Examination of Witnesses (Questions 540-559)
MAJOR GENERAL
ROBIN BRIMS
CBE AND BRIGADIER
SHAUN COWLAM
MBE
25 JUNE 2003
Q540 Mr Howarth: Did
you, at that stage, envisage the kind of level of commitments
that we were going to be making?
Major General Brims:
At that stage, I did not have any orders.
Q541 Mr Howarth: What
were you working on, in your discussions with the Americans?
Major General Brims:
Planning.
Q542 Mr Howarth: The
planning obviously was based upon a certain British contribution.
At that stage, did they ask you and say, "What, General,
do you think the UK can bring to the party?"?
Major General Brims:
There were different permutations at that stage. The structure
that I described at the start, that which we actually went with,
by New Year that was the structure, to go there; all planning
before then was with a range of different structures.
Q543 Mr Howarth: So
there were a number of options?
Major General Brims:
There were options, there were plans, there was nothing sufficiently
firmed up.
Q544 Mr Howarth: Did
you have a clear view in your own mind as to what the best British
contribution could be?
Major General Brims:
To do what, where?
Q545 Mr Howarth: To
achieve the objective that the Americans were looking for everyone
to achieve, in conjunction with the British?
Major General Brims:
What, coming from Kuwait?
Q546 Mr Howarth: Indeed;
because it was planned that we would come from Turkey?
Major General Brims:
To come from Kuwait to do it, the best structure would be the
one I was given. If I had gone somewhere else, it would not have
been that structure.
Q547 Mr Howarth: I
think I follow, General. But did your detailed planning change
between January, when you suggest things firmed up and the options
were considered, and March? There was talk, at some stage during
that period, of the United States looking to rely more heavily
on air power and on lighter ground forces; were you aware of that,
were you in that loop?
Major General Brims:
No. I am completely outside that loop. I was given a plan that
I developed, without any huge change from January through to March;
because, at some part of January, I was planning to come from
Kuwait. So it is from early January that I was informed that I
would have the task organisation, or probably have that task organisation,
and probably come from Kuwait; I think it was January 20'ish that
the Government made the decision that that was what would happen.
Q548 Mr Howarth: It
must have taken quite a substantial reconsideration of how you
were going to move from one set of tactics to a completely different
set of tactics?
Major General Brims:
I do not think so. I think we have got sufficiently agile, flexible
forces to be able to do that.
Q549 Mr Howarth: Were
the Americans impressed?
Major General Brims:
You would have to ask them. I commanded 24 Air Mobile Brigade
myself, and when I commanded 24 Air Mobile Brigade we went on
operations, and my logistics support, not under my command, came
from the then Colonel Cowlam.
Q550 Jim Knight: Just
briefly, Brigadier, I wanted to ask a similar question. I appreciate
your responsibilities were about logistics in theatre and not
supplies from the UK, but at what stage did you start being involved
in planning for that, given that inevitably you were going to
get a really short time window to get everything distributed out
to where it needed to go?
Brigadier Cowlam:
The time line involved in my own Headquarters was roughly the
same as that mentioned by the General, although personally I was
not involved in the senior commanders' seminars in the States,
but we did send members of staff to assist with the Division's
team, and we were in consultation with PJHQ, through October,
November, December, helping them and offering them staff assistance
in their contingency planning, to give them a view of what capability
could be provided and what time lines. So we were aware particularly
of the northern option, as a contingency plan that was being developed,
and we contributed to it as best we could.
Q551 Jim Knight: And
given "just in time" and that that requires certain
assumptions, certain types of campaign would require certain types
of ammunition, and you would have to make sure that all that was
going to come through?
Brigadier Cowlam:
Our assumptions were based on the assumptions which we were working
on. I challenge that they are "just in time", I think
that is a bit of jargon that people have grasped to describe what
we were doing, but certainly we do not have, I think, a British
military logistics philosophy which is based on "just in
time", certainly not for operational logistics. The contributions
we were making were on our capability, how quickly, how far, how
we would organise ourselves and what resources we would need to
do a range of tasks over a range of distances.
Q552 Jim Knight: And
during that planning phase, are there points at which it is the
job of your logisticians to say, "Sorry, folks, you just
can't plan to be able to do that, because I'm not going to be
able to get the stuff out there in time"?
Brigadier Cowlam:
The overall estimate does take logistics into account, and we
listen to what the commander would like to do and then we do various
staff checks, working out how we would achieve that. But I do
not recollect any stage where we said, "That's a no-hoper,
we can't do it," it was more a case of what additional resources
and how would we go around arranging ourselves to enable the commander
to have the greatest freedom of action.
Q553 Mr Cran: Gentlemen,
still under the heading of Preparation and Planning, the literature
that is building up around the campaign that we are talking about
suggests that the campaign set off 48 hours before that which
was originally planned, as a result of the possibilities being
provided by the decapitation raids; and, indeed, also it is suggested
that the campaign really started two weeks earlier than you were
ready for it. Would you like to comment on both those propositions?
Major General Brims:
Yes. To take the second one, no, we were ready. Of course, you
could spend more time, although actually we had declared certain
dates that we would be ready and we were inside that, so we were
ready. The operation, in the final analysis, D-day, that is the
language, D-day and H Hour did get pulled forward, first by 24
hours and then by another 24 hours. That was partly because, as
I understand it, there were some opportunity targets for deep
air to do, but I think that we had always decided that we wanted
to get the land campaign launched early so that we could try to
capture the oil infrastructure intact, and, in the final analysis,
as I understand it, there were thoughts that the oil infrastructure
was in danger of being trashed; and therefore, the decision, because
we were bounced to go early, we did.
Q554 Mr Cran: The
reason I think I asked the question was not only because that
is what is being suggested, not, I may say, by the people at the
sharp end, of course, you have contradicted that, but I think
essentially for the question that Mr Knight put to you. Because
it seems to us, at least, having gone out and spoken to some of
the components of the force that you commanded, that really they
were, in a sense, superbly professional people, of course, and
we associate ourselves with your remarks, but, nonetheless, they
had difficulties in the sense that the equipment was not always
with them at the time. And therefore this whole question of whether
it all started off quicker than you wanted really fits into that
question, does it not?
Major General Brims:
Certainly, if you come from my perspective, we were ready; if
you work from their perspective, certain of the units would say
they were not ready, because, the last Brigade, we came in Brigade
by Brigade, so the first one ready was 3 Commando Brigade, then
16 Air Assault Brigade and then 7 Armoured Brigade, and we defined
readiness, the readiness to be able to conduct the plan that we
had agreed, would be where we had two battle groups of 7 Armoured
Brigade ready, and that was the definition of readiness. Now,
if you went and saw the two battle groups of 7 Armoured Brigade
that were not the two that were declared the first ready, they
would tell you that they were not ready, but the Division was;
if that is a reasonable explanation. And the two battle groups,
the last two battle groups in were the Scots Dragoon Guards and
2 RTR, but, I may say, they did do the catch-up and they caught
up remarkably quickly, and, with all their professionalism, skill
and determination, they made light of that; but, from their perspective,
they would be entirely accurate to say that they were not ready
at that stage.
Q555 Mr Cran: Then
just so that I get this absolutely clear, and I think you have
made it quite clear, I just am circling in my mind as to at what
point do you, and, of course, you, Brigadier, say to yourself,
because it cannot be 100% prepared, it just cannot be, because
of how life is, and logistics, and all the rest of it, where are
we; where does the point arrive when you say, "Fine; we're
ready"?
Major General Brims:
The judgment is reached, partly you can do it by defining the
numbers of troops that you need by capability and volume.
Q556 Mr Cran: With
their equipment with them as well?
Major General Brims:
Yes. And you agree that with the coalition and the national chain
of command, and we had defined that, and the definition was 2
Battle Groups of 7 Brigade. That is in a scientific way. But,
ultimately, you know when they are ready when you look them in
the eye, and the person I would turn to, to reach the judgment,
would be the Commander, in this case, of 7 Armoured Brigade, and
the opportunity to go forward and see the commanders and some
of the troops of the two, well, all battle groups in question,
but certainly those two battle groups.
Q557 Mr Cran: I understand
all of that, and just to get another one just quite straight.
The commentators were saying that you were planning for something
two weeks later, or thereabouts; was that true, or not, or had
you a much more flexible approach to this?
Major General Brims:
I have no idea what the commentators said.
Q558 Mr Cran: Well,
we have to rely on them occasionally?
Major General Brims:
It is complete news to me. I was ready to go, and I thought we
would go and we did, and we were called forward and we could do
it.
Mr Cran: Chairman,
I am happy with that.
Q559 Chairman: Yes;
we met some of the guys yesterday. I would prefer to talk to the
quartermaster before asking if they were ready to roll, but you
know the situation far better than I do.
Major General Brims:
I see what you mean, yes; ah, but the commander would talk to
the quartermaster too.
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