Examination of Witnesses (Questions 520-539)
MAJOR GENERAL
ROBIN BRIMS
CBE AND BRIGADIER
SHAUN COWLAM
MBE
25 JUNE 2003
Q520 Chairman: And
do you think you learned anything from the way in which they are
organised? I am sure we will come on to this later.
Brigadier Cowlam:
A massive amount, in terms of the scale on which they operate
and some of the technologies that they have available, but also
some of the problems that they suffer; so I think at all levels
we learned a tremendous amount. And, to echo what the General
said, the personal relationships were outstanding, we were literally
living together. I shared a room with the Commander of the Marine
Logistics Command, and at a personal level the interaction, liaison,
co-operation, were outstanding.
Q521 Chairman: I am
sure we will come back to that. And a follow-up to that, how did
3 Commando Brigade's logistic structure fit into your responsibilities?
Brigadier Cowlam:
Three Commando Brigade, once they came on shore as an integral
part of 1 (UK) Armoured Division, the responsibility for sustaining
them switched to me; but, clearly, the Amphibious Task Group stores
on the RFAs were made available. And, indeed, in the early stages
of the campaign, because 3 Brigade were there early, we managed
to use some of their stocks to support some of 1 Div's training
before a lot of the equipment and the ammunition arrived. And
so they were a very positive addition and an early capability
that we were able to make use of.
Q522 Mr Howarth: It
sounds, from what you say, General, that things worked extremely
well, in terms of the relationship between you and Air Marshal
Burridge and your American counterparts. Were there any occasions
on which you were ever in direct contact with the Chief of Joint
Operations here, or with the Chief of the Defence Staff here,
or, indeed, dare I say it, even Ministers?
Major General Brims:
No; only when they came forward and visited. There was a period,
at the end of January, early February, that Headquarters 1 Division
was forward and we were sort of, as it were, pulling forward our
Division to do their training, but we were planning alongside
the Americans, so there was a period I deployed, towards the end
of January, when there was not a National Contingent Headquarters,
so we reported to the Permanent Joint Headquarters here in the
UK. But by, I think it was, some time around the second week in
February, with the NCC Headquarters, then we reported through
them; and I did not, other than when they visited forward, communicate
upwards other than through the NCC.
Q523 Mr Howarth: It
sounds like altogether rather a successful relationship was forged?
Major General Brims:
I have to say that it was a privilege, because throughout the
combat phase of the war I was given complete freedom by the coalition
and the national chains of command to conduct operations in the
way that we, in 1 Div, thought was best. I know that is what the
doctrine says, but history tells me I was extremely lucky.
Q524 Mr Jones: You
have talked obviously about the close working relationship with
the Americans. We understand that some American units were under
British tactical command in your sector. Could you explain actually
how that worked in practice, and have any lessons been learned
for the future?
Major General Brims:
There was one Marine Expeditionary Unit which was embedded in
3 Commando Brigade. When the decision was made that 1 Div would
come in the south, in early January, ahead of that, the decision
that 3 Commando Brigade would do the operation as much as it did
on the al Faw peninsula, and, at that stage, in order to bolster
up the size of 3 Commando Brigade, because it was actually only
with two Commandos, the Americans had put a third Commando into
it, which they call a Marine Expeditionary Unit, and it came as
quite a powerful organisation, and that was fixed ahead of me,
as it were, taking command of 3 Commando Brigade. It then stayed
in that state of command for about the first two or three days,
because once we had done the initial landings in the al Faw then
they went back to operate with the 1st Marine Expeditionary Force.
They did quite well.
Q525 Mr Jones: And
how did that work, in terms of command?
Major General Brims:
The Commanding Officer of the Marine Expeditionary Unit would
report to the 3 (UK) Commando Brigade, 3 (UK) Commando Brigade
reported to me, and I reported to the MEF; although, clearly,
the American would report directly to an American on a national
basis, in exactly the same way as I was reporting to Air Marshal
Burridge, so the fail-safes were there. So if we, the UK, had
given 1 MEU, this single American Unit, an order that perhaps
they felt was not in the US interests, contrary to US law, they
had a fail-safe mechanism, exactly in the same way as we had.
Q526 Mr Jones: And
that did not arise at any time?
Major General Brims:
It did not. I am not aware of it ever being exercised.
Q527 Mr Jones: And,
if it had been, what was the actual way of sorting it out?
Major General Brims:
I am quite sure that the Commanding General of 1 MEF and I would
have had a discussion, and, as it did not happen, I am confident
that General Conway, the Commanding General of 1 MEF, and I would
have been able to sort that out.
Q528 Chairman: Was
there any difference in doctrine between the British Army and
the US Marine Corps? I know their marines probably are more numerous
than the Army, but was there any difference that might have caused
any conflict?
Major General Brims:
There are no instances of difference, but the basic doctrines
are the same. And I think that the make-up of the US marine, the
US marines are much smaller than the US Army, they are about the
size of the British Defence Forces, and they are actually structured
as genuinely joint, they are the Fourth Force, they are not within
the Navy in the same way as the Royal Marines are in the Royal
Navy. So, I think, their size, and therefore they know each other,
they are quite akin to us in that sense. The American planning
system is different from ours, but we know that, we have worked
with them; they operate a system that suits them, which is, they
plan the staff, do the planning and present options to a commander,
who chooses, and then they develop the option. We tend to have
a command-led planning process, that starts with a commander and
his staff, and then the commander gives the staff direction, they
develop the direction. Both systems are perfectly respectable;
you had to work very hard to get them to co-operate with each
other, because one lot of staff has more freedom than the other
lot of staff, when you are planning together, but we knew that
and we have the universal connectors to be able to get over that.
Q529 Chairman: And
have we been doing any sort of joint exercising with them?
Major General Brims:
Oh, yes. What I have described to you, if you read the Operation
Granby Report, it came across very clearly in that, and we knew
that, we worked hard at making sure that we knew it, and therefore
we could find ways of working to overcome it.
Q530 Mr Roy: Can I
ask what your command relationship with British Special Forces
was, in your sector?
Major General Brims:
None; the Special Forces are a component, in the same way that
I was a component, so the Special Forces component would report
nationally to the NCC Headquarters, and in the coalition sense
to the Coalition Special Forces. So, it was nothing to do with
me.
Q531 Mr Roy: And were
you happy with that arrangement?
Major General Brims:
It was nothing to do with me.
Q532 Mr Roy: Yes;
but you were happy that it was nothing to do with you, that is
what I am asking?
Major General Brims:
Yes. I would never expect it to be unlike that, I would never
expect it to be any other way than it was.
Q533 Chairman: They
must have told you what they were doing; it is not like some stealth
force suddenly appearing on territory that you were operating
in, even though maybe you were not there?
Major General Brims:
They did not.
Q534 Chairman: They
did not tell you?
Major General Brims:
No, they did not appear on my territory.
Q535 Chairman: They
did not?
Major General Brims:
No.
Q536 Chairman: That
is a recipe for friendly fire, if they did not let you know what
they were doing?
Major General Brims:
No; they were not under my command, but if any Special Forces
had been in my area, obviously, they would have been in touch.
Chairman: That
is a great relief anyway.
Q537 Mr Howarth: Gentlemen,
when did you start planning for the ground campaign? We understand
the Americans were really planning it at the beginning of last
summer, at Centcom, and that the Brits were being involved towards
the end of the year?
Major General Brims:
I got involved in the planning phase right at the end of September,
when I started to be made aware of some of the planning going
on, I would not say actually I was directly involved in it, so
I was watching some of the potential planning from then. By the
end of October, beginning of November, I became more involved,
and in order to conduct an exercise we developed some plans within
an exercise setting, which took place in early December.
Q538 Mr Howarth: And
were you involved directly with Centcom in that planning, did
they call on your advice as to what the British contribution could
be, or did you just simply fit into the Americans' plan when you
got together?
Major General Brims:
No. I did go to a couple of senior commanders' conferences at
Centcom, and I was aware of the planning, but I was, as it were,
on listening, so I could understand the higher levels of the plan
and therefore develop my own plans to fit in within their concepts
and intents. But I did not contribute to that planning; other
British officers did but I did not.
Q539 Mr Howarth: At
that point, to where was your reporting line?
Major General Brims:
At that particular junction, I was reporting actually to Land
Command, as it were, my full command, but in detail I reported
to the Permanent Joint Headquarters.
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