Examination of Witness (Questions 400-419)
AIR MARSHAL
BRIAN BURRIDGE
CBE
11 JUNE 2003
Q400 Syd Rapson: With
the pooling of the air power and drawing from that pool, were
you happy with the timeliness of the reaction to support British
forces? Presumably if it was the Marine Corps doing this it would
have been fast, but were you concerned that there was a delay?
Air Marshal Burridge:
On occasions there was a delay, but by and large the land commanders
were content. There will always be individual instances where
there was a delay.
Q401 Syd Rapson: There
was also a tragic accident when the Sea Knight US helicopter crashed.
They immediately grounded all their aircraft for an investigation
into what caused it and a signal went out. We carried on flying
our aircraft regardless. Was that consciously done or were we
taking risks as a British force in carrying on flying, or were
the Americans right to stop everything until they found the cause?
Air Marshal Burridge:
It is for the US to decide how they respond to accidents. As a
matter of policy, that is how they react to accidents. Due to
some very, very good hot planning by the Joint Helicopter Command,
we were able to fill that vacuum without undue risk.
Q402 Syd Rapson: I
always assume that the British are much more careful in flying
aircraft if there is a suspected problem. In this case you are
saying that the Americans are far more careful about their aircraft
incidents than we are.
Air Marshal Burridge:
They throw a big switch and say stop flying until we understand
this in case we cannon it up. We retain flexibility in the sense
that we look at the priority of the task, and this was a high
priority task, and balance it against the risk and make judgments.
I was not part of the decision-making process with the Americans
on how they reached that conclusion.
Q403 Mr Howarth: It
was put to me by one of the commanders in the last couple of days
that the advantage of having the coalition close air support was
that the Americans brought a greatly extended range of aeroplanes
to provide that, the A10 and the Cobra, and we were reliant upon
the Lynx. It was also put to me that the advantage of having a
dedicated Royal Air Force close air support for British ground
forces is that they have been accustomed to working together.
There are clearly difficulties either way. Given your experience,
what would you say to us would be the lesson that you would derive
from the Iraq war in terms of close air support? Is this something
where yes, we should be more prepared to rely on coalition support,
or no, we should in future call first on the Royal Air Force and
then call on other coalition partners to assist?
Air Marshal Burridge:
All other things being equal, if we nationally lay down our procedures,
fund our training, fund the equipment required for close air support,
if we could live in a vacuum and know that always in coalition
warfare we would have the right amount of air power for the right
amount of ground forces and we were able to emulate successfully
the procedural excellence that the US Marine Corps achieved, then
clearly we would do it nationally. But there is a danger in that
in that it might not be possible to organise things that way in
a big coalition. It might also mean inefficient use of air power.
If we were to go back 30 years when we were starting to look at
the introduction of the Harrier, the way in which air power might
need to be penny-packeted was considered. Ultimately we decided
that aircraft like that ought to be a corps level asset. It may
just be that my views on post-modern warfare and high tempo, etc,
mean that we have to go back to thinking along those lines. I
do not know. We need to study it certainly.
Q404 Mr Howarth: I
think it is a key issue. Can we move to the role of the media,
which I did suggest some hours ago that we would be coming to?
Obviously it is a key factor in this campaign and those of us
here have been following it very closely indeed on the television
and it has played a major role. How far do you feel that an accurate
picture of the conflict emerged during the major combat phase
of operations?
Air Marshal Burridge:
Given that much of what was being seen on television and being
written in newspapers was based on the testimony of embedded journalists,
then the description of individual events should be pretty accurate,
with one major proviso and that is the loose use of language.
I was horrified at how profligate with language some of the embedded
journalists were. You may remember a Sunday morning when 1,000
people started coming out of Basra to the south over one of the
bridges and they talked about poor people being caught in cross
fire. They were not caught in cross fire, they were being machine
gunned by the Baath party militia. Nobody was firing back. It
is a word. Logistic nightmare. Humanitarian crisis. Words that
fall readily off the tongue but actually do not accurately describe
what they are seeing. The second point, even taking all that,
is that what I think was lacking, and I have given a lot of thought
to how this might be redressed, was a decent method of putting
that into context. I go back to the point I made earlier where
there was a tendency for a pinprick to be reported as a mortal
haemorrhage, the notion that things were bogged down, all dreadfully
inaccurate. Had there been a better method of placing those things
in context, then a more accurate picture would have been painted.
I contrast that with the way the media reports the City of London,
with real expertise I think.
Q405 Mr Howarth: Some
people in the City might disagree with you.
Air Marshal Burridge:
I think by and large they would say that at least the technical
understanding is there. I think individual events, barring language,
were accurate, but the analysis of it—with a few notable
exceptions: the Financial Times is particularly good and
The Times is quite good—by a lot of the populist
papers and much of the television was wide of the mark because
it lacked that context.
Q406 Mr Howarth: You
made some pretty trenchant criticism and for the benefit of those
who do not recall it, though I am sure most people will, perhaps
I can just remind you. You said at one point during the campaign
that the UK media had lost the plot, they stand for nothing, they
support nothing, they criticise, they drip, it is a spectator
sport to criticise anybody or anything and what the media says
fuels public expectation. Do you still stand by those undoubtedly
trenchant remarks?
Air Marshal Burridge:
Yes. They are long-standing views based on the enormous length
of time I have spent in the public sector and the leadership development
work I do in the public sector. I believe that the position that
the UK media has taken, for a number of reasons, is extremely
counter-productive as far as individual motivation goes.
Q407 Mr Howarth: May
I congratulate you for standing by your words? I have to say that
I agree with most of what you said as well, but that is not relevant
at the moment. Given that the media are with us, they are going
to be a permanent feature in combat operations. You cannot un-invent
them, they have become more and more sophisticated, they can provide
immediate coverage for the viewing public. What would be your
advice to your successor, were there to be an operation next year?
Air Marshal Burridge:
You are right that embedded media are here to stay. In fact on
balance probably the use of embedded media was just positive.
I see the need for us to provide the ability for all these little
reports to be put into context. Either we do that in theatre or
in London or wherever, but I do see the need for people who understand
military things to interpret events and to be able to put it into
context. We have never thought about doing this before and there
are operational security implications in having real experts interpreting
events. However, given that we went into this campaign with 33%
public support and given the need to generate greater public support,
then the media become such an important aspect that as the media
are here to stay perhaps the time is right to change our approach.
It is something we are giving great thought to.
Q408 Mr Howarth: Would
your message to Fleet Street editors be that, given the propensity
of the United Kingdom to engage in military operations, they have
a duty to ensure that a cadre of their reporters is properly trained,
does understand, going back to the old days when all the newspapers
had defence correspondents instead of just a few of them who do
now.
Air Marshal Burridge:
What I would say to editors is that you have a duty to deal in
fact with knowledge and apply balance. That drives us very much
in the direction you have indicated, that there has to be real
expertise. I go back to my parallel with the City of London where
financial journalists tend to be people who really do know their
business.
Q409 Mr Howarth: May
I just flag up one final point on this? I represent a garrison
town, as you know, Aldershot. It was pretty hard for the families
to see this immediate representation of battle where their husbands,
their sons, were fighting for their lives and for their country,
yet the rest of the nation was going to parties, watching football,
going to the pub and all that sort of thing. I wonder whether
you have had any feedback as to the difficulties that the troops
had in managing the enormous pressure which was placed on the
families as a result of this constant stream of information 24
hours a day.
Air Marshal Burridge:
I said in answer to an earlier question that one of my concerns
at the outset, given the lack of public support, was that that
would be particularly felt by the dependants, people back here.
Yes, my experience is exactly the same as yours. People have said
to me that this was really, really difficult. If we make a decision
not to have embedded journalists, it would not really make much
difference now. The technology exists, people can make their own
arrangements and do, as we saw. I am afraid it is here to stay.
The best approach for us is to try to get the strategic context
right. You will never get away from the impact of the visual image
and that is even more important now in this very competitive media
industry that we have. You will never get away from that. We do
have a requirement to get it set into proper context, but I cannot
give you an answer to the fact that there are going to be the
loved ones of 45,000 soldiers, sailors and airmen who are going
to be watching this thing and feeling very differently about it
than the rest of the population. I simply cannot.
Q410 Mr Jones: Cluster
bombs have been in the media quite a bit and we had a witness
last week who suggested that cluster bombs were used in urban
areas or nearer urban areas. Can the use of such weapons ever
be justified?
Air Marshal Burridge:
You are talking about US weapons.
Q411 Mr Jones: Yes.
Air Marshal Burridge:
I can think of one or two sets of circumstances where you may
have a large amount of armour penetrating one of your lodgements
or whatever, but it is hard to see where cluster bombs would be
the weapon of choice in most urban warfare for me.
Q412 Mr Jones: Were
they actually used in populated areas?
Air Marshal Burridge:
I can only speak for the UK weapons and they were not.
Q413 Mr Jones: In
terms of where they were used, both by ourselves and the Americans,
do we have reliable information on the locations where they have
been used? Has any estimate been done for clearing afterwards?
Air Marshal Burridge:
I can only speak for UK weapons. Yes, we do have reliable information
as to where they were used. As for the estimates of clearance,
I am not aware of an estimate. What I will say is that cluster
bombs are just one of the huge unexploded ordnance problems that
exists in Iraq, because there was so much Iraqi ammunition everywhere,
so much.
Q414 Mr Jones: Has
a programme been put in place to try to clear that ordnance?
Air Marshal Burridge:
Yes, so I understand.
Q415 Mr Jones: Is
there a concentration, for example, particularly on unexploded
cluster bombs because of the emotive nature of the interaction
with civilians and things like that, or is it just part of a general
policy for all ordnance?
Air Marshal Burridge:
I am not competent to answer that. It is beyond me. I handed over
command on 9 May.
Q416 Mr Jones: Would
it be possible to ask the MOD to provide a note?
Air Marshal Burridge:
Yes.
Q417 Mr Howarth: Prisoners
of war. How did the arrangements for prisoners held by the coalition
distinguish between prisoners captured by the United States forces
and those captured by our forces?
Air Marshal Burridge:
How did we distinguish?
Q418 Mr Howarth: How
did the arrangements distinguish?
Air Marshal Burridge:
With the help of our able lawyers on both sides we put together
a memorandum of understanding as to what it meant to be the detaining
power. In other words, if a UK unit takes prisoners of war they
are the detaining power, regardless of who actually provides the
prisoner of war cage or the guarding or whatever. So we laid down
the legal process, I signed it and General Abosaid signed it on
behalf of the US and that formed the basis of our joint activity.
Q419 Mr Howarth: Were
all those captured by British forces administered by the British
or were they transferred to the Americans?
Air Marshal Burridge:
Ultimately transferred to the Americans.
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