Examination of Witness (Questions 460-479)
MR BALTHASAR
STAEHELIN
18 JUNE 2003
Q460 Jim Knight: Have
you been positively assisted by the Ministry of Defence, by DFID,
to enable you to do the work you want to do? How would you compare
the co-operation of our Government to the US Government in those
areas where they were in control?
Mr Staehelin: We
certainly felt that there was a great understanding. I would like
to pronounce on the British forces now, without comparing them
with others. We have had an understanding of our role, also of
our limits, of our modus operandi, and of the law which
underlies our operations. We have had access to appropriate levels,
in the field and outside of Iraq. In this sense I think that we
can say that we have had support for our mission, without any
attempts to go against our independence, and this was certainly
appreciated by us.
Q461 Jim Knight: Did
you have any consultation immediately prior to the conflict as
to what sort of reconstruction work might be required, given the
level of the infrastructure that you would be aware of because
you were there? Was there any discussion of post-conflict work
with you?
Mr Staehelin: The
discussions before the conflict were essentially on our own conflict
preparation and on the legal framework regulating conflicts. There
was also dialogue on the law of armed conflict.
Q462 Jim Knight: What
impression did your personnel get of what life was like for civilians
living in Basra and Baghdad during the conflict?
Mr Staehelin: I
think that life changed dramatically, in the sense that, in the
early days of the conflict—and this applies also to our
delegates—air raids were made at night. During the daytime
you had an astonishingly normal situation, with people venturing
out and moving around. Bombardments at night represented a great
stress for everybody living there, including our delegates, but
it was clear when air raids would take place. As the conflict
went on, this became less and less clear, in the sense that you
would have air bombardments during the daytime. Indeed, the alarm
system of Iraq became less and less reliable; sirens would go
off and on without any apparent link to air movements and bombardments.
It became more and more hazardous for our delegates to move around
town because, inevitably, if you moved around town you might pass
a ministerial building—so moving around became more and
more an issue of concern. Once electricity stopped functioning—luckily,
at the very end—that had a major impact on the town in terms
of security, or rather insecurity. No lights, no street lights.
That represented a considerably changed climate. So, for the population,
a stressful situation which became more difficult.
Q463 Jim Knight: Finally,
on 25 March there were reports of a civilian uprising in Basra.
Did your personnel who were there at the time offer you any evidence
that such an uprising was taking place and, if so, were there
any implications for civilians in Basra and for your staff?
Mr Staehelin: To
the best of my knowledge, we have not observed such an uprising.
Q464 Mr Roy: Can I
continue on the Basra theme at that particular point in time?
We know that expatriate personnel returned to Basra on 29 March
but why did you withdraw them in the first place, before the conflict?
Mr Staehelin: We
decided to keep expatriate personnel in Baghdad, six persons and,
in the north, four persons. We decided not to keep expatriate
personnel in Basra but to keep a national staff team—for
the simple reason that we felt we were not known well enough in
Basra. We were afraid that, in a situation of chaos, we would
become the targets of a mob. We felt that in the north and in
Baghdad we had a more solid anchorage, explained by the historic
depth of our presence, which we did not have in Basra. Also, whilst
ICRC, as you know, wants to be operational on all sides and not
move in a theatre of operations behind enemy lines on one side—and
this is one reason why we wanted to remain in Baghdad—in
Basra we expected a relatively sweeping advance, with the front
line established behind this advance. It is true that we said
that it was logistically more feasible to come in this time behind
the lines. We did not anticipate that Basra would at one stage
be a besieged town. We had not anticipated that at all. We had
not anticipated the nonlinear situation in the south—where
our teams were operating almost as the only international humanitarian
organisation—in a situation where the front line was not
very clear. In terms of security management that was a challenge,
because if you have a clear front line you can establish a contact
with commanding officers on both sides even over the front line;
but if you are in a sort of patchwork situation, it is far more
difficult to operate. Retroactively, it was easier for us to come
back, after having pulled out of Kuwait; to have contact with
the commanding officers at the different levels; establish contact,
and enter Basra from outside. I fear that if we had kept the team
inside, we would have found it more difficult to establish contact
with the British forces. It also has to be said that, one day
after the British forces moved into Basra, contact was established
at the regimental level and, two days later, at the brigade level.
Q465 Mr Roy: Were
those the reasons that you were able to cross the front line at
that particular point? It is our understanding that was the only
occasion when you were actually able to cross the lines and you
did not do it anywhere else.
Mr Staehelin: There
were several moves. You had a convoy of aid entering Basra on
4 April with medical goods. The very first repair work took place
on the 26 March and then we redeployed our staff to Basra on the
29. We had various movements of teams from Kuwait to Basra, and
also from Basra to the pumping station. We had international border,
cross-border, operations and cross-line operations on various
occasions.
Q466 Mr Roy: Was that
the only region though where you were able to cross the military
lines in such a manner—south of Basra?
Mr Staehelin: I
think that it probably was, yes. We have had international cross-border
operations, for instance, from Iran into Iraq; but it is true
that, in terms of an open front line in a combat zone, it is probably
the most significant example.
Q467 Mr Roy: If that
was the only area where you did cross the lines, was it because
of the relationship you had built up with, for example, the army
personnel that were there? I am trying to get to exactly what
were the circumstances that allowed you to cross those lines.
Mr Staehelin: I
cannot now think of other cases where we tried to do it and we
did not have the support of the parties to the conflict to do
so. It is true, however, that if we managed to do so it was because
there was a good understanding by the British forces of who we
are and, I think, a degree of trust that we are a purely humanitarian
actor. Similarly, the Iraqi governor at the time felt that we
were trustworthy, and that Iraqi water board officials sent out
to repair a water pumping station under the auspices of the ICRC
with ICRC technicians would only do that and nothing else. To
a certain extent, without wanting to level everything, in the
type of work we have, you need a relationship with all parties
to the conflict to be able to have these cross-border operations.
But I think that the fact that British troops knew us—they
had some previous operations in other countries, or by training—and
the fact that we have been able to have good access to the officers
proved instrumental. I think that they were very supportive of
our mission, and indeed happy that the water was reinstalled—as
were the Iraqi authorities inside the town.
Q468 Chairman: You
obviously operate, almost by definition, in a precarious environment
where, although you try to be very prudent, it can be very risky.
Do you have in your headquarters a security department? When you
move around in dangerous areas do you have to hire people to come
in to stand guard over your property, or protect you personally?
Or would you just have to rely on the armed forces or the police
who happened to be in control when you were operating? When you
transport food and water, do you have to make arrangements to
protect that from people who would come and steal it, or harm
your personnel?
Mr Staehelin: We
do have a security unit at our headquarters, providing advice
and working on approaches. We have a security concept based on
seven pillars, which is in the public domain and on the website.
One of the main pillars is the acceptability by the parties to
the conflict. Everything rests upon the fact that everybody basically
agrees with our presence and agrees that we should carry out our
humanitarian mandate—which means a sustained dialogue with
all actors carrying weapons in a conflict. That can be states,
as in the recent conflict, but in certain areas of the world it
is a patchwork of groups and it is extremely complicated. Security
management is very much exercised by the field staff. One important
aspect is notification. Notification of buildings, in order that
you are not targeted or hit. It can also mean notification of
movements. Prior to the conflict, we established with Central
Command protocols on air movements, land movements, communication—respectful,
of course, of our independence. We were very happy that we were
granted, as the law stipulated, unhindered access in the field
and an unhindered right to move in the field. We insisted on having
liaison officers on all sides, including the Iraqi side, to be
able to notify our movements and the purpose of those movements.
Normally, we do not use armed guards because we consider them
as a source of insecurity rather than security. If you use the
armed guards in a conflict zone, you transform yourself into a
possible target. We therefore prefer to go on our own. We do not
ever carry weapons, and we rely heavily on being accepted by the
parties to the conflict. The only exception is that in some countries
you have crime. It can happen in some exceptional circumstances
that, for instance, a warehouse is protected by armed guards against
criminals. But we would never ever try to impose our presence
with arms upon one party to the conflict. That would be totally
contrary to our way of operating.
Q469 Chairman: Have
you lost people? Have people been killed?
Mr Staehelin: We
have very sadly lost one Canadian colleague, who was killed in
Baghdad during a crossfire incident. We were not targeted, we
established later. It was one of the six expatriate volunteers
who remained in Baghdad.
Q470 Patrick Mercer:
Between the end of the fighting and the arrival of the other humanitarian
agencies there was a gap in both time and circumstance.
Mr Staehelin: Yes.
Q471 Patrick Mercer:
How did you manage then? Were you able to plug this vacuum?
Mr Staehelin: It
was an extremely precarious situation in terms of security. We
were still under the shock of the death of one of our delegates.
We were in a situation where we feared that our delegation in
Baghdad would be looted, and we were happy that coalition forces
there established law and order in the part of town where our
delegation was situated, and where also a hospital was situated.
That was helpful in terms of not being looted. What we also realised
was that our in-depth knowledge of the systems, of the water and
health infrastructure systems, proved useful to the joint efforts
of all concerned to get these systems up and running again. We
had interesting situations where Iraqi technicians approached
us and told us that they would be ready to work with coalition
forces to restore these systems under an ICRC umbrella, but they
would not be ready to meet with foreign soldiers bilaterally,
because that would be treason to their country. However, if it
was overseen by the ICRC and within a framework guaranteed to
deal only with the re-establishment of these public services to
their population, they would be ready to meet with them. For instance,
in Basra we very rapidly had such meetings, which were facilitated
by the ICRC and which I think were conducive to re-establishing
water and electricity in the town. A similar experience took place
in Baghdad.
Q472 Patrick Mercer:
When the other agencies began to arrive, how did that affect your
work?
Mr Staehelin: It
is certainly welcome that other humanitarian actors come in. It
was a tremendous weight on our shoulders during the phase of major
combat to intervene, with limited means, on life-saving matters.
We realised that there was a certain gap between what humanitarian
organisations can deliver and the expectations of the Iraqi population.
The Iraqi population today appears to be most concerned about
security. Obviously, humanitarian organisations are not in a position
to provide security. They are very much concerned about having
a government which functions again. Again, humanitarian organisations
are not in a position to deliver. They are interested in receiving
salaries. Humanitarian organisation may intervene on salaries,
but it would not be the prime action. So there was a certain gap.
Some of the NGOs came and said, "There isn't a humanitarian
catastrophe. What we can bring to the table is therefore not the
most appropriate answer", and left. We have had instances
of NGOs actually pulling out again.
Q473 Rachel Squire:
I am very interested in whether there are any particular new lessons
that the ICRC has learned from the Iraq conflict. For instance,
I was listening carefully to your comments about water-trucking,
the mobile workshops, the focus on hospitals, your comments about
the need for a family approach to bodies that are uncovered in
mass graves, and your comment just now about the gap between what
you can deliver as a humanitarian organisation and what the population
of Iraq is looking for. My first question, therefore, is whether
any of those that I have just mentioned, picking up on your earlier
comments, are new lessons for your organisation? Are those things
that you have learned and had experience of in previous conflicts?
Mr Staehelin: To
be perfectly frank with you, we have not yet carried out an internal
review on this operation, which is still ongoing. It would be
thinking aloud if I gave you my personal comments on it. For me,
the lessons are reconfirmations rather than new lessons. I think
that our insistence on our independence, our insistence on having
a dialogue with all parties to the conflict—even parties
which are regarded as parties one should not talk to—is
right. We need to talk to everybody who carries arms in conflict
zones, in order to accomplish our mandate. We need to defend this
independence space. It was not really necessary in this conflict.
We felt there was a large support for our way of operating; but,
in other conflicts, I think that it is very important that we
defend this humanitarian independence space , which is not instrumentalised
by one or other party to the conflict. Secondly, we had the difficult
situation of seeing a war coming—as nevertheless a distinct
possibility, without wanting to take it as a foregone conclusion.
Rather than to speculate on possible scenarios, we tried hard
to prepare solidly for this eventuality, whilst of course hoping
that a peaceful solution could be reached by other means. Much
of our capacity to work during the conflict was built upon very
solid and serious preparation. That also means the preparation
of the hospitals, for instance, in Baghdad, in terms of water;
an acknowledgement that interventions on systems are far more
efficient, even if they are less visible than, for instance, water-trucking.
It is true that we did some water-trucking, but it is a drop in
the ocean. It is far more efficient to repair the water systems,
the big water pumps, because the water trucks will never reach
a sufficient number of persons. For instance, the distribution
of bottled water is really a drop in the ocean in most situations.
This approach, focussed on reinforcing systems with a solid preparation,
is certainly something which we want to pursue in similar situations.
Water has also rightly emerged as an important problem in times
of armed conflict. Some years ago there was a debate even in the
ICRC whether water was really an issue in which the ICRC should
be involved. Is it really relevant in a conflict situation? Is
it really part of our mandate? I think that Iraq has nevertheless
shown that, in such a situation, water was absolutely vital. People
had food stocks. Food was not the problem in this war. But if
the water had been cut, it would have been a major problem. I
think that also one lesson is that sometimes you have to prepare,
even if you cannot be sure that your preparation will pay off.
We prepared for 150,000 IDPs. We bought relief items; we established
a system of warehouses; ICRC trucks—because we know that
ICRC trucks with expatriate drivers can cross front lines whereas
local drivers often cannot, because people do not trust them.
So we have invested in certain fields which were not necessary
to that extent. For me, the lesson learned is that it was right
to do so—even if I am very happy that this internal displacement
has not taken place on that scale. I would still regard it as
the right decision to have this capacity. Lastly, it is important
to communicate what you do. What the ICRC has done in this war,
perhaps more than in previous conflicts, is try to be transparent
as far as possible on what it does and why it does it. We have
issued daily bulletins; we have put them on the website. We have
communicated in English and French, but also in Arabic. We have
had a large investment in trying to put across our priorities
and our independent, purely humanitarian way of operating, to
all the constituencies. I think that it was picked up by the Iraqi
population, from Radio Monte Carlo and other outlets. I think
that it contributed to the fact that we were not deliberately
targeted by any of the parties to the conflict.
Rachel Squire:
You have made the point about neutrality. Also, trying to communicate
that to a population, who may well have never heard of you before,
is a lesson that has global application—not just for the
Iraq conflict.
Q474 Chairman: Has
your organisation made some sort of assessment of the damage that
was caused by the bombing, the looting, and other criminal activity?
I know that it will not be an exact science, but has anybody tried
to give some kind of notional figure of the damage?
Mr Staehelin: I
am afraid that we have not been able to map the damage. Also,
at the beginning of the conflict, we provided some of the figures
on injured persons—figures we established by visiting the
hospitals. We quickly came to the conclusion that it was impossible.
We did not have access to all the hospitals. For instance, we
did not have access to the military hospitals in Baghdad. It was
very difficult for us to assess whether the persons in hospitals
were civilians or military. We did not know the circumstances,
so we stopped providing figures. We rapidly came to the conclusion
that we could not provide statistics on the war damage.
Q475 Chairman: So
you will not have made any calculations of the cost of repairing
the damage?
Mr Staehelin: No,
we have not.
Q476 Chairman: Has
anyone done that, do you think?
Mr Staehelin: Not
to my knowledge, but it is absolutely possible that it has been
done without my knowing.
Q477 Syd Rapson: On
11 April you made a very rare public statement, criticising the
allies and pleading for more security to protect the infrastructure,
the hospitals and the water supply against looting and destruction.
We can understand that, but I wonder whether or not the security
system did improve due to your pressure and the public statement,
or whether it is just a natural evolution which will happen anyway?
Has the security changed since 11 April?
Mr Staehelin: I
would say that the statement has had an impact. The statement
has followed bilateral dialogue. I would perhaps dare to disagree
that it was a "rare statement". The ICRC has often put
forward its humanitarian concerns in a public way. For us it was
important. We felt that if immediate action was not taken to protect
the hospitals, this would create a major humanitarian catastrophe,
and that it was our obligation to ring the alarm bells. We have
done so. I think that it was well understood, and it has had an
immediate impact on a variety of medical structures which were
subsequently protected.
Q478 Syd Rapson: Is
the security system at the moment impeding the restoration of
the infrastructure?
Mr Staehelin: There
is still looting and it is an enormous challenge to protect all
installations. We have constantly argued that, in addition to
the hospital structures, the water system, and indeed the electricity
system needed to keep the water system running, are also installations
which are of priority concern. I agree that it is a challenging
task. I am not myself of a military background, so I do not think
that I am in a position to give advice on how it should be done.
But we have constantly argued that it is extremely important that
these installations be protected.
Q479 Syd Rapson: Is
the humanitarian aid itself able to be supplied at a level you
would want, or is it still held up due to the security system?
We do not know. We just assume that the place is calming down.
One wonders whether or not the security situation is impeding
that humanitarian aid, as well as protecting the water supplies.
Mr Staehelin: In
certain instances it can impede access. To give you but one example,
ICRC still does not use the road from Amman to Baghdad and has
not used it since the beginning of the war. We judge it as simply
too dangerous. Part of our humanitarian relief arrives by plane.
We were the first organisation to operate civilian planes in what
is still military airspace over Iraq. For me that is another example
of the support we have had for the accomplishment of our humanitarian
mission. To give you but one example, on the very same day that
I accompanied our president on a visit to Baghdad in early May
we had a Hercules coming from Amman bringing in humanitarian relief.
We came from Cyprus, and we also had a jet coming in from Teheran,
bringing back Iraqi prisoners of war who were released by Iran—prisoners
of war dating back to the 1988 war. So we had three ICRC aircraft
arriving on the same day. On the one hand, it shows the co-operation
we have had to operate these aircraft, which is very positive;
on the other hand, it shows that certain roads are still considered
to be too dangerous for us, and that there is certainly still
work to be done to secure the country, in order that everybody
can operate safely.
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