Examination of Witness (Questions 80-99)
RT HON
GEOFFREY HOON
14 MAY 2003
Q80 Patrick Mercer: And the same
question for northern Iraq.
Mr Hoon: Same answer.
Q81 Patrick Mercer: Did the United
Kingdom special forces act as independent units or joint forces
along with the United States special forces?
Mr Hoon: Again I am not going
to go into that kind of operational detail, save to say that there
was a coalition effort involving not only forces from the United
Kingdom and the United States, but also from at least one other
country.
Rachel Squire: I was going to
ask some questions about equipment systems and what had worked
well and what had not worked so well, but in fact, because of
the time constraints, I think we will look to take evidence on
that from other witnesses and certainly write to yourself, Secretary
of State, if we need to. We can, therefore, move on to friendly-fire
incidents.
Q82 Jim Knight: Like others before
it, the conflict produced victims of so-called "friendly
fire" and, as I understand it, it is fairly common, particularly
in the early stages of a conflict, that those sorts of incidents
should happen. What have your investigations of the incidents
of UK forces being hit revealed about the causes, whether there
are any common threads to those causes and to what extent is friendly
fire a particular problem of combined coalition operations?
Mr Hoon: Those investigations
are still under way and I think it would be wrong at this stage
to preempt their conclusions by making even tentative suggestions
as to causation. Certainly those investigations will be rigorous
and will involve, where relevant, coalition forces in the widest
sense. In answer to your second question, I think it is fair to
say, sadly, and I recognise that the relatives of those killed
will not make this kind of distinction, that there were friendly-fire
incidents involving mixed forces, US on UK, there were friendly-fire
incidents involving US on US and there were friendly-fire incidents
involving UK on UK.
Q83 Jim Knight: But none UK on US?
Mr Hoon: Not that I am aware of,
but I think it does demonstrate the accidental nature of this.
I am not using that word in its light way, but in the way that
is proper. These were unlooked-for incidents, despite very determined
efforts made, certainly as far as the technology provision was
concerned, to use all the efforts that we could to avoid them,
but the real answer to your question is that I cannot see, from
what took place, that there is any pattern that suggests that
this is the result of coalition-style operations.
Q84 Jim Knight: If combat identification
had been successfully rolled out some time ago, as was originally
planned, do you think those incidents would have been reduced?
Mr Hoon: Well, I do not believe
so. Using the example of the Challenger 2 tank attacking another
Challenger 2 tank, and there is an investigation and I am not
in any way prejudging that investigation's conclusions, but from
what I know of that incident, a tank thought it was under attack,
it wheeled round very quickly and fired a shell at what it thought
to be the enemy. It proved to be a British tank. I cannot see
that any level of technological innovation could avoid that kind
of incident taking place. If there is such an innovation, then
certainly we will vigorously investigate it, but I cannot see,
at the present levels of technology, that being easy to see a
solution to, which is why I have consistently emphasised, when
this question has been raised in the House of Commons, that there
is no simple, single technological solution to these problems.
Q85 Jim Knight: But combat identification
projects are still underway 12 years after the last Gulf War when
they were first identified, are they not?
Mr Hoon: But we do have identification
systems. I do not believe that that is the problem. Part of the
efforts that we made once we knew that we were potentially going
into military operations alongside the United States, I was determined
to ensure that we had comparable equipment, particularly in this
area. The issue is not just the system, and there are reasons
why NATO has failed to produce a common system, but bear in mind
that at the level of NATO, we are talking about a common system
for all NATO members and that is part of the problem, but as between
the US and the UK we had compatible systems that should have delivered
appropriate information. They did not because other factors supervened,
not least the understandable factor of the intensity of battle
and human reactions when people consider that they are under attack.
Q86 Jim Knight: You may be awaiting
the outcome of those investigations, but is there anything that
you are doing now to prevent future fratricidal incidents?
Mr Hoon: Well, there is a long-term
effort obviously to get as many allies as possible agreeing on
a single system, so if we had to conduct high-intensity combat
operations next week, then I believe that the systems we put in
place for operations in Iraq were the best available. That is
not to say that they will not evolve and we will look to other
systems in the future to replace them, but for the moment we have
committed ourselves, I believe rightly, to having the best equipment
that we could lay our hands on.
Q87 Mr Crausby: It is accepted, Secretary
of State, that you reported to the House that cluster bombs were
used in Iraq and you have consistently argued that more suitable
weapons would be used in order to defend our forces, but it was
predictable, because of the controversial nature of cluster bombs,
that the Government would be criticised in their use regardless
of the circumstances. For the record, could you tell the Committee
in what circumstances were cluster bombs deployed in Iraq and
why was their use essential?
Mr Hoon: Essentially cluster bombs
are an effective weapon against what are known as wide-area targets,
so for armoured columns, groups of lighter-skim vehicles, cluster
bombs are extraordinarily effective. I think one of the issues
that those criticising the use of cluster bombs have to face up
to is not only the impact on our own forces if we fail to prosecute
an attack in those circumstances where we had a suitable weapon,
but, for example, what would then happen if we dropped much heavier
equipment, and clearly there are heavier bombs than the bomb that
comprises a cluster bomb, we would have to drop many more such
weapons with the obvious and consistent consequence that some
of those might fail with still more catastrophic consequences.
I am not suggesting that we are in any way other than extraordinarily
sensitive to the potential impact of unexploded ordnance. We keep
records of where cluster bombs have been used and, as I have repeatedly
said, it is, generally speaking, British servicemen and women
who are charged with the task of clearing up those sites.
Q88 Mr Crausby: What steps did the
Government take to learn lessons from the previous use of cluster
bombs, for example, changing their colour, limiting their use
to certain types of terrain and installing deactivation devices?
Mr Hoon: All of these types of
thing have been done in the very latest generation still only
just coming through into service. There are failsafe devices and
timing mechanisms that mean that the bomblets, if they fail to
explode on impact, which is how they are designed to operate,
will explode of their own accord, but those newer munitions are
only just coming through into service.
Q89 Mr Crausby: So could you tell
us what steps you are taking to locate and deactivate unexploded
bomblets and could you also tell us what assistance you are giving
to the United Nations in mapping the locations of unexploded ordnance?
Mr Hoon: Well, at this stage it
is not a responsibility of the United Nations. I accept that it
is a responsibility of coalition forces and, as I have indicated,
we have kept records of where these kinds of munitions have been
used, but I think it is important not to just be fixated on cluster
weapons. There are a range of munitions, many dating back years,
if not decades, in Iraq that are a continuing threat to the Iraqi
people and we are deploying forces to be able to deal with that.
It is part of the effort to make Iraq a safer and more secure
place, so it is not just cluster weapons that we are dealing with,
but there are any number of unexploded weapons in Iraq that we
are making safe, but it will take time.
Q90 Mr Crausby: What steps have you
taken to secure munitions stockpiles in Basra?
Mr Hoon: I do not have specific
details about that, but I am confident that that is something
that is being attended to by British forces. I will write to you
if that answer is wrong.
Rachel Squire: Given that we only have another
15 minutes left, I am going to make myself universally unpopular
by saying that we will skip the questions on the role of the media,
POWs and military and Iraqi public servant co-operation. We will
certainly take those issues up in future evidence sessions and,
if necessary, write to you, Secretary of State. I think we will
focus the time we have left on the two key issues, the one of
the cost of the whole campaign and the other on how long our British
forces are likely to remain in Iraq. In fact can we start with
that.
Q91 Patrick Mercer: Secretary of
State, we hear reports of a brigade and a divisional headquarters
being in Iraq for the foreseeable future. Can you confirm that?
Mr Hoon: Well, there is a continuing
need for British forces to be deployed in Iraq, but we are making
appropriate adjustments, as I have regularly reported to the House
of Commons, in the first place withdrawing those forces whose
job has been completed, particularly from the Air Force; Royal
Marines, Ark Royal, submarines, and a range of assets are either
back or nearly back home. There is now a different kind of military
operation underway to ensure the security and stability of Iraq
in this obviously difficult period in the aftermath of a conflict.
Some forces which were engaged in combat are participating in
those tasks and in due course they will be replaced. They will
also be joined in due course by forces from other countries and,
as the Committee may well be aware, we had a very successful meeting
recently with a number of countries already who have indicated
their willingness to send the right kinds of forces to help in
the work that is needed now. I say "the right kind"
because they will largely be of a very specialist kind. One of
the reasons why it is impossible to answer that question with
any kind of precision is that it does depend on the circumstances,
but I believe that the kind of contribution that forces can make
in Iraq now, particularly in the south, which is calm, stable,
increasingly secure for the population, is in that specialist
area, following on from the previous question, making sure that
the range of unexploded ordnance from a series of conflicts in
which Iraq has been involved over many years are made safe for
the safety and security of the population, and increasing efforts
to guarantee the utilities to make sure that there is no shortage
of food in a country which has been largely dependent on UN assistance
over very many years, so there are a range of tasks that military
forces can be involved in. From my point of view, the sooner those
tasks are completed, the better, but I recognise that we do have
a continuing responsibility to Iraq until we achieve the kind
of stability that gives us the confidence that the Iraqi people
themselves are in a position to take up where we are leaving off.
Q92 Patrick Mercer: If you were a
betting man, Secretary of State, and I am sure you are not—
Mr Hoon: I am not.
Q93 Patrick Mercer: —what sort
of duration do you think we might be right to prepare for in terms
of a largish commitment of British soldiers, sailors and airmen?
Mr Hoon: I could repeat what I
have just said to the Committee, but I do not think that would
help.
Q94 Mr Hancock: It is a very interesting
point you raised there and it is a compliment to our Armed Forces
in the south of Iraq that there was a quietness about the place
which is not universal across the country, particularly around
Baghdad, but because of the success of the British military in
being able to secure that calmer atmosphere in that area, do you
see our role as actually being one that was spread further across
Iraq and maybe to replace the presence of the Americans who seem
to be universally unpopular wherever they are located in Iraq
at the present time?
Mr Hoon: I think that is a very
unfair characterisation of what has taken place in Baghdad. Baghdad
is undoubtedly a more difficult place. It has a more diverse population,
it is and has been historically, as far as the recent history
of Iraq is concerned, the centre of power in Iraq and, not surprisingly,
therefore, it was the centre for Saddam's regime as much as it
has been the centre for previous governments of Iraq. Therefore,
the problems faced by coalition forces in Baghdad are inevitably
more intense than they are elsewhere in the country. So I do not
accept that there is universal criticism in the way that you describe,
not least as, and this may only be anecdotal, I had two Iraqi
citizens in my constituency office last week from Baghdad thanking
me for the efforts that coalition forces had made and that meant
American forces, so I do not believe that there is that kind of
difference. What there is is a difference in the circumstances
that US forces in Baghdad have to deal with and I think it is
more understandable when they are being routinely shot at that
there is a more difficult security environment.
Q95 Mr Hancock: Have you had no request
for British Armed Forces to be further extended into Iraq and
into other areas? Have the Americans asked you to consider the
possibility of replacing some of their forces in the area of Baghdad
with UK forces?
Mr Hoon: There are enormously
more American soldiers in Iraq; I do not have a figure readily
to hand, it is around 100,000.
Q96 Mr Hancock: I did not ask for
the numbers, I said have any requests been made to you to extend
the role of British Armed Forces in Iraq at the present time.
Mr Hoon: Not from the United States,
no.
Q97 Mr Hancock: From anyone? From
the Iraqi people who might be in a position to have some say in
it?
Mr Hoon: It depends how broadly
you take the question of request. I have seen suggestions, in
published sources, that UK forces should extend their area of
operations. I do not believe that that is practical, sensible
or, for the moment at any rate, necessary.
Q98 Mr Hancock: But you have had
that request from some of them?
Mr Hoon: I have not had any formal
requests, no. I have seen suggestions. I think I have just heard
another one.
Rachel Squire: Can we move on
to what has to be our final issue and that is one of the whole
costs of the campaign. Mr Roy, as the canny Scot I allow you to
come in first on that.
Q99 Mr Roy: The Treasury made a £3
billion contingency reserve available for additional costs in
Iraq and up to the financial year 2002-03 only £1 billion
has been identified. Will you need the further £2 billion
and what for?
Mr Hoon: I think it is too soon
to say. Essentially this was a provision, if you like these were
drawing rights available to the Ministry of Defence for conducting
operations in Iraq. A significant amount of money has already
been spent. It depends on how long operations continue, but it
will take some time before we are in a position to be able to
say what are the precise costs, I think it is too soon yet to
make that judgment.
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