Examination of Witnesses (Questions 560-579)
MAJOR GENERAL
ROBIN BRIMS
CBE AND BRIGADIER
SHAUN COWLAM
MBE
25 JUNE 2003
Q560 Chairman: But
do the commanders always know what the quartermasters know?
Major General Brims:
The proof of the pudding is in the eating.
Chairman: Well
they were very happy their kit was finally arriving, when we met
them yesterday.
Q561 Mr Howarth: I
think it was only baked the night before, in that particular case.
Major General Brims:
Sometimes, you have to be positive, and you are dealt a hand of
cards and you have to play the hand of cards you have got to the
very best of your ability to deliver the mission; you cannot turn
round, on some sort of scientific basis, and say, "I'm not
going to do it."
Q562 Chairman: You
would like to have 52 cards in the deck, when you do play them;
but that is more a question for the DLO, I think, than for yourself?
Major General Brims:
But, in this case, we had actually declared readiness in that
scenario with 46 cards; that was the state of readiness, because
two of the battle groups were not, to go back to the earlier question.
Q563 Patrick Mercer:
General, we have touched on this already. With the benefit of
hindsight, did you have enough troops for what you were required
to do?
Major General Brims:
Yes.
Q564 Patrick Mercer:
Were they the right mix; again, we have touched on this already?
Major General Brims:
Yes, absolutely.
Q565 Patrick Mercer:
For instance, would you have two Armoured Brigades used, rather
than simply one?
Major General Brims:
To do what?
Q566 Patrick Mercer:
The fighting that you were confronted with?
Major General Brims:
I was given a mission and tasks within a concept of operations,
which was the 1st Marine Expeditionary Force, and I judged that
I had the forces commensurate with that mission and tasks; so
I was happy.
Q567 Patrick Mercer:
Was there any equipment that you might have liked, again, in retrospect;
for instance, you mentioned MLRS that you did not have, might
that have been useful, or was there something else available?
Major General Brims:
No, I do not think so. We examined the MLRS very carefully; it
is an area weapon and, right from the outset, when we put this
force together, in early January, with our analysis of the ground,
of the nature of the population and the probability of the way
the Iraqis would fight, it seemed to me an inappropriate weapon
system, we wanted something which had precision. And, therefore,
in that sense, that deep range was going to be that provided by
the 3rd Marine Air Wing; so I was very happy.
Q568 Patrick Mercer:
Is there anything else, that you felt that there was a gap?
Major General Brims:
No.
Q569 Patrick Mercer:
We talked to two of your battle groups yesterday, neither of whom
went at full war establishment, I do not know, I am not sure whether
the Commanding Officers knew, whether they chose, or whether it
was simply expedient, that the two Tank Regiments, to whom we
were talking, both went three squadrons rather than four. What
was it; was it choice, was it expediency, why did they not go
at war establishment, was that what you directed, or simply was
it a best effort?
Major General Brims:
It did go at full squadrons. Regimentally, they went with fewer
squadrons, but there were two extra squadrons provided by the
Queen's Royal Lancers, which produced the extra squadrons, so
that we did have square battle groups, i.e. two tank squadrons
in the battle groups. And that was achieved by the numbers available,
by reinforcing with the two squadrons, the Queen's Royal Lancers,
who are normally, physically, in 4 Brigade, in Osnabruck.
Q570 Patrick Mercer:
Going back to the question about the two Armoured Brigades, we
saw yesterday that these two Regiments, that we are talking about,
had taken reinforcements from 4 Brigade, and, the Infantry, there
were four companies brought from 20 Brigade. If you had wanted
to deploy from your normal order of battle, if you had wanted
to deploy two, or even three, Armoured Brigades, could you have
done that, at battle strength?4[3]
Major General Brims:
You would have to provide quite a long answer to the question.
I am not really a competent authority. You would have to ask Land
Command that, and you would have to define what you meant by an
Armoured Brigade and what you meant by an Armoured Battalion;
and it is a bigger question, I am not the competent authority
to answer that. It was not a relevant question to me at the time.
Chairman: Thank
you. We have a few questions on the Basra decision.
Q571 Jim Knight: As
you said, there was the northern option, I think the good Brigadier
described it as. If asked to do so, could the 1 (UK) Division
have supported a major thrust down into the north of Iraq, given
the terrain, given the long lines of communication?
Major General Brims:
Yes.
Q572 Jim Knight: So
our logistics capabilities would have been up to the task, or
would we have had to rely on the Americans?
Brigadier Cowlam:
For the northern option, we were planning both to rely on the
Americans to help us with transit facilities through Turkey, and
also to take more British logistics, including more C2 fighters
in both Logistics Brigades, one, as the Land 3rd Line logistics
component, and the second as a Joint Force logistics component,
so we did have a plan, which we developed in the autumn, to allow
that to happen.
Q573 Jim Knight: I
think we would all agree that it was remarkable, the logistics
achievement in such a short time-frame, and I think also we would
agree that it was not without its problems, and we will go on
to discuss those. Do you think those problems would have been
greater or fewer if you had had the northern option?
Brigadier Cowlam:
It is difficult to assess, in terms of time and distance, and
many of the issues about logistics are about time and distance,
how much time you have got and how far you need to go. I think,
because we were planning to use more forces and we were going
to rely on greater host nation and American assistance, it is
difficult to judge which would have been the worst option.
Q574 Jim Knight: So
would you agree that, from a logistics standpoint, it would have
been very challenging?
Brigadier Cowlam:
Both the north and the south were very challenging.
Q575 Jim Knight: Would
you agree that it would have been more challenging from a logistics
standpoint?
Brigadier Cowlam:
It is difficult to assess, and the reason is that, of course,
from the north we would not have had to go through the Suez Canal
and all the way round into the Gulf. The level of infrastructure
in Turkey we had not seen, and therefore I cannot comment. The
level of infrastructure in the south was very good. The best I
can say is, I think both would have been very challenging.
Q576 Jim Knight: And
so there was no suggestion that you guys, from the UK point of
view, were lobbying for Basra over the northern option?
Major General Brims:
I did not make that decision, that was made above me. When we
were planning the north, I got on with my tactical planning in
that area and we were making a plan there, and we exercised some
things there, and then I was asked to make a tactical plan with
a different scenario, so I got on and did that.
Q577 Jim Knight: And
then, finally, if we had fought alongside the US forces moving
towards Baghdad, would we have had then to rely pretty much solely
on their logistics chain?
Brigadier Cowlam:
No, I do not think so. We did some work to assess the reach, that
we could push, say, 7 Brigade further north, and, whilst Baghdad
is a long way, the infrastructure in the country very much would
allow them to move. An unknown factor, when we were thinking about
this, was how much resistance they would face, from a logistics
point of view; perversely, it is better if the rate of advance
is quite slow, whereas, from an operational perspective, the reverse
is true and a rapid advance is a greater logistics challenge.
Q578 Jim Knight: And
there is some discussion that it was almost a move to use some
of the logistics tail as a way of enticing out forces and then
coming back and getting them, I have seen that discussed in some
journals. I mean, force protection of logistics must be an increasing
concern for you?
Brigadier Cowlam:
I would not be an advocate of using your logistics to entice your
enemy to attack you; but force protection, clearly, is a major
factor in all the work and the estimates that we take on. We did
look at going north, and came to a judgment of how far we could
push, because, because it is time and distance again, you can
go very long distances, it depends on how much time you want to
do it in, and what sequencing and phasing would be required if
elements of 1 Div. were going to go further north.
Jim Knight: Thank
you. Your faith in the northern option is admirable, slightly
greater than the impression we got from the Secretary of State
and Brian Burridge; but, that is great.
Q579 Chairman: I would
be interested to know how it could be equally challenging to cross
mountains and rivers as opposed to fairly flat land? I know it
is more sandy in the south, but really I would have thought that
coming through Turkey and coming through Kurdish territory would
have been significantly more challenging than transiting the Suez
Canal and arriving by boat and driving up to Basra?
Brigadier Cowlam:
I think that is why I said I could not make a judgment on which
was the most challenging, because I had not seen northern Turkey.
But what I do know is that there are various NATO plans which
have been worked over many years to produce plans, and we had
access to those, and that is why I cannot judge which would have
been more difficult, because I know the south intimately but I
do not know the north, apart from the direct planning.
Chairman: Well
I think it would be quite difficult; anyway that was not a problem
we had to face.
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