Examination of Witness (Questions 480-499)
MR BALTHASAR
STAEHELIN
18 JUNE 2003
Q480 Syd Rapson: Could
I ask you to make a guess? There is obviously a difference between
air-supplied humanitarian aid and the lorries.
Mr Staehelin: Yes.
Q481 Syd Rapson: The
lorries are still vulnerable to attack. Is there a quantifiable
difference between what is getting in by air and what could have
come in by road? A guess that perhaps 80% more could get through
if it were by road? It is obviously not the same, is it?
Mr Staehelin: I
am afraid that I would not be in a position to give percentages.
ICRC is not really an actor in the food sector, so I do not want
to elaborate on issues which I do not know well enough. The World
Food Programme would be the appropriate one to pronounce. However,
it would seem to be almost impossible to bring in all of the food
supplies by air, and I think that it is operated by lorries. In
our view, however, the major challenge today is not so much bringing
in lorries of humanitarian relief goods, but to establish a functioning
administrative system. That would perhaps have a more direct or
rapid impact, because we do not have a humanitarian crisis which
would need thousands of lorries. We really need a structure to
run the country.
Q482 Patrick Mercer:
Moving on to the vexed question of cluster bombs and the disposal
of unexploded ordnance, the ICRC are quoted as saying that they
believe that cluster bombs in particular should not be used in
populated areas. Can you expand on that for us, please?
Mr Staehelin: That
is correct. I am not myself a lawyer, but what we have seen is
that the cluster bombs or artillery-delivered submunitions have
had a negative impact in certain countries. Essentially, we present
three questions. One is the question of targeting: that all ammunition
targeting must be done in a way that it can distinguish between
military and civilian objectives, and that it is proportional.
Secondly, we have the issue of the explosion rate of this ammunition.
Some figures I have seen suggest that up to 10 to 30% of this
ammunition does not explode upon impact and afterwards represent
hazards to the population, but also to peacekeeping troops or
humanitarian actors, or whoever moves on the field. The clearance
is a third important issue, in terms of the ammunition which has
not exploded and should be cleared. While the weapon as such is
legal, it is not exempt from the rules applicable to all weapons.
In this sense, the ICRC has suggested that one might consider
regulating the use of this ammunition and not to use it in densely
populated areas.
Q483 Patrick Mercer:
We took evidence from one of the Defence Ministers a couple of
weeks ago, where he confirmed that the British had not used cluster
weapons in the populated areas but suggested that these weapons
had been used in the periphery, in the outskirts of populated
areas. Would you have a comment on that?
Mr Staehelin: We
have already had, prior to this war, awareness campaigns for the
population in the south, due to the concentration of explosive
remnants of previous conflicts, which already represented a challenge.
We have since stepped up these efforts to alert the population
to the dangers, with the help of the Iraqi Red Crescent Society.
Indeed, the first convoy coming into Basra on 4 April carried
material, leaflets and posters, which we had produced previously
because we were very aware in our contingency planning that this
would be an issue. In our experience, without being able to pretend
that we have an intimate knowledge of exactly which type of weapon
was used where, we have rapidly informed the British forces of
places where such unexploded submunitions were detected by our
team, and they have immediately cleared these places. There was
certainly a willingness to try to act swiftly and to clear these
regions. Where we were under the impression that they were overstretched,
in terms of resources, was with the perhaps even greater problem
of enormous amounts of ammunition, and indeed weapon systems,
scattering the south. We notified places which we found, with
a request to try to secure these sites and actually to take out
the ammunition, because children started to play with it and it
was quite dangerous to the population. There, I think, there was
certainly not a lack of will but perhaps a lack of resources to
respond as rapidly as we would have wished.
Q484 Patrick Mercer:
Have you discovered or been made aware of cluster munitions in
populated areas?
Mr Staehelin: As
far as I am aware, it was artillery-delivered submunitions which
were used in the south and not air-delivered cluster bombs.
Q485 Patrick Mercer:
In populated areas?
Mr Staehelin: I
know that we have had one incident in which two persons were killed
in or around Basra, which we immediately notified to the coalition
forces; but I am not sure whether it was in the town or on the
periphery of the town.
Q486 Patrick Mercer:
This is probably impossible to answer, but do you believe that
these are munitions from the recent conflict or from previous
ones?
Mr Staehelin: Yes.
Q487 Patrick Mercer:
From the recent one?
Mr Staehelin: I
think that the ones which we notified for immediate clearance
were of the recent conflict, but I do not know the precise location.
Q488 Patrick Mercer:
You have already touched upon this, but how have your staff worked
on the ground to avoid civilian casualties in the presence of
unexploded ordnance?
Mr Staehelin: During
the intense phase of the combat there was not much we could do;
but, as soon as it was possible, we started to draw upon the persons
we had previously trained of the Iraqi Red Crescent Society and
have added volunteers, who were trained. It is now well over 100
who go round with this awareness material and try to inform the
population of this danger. Of course, that does not solve the
issue. It is important that the population is made aware that
there is the issue of clearance, which will be a major headache—clearance
of the explosive remnants of war of the recent period, but also
clearance of all of the explosive remnants of the last decades.
Our regional adviser on this issue covering the Middle East, who
is a man of military background and who has long been active in
this field, has said that, if you look at the overall situation
in Iraq, it is the worst situation he has seen in many years of
experience. I think that it is a substantial problem, which will
plague Iraq for a while.
Q489 Jim Knight: Continuing
with explosive remnants but not specifically relating to cluster
bombs, in a press notice of 1 May the ICRC stated that it had
identified around 30 sites in Basra containing explosive remnants
of war. Can you tell us how many of these sites have now been
secured or made safe, to your knowledge?
Mr Staehelin: I
would have to get back to you on that question. I do not have
the information at my disposal right now.
Q490 Jim Knight: With
any of these things, if it is better to give us a written note
then that is fine and very helpful. Do you have any idea of how
many more sites have been identified since 1 May?
Mr Staehelin: I
would prefer to get back to you in writing on that also.
Q491 Jim Knight: The
indication we have had is that it is substantially more. There
is a Written Answer in Parliament, identifying 400 sites containing
unexploded ordnance within the British area of control in Iraq.
How do you believe that the disposal of those remnants should
be prioritised?
Mr Staehelin: I
think that certainly areas in which you have a lot of population
movement would have to be dealt with as a priority, namely sites
inside town. We have had ammunition found in primary and secondary
schools, in kindergartens, and that would logically be a first
priority. Sites which are perhaps outside of town—the desert,
et cetera—could be dealt with as a second priority.
Q492 Jim Knight: Reports
of ordnance amongst rubbish on the side of the roads—would
that be reasonable?
Mr Staehelin: That
it would be mingled?
Q493 Jim Knight: Yes.
Various garbage, detritus, of whatever description.
Mr Staehelin: In
terms of booby traps? People had an enormous amount of ammunition
and they basically dropped it wherever they were. In Baghdad I
have seen relatively small positions, supposedly to defend a building.
So it is absolutely feasible that you would find ammunition next
to dust bags. That seems possible.
Q494 Jim Knight: To
what extent does the presence of all of this unexploded ordnance
impede the other work that you have been talking about—the
repair of essential infrastructure, the provision of humanitarian
assistance and other matters? You have said that this is a really
big problem, and particularly bad from this conflict. Is this
something that we have to tackle first before we can hope to make
great progress on the other hand?
Mr Staehelin: It
really very much depends what type of explosive remnants you are
talking about. Whether you are talking about mines from previous
wars, which make whole areas inaccessible; whether you are talking
about ammunition dumps in schools; whether you are talking about
unexploded submunitions—it is different types of explosive
remnants of war, but they certainly have an impact on the possibility
by the population to access certain regions and to develop economic
activities in these regions. So I think that it would be a priority
to map and mark the sites. Whenever we come across such sites,
in the first place we informed the coalition forces with forms
in which we gave all the details, and now we give them to the
United Nations Mine Action Centre. We hope that a clear mapping
and marking will emerge as a first measure, coupled with an awareness
campaign for the population, to control the situation; and subsequently
there must be clearance, according to a priority which experts
are in a better position to define than myself.
Q495 Jim Knight: Finally,
are the coalition forces giving enough priority to this issue?
Mr Staehelin: We
in the field have always felt that there was an interest in trying
to respond but that they were really overstretched—terribly
overstretched. They have a relatively small number of teams to
deal with such matters and the sheer size of the problem is overwhelming.
Q496 Rachel Squire:
Can I move to the obligations of the occupying power? You have
already made some related comments that, in the view of the ICRC,
the breakdown of law and order in some respects has had a greater
impact on the civilian population than the conflict itself. I
understand that the main sources of law on occupation are the
regulations annexed to the Hague Convention and the Geneva Convention.
You yourself have stated that, on the basis of that law, "the
coalition forces, in their role of occupying power, have a key
part to play in stabilising the situation and in enabling Iraqi
civilian personnel and structures to resume their functions".
Can I ask you about the fine balance in international law between
the requirement for the occupying power to stabilise the situation
in Iraq and the requirement for it to respect local laws, civilian
personnel and structures? When is an occupying power, in your
organisation's view, entitled to overturn local laws and dismiss
local public servants? Would such action be a breach of international
law?
Mr Staehelin: First,
I have to admit that I am not myself a lawyer, so forgive me if
I am imprecise. It is the view as I interpret it, as someone who
has worked for over a decade with the ICRC. In my understanding,
the Fourth Geneva Convention in particular tries to reconcile
the need of an occupying power to impose itself, in a situation
of belligerent occupation, with the essential rights of the population
under occupation. In this sense it is not a human rights catalogue,
but a carefully crafted reconciliation of the legitimate need
to uphold security with the needs of the population. Essentially,
occupation is a provisional state and the occupying powers are
a caretaker for the authority of the country. They can take certain
measures necessary for the implementation of the Fourth Geneva
Convention and militarily to occupy territory. However, under
the law as I understand it—which does not confer sovereignty
over the territory—they should try as much as possible to
leave the systems in place. In terms of dismissal of officials,
I would say that if an official is seen as a threat to the security
of the occupying power or as an obstacle to the implementation
of the Convention—which means establishing a system which
serves the population efficiently—I do not think that to
dismiss that official would be a contradiction of the Convention.
Q497 Rachel Squire:
I do not know whether you can comment on it, but do you or your
organisation think that in that particular respect there has been
any breach of international law in Iraq?
Mr Staehelin: In
general, on the issue of possible observations of breaches of
international law by any of the parties to the conflict, we would
submit our findings to the authorities concerned in a bilateral
dialogue, which would be of a confidential nature. In this sense,
I would prefer not to start to pronounce on this issue because,
afterwards, it would be too easy to induce—when I do not
answer! So I would prefer not to answer this question.
Q498 Rachel Squire:
Can I ask you about UN Security Council Resolution No.1483, which
was passed on 22 May and was very widely welcomed by anybody with
an interest? It lifted the sanctions against Iraq and called on
the coalition authorities "to promote the welfare of the
Iraqi people" and also called for the formation "of
an Iraqi interim administration", amongst many other things.
Can you say whether there has been a practical effect in Iraq
of the passage of that UN Security Council Resolution No.1483,
or has it been high-sounding words which, practically, did not
make that much difference?
Mr Staehelin: I
do not think that I am really in a position to judge the direct
impact of Security Council resolutions on the ground.
Q499 Mr Roy: Could
I ask about the co-operation that you received from the Coalition
Provisional Authority? How does that actually work-or not?
Mr Staehelin: We
certainly are in a dialogue with both the armed forces, in particular
because we were there when they arrived, and it is true that we
also had close contact with, first ORHA and then CPA, in the field
of our interests. Our president met with Mr Garner at the time
of his visit in early May, and our head of delegation met with
Mr Bremer. We are in intense dialogue both with the armed forces
and the CPA, mainly in Baghdad. In Basra in the south, operationally
speaking, at this stage it is still predominantly the armed forces
who are the main occupational interlocutor and, perhaps to a lesser
extent at this stage, CPA.
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