge. My sense would be that many of
them arrived relatively late before the conflict started.
Q41 Patrick Mercer: If those connections
were to be underlined rather more clearly I think it would be
deeply helpful to your cause.
Mr Hoon: But it would not necessarily
sustain our central argument about the need to remove from Iraq
weapons of mass destruction, which was the purpose of military
action.
Q42 Jim Knight: You mentioned in
your opening comments, Secretary of State, tribute to the logistics
effort, quite rightly. The Committee, as you know, way back in
October 2001 visited exercise Saif Sareea in Oman which did not
really test your ability to rapidly deploy and sustain a medium
scale operation of Joint Rapid Reaction Force proportions. It
nevertheless showed, according to Ministry of Defence lessons
reports, that strategic lift remained a limiting factor in sustaining
a force of 15,000 personnel. In the case of this operation to
what extent did strategic lift constrain how quickly you were
able to get a much bigger force to the Iraq theatre?
Mr Hoon: There was a remarkable
logistics effort. It succeeded. It could have succeeded in different
ways had there been, for example, more aircraft available, but
that is not to say necessarily that the numbers that we had available
were in any way a limiting factor. The issue is how many flights
take place. Sometimes having more aircraft, given the limitations,
for example, of aircraft movements in and around a theatre, would
not make any difference because physically it would not be possible
to fly more into the particular base in question. I am absolutely
confident that we had the right combination of lift needed to
get this force at this speed to where it was going.
Q43 Jim Knight: The emphasis you
have just placed on air lift suggests that sea lift went very
well but perhaps a little more air lift capability would have
been helpful.
Mr Hoon: Clearly air lift generally
gives the maximum speed, but in deploying 116 tanks, for example,
air lift could be done but it is of limited utility, not least
because, even if you had 116 C-17s all lined up to fly one after
the other into the Gulf, it would be quite difficult to deal with
that volume at the other end, particularly when the other end
was also receiving large amounts of equipment and personnel from
the United States. It is not just the air lift that is a limiting
factor or the number of aircraft. The number of air movements
is a much more relevant issue, and particularly where at either
end it is necessary to de-conflict large amounts of equipment
and movements given the limitations of the pipe from which the
equipment is setting off and where it is going into.
Q44 Jim Knight: There was considerable
comment in the media in the run-up to conflict about shortages
of this, that and the other and things not working, and there
has been a bit less comment on how things have worked since. Do
you think we would have had less of that comment if the lift had
given you more rapidity? I accept the constraints you have just
mentioned, but do you think that if you had got all the requisite
numbers of boots out, for example, to people when they wanted
them, the lift would have been any better?
Mr Hoon: All the requisite numbers
of boots and clothing and equipment were there and, having only
had a brief opportunity of inviting editors of newspapers to devote
an appropriate amount of space to the success of the equipment,
given the hugely disproportionate amount of space they wasted
on making facile criticisms of equipment that proved its worth
in the conflict, I am still waiting to see any signs of apology
from either individual journalists or from their editors.
Q45 Jim Knight: I am glad I gave
you the opportunity to make that comment. Clearly there was a
lengthy diplomatic phase during which there was a military build-up
which, as you said at the beginning, was useful in adding weight
to that diplomatic phase, but did that also prove useful logistically
for you? If you had had to move more rapidly, clearly you would
have had more constraint.
Mr Hoon: Not necessarily. I am
not quibbling in saying that but, had we had to move more rapidly,
for example, we could have taken up more ships from trade, we
could have taken more commercial vessels, we could have looked
at ways in which we secured more air lift should that have been
required.
Q46 Jim Knight: You would still have
the log-jam at the other end.
Mr Hoon: That is the point, that
it will depend on not only the actual amount of lift in terms
of numbers of aircraft and numbers of ships immediately available
but also how much you use particular aircraft, how quickly you
can turn them around and, moreover, crucially, the space for them
where they are going. Sometimes people tend, understandably, to
concentrate on platforms without necessarily concentrating on
the real issue which is outputs, what you get out of what efforts
you are making.
Q47 Mr Howarth: What is the balance
between the use of the MoD's own lift assets, both ships and aircraft,
and those which are chartered on the open market?
Mr Hoon: I do not think I have
got that information readily available. No doubt (he says pessimistically)
someone will have it. I can make that information available.
Q48 Mr Howarth: I think it would
be quite helpful because, if I can remind you, as it does happen
to tell me here, in the Kosovo campaign you chartered 23 ships
and 50 flights from the commercial sector. I think it would be
quite interesting to know just how much you had to pay and whether
you had to pay anything over the odds for this commercial lift.
Can you tell us that? Did you have to pay over what would otherwise
be peace-time steady state market rates?
Mr Hoon: Again, I will have to
write to the Committee about that. My sense would be that shrewd
entrepreneurs would probably have adjusted their prices knowing
the likely demand that was coming down the track, but that is
one of the issues that we are looking at in the way in which we
are organising our own sea lift so that we have guaranteed access
to ships when we need them. Again, the scale of this operation
was such that it went beyond what was anticipated, for example,
in relation to the Joint Rapid Reaction Force concept of deployment,
so obviously we did need to go to the market for this scale of
operation as we would have to do in the future because it would
simply not be sensible, even for the United States, to have this
number of ships always available sitting idle given that we would
not anticipate using them from year to year. There is a balance,
a judgment, to be made there. It is part of the reason why we
have organised our arrangements for sea lift in the way that we
have, recognising that we have a relatively modest week to week
requirement for sea lift but recognising as well that there are
times when that sea lift is urgently needed and on a greater scale
than routinely. These things are a balance, they are a judgment.
We could certainly go out and buy lots of ro-ro ferries and have
them sitting idle for this kind of eventuality but I do not judge
that the Committee would find that particularly satisfactory.
Q49 Mr Howarth: On the C-17s, were
you pleased with their operation and, given that part of the lease
arrangement, I gather, is that we pay for 750 hours a year but
over that utilisation you pay a pretty hefty premium, did you
pay over the odds and again, if you have not got that information
to hand perhaps you could write to us and tell us?
Mr Hoon: I will, certainly. On
the substantive issue, the C-17s have provided a superb contribution
since they were delivered to the United Kingdom not only in this
operation but also in previous operations. They have been an absolutely
magnificent addition to our capabilities.
Q50 Mr Howarth: Have they swayed
you to have rather more C-17s instead of A-400s?
Mr Hoon: I am certainly very impressed
by their capabilities.
Mr Howarth: I think I agree with that.
Q51 Syd Rapson: Secretary of State,
the United States has for many years been very clever in pre-positioning
its spares and equipment in potential theatres of conflict before
any operations have commenced. As the UK will be experiencing
a Middle Eastern focus in the future, are there any considerations
for our pre-positioning in these theatres?
Mr Hoon: Yes. I think it is to
do with the fact that the US defence budget is now around $400
billion.
Q52 Syd Rapson: So the answer would
be that we are not considering pre-positioning kit that we have
already bought in advance of any requirement?
Mr Hoon: I think that is a fair
conclusion to draw and it is not because I am in any way opposed
to the idea of pre-positioning that amount of equipment. I just
do not have that amount of equipment. Unless the Committee is
going to recommend that the defence budget of the Untied Kingdom
gets close to that of the United States I think it is highly unlikely
that we will be in a position to do so.
Q53 Mr Hancock: You were very dismissive
to Jim about the stories that appeared in the papers about the
kit and equipment and you seemed to belittle the suggestions that
were being made by the troops in Kuwait in the early stages that
they were short of rations and some of their kit was not correct.
Are you absolutely sure that those soldiers and marines and others
who were making those claims were wrong?
Mr Hoon: I am certainly suggesting
that, in a force of around 45,000 people across three Services,
there may have been the odd person who, for example, did not get
the right sized pair of boots. There may have been the odd soldier
who one day did not get his lunchtime ration pack. There may have
been the odd soldier who did not like his ready-to-eat meal of
the sort issued by the United States to their forces. There is
not the slightest suggestion, however, that any of the stories
that appeared so routinely in our newspapers stood up to detailed
analysis against what was delivered and what was proved ultimately
to be a very successful campaign based on logistical success and
the quality of our equipment.
Q54 Mr Hancock: So would you say
all of those many soldiers who contacted their families and asked
them to send them stuff—and your own Minister in answer
talked about the deluge of parcels that arrived—were wrong?
This was not the odd soldier. This was thousands of them who asked
for stuff to be sent to them, Secretary of State. Are you seriously
telling us that in your organisation you have no record of any
of the commanders saying, "We have a morale problem here.
There is a shortage of rations. Some of our soldiers have not
got the right kit"? There is no record at all within the
MoD of those thousands of soldiers who bothered to get in touch
with their families, either by phone or by mail, and whose families
responded by sending them there, and that they were just the odd
whingers? Is that what you are saying?
Mr Hoon: No, I am not saying they
were the odd whingers. I am sure the Committee is well aware of
the way in which these things operate. I have a letter in my family
from my uncle who wrote home in the First World War asking for
cigarettes to be sent to him, and the kinds of requests that were
made were requests for the kinds of equipment, some toiletries,
for example, that were simply not readily available in theatre
at the time. Not surprisingly, given that I saw those stories
in the newspapers, I checked routinely with the Chiefs of Staff
whether they had those kinds of complaints from our forces, and
they assured me at every stage that there were not such complaints.
I have indicated the kinds of problems that arose. Our soldiers
did not always like the American meal. It did not suit them necessarily
in terms of taste but it was perfectly wholesome, perfectly effective,
and I have to say that some of the chiefs of staff were fairly
robust about the newspaper stories because of the way in which
they were presented.
Q55 Mr Hancock: So flak jackets and
boots did not feature in any of the complaints you received?
Mr Hoon: I have indicated that
I am sure it is possible that the occasional soldier was not supplied—
Q56 Mr Hancock: With a flak jacket?
Mr Hoon: Let us deal with the
boots. The occasional soldier was not supplied with the right
size desert boots on the particular day that the story appeared
in the newspaper, but the truth is that when they went into operations
all of our forces were given the right boots. There was sufficient
clothing and protective equipment in theatre to deal with a force
of this size. I will look to the Committee to make its assessments
and I certainly would be delighted if the Committee wished to
interview any of the logisticians responsible of this operation.
I have talked to them. I do not judge them to be people who would
dissemble when faced with those kinds of criticism because those
kinds of criticism damage their own sense of professional ability
and they have a very strong sense of their own professional qualities
and were absolutely determined on the occasions when I spoke to
them to make absolutely clear that there were not those kinds
of difficulties, but the Committee clearly is in a position to
make its own judgment about that.
Rachel Squire: I think the Committee
may well wish to interview those and follow up this campaign.
Q57 Mr Cran: Secretary of State,
I wonder if you could talk to us a little about the civil/military
interface? This is a very important aspect of an operation like
this that is seldom, if ever, seen and we know little about it.
The Government have a War Cabinet. Maybe "War Cabinet"
is a press word for it, I do not know, but there was some mechanism
that had a central role in all of this. Could you set out for
the Committee the structure of the political-military decision-making
and also the role and the membership of the War Cabinet or whatever
it was called? If you want to send us the structure stuff after
the event, fine.
Mr Hoon: I think I can probably
summarise it but I am grateful for the opportunity of setting
it out in more detail if that is necessary. Obviously, there were
regular discussions in Cabinet. I reported regularly to my Cabinet
colleagues, as did other members of the Cabinet with obvious responsibilities
for the conduct of the wider operations, particularly the Foreign
Secretary and the Secretary of State for International Development.
In addition, there was the so-called War Cabinet which met regularly,
most directly involving those who had departmental responsibilities
relevant to what was taking place but involving other senior Cabinet
Ministers as well. In addition to that I would have daily meetings
with the Prime Minister together with the Chief of Defence Staff
and others directly engaged in the day-to-day handling of the
conflict. That tended to follow meetings in the Ministry of Defence
where I met with the Chief of the Defence Staff and others in
the direct chain of command responsible for the conflict. In addition
there were meetings of the Chiefs of Staffs and indeed I had another
daily meeting at the other end of the day in order to catch up
with any events that had occurred in a theatre that was three
hours ahead of us. Basically, that was the political structure
in the sense of the structure involving politicians.
Q58 Mr Cran: And you are satisfied,
with the benefit of hindsight, which is always accurate, that
the structure met the needs of the operations that we are talking
about?
Mr Hoon: It is something that
I am certainly prepared to look at as part of our process of considering
what further action might be necessary in the context of future
conflicts, but from my own experience of Afghanistan, Sierra Leone,
even the tail end of operations in Kosovo, I had a major role
in the designing of the structure, certainly as far as the Ministry
of Defence is concerned. Although I am prepared to look again
at the structures we developed, I think that they delivered what
we needed, which is an understanding of how the conflict was developing
whilst at the same time a recognition that there are political
decisions that have to be taken from time to time as a conflict
unfolds.
Q59 Mr Cran: You have played a key
role in the whole exercise, at least at the political level. I
wonder if you could tell the Committee what your relationship
was with the military commanders in the field. In other words,
were you an interferer as, when we read these things, sometimes
people are, or did you tell them to get on with it? Did they consult
you in whatever parameters you laid down?
Mr Hoon: I certainly judge that
the role of the Secretary of Defence in this case is to be aware
of the wider nature of the planning, to be aware of the way in
which a conflict is unfolding but not to interfere in a detailed
manner in the actual conduct of it. The practical mechanism for
contact with commanders in the field is through the Permanent
Joint Headquarters at Northwood and the process of meeting with
the relevant chain of command was conducted through the Permanent
Joint Headquarters by a video link into the Ministry of Defence
on at least a twice daily basis.
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