Examination of Witnesses (Questions 600-619)
MAJOR GENERAL
ROBIN BRIMS
CBE AND BRIGADIER
SHAUN COWLAM
MBE
25 JUNE 2003
Q600 Mr Roy: But did
that policy increase the dangers to our Armed Forces; did that
political policy, that was stated by the Secretary of State, increase
the danger to our Forces?
Major General Brims:
No, I do not think so; no.
Q601 Mr Roy: None
at all?
Major General Brims:
No. I think we were very aware of it, and it seemed to me the
best way to do things. If I may, to make the issue a bit clearer,
I would assess that Saddam Hussein's regime wanted us to go into
the urban areas and fight, be they the Armed Forces or the irregulars,
in those urban areas, so that we would have caused collateral
damage, damaged people, taken casualties ourselves, high casualties,
the media would have reported it, and, potentially, somebody would
have said, "Up with this we cannot put." And there would
have been huge pressure, I think, on the leadership of the coalition,
and potentially some form of the regime suing for a settlement.
And, therefore, that, I think, was one of the courses of action
that I thought he might take, that is what I assessed he was doing
when we got to about days D plus two, three, four, this was becoming
self-evident. And that is why we conducted operations to do things
in a clever way that actually used the population, we wanted them
to be on our side, and tried to drive a wedge between the population
and the regime, in whatever way the regime was being represented
at a particular moment.
Q602 Mr Roy: I can
understand that, but what also we saw were the images of our soldiers
in berets, very, very quickly after they had gone into Basra,
and obviously that was to follow on the original policy that our
argument is not with the Iraqi people. But was there not a case
that maybe there was a chance that those soldiers were taking
off their hard hat and putting on their beret rather early, to
suit what the policy had been in the first instance?
Major General Brims:
No, I do not think so. Obviously, there is an element of risk
in that. I did not give out orders for people to put their beret
on and helmet off, and so forth, I left that to local commanders
to judge as they saw fit, and I am confident that our commanders,
right down to the man on the ground, who may well be a corporal,
or a sergeant, have got the judgment to make those judgments.
There is a risk in it, of course, but I think it was a risk that
was worth taking, and I think those judgments were well exercised
by everybody.
Q603 Chairman: Thank
you. So, the existence of weapons of mass destruction, how far
was their existence, or the belief of their existence in the Iraqi
armoury, central to the belief by your forces of the legitimacy
of the operation? I know Mr Campbell is answering the same questions
next-door to us.
Major General Brims:
I cannot connect what it would do to the legitimacy; but, as far
as I was concerned, we took the threat of weapons of mass destruction
very seriously, we did our training, we took the defensive measures,
in terms of equipment, taking the necessary pills, and so forth,
we did all of that. And, within the operation, one of the advantages
of going early with the ground campaign was that it meant there
was less opportunity for those people who had been trying to hide
the weapons of mass destruction to bring them together and use
them against us. And, secondly, we conducted an extensive information
operations campaign, among other things, telling people not to
use weapons against us, and if they did they would be held personally
accountable and it would not be an excuse to say that you had
been ordered to do so. And I think all of those things were very
prominent in our minds, in getting our message across, against
the threat of them being used.
Q604 Chairman: If
you were anticipating an NBC attack then I presume, as the kit
issued, following one attack, would need to be disposed of and
a second or third or fourth set of suits issued—this is
a question for the Brigadier—did you have enough sets that
could have been issued should our troops have been subject to
multiple chemical attacks?
Brigadier Cowlam:
The number of sets of suits for NBC and other consumables that
we required were specified in the sustainability statement, which
gives the holdings and numbers of suits to be held at different
levels. Across the force, there were some imbalances, which led
to a plan to redistribute some of the equipment. I cannot actually
answer the question whether or not there were sufficient numbers
of suits, I think it was three suits per man for the whole force.
Q605 Chairman: Perhaps
you could drop us a note as to how many you had?[4]
Brigadier Cowlam:
Yes.
Q606 Mr Jones: In
terms of some of the suits that were issued, is it a fact that
some of them actually were out of date; the labels on some of
them, we were told, were actually expiry dates, and the individuals
they were issued to were just told that their life had been extended?
Brigadier Cowlam:
I think that is the case with respirator canisters, when some
did have a "use by" date, which were then re-lifed,
as a result of work tests and analysis in the UK, but I do not
know the scale of that.
Chairman: Perhaps,
when you go back, you can give us a fuller reply than you are
able to in open session, because this would be very helpful.
Q607 Mr Jones: So
actually you are saying they were given an extra life, it was
not just somebody sitting in an office deciding they had got an
extra life, they were actually analysed and proven to have, the
fact that they could actually be issued?
Brigadier Cowlam:
Absolutely.
Q608 Jim Knight: Did
you have a policy, or a statement, in relation to air filters
for NBC on your vehicles, and whether or not they should be refreshed;
if the vehicle was 40 years old and had had only one filter ever
in its life, whether or not those would be refreshed?
Brigadier Cowlam:
The sustainability statement would not express it in those ways.
The assumption would be that the filter was serviceable and then
the replacement of the filter would be dictated by the decline
in its effectiveness.
Q609 Jim Knight: Was
the sustainability statement communicated to your people on the
ground, so that they had the confidence that all of this had been
thought through and that they were properly protected?
Brigadier Cowlam:
The sustainability statement is a document used by the staff to
decide what sustainability levels are to be deployed and what
systems are to be put in place. I suspect it does not cascade
down to every tank driver and commander.[5]
Q610 Jim Knight: Is
that something you are thinking about, in terms of, if someone
is there, about to go into theatre, or in theatre, and they are
looking at a canister that has got an expiry date that has passed,
or they know that they are in a vehicle with a filter that has
not been changed for 20 years, that it is worth making sure that
they know that that has been thought through and that they have
not been overlooked?
Brigadier Cowlam:
Indeed; and, of course, units have a responsibility themselves
to maintain their equipment in a serviceable manner, and, of course,
a lot of preparation of the equipment took place in the UK and
Germany before they deployed, and the units, both the quartermasters
and the OC workshops and the squadron company commanders themselves
have a responsibility to make sure that their equipment is serviceable.
Q611 Jim Knight: And
if they took a decision that they needed to replace those filters,
or those canisters, or whatever, you were confident that you had
the supplies available to get them to them in time, within that
limited logistics window that you had?
Brigadier Cowlam:
I cannot answer that question, because, of course, a lot of the
demands for replacements in the early stages would be going through
the normal supply chain in the UK and Germany. If the unit had
then deployed between demanding the item and the item becoming
available, there is a mechanism which would divert that spare
to theatre, and it is called the Task Issue, and we see it arriving
in theatre and then move it forward through the logistics chain
to that unit.
Q612 Jim Knight: And
is that mechanism flexible enough so that if, for whatever reason,
that item is late arriving and that unit has now gone back to
Germany, shall we say, that it is not then going to forward it
on to Germany, where it is not needed any more, because it is
a desert uniform and they are back in Germany, that you might
hang on to it in theatre and give it to somebody else who is issued
a Task Issue and might need it?
Brigadier Cowlam:
In some cases, it is.
Q613 Jim Knight: In
some cases it is flexible enough, and in some cases it is not?
Brigadier Cowlam:
Correct.
Q614 Mr Jones: I have
got something on the canister. You said that, obviously, there
was analysis done here so that they could be extended; who was
actually told, and how was it communicated, that these canisters
were perfectly okay to use?
Brigadier Cowlam:
Told to us, or as we pass the information down?
Q615 Mr Jones: Who
actually had got to be told about the canisters? If you were given
a canister and it had an extended life, obviously it was concerning;
how far was that information passed down the chain of command,
who was told?
Brigadier Cowlam:
We pass the information to the next level in the chain of command
down, and they cascade the information down.
Q616 Mr Jones: If
I told you that actually that did not happen, that people were
issued with the canisters, and it was one of those issues that
was of serious concern to a lot of people that they were not actually
told that this analysis had been done and it was okay to use these,
would you be surprised by that?
Brigadier Cowlam:
I think, given the confusion, tiredness, geography, environment,
heat, I am not surprised that every piece of information does
not pass through the chain of command as smoothly as it could.
Q617 Mr Jones: Do
you not think it is very important though, especially as actually
we had come up against, for example, chemical and biological weapons,
that the people who were going to use the kit should have the
full confidence that the kit they had got was actually going to
do the job?
Brigadier Cowlam:
Absolutely. I agree.
Chairman: Cluster
bombs. Patrick.
Q618 Patrick Mercer:
Are you aware of whether coalition forces delivered cluster munitions
into urban areas, in your area of operation?
Major General Brims:
Cluster bombs. I am not aware of that.
Q619 Chairman: Some
questions, General, on the military campaign. I have got a bundle
of questions, four or five, I will come back to them one by one,
but at least if you listen to the four you will see where I am
coming from. The key points of the campaign, from your perspective;
were you expecting a rapid collapse of Iraqi forces; what contribution
did air power make; and what preliminary lessons do you think
could be drawn from the degree of air/ground operation? If I could
start with the first then. From your perspective, what were the
key points that you would draw from the military campaign?
Major General Brims:
In terms of, overall, from the campaign?
4 Ev Back
5
Ev Back
| 
