Examination of Witnesses (Questions 1380-1399)
MR A PAWSON
AND COLONEL
PAUL BROOK
12 NOVEMBER 2003
Q1380 Mr Hancock: What involvement did
you have with the late Terry Lloyd who was not part of your embedded
team but was there with a substantial number of colleagues working
on a particular issue on the war but was not travelling with the
UK forces? Would you have in any way tried to influence what he
was doing or similar journalists in the same position as him?
Mr Pawson: What they would have
had was access, if they chose to have access and had so registered,
to the field press information centre and indeed to the coalition
press information centre in Kuwait. They would have received advice—security
advice in particular—on the situation at those places but
clearly it is only advice and they are free to choose to do what
they wish.
Q1381 Mr Hancock: Those freelance journalists
not travelling with British forces had no conditions attached
to their involvement in this war? They could travel wherever they
could get to if they chose to do so?
Mr Pawson: Yes.
Q1382 Mr Hancock: Can I refer you to
what I think is a contradiction in First Reflections? Your
primary aim, it suggests, is to provide accurate and timely information.
I would be grateful if you could tell me to what extent you met
those aims because timely information is not always accurate and
accurate information is not always what you get at a timely point,
is it?
Mr Pawson: Our view is that overall
we felt it was successful in the sense that information was put
out in volume both on broadcast medium, in the newspapers and
in the viewing figures. The amount of articles shot up dramatically.
Terrestrial television news went up by nearly twice and in terms
of satellite it went up two and a half times. The number of articles
about the operations in Iraq shot up from 500 to 2,000. There
was a big increase, so the information was coming out. The consensus
that I have seen of the views expressed in the media is that broadly
the information was accurate, for example, from embedded media.
The analysis done by media agencies has shown that something like
70% of the reporting was, in their terms, neutral which is another
example perhaps of accuracy. In terms of achievement, I would
say yes, we have. Some areas did not go absolutely according to
plan but if there were some half a dozen or perhaps a few more
incidents that later proved not to be wholly accurate that has
to be seen against the background of hundreds of incidents that
took place, if not thousands, throughout the conflict phase. We
certainly did not, to the best of my knowledge, ever seek to mislead
anybody. The media may have said, "The government misled
us over this and that" or, "The military misled us".
Yes, the factual information may have been wrong but it was not
deliberate in the sense that the use of phrase "factually
misleading" implies. The sort of situation where I think
our people on the ground had a very difficult time was if you
had, to take an example, a company commander going into Um Qasr
and it looks to him to be clear and safe and he has an embed with
him who reports it clear and safe; the embed reports back to Qatar
and Qatar asks the people there, "Is it safe?" "We
do not know, but your man says it is." It is very difficult
for him to continue to say, "We do not know" until it
is absolutely safe and something unexpected happens in these situations.
It was the first time we had seen the irregulars in a major way,
operators in civilian clothes and so forth, so yes, in a sense
it was wrong, but it was not deliberately wrong. It was done in
good faith. We try to correct those things as soon as we can afterwards.
The events in the media, as you well know, have generally moved
on from that, but that is what we try to do.
Q1383 Mr Hancock: Have you had any analysis
done of the service personnel who had, in particular, embedded
journalists working with them closely about whether or not they
felt on reflection it would have been better had they not had
that deployment of journalists with them; or they felt that it
was a fairly accurate reflection of what they were doing that
was getting out? Have you done any analysis within the MoD on
what your own forces felt about the way in which this interaction
worked or not?
Mr Pawson: The commanders—and
I have spoken to them—are satisfied with it and they report
that the vast majority of units were content with what was happening.
Colonel Brook: I have spoken to
my own contemporaries who were commanding units at the time. Although
they said there was a little bit of clunkiness when these unusual
people arrived in their units, it was a very short space of time
before they were completely assimilated in. Many of the journalists
themselves reported being taken completely into confidence and
given the briefings and the information and I think everybody
concluded after the event that it was a worthwhile activity and
experience.
Q1384 Mr Hancock: What about those units
who took casualties in the first two days, the two helicopters
crashing off the aircraft carrier, and the fact that families
back home got one version that helicopters had gone down close
to the ship? Obviously they were alarmed by that and they had
not been informed but it was in the media. I know from my own
experience, coming from Portsmouth, that there was a lot of distress
caused when the Royal Marine helicopter went down. There was a
suggestion that a number of marines were killed and the families
were concerned. This information was coming out before any attempt
was being made to tell the families what had happened.
Colonel Brook: I think, in terms
of the second part, we were making very strenuous efforts to locate
and properly inform families. That is our overriding concern.
There was an inevitable tension between the speed of reporting,
particularly on the 24 news approach, and our ability to get that
very precise, accurate information back to next of kin and families.
Q1385 Mr Hancock: Are you satisfied that
there was no estimating of casualties to families before they
were told what happened?
Mr Pawson: I am not satisfied
wholly that it did not happen. You have touched on what has been
quite a difficult subject for us during this operation. Our whole
aim is to minimise distress but it is not an easy picture. First
of all, we want to be first to tell the next of kin but if you
are in an area where colleagues have mobile telephones or other
access, with the best will in the world, they can ring back to
bases, to their wives or whatever, saying, "There has been
a terrible accident. Go round and make sure they are all right."
Word begins to get out in that way which makes our life quite
difficult. We have difficult choices as well between a little
bit of distress for a lot of people or a lot of distress for a
small number of people. If an aircraft crashes, do we say what
sort of aircraft it is?
Q1386 Mr Hancock: What is the test from
your point of view?
Mr Pawson: In consultation with
the personnel authorities, we have learned that we need to be
quicker and more flexible as a result of what happened in Iraq
than the standard procedures we had in the past.
Mr Hancock: I cannot understand how a
family can be told that somebody close to them has been killed
by somebody other than the MoD if you say that that is happening.
Chairman: He has just told you.
Q1387 Mr Hancock: If they can use a mobile
phone to tell colleagues locally, why on earth was it not possible
for the MoD to make contact quicker so those families were given
the benefit of the MoD informing them, rather than somebody else
having a mobile phone to phone home to say, "Go round. There
is a chopper down. They are all from this area? You must get one
of the families if you knock on enough doors." I am not blaming
journalists here; I am blaming the MoD for not getting their communications
back to family units quickly enough.
Mr Pawson: In terms of the substance
of that, it is a matter for the personnel authorities and no doubt
the Committee will be considering the personnel issues. Families
come in a whole variety of shapes and sizes nowadays. There can
be two of them and the way in which they have to be found and
informed is not always straightforward compared to finding somebody
close. Our role in personnel is to provide advice about the media.
What we say is that the media and high media interest is a fact
of life. It is something that the casualty visiting officers and
subsequent visitors have to bear in mind. We have to manage this
properly. Families want all sorts of different arrangements in
relation to the media. We will offer to put something, if they
want, on a website, who it is, a picture, a tribute. Others want
no publicity at all. Others want the very minimum they can get
away with. Others choose to be proactive about it for a whole
variety of reasons. Our role is to try to make sure that the personnel
systems right back from the front line through theatre, PJHQ,
up here and out at the end to the local commands recognise the
speed of the modern media and the pressure they can build on individuals.
Q1388 Mr Hancock: Can I ask what other
aims and objectives you had when you were putting your reporting
scenario together and how you were going to work with journalists
to enable them to get the best possible access that they needed
to get their stories accurately and timely? What were you hoping
they would present as far as the British military were concerned?
Mr Pawson: We were hoping that
they would expose to the population as a whole and to the families
what life was like for soldiers, sailors and airmen when they
were on operations. We naturally felt confident that the high
standards to which the armed forces operate would also come through
this and that, as a result of that, public understanding would
be increased.
Q1389 Mr Hancock: Did you set the goal
to show that our forces, as a number one objective, were trying
to minimise civilian casualties and you were saying to journalists
that this was something you would hope they would emphasise?
Mr Pawson: That is what I meant
by the highest professional standards, both in the way they conduct
themselves and in relation to collateral damage, casualties, handling
prisoners of war, the whole gamut of the framework for military
operations.
Q1390 Mr Jones: Would you agree that
it is not just getting the right person to speak to relatives?
Extended families might be difficult but it is also important
to tell them the correct information because the media would have
a field day if you told somebody that someone had died and they
had not. Is it not also vitally important that the information
from theatre is as accurate as possible when it is told to the
next of kin?
Mr Pawson: Absolutely. You have
hit on a very real difficulty. One of the things we have to do,
before the next of kin is informed, is establish that the individual
is actually dead and not missing. Even in a helicopter crash where
you have not recovered the bodies, they are technically missing
and not killed. You have to be sure it is the right person, that
you have the right next of kin and that you have the right extra
information that inevitably they will want to know when that chap
knocks on the door. All of those things, particularly in a combat
scenario, take an enormous amount of time—we are talking
hours, not days—to gather together; whereas perhaps a member
of the press can be a little more speculative.
Q1391 Mr Crausby: You have the very difficult
task of persuading Arab and Muslim opinion, both within the region
and more widely, that the coalition's efforts were not aimed at
Arab interests or indeed a war against Islam. How did you seek
to engage with Arab and Muslim news organisations, Al Jazeera
for instance, or indeed Muslim news organisations in this country?
Mr Pawson: We did this at a number
of levels. First of all, we were entirely open with our press
information centres to Al Jazeera and other networks in theatre.
Secondly, they are invited to our briefings and press conferences
here in London. Thirdly, ministers—and this was not just
a Ministry of Defence issue—went daily to give interviews
to the Arab media here. Of course there was activity in Washington
at the same time.
Q1392 Mr Crausby: My experience in my
constituency is that you were not too successful in communicating
that line. It is not a criticism; it is a hugely difficult argument
to present. Can you point to any successes that you had with Al
Jazeera, for example? You were not able, for example, to persuade
Al Jazeera not to show pictures of British bodies.
Mr Pawson: No, Al Jazeera has
its own standards. In my experience, albeit limited, Al Jazeera
does not operate in the same way with the same sorts of editorial
controls as happens with the UK and other western media. It is
a lot more personality dependent and chaotic in the way in which
the programmes are put together. It is also the case that they
appear to balance a major item from a press conference with an
immediate comment from the opposite direction afterwards. We relied
very heavily on the embassies in the Gulf region to advise on
what they thought would be important to influence in terms of
the governments of those countries and what their view of what
the Arab streets would or would not think about the way in which
we did it.
Q1393 Chairman: Did you have any specialists
in your media department in Islamic affairs? I know the Foreign
Office has an Islamic media unit.
Mr Pawson: No. We relied on the
Foreign Office unit to help us.
Q1394 Mr Cran: I wonder if you would
trace out for the Committee how the relationship was between you
and the MoD at the sharp end of the PR exercise within the MoD
and the press itself. Is it you acting as the megaphone for the
press within the MoD or is it the other way around?
Mr Pawson: The answer is both.
If the media are concerned about something, part of our role is
to inform the Department of that concern, to get answers to questions
about it, and this was particularly true during the conflict in
Iraq. At the same time, it is our job to get out to the media
what has been going on in a way which we hope interests them.
Much of what happens in the Ministry of Defence does not make
sexy copy. We have difficulty in getting that across. We have
a valve role in both directions—that is to say, chivvying
the department to help provide facilities and information for
the media and, on the other hand, getting what the department
wants us to put out out to the media.
Q1395 Mr Cran: Was there any development
in the role as the war trundled on? We all know what the press
are like. They are simply built to take a mile when we all intend
that they should take an inch. It would seem to me that they have
not changed their spots in any way whatsoever. It must have been
quite difficult for you on occasions.
Mr Pawson: It was certainly pretty
busy.
Q1396 Mr Cran: That is not what I said.
I take for granted the fact that you were busy. I asked something
very different.
Mr Pawson: For example, with the
question of the media and families and casualties, we had to establish
direct links between the press office and the casualty visiting
officer to try to match the speed, timeliness and pressure from
the media. As time went on, there were also comments among Members
of Parliament and others about the context of what was happening
in Iraq, so we in the press office spent a lot of time trying
to help get the context out. We made sure that, for example, the
Secretary of State's statements to the house were not simply narratives
of what happened but had a bit of analysis and context set in
them to try to help to correct that. The role developed in relation
to the operation as it itself developed.
Q1397 Mr Cran: Did you have to crack
the whip? If you did not, you are the only one who has not had
to.
Mr Pawson: I did not have to crack
the whip, but there was a constant dialogue about what should
be done about things as they arose and to convince people that
the media is an important part of what was happening and, if necessary,
to sort out the practical problems that were taking place.
Q1398 Mr Cran: In the main, would you
say that if you made a point or any of your staff made a point
to the press they accepted it? You try to get a context. That
was one of the examples you gave. Would you say that, as a result
of your representations, they did what you asked?
Mr Pawson: I would not say they
were 100% satisfied. We had a particular issue about the added
role of the forward press information centre which was located
at the rear of 1 Division. The media had quite a difficult decision.
Where did they put their big hitters? A number of them chose to
put them there. For whatever reason those who decided what would
be broadcast here in London seemed to prefer footage from embeds
from the front, from unilaterals, as being in some way more appropriate
or getting larger audiences; rather than a whole series of more
thoughtful pieces put together at the FPIC. That left a number
of them dissatisfied in that respect. We certainly tried to help
them. I think I am right in saying that General Brims has been
before the Committee to explain what he was doing in relation
to the press to try and help them, but I would not say they were
100% satisfied.
Q1399 Mr Cran: What problems did you
have with journalists in theatre breaking the conditions that
they had agreed with you? In that regard, I seem to remember a
Sun journalist who reported an off the record speech of a US general
to his troops being thrown out of theatre. Did that occur as a
big problem or was that a one-off?
Mr Pawson: Our main concern was
operational security. There were one or two incidents which were
probably not ideal in that respect, but again we left commanders
with a certain leeway in relation to what they felt was important
about operational security against the need to keep the media
and the population informed about what was happening. Overall,
we were satisfied with operational security. In terms of the behaviour
and fitness of the journalists, there were odd examples, but they
were odd, two or three in a coterie of 150, which were not satisfactory.
Overall, I think we felt that the media behaved responsibly.
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