Select Committee on Defence Minutes of Evidence


Memorandum submitted by the Ministry of Defence (30 September 2002)

Did the New Chapter use the same foreign policy baseline as the original SDR? If so will you provide it to the Committee? If not, what were the differences?

  It was considered prudent to begin the New Chapter by reviewing the original Foreign Policy Baseline for the SDR (as articulated in the 1998 White Paper and its Supporting Essays). It was the judgement of the working group responsible (that included FCO officials) that, with some minor changes in emphasis to reflect the scale and potential of the asymmetric threat especially posed by International Terrorism, the Foreign Policy Baseline was still valid.

What does network-centric capability (NCC) mean for existing structures, what time frames are envisaged for implementation and what capabilities are deemed less than critical in the delivery of military effect to prevent, deter, coerce, disrupt and destroy in the post 9/11 world ?

Which elements of the armed services are likely to be the primary focus of the New Chapter and the NCC? Which platforms or types of platforms may be no longer required to provide capability? What barriers to integration with NCC face reserve forces?

  A key aim of the New Chapter is to increase our capability rapidly to deploy forces capable of undertaking operations against international terrorists. The detailed implications of the New Chapter, and of a further shift in investment towards NCC, for force structures and equipment programmes are being considered as part of the Department's normal planning process, and we expect to be able to reflect the outcome of this work in a further White Paper next year.

  As stated in the New Chapter, the key to delivering NCC is the ability to collect, fuse and disseminate accurate, timely and relevant information rapidly to deliver situational awareness—ie a better and shared understanding amongst commanders at all levels. The early capability enhancements announced in the New Chapter will help to contribute to the overall goal of improved situational awareness. For example, the extra mission console for the E3-D aircraft will improve the quality of the radar picture and this additional fidelity will enable targets to be passed to other aircraft with greater precision. This will help reduce uncertainty and potentially shorten mission times, increasing operational tempo. The WATCHKEEPER UAV will also provide an important collection and analysis capability, providing an essential part of the integrated sensor matrix required to help realise the benefits of NCC. Whilst WATCHKEEPER will be focused on the land component's information requirements, we are conscious of the wider potential of UAVs and the joint-service UAV Operational Development Unit will examine this broader utility.

  The focus of the New Chapter work in respect of the reserve forces has been on their closer integration with the UK emergency services and local authorities. This is the ethos behind the volunteer reaction forces proposal.

How are capabilities designed to dominate the battle-space useful in fighting terrorist networks?

  UK military doctrine already emphasises the need to deliver military effect precisely, rapidly and reliably. The aim is to maximise combat effectiveness by making decisions and acting quicker than an adversary, highly relevant to exploiting the fleeting opportunities to engage terrorist groups. This is known as manoeuvre warfare. Underlying this approach is the ability to absorb and exploit large quantities of raw data and transform it rapidly into the direction of military action. These capabilities support the concept of Knowledge Superiority and are equally applicable in the combating of terrorist networks.

  The SDR NC study determined that the military could contribute to a range of effects. For example, precision weapons and their supporting sensor systems, that contribute to domination of the battlespace, are particularly effective where there is a particular need to limit collateral damage, and to respond to fleeting targets.

It has been argued that the MoD's vision of NCC differs from that of the Pentagon. Can you explain these differences and their implications for interoperability?

  Network Centric Warfare (NCW) is a formal US networking concept and doctrine at the heart of the US transformation process. It has been described as `the embodiment of the information age transformation of the DoD'.[1] The central tenets are:

    —  robustly networked sensors, headquarters, units and weapons systems improve situational awareness;

    —  situational awareness contributes to the quality of command and decision-making;

    —  that in turn increases tempo, operational effectiveness and the likelihood of mission success.

  The UK's NCC thinking shares the philosophy of NCW, but is focused on evolving the concept pragmatically through the provision of a coherent framework to link sensors, decision makers, units and weapon systems. Crucial to the realisation of this concept is ensuring that we have the right calibre people and that they are well trained to cope with the demands of the information age. The aim is to realise an ability to implement more effectively a range of military effects such as prevention, deterrence, coercion, disruption and destruction.

The SDR spoke of going to the crisis before the crisis comes to us. The New Chapter discusses the attractions of fighting the enemy abroad rather than at home—to what extent does this represent an evolution in MoD thinking of the balance between home and abroad?

  The essential logic remains the same. SDR focused on developing our expeditionary capabilities, with the creation of the Joint Rapid Reaction Forces and planned purchases of new strategic transport aircraft and ships. As outlined in Section 2 of the New Chapter White Paper, it is better where possible to engage terrorists before they get the opportunity to attack. The New Chapter recognises more explicitly that expeditionary or power projection capabilities are a necessary component of our ability to ensure the immediate and direct security of the UK.

The Secretary of State said on 30 July 2002 that in most deployments the UK would be working with "more than one ally". Which allies are being considered in this regard? Which allies have or are planning to have NCC that would be interoperable with ours?

  NATO remains the cornerstone of our defence and security policy and as such we will continue to develop common doctrine, training and equipment compatibility to consolidate our ability to operate alongside our NATO Allies. For some operational theatres where the US or NATO may not be actively engaged, possibly at lower scales, we could expect to play a leading or prime supporting role to other NATO allies, EU partners or the UN. Equally, we are keen to explore and develop regional links with nations beyond these alliances, recognising the political as well as military importance of host nation support.

  Network Centric Capability has the potential to revolutionise future military operations. Currently, our focus is on our interface with the US, recognising their likely leadership role in NATO and other operations. However, we would wish to be able to provide similar connectivity, possibly at lesser scale, with EU partners in due course: much will depend on their ability to invest appropriately.

The Secretary of State has referred to safeguards in existing command structures that may be lost in NCC. How will those safeguards be replicated in the new structures? Is the MoD considering the pressures that NCC potentially places on decision-makers and their advisers, in light of the opportunities and challenges of near-real time information?

  The provision of training facilities to help commanders understand and maximise the benefits of NCC will be an important element in ensuring normal safeguards are developed, and is an issue being taken forward in the course of further work.

  NCC is intended to enable more timely decisions to be made on better information. The Secretary of State noted the challenges this presents. The significant improvements we plan through networked capability will help to clear the "fog of war", providing greater clarity to all levels as to what actions need to be taken. The safeguards we currently use to ensure political control of military operations, including through the appropriate delegation of ROE, will continue to be fundamental. The challenge is to make decisions more quickly whilst preserving key controls.

Does the MoD have a clear picture of how the Command chain is going to be changed by the development of NCC and what elements of old-decision making structures are to be eliminated?

  It is still early days in the MoD's analysis of what real opportunities networked capability will provide for changing elements of existing decision-making structures, and which of these may no longer be required.

  In parallel with the development of NCC, studies are currently underway that will look at a broad range of possible command structures. Issues to be examined will include the removal of command layers and/or the development of more integrated and joint multinational Headquarters. These studies will also consider the relevant safeguards provided by current structures and how they can be maintained in the future environment.

What specific new roles are envisaged for Commander in Chief Land Forces?

  The New Chapter White Paper set out, in paragraph 79, that there would be a "clearer", as opposed to a new, "role for the Headquarters of the Commander in Chief Land Forces, as the principal focus for the provision of military assistance to civil authorities in a wide range of operations". The Commander in Chief Land Forces will therefore be responsible for co-ordinating support from all three Services (where appropriate), not just the army.

Is the MoD considering a new overall command structure for Special Forces, or elite forces (ie Marines/Paratroops and others), beyond the JRRF concept?

  Following our analysis, it was decided there would be no operational benefit in changing present arrangements. Improved arrangements for the integration of Special, and other Forces into the JRRF have been implemented as a result of New Chapter work and lessons learned during recent operations.

When will full capacity for the Reaction Forces from the Volunteer Reserves be achieved? What does the New Chapter's target of initial capacity mean? How many more staff will be available in each brigade headquarters under current proposals for strengthening joint liaison arrangements?

  Our proposals for the formation of Reaction Forces have been subject to formal consultation, and comments from the Reserves were due by Friday 13 September. Once we have analysed all of the responses, we shall look again at our various proposals, before the Secretary of State makes his decision on the use of Reserves in Home Defence and Security, and presents this to Parliament.

  If the Reserves are supportive of the Reaction Force concept, then we would aim to have an initial capacity in place by the end of the year. This would mean that the structures would be in place, and volunteers identified, but that the full training cycle would not yet have begun. The Reaction Forces would be available to respond to crises but the individuals would not have trained together. Communications would be provided by existing systems.

  Our current proposals are that each of the regional brigade headquarters will have two additional staff (one of which will be TA) for strengthening liaison arrangements. These could be augmented when circumstances dictated.

What number of concurrent operations is now being planned for, at what scale and for what duration? Do the SDR's small, medium and large categories still apply? If more small operations are envisaged—is the SDR's assumption that two medium operations should be sustainable still valid? Can several small operations be undertaken during a large-scale operation under the SDR's categories?

  The SDR New Chapter has recognised that frequent smaller-scale operations are becoming the likely pattern of future commitments for our forces. However, as the Secretary of State for Defence made clear in his speech to RUSI on 30 July 2002, the Department is now working through the implications of the new challenges that have been identified and no decisions of any kind have yet been taken. It is anticipated that the outcome of this work will be included in the general Defence White Paper that will be published next year.

The New Chapter White Paper mentions a number of equipment capability areas that may be affected by the New Chapter review—Watchkeeper, FRES, E3-D AWACS, air-defence radar systems, and "critical enabling assets" including deployable headquarters, communications, "MARS" and deployable logistics support. The Committee would like information on each of these and any other programmes that will be modified or introduced (or indeed cancelled) following the SDR New Chapter. For each programme, this should include details of changes to timescales, cost estimates, acquisition approach, and the envisaged implications for operational capability.

  The New Chapter publication announced some changes to specific programmes. These were: WATCHKEEPER, E3-D Sentry and air defence radar systems. Further information on all these programmes is provided below. These and other programmes raised in the question contribute to the outcomes we are seeking from networked capability. The need for changes in those programmes not subject to formal announcement will be addressed as part of the Department's normal annual equipment planning process, which considers the forward programme.

FUTURE RAPID EFFECT SYSTEMS (FRES)

  FRES is a family of Armoured Fighting Vehicles in which we hope to replicate, over time, the levels of protection and firepower currently available within our heavy forces, whilst providing improved tactical mobility, in a platform which is strategically and operationally air-transportable. It is currently envisaged that FRES will provide the capability to conduct sustained, expeditionary, full spectrum operations in a combined-arms, joint and multi-national context, in a wide range of future operating environments. FRES will support the achievement of rapid effect and it is a capability, therefore, that is fully coherent with the direction of the SDR New Chapter. Initial approval of the programme is due in 2003, with the aim of an In Service Date of 2009. It is intended to use innovative approaches to the acquisition of FRES to meet the demanding timescale, including the possibility of partnering with industry. The plan for acquisition is one of the elements to be confirmed during the Assessment Phase.

WATCHKEEPER

  WATCHKEEPER will provide accurate, timely and high quality imagery and image intelligence to satisfy the land manoeuvre commanders' critical information and intelligence requirements throughout a range of environments and operations. The UAV-based solution will form a vital part of the land component's ISTAR mix. The total costs of WATCHKEEPER are being reviewed as part of the annual planning round but, as a result of the SDR New Chapter, additional funding up to £50 million over the period 2003-06 has been made available in order to bring forward the ISD by up to two years.

Joint Service UAV Operational Development Unit

  A joint service UAV Operational Development is to be established to examine the use of UAVs in areas beyond those currently defined and exploited in the WATCHKEEPER programme. The Unit will be manned by personnel from the 3 Services and will experiment widely to scope the roles that UAV Systems might play. It will also gather information to support the analysis for meeting capability gaps and to reduce the risks associated with the development of operational concepts and information management. Specific objectives for such a Unit are still being refined by the Directorate of Joint Warfare.

  The costings are subject to the normal annual planning considerations but are expected to be in the order of £60-70 million to support the establishment of this Unit, which will form by the end of 2003.

E3-D Extra Mission Console

  The extra mission console will enable the E3-D to conduct full airborne battle management at a level that will ensure interoperability and interchangeability with the USAF AWACS aircraft in the face of increasing operational complexity and tempo. As discussed earlier (Questions 2, 5 and 19), the key aspect of this increase in capability will be improvements in situational awareness. Work is to be completed by the end of 2003 at a cost of around £5 million

ASACS RADAR

  This measure will provide the Air Surveillance and Control System with additional information from selected primary radar's based at civil airfields to complement current coverage of UK airspace by military radar systems. Costs are expected to be in the order of £20 million over the next decade.

What measures will be undertaken to establish a Quick Reaction Alert aircraft capability at Marham, St Mawgan and Yeovilton, and in what timescales and at what cost?

  The general requirement is to provide a facility that, if activated, will allow the deployment and operation of air defence fighters in the Quick Reaction Alert (QRA) role for an unspecified period. This therefore covers the provision of first line maintenance support of the aircraft, technical and domestic accommodation for their crews and personnel, and provision of live weapon storage facilities commensurate with appropriate licensing regulations. The facility must be capable of sustaining 24 hour alert. Furthermore, robust communications with the tasking authority and air defence radar network will be required.

  At RAF Marham, which already accommodates ground attack Tornado aircraft, deployment of air defence (F3) Tornado aircraft is not an uncommon occurrence, although it would be rare for live-armed Tornado F3 aircraft to deploy. Indeed, with scheduled runway resurfacing work due to commence at RAF Coningsby next year, possible redeployment of Coningsby-based Tornado F3 aircraft had already been expected, prior to the new QRA requirement emerging.

  Infrastructure requirements at RAF Marham include the purchase and build of a portacabin complex to provide operational and domestic accommodation, together with the necessary communications and IT linkages. Deployed aircraft would be housed in extant Hardened Aircraft Shelters. The total cost is expected to be some £650k. The full facility is expected to be available from June 2003 (although Tornado F3 aircraft could deploy in extremis before then).

  RAF St Mawgan is already used on an occasional basis for deployments of RAF aircraft. It, too, has operated Tornado F3 aircraft during exercises in the past. Building works are limited to the conversion of operational and domestic facilities within an existing Visiting Aircraft facility, together with the provision of communications and IT facilities as for RAF Marham. Existing Hardened Aircraft Shelters are available and compatible with the QRA task. This work will be completed in April 2003 and is expected to cost approximately £150k.

  Of the three bases, RNAS Yeovilton requires the most extensive investment. Additional hangarage, in the form of a Rapid Erect Shelter, together with revetted aircraft parking slots will be required. Additionally, modification will be needed to the existing weapon storage facility to meet current licensing regulations. As RNAS Yeovilton is not currently scaled for 24-hour operations, additional manpower would be required to operate beyond current airfield operating hours. This might be provided by detaching manpower from parent units; this area is now being studied. The work is expected to take three years to complete at a cost of £4 million for infrastructure requirements. Here, too, aircraft could deploy to the base if necessary in a crisis.

What specific measures are you undertaking to protect against CBRN threats at home rather than on deployed operations?

  The Committee will be aware that the Home Office takes the lead in protection against and the response to CBRN threats in the UK. The MoD acts in support.

  For some years the MoD has provided a capability to identify and make safe a CBRN device. Information on this capability was provided in evidence to the Committee during their enquiry into "Defence and Security in the UK". The Committee is consequently referred to their Sixth Report of Session 2001-02—Volume II: Minutes of Evidence and Appendices, and in particular Questions 448 to 495 and supplementary material provided to the Committee and published at Ev 100 (Q456) and Ev 104 (Q492). Members of the Committee were, we understand, also briefed on this capability during this enquiry when they visited AWE Aldermaston and Porton Down.

  This is a significant capability, and is regularly exercised and updated to ensure that it keeps in step with the threat. It is available at all times and at short notice. There was consequently no need to develop a new capability as part of the SDR New Chapter work, although continual technical up-dating is of the essence in this field.

  Although the lead on the response to the consequences of a CBRN incident would also rest with other government departments, MoD can expect requests to provide support to this response should an incident occur. This response would be drawn from capabilities and units available at the time. This would include the provision of regular units, but the SDR New Chapter also identified the possibility of an enhanced role for the Reserves in providing support. The Committee will be aware of the Discussion Document published by the MoD in June, entitled "The Role of the Reserves in Home Security and Defence" which outlined some of the roles the reserves might play. Those members of the Reserve Forces volunteering for this role will be trained to the necessary competence levels, in order to act in chemical, biological, nuclear and radiological conditions if necessary.

What lessons has the New Chapter drawn from operations in Afghanistan and how do these fit in with earlier lessons from Saif Sareea II?

  MoD has produced operational lessons reports on both Exercise Saif Sareea II[2] and operations in Afghanistan[3]. Both reports were used to inform the New Chapter work. Further reports on Ops FINGAL (the ISAF deployment), JACANA (the 3 Commando Brigade deployment) and VERITAS Volume 2 are currently being staffed and will help to identify priorities in taking forward the New Chapter work.

  The work on Afghanistan has, in the context of addressing the wider threat, stressed the importance of Defence Diplomacy, continued engagement with allies, deterrence, coercion and the need to address the problems of terrorism at their roots. In terms of specific capabilities required the importance of network centric capability, enhanced SF capability, more capable light forces, enhanced strategic lift, enhanced force protection, increased intelligence capability (especially HUMINT, ISTAR), and further development of precision weaponry have all emerged as key lessons. These themes have been developed in NC work.

  Saif Sareea II emphasised the importance of appropriate training, with allies, in different environments and at the appropriate scale. The exercise meant the UK was well poised for subsequent operations in Afghanistan. It also allowed further refinements necessary to the JRRF capability to be identified, especially in terms of strategic lift and environmental effectiveness of equipment—all themes echoed in current reports on Afghanistan.

Are there plans to increase the size of Special Forces and, or, their budgets, and what sort of equipment enhancements are you considering for Special Forces.

  There are no plans, as a result of the New Chapter work, to increase the numerical size of the Special Forces. The number of Special Forces available is sufficient for those high-value tasks they undertake. As the Defence Secretary has indicated, it would not be sensible to go into detail concerning SF equipment enhancements.

Is the MoD planning to change the tempo of operations and deployments as a result of the pressure on a number of servicemen and women who "have been working at or near, and in some cases beyond, the boundaries of what was planned in the SDR"

  Certain key trade groups have been working beyond what we assumed would be the case in the Strategic Defence Review. These groups are mostly in the logistics and support area (chefs, doctors, movements staffs etc)—often referred to as the "enablers". The intervals between overseas deployments for many of these individuals have been less than we assumed in SDR. On the plus side, other front line units have enjoyed intervals between operational tours which were longer than we had assumed—though this conceals the fact that individuals might move between units and thus go from one operational tour to another rather more quickly.

  The tempo of operations is driven by external factors. However, we can ensure that the force structure is well balanced to meet our planning assumptions, and we will be considering this as part of this year's planning process. We are also looking closely at the ways we carry out training to avoid unnecessary deployments, while bearing in mind that the vast majority of our people relish the opportunity to exercise their skills in an operational setting. We are introducing career management processes that are more sensitive to individual circumstances, although the Service needs will always remain paramount. Finally, we will seek to ensure that the pay and allowance package for our people compensates them properly for the work they do. The Committee will be aware that the Armed Forces Pay Review Body takes these factors into account in making their annual recommendations about pay and allowances.

What specific role does MoD envisage for NATO in home defence and countering terrorism?

  Acting against terrorist threats is not a new mission for the Alliance—it is already encapsulated within the 1999 Strategic Concept[4]. But, as with all NATO missions, the key to their successful prosecution depends upon the continued modernisation and adaptation of the organisation and, in particular, the accelerated acquisition of effective, deployable and sustainable military capabilities. Much of our thinking on what NATO can and should do in the war against international terrorism is predicated against these improved capabilities.

  As the White Paper makes clear, NATO has already acted very positively since 11 September 2001. By invoking Article 5, taking a range of practical measures (including deployment of early warning aircraft and naval forces), and taking action against terrorist groups with Al Qaida links in the Balkans, NATO has sent a clear message to international terrorist organisations that an attack on one ally will be treated as an attack on all. This sent a deterrent message to terrorist leaders and any states contemplating giving them succour. Credible deterrence is a part of home defence and NATO has a continued pivotal role to play here.

  Deterrence aside, NATO forces and capabilities could contribute greatly to preserving the integrity of member states' territorial waters and airspace. In addition, the work NATO has done to date (and will develop further in future) on WMD protection has utility not only for the security of deployed forces but also for supporting national authorities' home defence and consequence management arrangements and capabilities. UK will continue to pursue these themes as the Alliance debates the scope of its response to international terrorism.

  By providing a forum for allies, partners (including Russia) and Mediterranean Dialogue countries to discuss security risks and develop effective mechanisms to deal with them, NATO already does much to foster international co-operation in counter-terrorism. UK wants to see both these initiatives and NATO's wider co-operation with other security organisations expanded in order to maximise the benefits derived.

  And at the operational end of the spectrum there is the possibility of counter-terrorist operations being carried out under NATO command and control, or being facilitated through NATO structures and operational planning mechanisms. But even when not involved directly NATO has a fundamental role to play as the facilitator of (ad-hoc, EU, US or UN-led) coalitions of the willing through the provision of common doctrines, training and interoperability—the key to the execution of multinational operations.

How does the MoD expect ESDP to be influenced by the New Chapter work?

  Since 11 September, many of our EU partners have also been reviewing their defence and security policy in the light of the attacks. We have also been working together within the EU and are taking action together against terrorism through a co-ordinated and inter-disciplinary approach embracing all EU policies.

  ESDP can play an important part in that approach, particularly in the stabilisation role identified in the White Paper. The EU's first crisis management operation—the EU Police Mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina—is one example of the shared European commitment to stabilise post-conflict regions, and to help establish the rule of law. (There are also linkages between other activities in the White Paper—civil protection, prevention and disruption—and EU action in areas outside the scope of ESDP).

  And investment in new equipment and capabilities for counter-terrorism will be mutually reinforcing with capability development work already in hand to address the Headline Goal shortfalls.

Is the MoD considering increasing its activities under Defence Diplomacy and how does it fit in with the NCC and the New Chapter.

  MoD is increasing the effectiveness of Defence Diplomacy and our other international Defence co-operative activities, (eg through NATO and Europe) in achieving our national security objectives, including those which have been identified as part of the SDR New Chapter. The latter involves using Defence Diplomacy to maximise the prospects for support from our partners, both bilaterally and multilaterally, for Defence efforts to counter international terrorism. These efforts include deploying our Armed Forces on peace support operations—which aim to increase stability in regions of concern, operations to disrupt terrorist support networks and operations which strike at the terrorists themselves.

The doctrine of fighting abroad rather than at home and the possible requirement for pre-emptive action may increasingly require host-nation support. How will such requirements be balanced with the discussion of the legal context of possible British military action where HNS is in question?

  When considering large-scale or medium-scale war-fighting abroad, our sea-based forces alone may not be able to provide the required proximity to the target area or the necessary combat mass to accomplish all strategic objectives. Therefore the provision of political and/or practical HNS will be an essential pre-requisite for mounting credible sustained combat operations in-theatre.

  Our Defence Diplomacy and other politico-military activities (such as defence export sales, bi-lateral military exercises and peace support operations) within key geo-strategic regions aim inter alia to develop an increasing number of states willing and able to provide suitable HNS thereby offering us reduced strategic risk and improved operational flexibility.

  Practical HNS requires the unequivocal formal consent of the providing nation and thus, by extension, if the provision of support is in question official consent must either not have been received or withdrawn if previously given. In the absence of such consent, military operations by UK forces could be undertaken within the land, sea or air borders of another sovereign state only where such action is fully consistent with international law.

The Committee is also interested in having a detailed explanation of the process of the New Chapter. How many staff were involved; what were the various work streams and who were the directors of these studies; why was the number of work streams reduced halfway through the process; what was the extent of MoD's consultation beyond the occasions listed in the White Paper?

  As was explained in Section 7 of the SDR New Chapter White Paper, Supporting Information and Analysis, a number of Working Groups were set up at the start of the process, each led by a senior official or senior military officer. Details are given below:


Working GroupChair (and post held during New Chapter process)

Strategic IssuesAir Vice Marshal David Hobart, Assistant Chief of Defence Staff (Policy)
Overseas Relations & DeterrenceMr Brian Hawtin, Director General International Security Policy
Home Defence and SecurityMr Bruce Mann, Director General Financial Management
Overseas OperationsPhase 1: Major General Tony Milton RM, Director General Joint Doctrine and Concepts
Phase 2: Major General Rob Fulton RM, Capability Manger Information Superiority


  Work was split over two phases, the first focused on the policy and conceptual framework, the second on potential capability and resource implications. Only the latter two groups carried their work forward into the second phase. In each of the work groups, sub-groups formed as required to tackle particular elements (such as science and technology, airspace integrity or defence diplomacy). Issues with implications across all working groups, principally personnel, were co-ordinated centrally.

  About 150 staff, both military and civilian, were involved, from a variety of government departments, and beyond.

  We consulted widely outside government, at the various events described in the White Paper. In addition, senior officials throughout the Department discussed the issues with their international partners, and with the academic world whenever possible.

How did the MoD consult with the members of the individual services themselves? What consultation with Allies in Europe and outside Europe took place that fed into the New Chapter process?

  In the first instance, consultation with the Services was facilitated through the involvement of the single-service programming, planning and secretariat staffs in the New Chapter work. Wider consultation was achieved through the publication and dissemination of the New Chapter "Discussion" document on 14 February. The document, together with a summary leaflet, was sent to every Service officer at one-star level and above, with the request that personnel were made aware of the consultation and told how to pass their comments to the New Chapter team. The discussion document was also covered by the main internal newspapers/magazines (FOCUS, Navy News, Soldier and RAF News) and published on the MoD Intranet and Internet sites to maximise its availability to members of the armed forces. Hard copies of the document were also sent to individual forces' organisations and clubs and to former Chiefs of Defence Staff in the House of Lords.

  Separately, the discussion document was circulated widely for comment particularly to NATO and EU allies and aspirant states, to the NATO Secretary General and the EU's High Representative, and to Foreign Defence Attaches resident in London. We also used regular formal contacts with bilateral partners to air our New Chapter thinking and gauge their reaction. The New Chapter initiative also featured regularly on MoD ministers' and senior officials agenda with in-coming dignitaries.

  On 12 June we issued a second discussion paper—this time on the Role of the Reserves in Home Defence and Security. Reservists were the primary focus of this consultation exercise. Consultation has been undertaken through the Chain of Command and responses were received back on 13 September. As with the first consultation exercise, we covered the main internal newspapers/magazines (FOCUS, Navy News, Soldier and RAF News) and published on the MoD Intranet and Internet sites to maximise its availability to members of the armed forces.

The committee would like to see copies of the responses to the public exercise, if necessary in confidence.

  The public consultation was intended to stimulate a full and frank discussion of the issues and, as such, the individuals who responded were not specifically asked for permission to publish their responses. Before agreeing to provide the 252 responses to the public consultation exercise that were highlighted in Section 8 of the SDR New Chapter Supporting Information & Analysis document, we are obliged first to seek permission from each of the respondents.

What further publications in the New Chapter Process can be expected?

  It is our intention to publish our conclusions on the roles of the Reserves in Home Defence and Security this winter, following the completion and review of the consultation process we initiated on 12 June.

The Secretary of State has stated that work on next year's White paper was already underway—in which month will the 2003 White Paper be published? How does the New Chapter fit into other work underway in the Ministry and in what ways will these efforts be co-ordinated?

  Our intention remains to publish the White Paper next year. The New Chapter is being fully co-ordinated with, and integrated into, the Department's annual processes through the strategic planning and equipment and programming mechanisms that already exist. A One-Star official has now been appointed to oversee the New Chapter implementation phase and to facilitate the co-ordination and integration work. He will deliver the agreed New Chapter measures, take forward further detailed policy and force planning development particularly in the Home Defence and Security area, and act as the Department's focal point for external interest in the implementation process.



1   DoD Report to Congress on NCW Jul 2001. Back

2   Appraisal of Exercise SAIF SAREEA II-D/DOC/9/7/1 dated 10 April 2002 (not published). Back

3   op VERITAS Vol 1-D/Doc/12/36 dated 20 March 02 (not published). Back

4   Paragraph 24: "Any armed attack on the territory of the Allies, from whatever direction, would be covered by Articles 5 and 6 of the Washington Treaty. However, Alliance security must also take account of the global context. Alliance security interests can be affected by other risks of a wider nature, including acts of terrorism, sabotage and organised crime, and by the disruption of the flow of vital resources. Arrangements exist within the Alliance for consultation among the Allies under Article 4 of the Washington Treaty and, where appropriate, co-ordination of their efforts including their responses to risks of this kind." Back


 
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