Examination of Witness (Questions 60-79)
RT HON
GEOFFREY HOON
14 MAY 2003
Q60 Mr Cran: So on what sort of issues,
if you are at liberty to tell us and to put the question the other
way, would the military commanders in the field feel obliged to
come back to MoD in London and therefore perhaps, by extension,
to you?
Mr Hoon: All my experience would
not suggest that there is quite that neat delineation of responsibility
in the sense that this is a team of people who work together in
the preparation of military plans, who work together in their
execution and who continue to work together in looking at further
military operations. I do not think you can break it down quite
as neatly as your question suggests. I would have regular reports
from theatre. I might raise questions from time to time as to
what was happening and why it was happening. Perhaps something
would come up that I was aware of that needed addressing, but
not in the static way, if you will forgive me for saying so, that
your question suggested. This is a process and it is a process
that moved along at pretty high speed in this conflict, and there
was never an occasion on which ministers were sitting back thinking
about a decision whilst military commanders were waiting for the
answer. If a decision needed to be taken it was taken very quickly.
Q61 Mr Cran: I was tempted for my
last question to ask you what the key decisions were that you
took, but I think I am going to wait for your memoirs to read
about what they were.
Mr Hoon: You may wait a long time.
Q62 Mr Cran: Let us wait and see.
What I am going to ask you instead is about the relationship you
had with your opposite number in the Pentagon because there was
quite a lot of press comment, speculation—who knows?—right
or wrong. I have no idea. Could you tell us what the relationship
was and what was the extent of your contact? Was it daily? What
was it?
Mr Hoon: It was certainly very
regular. I could not say to the Committee that it was daily. There
were times when every day we spoke but there were other times
when that was not necessary. Bear in mind that I would meet with
the Defense Secretary of the United States on a pretty regular
basis even before Iraq was a direct and specific issue, so our
relationship goes back rather further than this particular context.
We have always been able to speak frankly and openly to each other
and part of the reason for that is that we do not disclose the
contents of those conversations. But I can assure you that there
was excellent co-ordination at every level between the Ministry
of Defence and the Pentagon.
Q63 Mr Cran: So it was a harmonious
relationship despite the comment that I think was Mr Rumsfeld's,
"We like the Brits but they are not really necessary",
if I recall the general quote?
Mr Hoon: I think that is an unfair
summary of what he actually said. Donald is a very astute observer
of the political situation, particularly in this country, and
he knew, as I knew, and as members of this Committee knew, that
there were certain constitutional conventions pertaining to decisions
of the House of Commons. I think you will find if you look carefully
at what he actually said that he was simply aware of the impending
vote in the House of Commons, as were we all.
Q64 Syd Rapson: The trigger for war
was the "opportunity" assassination strike on the Iraq
leadership on the night of the 19 March. How far did that pre-empt
the very careful planning that was ongoing at that time?
Mr Hoon: I think it is fair to
say that it accelerated certain decisions that were in any event
going to be implemented very shortly. I have emphasised already
in my opening statement the importance of preserving, for example,
the infrastructure of Iraq for the future of the Iraqi people
and certainly the strike of 19 March made sure that we were focused
on the preservation, especially in the south, in our specific
area of operation, of that infrastructure and took decisions accordingly.
Q65 Syd Rapson: Did that particular
strike, that caught us all out, and I am sure it caught the Iraqi
leadership out, bring forward the Royal Marine attack on the Al
Faw peninsular on the 20th?
Mr Hoon: When you say "bring
forward", there was no difficulty. Those forces were poised
and ready to do the important job on the Al Faw peninsular and
begin the move north. As I say, there was some acceleration in
the timescales but essentially we are talking hours rather than
days.
Q66 Mr Howarth: As operations progressed,
Secretary of State, what were your greatest concerns?
Mr Hoon: Winning.
Q67 Mr Howarth: That was your concern
at the outset, but it looked at times as if it was going to be
a bit more difficult.
Mr Hoon: It carried on being my
concern.
Q68 Mr Howarth: There were times
when it was looking less easy than first appeared to be the case.
Mr Hoon: I have never ever believed
that military conflict is easy. The risks, the uncertainties,
the unpredictabilities, the danger of what we are asking people
to become involved in should never lead anyone to assume that
it is easy and I have never done so in any of the operations in
which I have been involved.
Q69 Mr Howarth: Some commentators
have suggested that the force that we sent was the maximum that
we could have put together. In the event that it had not gone
as well as it did and we had been in a much more prolonged campaign,
what contingency plans did you have for reinforcements, or were
you going to rely upon the United States?
Mr Hoon: I would need you to be
a little more specific about length, because we went through this
as I recall when Mr Mercer asked me these questions in a Question
Time. We had a balanced force, we knew that that force could remain
in theatre, as it is doing, for a reasonable length of time to
conduct not only combat operations but also any follow-on of humanitarian
operations. Clearly, had the conflict gone on for what, with the
benefit of hindsight, would have been a very long time, going
into many months, we would then have had to make judgments about
the replacement in particular of combat forces because clearly
it would not be reasonable to expect combat forces to maintain
that high intensity conflict for large numbers of months. We would
then have made decisions as to how to replace them. That would
have been possible and continues to be possible and in due course
we will be replacing some of those forces in theatre.
Q70 Mr Howarth: You did have contingency
plans therefore to do that?
Mr Hoon: We could have done so.
We could have found other forces if necessary but, as I think
I made clear to Patrick when he raised it with me, I would prefer
not to have to do so, and that remains the case. As it is, we
have not needed to do so in the way that I have just set out to
you because the conflict did not last for very many months and
the kinds of replacements that we will be sending into theatre
in due course will be replacements that can be managed from our
existing resources.
Q71 Mr Howarth: It is replacements,
not reinforcements, which is the key issue here. There is a sense
in which some commentators feel that we got away with it and that,
for example, had we faced an enemy which had an air force—the
Iraqis had none—
Mr Hoon: They did have an air
force. They chose not to use it.
Q72 Mr Howarth: Half of it was exported
to Iran. I think you will agree that they presented no credible
air power, but had we had to contain some of that do you not agree
that we would have been facing a rather different situation in
which we might have taken a rather high level of casualties and
would have needed reinforcements?
Mr Hoon: I do not accept that
because the forces that we made available in coalition with the
Untied States were forces designed to deal with the highest level
of estimation of what the Iraqis could achieve. The force was
specifically designed on the most optimistic assumptions of what
Iraq could throw at us.
Q73 Mr Howarth: You mean the most
pessimistic assumptions?
Mr Hoon: Optimistic from their
point of view: what they could manage in terms of a military response
to what we were going to put into theatre.
Q74 Mr Howarth: We were talking about
reinforcements, Secretary of State, as you will recall, and obviously
you touched on Operation Fresco, the firemen's strike, and you
downgraded the requirement from 19,000 to 16,000, and it is now
down to 9,000, but it is still a huge constraint on your ability
to deploy. What were your plans in the event that the firemen
had gone on strike in the middle of all this because my constituents
who are in the Armed Forces are pretty fed up with this Operation
Fresco nonsense, so can you tell us that? Can you also just tell
us why you are withdrawing regular personnel and leaving reservists
out there?
Mr Hoon: Can I, I am afraid, again
dispute with you the premise. We did deploy and we deployed very
successfully, even though 19,000 of our forces had been earmarked
for emergency firefighting duties, so there was no difficulty
about the deployment caused by Operation Fresco and the deployment
was extremely successful, so I am not sure I really need to comment
further on the balance of your question. The premise that you
set out was wrong. As far as reservists are concerned, generally
speaking, the principle will be that any reservist deployed alongside
regular forces who are returning to the United Kingdom will return
with them. The whole point about integrating our reservists into
regular forces, consistent with the SDR, is that they are usable
and when the regular forces have completed their operations, they
will return with those regular forces. There are some limited
exceptions to that mainly in the medical field, but the purpose
of leaving medical reservists in theatre is to give regular medical
forces a break so that they can then return to theatre, relieving
the reservists in the process, so that is an exception, but, generally
speaking, the principle will be that reservists will return with
the regular forces to which they are attached.
Rachel Squire: As you know, the
Committee always takes a keen interest in the issue of reservists
and also medical units, so I think that may be one we come back
to, but I am aware that the time that we have left is very short,
so can we move on.
Q75 Patrick Mercer: May I talk, Secretary
of State, about British operations in western Iraq. What was the
extent of Scud activity in western Iraq?
Mr Hoon: None.
Q76 Patrick Mercer: Were any launches
forestalled?
Mr Hoon: There were certainly
launches. Missiles fell on Kuwait and some fell into the water
near Kuwait and quite a number were destroyed by Patriot missile
batteries in northern Kuwait, but I am not aware of any of those
being launched from what I would generally take to be western
Iraq.
Q77 Patrick Mercer: Can you tell
us whether any launchers were found in western Iraq?
Mr Hoon: I cannot, no.
Q78 Patrick Mercer: What was the
role of British forces in western Iraq?
Mr Hoon: By the way, I could,
but I cannot!
Q79 Patrick Mercer: Yes, I understand
that. What was the role of British forces in western Iraq?
Mr Hoon: By and large, the forces
deployed in western Iraq were special forces and I am not going
to go into the detail of what they were doing.
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