Examination of Witnesses (Questions 520
- 539)
TUESDAY 28 JANUARY 2003
MR DAVID
GOMPERT AND
MR BILL
ROBINS CB OBE
520. IFF, presumably?
(Mr Gompert) Yes, IFF.
Syd Rapson: Very important; thank you very much.
Jim Knight
521. In the New Chapter of the SDR, it was mentioned
that the MoD wanted to push forward with unmanned air vehicles,
with UAVs, since when, as far as we can perceive it, nothing much
has happened. Does that lack of progress tell us anything about
the difficulties of moving towards network-enabled capabilities?
(Mr Robins) I do not know when, or why, I do not know
when the decision on Watchkeeper is going to be made or why the
delays are, I am not closely connected with the programme. I believe,
however, that more has happened than nothing much, than meets
the eye, absolutely. Taking the point that Mr Rapson made, that
we have a UAV coming into service and it does not have a kill
capability. The US hung, I think, Hellfire off Predator, to produce
an extremely effective weapon, with enormous command and control
consequences for making sure that when you were going to make
quick kills you made a quick kill on the right target. What that
innovation does is, I think, it emphasises one of the points that
I made, rather falteringly, earlier, that is that I believe, in
our acquisition process, we have to be able to bring in such innovations
much more easily; the US do it, I feel with much more energy and
much more focus than we are able to do, and I believe that smart
acquisition must enable this to happen. I have some points to
make on that, because I believe that smart acquisition, particularly
the front end of the programme, the concept and assessment phases,
for those who study acquisition, is going to be right at the centre
of making network-enabled capability a reality. That means, in
my view, that to do the sorts of things that you have mentioned
on a wider scale, that Mr Rapson was referring to, we have to
have an ability to see how programmes can interact with each other
in a positive way and then be able to focus on experimentation,
on experimenting with those programmes, to make sure that we are
not going to be surprised nastily by anything that comes out of
tying them together.
522. The MoD tell us that it is too late to
adapt Watchkeeper for a kill capability. Are you suggesting that
if smart acquisition were working well and properly then you could
adapt it and you could develop that capability fairly easily?
(Mr Robins) I suspect that that remark might need
re-examination. What I suspect the MoD are concerned about is—
523. The remark by the MoD?
(Mr Robins) What I suspect that remark by the MoD
reveals is a concern that, "Look, we haven't got this thing
into service yet, and this is another change which will prevent
it from coming into service at the time that we want it, and so
we are in danger of making the best the enemy of the good."
The advantage that the US had is that Predator was in service,
I am not sure whether it was formally in service at the time but
certainly it was flying and being used tactically. And so there
was something called Predator and there was something called Hellfire
and there were some hooks that you could hang Hellfire on Predator,
and so you could get on and do something, without actually affecting
the ISD, the in-service date, a system that had not yet entered
service.
524. So I guess what follows is whether or not
you think it is better to get a UAV quickly, that does not have
that kill capability, or whether we would be better off waiting
and moving the delivery date in order to achieve that?
(Mr Robins) Yes; and my own feeling is that the optimum
solution, without actually being in the detail of where Watchkeeper
is in its procurement, is to go for an incremental acquisition
in which Watchkeeper is delivered as planned, but that planning
now goes on in parallel for hanging something off it as a kill
capability, doing the modelling and the assessments that that
will involve, getting the money into the programme to make sure
it is done and then knowing when it comes into service that two
years later there will be an incremental upgrade to give it a
kill capability, once that has gone through all the assessments
and decisions.
Jim Knight: Sure; that is logical. Thank you.
Chairman
525. Perhaps we should write to the MoD to ask
them to elaborate upon that, because it did seem bizarre. I know
you have had many instances where external events forced the MoD
to change its specification and sometimes it does not work, but
this programme is in a fairly early stage, and I could not believe,
when we had this exchange of views, that they should not have
thought much more seriously about doing what seems to be obvious,
to me, although I am not technical. But we shall ask them to elaborate,
in the light of your what could be quite helpful advice, Mr Robins.
(Mr Robins) I suspect, Chairman, that the MoD's position
is entirely understandable and it is not unconnected with the
idea of fixed-price contracts with enormous penalties for change.
Patrick Mercer
526. What concerns me slightly about this is,
do we believe that the systems will be robust enough for the battlefield?
First question. Do we believe that we can actually produce those
systems? And, thirdly, what happens when we come up against a
foe who is either equally capable, which I think unlikely, or,
perhaps more likely, who is capable of attacking our network-centric
capability? Just going back, this was what always worried me about
manoeuvre warfare, that it was never practised against a foe whose
ability to fight could not be eroded. Are we sure that we are
not putting something in place here which is (a) impractical and,
secondly, will not stand the test of battle?
(Mr Gompert) Let me just comment on robustness and
vulnerability. I think that the kind of robustness that is particularly
important for new systems will be their ability to work effectively
across a very wide range of circumstances, ie robust in a planning
sense. If they are robust in the sense that they are able to withstand
any possible hit, any possible circumstances, I think that gets
you back into a habit of trying to perfect the capability, perfect
the programme, avoid changes, do not introduce it too soon. And
I think all of that runs against the grain of a more free-flowing
introduction of new systems and innovations and adaptations, all
of which is extremely important, and some of which we did see
in Operation Enduring Freedom, where the United States was not
hesitant to try things in battle that really it had not tried
before, certainly it had not perfected before. So the kind of
robustness we want is robustness against an uncertain future.
The vulnerability that you mentioned is the one that I mentioned
in my opening remarks, and that is information warfare. Here,
I think there are two types of vulnerability that need to be considered.
One is the vulnerability of our military systems, that is our
military links within the command and control system, the military
sensors, the nodes, the fusing and the product of those sensors.
Interfering with those links and those systems, I think, is going
to be difficult for anyone, and I think it is relatively easy
for us always to stay a step ahead in terms of hardening those
systems. However, we are increasingly dependent, not only in peacetime
activities but in preparing and mounting operations on a wide
range of non-military, or dual-purpose, or public and commercial
networks and software operating systems and applications. Increasingly,
the US military is using the public-switch network, the Internet,
the latest Oracle system, or Microsoft system, not only to do
routine business in peacetime but to prepare and mount an operation,
and to some extent you can conduct an operation. And it is those
systems, those commercial systems, which were never designed really,
and given the pressures of the commercial market-place, were not
designed with invulnerability from information warfare attack
in mind, I think that is where the vulnerabilities will come in.
It is all the networks and the operating systems that are not
really controlled by the military, were not really designed as
such by the military and are not controlled by the military, yet
are increasingly encroaching on how operations are planned and
conducted. I think there are vulnerabilities there, and I do think
that adversaries are going to be able to exploit that. I was in
China a few years ago to lecture at some of the command colleges
and other institutions in China, and they were vaguely interested
and mystified by the whole notion of network-centric operations,
they are so far from being able even to contemplate how to organise
the People's Liberation Army to be able to conduct operations
like that. However, when you got to the question of the vulnerability
of network-centric operations, because of the links, the military
links as well as the civilian communications links, they were
very, very much focused on that; they understood that this is
a potential vulnerability for American forces, and also they understand
that you do not have to be an advanced, post-industrial, democratic,
flourishing, free-market society and economy, like the United
States and the United Kingdom, in order to develop that particular
capability, what you need is a cadre of highly capable information
lawyers. So I think it is a concern, it is a big concern for the
United States, and so it should be for the United Kingdom, and
I would think that only the closest possible co-operation between
the United Kingdom and the United States on defensive information
warfare would be indicated.
(Mr Robins) There is another vulnerability which I
might suggest, and then produce possibly a note of, I hope, warranted
optimism into this debate. The second vulnerability of these networks
is that people will use them merely because they are there; video-conferencing,
for instance, and the exchange of information over networks. Both
the UK and US, I think the US much more than the UK because the
US are further ahead, have found that in operations where shifting
information around, meeting people over video-links, and that
sort of thing, is possible, people do it, they do it because it
is there. And in the ultimate, before the sort of net disciplines
and operational disciplines are imposed, people will waste a lot
of time doing it, by shifting information around and having totally
unnecessary conferences; and that has been found, I think, in
a number of both operations and exercises. A little optimism comes
really from the fact that only by understanding how these systems
interact and how their vulnerabilities are increased by linking
them together, and undoubtedly they are, will we actually get
at the heart of where network-enabled capability is going. An
initiative which was very, very embryonic when General Rob Fulton
talked to you, I think, earlier this month, has now gone a little
further, and the MoD are now working with industry on something
which, for want of a better word, has been called the network
integration facility, to ensure that MoD and industry, that is
the whole of industry, BAE Systems, GD UK, all the people who
are building components of the UK's network-enabled capability,
are able to model it together, to ensure that, for instance, when
we look at—I will give an example. When we look at fires
into the deep area, the fires into the deep battle area can be
provided from land, sea and air, they can be provided from land
by a thing called the indirect fire precision attack system, IFPA,
they can be provided from the air by FOAS, the future offensive
air system, and from the Navy by Tomahawk land attack missile;
only by seeing how those things interact together can one get
a proper idea of how networking to enable a greater effect in
the deep battle area can be achieved. Now the facility that the
MoD and industry are now working on, ENIF, the experimental network
integration facility, which is undergoing a scoping study with
industry at the moment, is the sort of thing, I believe, that
is going to underpin the vulnerability assessments that you talk
of. Because it can operate at three levels, not only can it wire
the stuff together to make sure that the technology is going to
work together and that the electronic handshakes, and all that
sort of stuff, will work, it can take into account the behavioural,
procedural, operational aspects of it by putting soldiers, sailors
and airmen in the simulator and making sure that their behaviours
are studied and that we reach a sensible idea of how they are
being used. And the third level, if we really get it right, is
they can start to enable much earlier decisions within the procurement
cycle; at the moment, the front end of the procurement cycle,
the pre-concept, the concept and assessment phases, need a lot
more study, need a lot more discipline, and I believe this machinery,
the experimental network integration facility, will enable that
to happen.
Mr Roy
527. Can I just take you back slightly to industry,
and British industry in particular; do you think that industry
should be proactive or reactive when it comes to this whole new-market-place?
In other words, should they respond to demand, or create solutions,
and therefore sell them before the problems arise?
(Mr Robins) I believe that industry has no option
but to be proactive, but to be proactive in as helpful and as
sensible a way as possible, and that means that the MoD have responsibilities
too. The downsizing of the UK Armed Forces, of the UK Defence
Procurement Agency, has meant that the skills which the DPA and
the UK MoD and the Armed Forces had 20 years ago they do not have
now, and therefore they depend on industry not just to react to
requirements and to build things to specifications which the UK
supply but to work with the UK and assess what it is feasible
to build, what makes operational sense, what makes commercial
sense. And there is a lot of horse-trading, a lot of deal-making
to do at the early stages of programmes; and, again, the experimental
network facility can actually reveal the sort of operational impacts
of doing that and can ensure that industry start to understand
the operational impacts of building things in certain ways early
on, so that nobody has nasty surprises later.
528. And at the moment do you think British
industry has the capability to meet the new priorities, for example,
of network-centric warfare today?
(Mr Robins) It is a broad question. I think we have
all got an enormous amount to learn. I think the embryonic capabilities
are there, in the firms who are building the current communications
systems, sensor systems and command and control systems, but we
have a massive amount to learn, and we can only learn it together.
(Mr Gompert) I think there is a new role for the traditional
defence industry. It is important to bear in mind that the technology,
information technology, the underlying technologies and the basic
research and development of the underlying technologies is no
longer being done, for the most part, industries whose predominant
market is defence; that was the case 30 years ago, it is not the
case now. In the last 20 or 30 years, some of the very big, traditional
computer and telecommunications companies, like IBM, AT&T,
General Electric, Unisys, they got out of the defence business
because things were so exciting in the information technology
industry; why would they want to be in the shrinking, slow, low-profit
defence industry when they could be doing much, much better in
a much larger and rapidly-growing information technology market,
commercially. So the traditional IT companies really pulled out.
The new ones, the Microsofts, and the Oracles, never had their
start in defence, and they always saw defence as, you know, "It's
just another market. If the defence establishment wants to buy
what we sell, fine, but we're not going to change it." So
where does that leave the ability of the defence establishments
to buy systems and networks of systems that are based upon rapidly
improving information technologies and the networks that those
technologies enable. I think, even though the traditional defence
contractors are not the sources of this technology, they play
an absolutely critical role in figuring out how to apply it. In
some respects, they will develop the applications, because they
are the ones who know this market and who know the needs. But,
in any case, I see them as playing a critical intermediary role,
taking a technology that basically is being developed and moved
along at a high speed, based upon market forces, well beyond the
defence field, and translating from that into military applications.
That role does require a very proactive stance, because it cannot
wait for the IT industry, which frankly views the defence market
as a relatively small one, and it cannot deal with the military
establishment itself, which is far removed from those technologies.
The defence industry it has to be, in a way, the drive-train.
Patrick Mercer
529. Gentlemen, if we could just go back to
vulnerabilities for a moment. Harking back to the Northern Ireland
campaign, where the intelligence effort was computerised, where
information was gathered automatically and technologically, from
number-plate-gathering machines, this sort of thing, the enemy
could not attack those systems but they could certainly deceive
them. What are the implications for widespread deception for network-centric
capabilities?
(Mr Robins) The sensors are the things which can be
deceived. One of the most important things that any intelligence
chief has to do all the time is constantly to assess his sources
and constantly assess the information that they are giving, and
what he does is assess the relative sources, he looks at collateral.
And so, ultimately, if you put all your faith in a single network
of sensors you are going to end up with egg all over your face;
but any sensible intelligence chief and any sensible operations
chief will ensure absolutely, particularly when it comes to critical
decisions, that he has collateral. Blind belief in any technology
is the road to ruin. That is a starter, while David thinks of
something more intelligent to say.
(Mr Gompert) I think we are seeing more and more deception,
and we will see more of it, because we are forcing adversaries
into deception, and they are very creative.
530. There was a bit of that in Afghanistan,
was there not?
(Mr Gompert) Yes; and there is a bit of that in Iraq,
there is a bit of it in North Korea. But when we did not have
the ability for persistent, broad area staring at other countries,
or rapidly moving overhead surveillance into a position where
it could see something that had suddenly appeared, or an area
where we had suddenly gained some concern, when we did not have
that ability, deception was much less important. But it is increasingly
important, and it is a natural asymmetric response. It could be
simple things, like digging big holes, and a variety of other
denial and deception tactics. There are two ways to deal with
this. One is human intelligence, where the United States, I think,
has fallen far behind its own requirements, let alone the ability
that the United Kingdom and others have in human intelligence.
The United States has a lot to learn, a lot of catching-up to
do. But then also to improve our intelligence and surveillance
capabilities themselves. One of the biggest problems there has
to do with real-time observation, that is, the ability to detect
something that happens fleetingly, e.g. when a missile launcher
suddenly appears. Missile launchers, for the most part, cannot
launch from their concealed locations, some could under some circumstances,
but the basic idea is that they may be concealed and then rolled
out for launch. The period of time during which to detect, locate
and then communicate the results of your sensor to strike assets
that can actually kill such a critical target, that time is very,
very brief. So it is a combination of deception, on the one hand,
and the urge of adversaries to develop anti-access capabilities,
particularly missiles, that can go against local targets or bases
or forces or allies, particularly if married with weapons of mass
destruction warheads. This is really a critical combination of
asymmetric capabilities that adversaries can come up with that
is not easily solved, and it is not solved simply by me sitting
here and telling you how wonderful networks are and how great
our sensors are. Because that process of knowing where to look,
looking, spotting, targeting and delivering, all within a very
short period of time, is an extremely demanding one. We are not
there yet, I think not so much in terms of the technology but
not there yet in terms of the ability to move and to act upon
that information. So it is deception but not only in the narrow
sense of hiding things, it is changing the way they operate. Now,
fortunately, we are pushing them to have to operate in increasingly
awkward and limited ways; so that is the good news. The bad news
is, we have not solved all the problems associated with the truly
shrewd denial, deception, mobility tactics that are being developed.
531. Gentlemen, I am using up more time than
I should, so could I encourage you to be brief with the next question.
The whole idea of this is to give us an advantage, that battalions
can do what brigades did, brigades do what divisions did, etc.
The implication of that should be that there are fewer troops
on the battlefield, first point; and, secondly, there are clear
implications for force structures and training. Comment?
(Mr Robins) Yes. Undoubtedly, the power of an infantry
battalion now is infinitely greater than the power it had even
50 years ago, and certainly before that, and that obviously has
enormous implications for the training of its commander and the
training of its soldiers. I think that we are going to find that
one of the greatest changes to soldiers', sailors' and airmen's
training is going to be the ability to handle information quickly,
to handle fleeting information, as David just referred to, very
quickly, in far faster ways than currently we have been used to
running. I am slightly reassured by the fact that our children
are, in fact, handling information in ways which we never had
to at their age, and already we are finding that in our offices
and in our homes we have got information coming walloping in,
in great amounts, both entertainment and other types. So I believe
that the first world human beings, particularly young ones, are
becoming much, much more adaptable at handling large amounts of
conflicting information and coming to sensible decisions about
it. I think that is going to be seen in spades on the battlefield,
with the added emphasis on stress and fear. And I think that we
are going to find that what we see on the battlefield is merely
a reflection of what is already happening in our houses and in
our offices, with the added emphasis of nasty things going on.
(Mr Gompert) The reason a battalion will be able to
do what it used to take a brigade or a division to do is not simply
because that battalion has more organic fire-power, its systems
are improving, they are gaining precision, and so on. But that
is only one factor. Another factor is that the battalion is, networked,
and therefore can call upon inorganic fire-power. It can call
upon the strike-power of whatever part of the force as a whole
may be available to help that battalion achieve its objective
or defend itself, if it finds itself up against a much larger
force. So it is really the networking and the availability of
the inorganic fire-power that makes that battalion so much stronger
than a battalion used to be; but that works only if that battalion
is accustomed to operating in a joint and integrated force where
much of its fire-power is not within the battalion. And this is
why military men struggle so much with this dependence upon the
network, it is not so much their dependence upon the network,
it is their dependence upon somebody from a different service,
over in a different part of the command structure, operating a
strike platform that is going to provide the fire-power that that
ground force desperately needs to fulfil its task or to protect
itself. And, to get to your point about training, that means that
it is not just the unit training of that battalion, it is increasingly
joint training and thinking about readiness and preparations in
joint terms, which becomes important because it is the way the
system as a whole works, not just the unit.
532. But surely the thinking is there already;
an infantry battalion commander depends on guns that he never
sees, he depends on aircraft he never sees, he may depend upon
naval-fire-power that he never sees? He has all of these assets
at his command, or under his direction anyway; is it so very different?
(Mr Gompert) Yes, I think it is very different, because
it is possible, on paper, to reduce the size of a ground force
unit, very, very far, and yet, in models, at least, to see that
ground force unit not only hold its own against much larger forces
but also be able to accomplish specific tasks that in the past
it took much larger ground forces to do. The strike-power available
to it has grown exponentially, not only has it grown because of
the abundance of our strike capabilities, speaking for the United
States, it has grown because of the improved precision of those
strike capabilities, it has grown because of the improved sensors
that enable us to use those precise stand-off weapons more economically.
So the amount of inorganic fire-power available to that battalion
has grown by orders of magnitude from what it was. The concept
is no different but the magnitude is much, much different. This
argues, again in theory, that you can continue to shrink that
ground unit down, the number of boots on the ground, to the point
where its minimum critical size is that which it absolutely must
have to defend itself in a really close battle when distant strike-power,
stand-off strike-power, can no longer help it that much, just
because of the times and distances involved. And that can be rather
small. Now again we are talking about 20 or 30 years out before
the US Army, at least, is comfortable operating that way. But
it provides enormous advantages in the ability to swarm, the ability
to operate elusively, not to mention the fact that there are fewer
boots on the ground and less risk of high casualties.
Mr Crausby
533. Given that the United Kingdom cannot afford
the level of investment for such transformation, be that revolutionary
or evolutionary, it is such an incredibly expensive business that
we certainly will not be able to compete in the way that the US
can. So in which particular niche areas can the UK integrate with
the US?
(Mr Robins) I think that we certainly will have to
share, depending on types of operation, sensor networks, in the
way that David has indicated. We are already sharing, as you know,
a good deal of intelligence. What we are trying to do, I suspect,
with network-enabled capability on the UK side, and network-centric
warfare on the US side, when we are talking of coalition operations,
is attempting to do two things. One is, we are trying to link
command and control systems so that we both have the same picture
of what is going on in the battle space; that is the first thing,
and that is relatively straightforward because it is an information
system thing which we have been doing for some time and are getting
better at, and which the world has been doing for some time, which
we have to innovate to put into the battle space. The next thing
though, which is a lot more demanding, is to link our real-time
systems, that is the sensors which cue missiles, which supply
information to platforms, aircraft, ships, and that sort of thing.
That in itself, I think, will be a lot more demanding, and I suspect
that we are going to find that two things will drive us to put
command posts in that loop, and possibly to have systems which
are not totally compatible and integrated on the US and the UK
side. One will be national aspects of security, and that will
always be something, even with the close working which the US
and UK have, which will inhibit particularly encrypted systems
from always working together, because, despite the close working
which we have, there will be national issues. The second is the
question of the expense of making real-time systems totally compatible
when they have been built in different places. So I think that
we will be attempting to ensure that the communications systems
of both nations will work together effectively, and indeed I think
there is some work to make sure that the Bowman wave form for
our own tactical radios is available in the war fighter information
network, the tactical part of it, in the US. And I think, if we
make those communications systems compatible, that will be the
basic framework which I think will enable a lot of other things
to happen. But there will be limitations on, I think, exchange
of real-time information which is designed in right from the start;
there could be patches achieved on the battle space within given
operational areas for given things to happen.
(Mr Gompert) In terms of mission niches, the American
attitude is likely to be that the UK can occupy some niches, but
these would be very ambitious niches. The United States looks
upon the United Kingdom, because of the nature of its political
and strategic relationship but also the very high level of confidence
the American military has in operating with its British counterparts,
as its most effective and probably its most reliable partner in
any type of contingency, even at the highest end. So with that
as the setting, I would say to try to look for small niches is
not really where you want to look. From an American point of view,
there would be a strong desire to see that the United Kingdom
has, as one of its niches, participation in diverse strike operations
from the outset. The United States does not wish to go to war
alone, and, for a variety of international and domestic reasons,
would prefer to have others participating from the outset, and
the outset may often be strike operations in which the United
Kingdom can play and has played a role. So I think that is a very
important niche, and not just a symbolic niche, we are talking
about land-based, sea-based and missile strike capabilities. A
second niche, if you want to call it that, has to do with inserting
land forces, and I am not talking about late-arriving, heavy land
forces. I am talking about initial ground force arrival and insertion.
Again, for somewhat different reasons, the United States will
prefer to have allies with it as it takes what is likely to be,
in the course of a campaign, the most dangerous phase, exposed
not only in political terms but now very much in casualty terms,
and that is the insertion of ground forces into a battlefield
that presumably has been well prepared by the strike. And there,
too, I think the United States would look as much to the United
Kingdom to be able to insert manoeuvre forces, increasingly light
and yet still very lethal, air-deployable manoeuvre forces, when
the United States does, and in a fashion that essentially is integrated
with the entire operation. And then the last major niche would
be, again, from an American, perspective, to see the United Kingdom
take a leading role in what might be transition operations, or
demanding stability operations, where the United States might
play a part, but it would certainly like to see an option, in
the form of a highly capable and competent ally that can occupy
that leadership role, as you move from non-permissive to semi-permissive
operations. We have seen a little of that, of course, in Afghanistan,
but I think it is a taste of things to come, in terms of the American
attitude about the most useful niches for the United Kingdom.
What does that imply in terms of capabilities, it implies airlift,
it implies lethal ground forces of the sort that can move in into
a non-permissive environment, and it implies a wide range of strike
capabilities, in addition to all of the connectedness and the
contribution to the intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance,
that Bill mentioned. So I would view those as the niches; not
long-ranging bombing, not space-based surveillance, but these
other, very, very important campaign contributions.
534. Mr Gompert, you made the point in your
opening remarks that you felt that the UK had the motivation to
go forward, but you were less optimistic really about our other
NATO allies. So what effect will this integration with the US
and this improvement have on our ability to act both alone and
in particular with our European allies?
(Mr Gompert) My hope is that the other allies will
view the United Kingdom as the model of a country and a military
establishment that is able to play an important role in the world,
along a full spectrum of operations, including, at the higher
end, alongside the United States. That is a standard that the
United Kingdom has set for itself, whereas other allies have not.
As other allies realise that they must accept similar responsibilities,
or a similar standard for their defence planning, there is no
better place for them to look than to the UK as to what that implies
and how to move forward, both with regard to their own concepts
of operations and how you work with the Americans. So my hope
would be that the United Kingdom would continue to operate not
only within but also beyond the sort of Petersburg task framework
of the European Union. The reason for that hope is the expectation
that the other allies will follow in the UK's footsteps, or, at
least, some of them will. If they do not then I think the United
Kingdom is going to find itself increasingly pulled between two
very different types of requirements, the rapid deployment, fast
manoeuvrability, strike and manoeuvre type of concept that we
have been discussing here, on the one hand, and the more set-piece
stability operations of the kind that most thinking within the
European Security and Defence Policy has been focused on.
(Mr Robins) A point, Chairman, which the Committee
will be only too well aware of, but it might be worth making it
here, is that the dilemma for the UK is how to achieve that interoperability
without automatically being constrained because of difficulties
of technical assistance and information coming to UK and continental
firms, without therefore having to be constrained to buy American
equipment automatically to achieve that level of interoperability.
Now this is something which I know the UK Ministry of Defence
is wrestling with, and I know that the UK DoD is trying to make
easier to happen, and certainly state this; but it is an issue
which hits us and it is an issue which, of course, our allies
are only too vociferous in pointing out, from the European continental
perspective, and it is a very real issue and it is one which the
US is attempting to solve, with a little success at the moment.
Syd Rapson
535. Can I move on to the special forces, and
to clarify that, special forces, the SAS, SBS, rather than the
elite forces of the Royal Marines and the Parachute Regiment.
But the special forces' prime role, especially the SAS, in particular,
in war, is to gather information secretly, and they are compromised
by contact with the enemy and their use is diminished somewhat.
And I am wondering what will happen with network-centric information
being all over the place; and how do you see the role of the special
forces, the SAS in particular, with this gathering information
evolving as a consequence of the network-enabling technology?
(Mr Robins) The network, of course, is there to join
or not join, and the special force commander can make risk assessments
and decide on the risks of being part of it or not being part
of it, or having his own extremely secure, extremely directional,
extremely focused sub-network, which is able to provide information
to the people who need it at the most appropriate and secure place.
So I see network-enabled capability, used badly, certainly it
will be a risk to special forces, but I would hope that the special
force commanders and those who support them will make certain
that it is not used in that way, in which case I see it as a massive
opportunity to have far greater facilities within the special
forces environment and make them much more effective. It does
not need to be a risk.
536. Yes, that might not be clarifying it. What
makes them special is this ability to gather information, secret
information, and hold it for specific use; and once everyone has
got that information it diminishes their role. And that is a worry
that I have got in the back of my mind, that it will change the
nature of the special forces if the information is out there and
they do not hold it specifically to themselves?
(Mr Robins) I am not sure we have got the same picture
in our heads. I see special forces, certainly when I have been
associated with them, as providing information for the main force,
not just for their own use, except in certain circumstances, and
so the ability they have to gather information, I think, will
be enhanced by network-enabled capability and by the devices that
they will get out of it, and possibly, the points that Mr Mercer
was making, by the vulnerabilities of the opposing network. That
they will then have, I think, a concept of operations which dictates
how and to whom they are to provide that information, and also
it will dictate how it is going to be used.
(Mr Gompert) The US special operations forces played
a pivotal role in what I think was the first real glimpse of network
operations in Operation Enduring Freedom. So far from those American
special operations forces becoming in any way sort of a casualty
of the information available through the network, I do not think
Operation Enduring Freedom would have succeeded without those
forces. American special operations forces are more joint than
any other forces. Just by the way their careers are managed for
both officers and enlisted men, they view themselves and they
think of their operations in more purely joint terms than really
any other forces. And precisely because of that they are totally
comfortable, and they were totally comfortable, taking full advantage
of the network, in fact, bringing that network to life, by being
in effect both the forward observers for US Strike forces and
also the liaison with the Northern Alliance. So, in a way, I do
not think we would be where we are today except for the fact that
American special operations forces used that network. You asked
the question about whether those forces could become more vulnerable.
I think the problem of knowing where all friendly forces are,
and yet not necessarily revealing the location of all friendly
forces, even to all of your own forces, for fear of leakage of
information, is a very, very difficult problem of information
management. The first task we want to do is make sure that the
commander knows where all blue forces are, it ought to be possible
technically and ought to be possible in terms of the command and
control protocols and procedures, to ensure that the location
of some of those forces is revealed only to the commander.
537. Yes, well I think we will leave it there.
The special forces themselves, our special forces, might well
be more limited than the American special forces, which are a
wider organisation, as I see it; but I am worried about our special
forces. If they are using the same networks as the other forces,
how will their more secret information be secured? They are sort
of a murky group, and it just seems that by entering the network
and giving out the information their niche role, of having that
secure, very secret information for specific, strategic use, is
going to be compromised?
(Mr Robins) I think the point I am trying to make
is that they do not need to join the network. They do not join
conventional command nets now, they have their own dedicated communications,
for really good reasons, for just the reasons that you are concerned
about; and I am quite sure that that will continue, that their
access to the network will be very, very carefully controlled.
538. Would you see the special forces network
widening, the special forces organisation, under this new concept,
at all?
(Mr Robins) As much as it needs to, but it depends
on the concept. The idea of deep insertion forces, for a start,
the nature of the way that they are inserted and the nature of
the distances that they will be operating on and the constraints
of their operation will dictate that they have very different
communications systems, and very different information systems
possibly than the main forces. Keeping those two domains separate
in information terms is a relatively easy thing to do.
(Mr Gompert) I think there is a difference between
the American and British concepts, that is, the concept of the
separate domain. American special forces depend upon and are dependent
upon main forces to a very high degree. We see in almost every
operation, while they conduct some sort of other domain type operations,
they will also operate with or on behalf of the main force. But
we talked earlier about the growing possibilities that very small
ground units with access to inorganic fire-power and sensors will
have enormous advantages, and the place to begin, in fact, the
place where the United States has begun, is with the special operations
forces. So I see that role, on the American side, growing. Now
maybe over time it will be subsumed, as the US Army and Marine
Corps move toward more agile, very small units that can take advantage
of the same network capabilities. But for now the ones that can
operate on that truly small and elusive basis are the special
operations forces.
539. Would you see the tactical, strategic and
operational networks remaining separate?
(Mr Gompert) I am a little bit hesitant to say that
those networks ought to be kept separate because of the sensor
systems. What you do not want to do is say, well, you have certain
sensors and they really are sort of strategic sensors, and the
data from them will create images that can be seen by people who
are looking only at the strategic level, and then differently
at the operational level and the tactical level. We just do not
know what the value will be of whatever sensor information can
be acquired somewhere in the force, whether it is at the strategic
or operational or tactical level. So I am not so sure about segregating
grids, at least for that reason.
(Mr Robins) I think I would add to that, the original
reason for tactical, operational, strategic levels of command,
of course, was that they actually serve—they do still, to
some extent—to illustrate different time domains, different
space domains, and different paces of operation. That does not
always apply now, for instance, the Tomahawk land attack missile
is controlled at operational, or even at strategic, level but
it can have a very tactical effect. And so one has to look at
information; and special forces are another case of a tactical
effect achieved or controlled at a strategic level. And so the
way in which one looks at these things increasingly leads one
to think that strategic, operational and tactical type networks
are merely a convenience for describing something which may or
may not apply to a particular focus on an operation.
Chairman: Thank you. We have two brief
questions on costs.
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