Examination of Witnesses (Questions 540
- 542)
TUESDAY 28 JANUARY 2003
MR DAVID
GOMPERT AND
MR BILL
ROBINS CB OBE
Mr Roy
540. Briefly, on costs, do we expect costs to
be more expensive, less expensive, or cost-neutral, when we consider
network-enabling assets in the future?
(Mr Gompert) I can give you a very general answer
to that. We know that the costs of information technology have
been coming down very rapidly in general. In the military field
we have not seen the costs of systems come down, even though those
systems depend increasingly upon microelectronics and other types
of information technologies, but I believe, with smarter procurement,
we will begin to see, in military systems, particularly information-rich
military systems, the benefits of the declining costs of information
technology generally. So the greater the role those technologies
play in our systems, and in our capabilities as a whole, you would
expect that there would be a natural cost reduction force in play.
By the same token, because of these technologies, we may be able
to reduce force structure, reduce end strength, or at least allow
our forces to continue to decline in their total size, even as
their capabilities improve. That would reduce the cost burden
of an element that is becoming increasingly expensive, ie people.
So a future force which has more information technology and maybe
fewer people, but people who are better able to function effectively
with those technologies, in the steady state, ought to be a highly
cost-effective force.
(Mr Robins) I think I would merely add that when Accenture,
or CSC, or EDS, do an analysis of a big enterprise they offer
cost reductions normally as the payoff for investing in technology,
and those cost reductions are achieved really as a result of better
operations, more focused operations, more effective operations.
I think, in the teeth of the sort of defence cuts which we have
been seeing, despite the advent of the SDR New Chapter money,
I believe that network-enabled capability offers the UK Armed
Forces a chance to regain effectiveness, which should not have
been lost in the first place. I do not see much scope for cost
reductions in this. I believe that what we are trying to do is
make the sometimes paper-thin capability, which we have been left
with in our Armed Forces, into the sort of reality that it should
be.
Patrick Mercer
541. What more should the UK be doing to embrace
these opportunities?
(Mr Robins) I would say, it comes back to the point
that both David and I made at the start, to understand that network-enabled
capability is not a technology thing, purely, it is dealing with
the total enterprise, and therefore to understand how the acquisition
process to bring this sort of stuff into service, taking into
account Mr Rapson's point, it has to be more responsive, it has
to allow innovation; and if it is going to do that then more attention
has to be paid to the acquisition cycle at the early stage. You
will be familiar with the terms "main gate" and "initial
gate" and the "acquisition cycle". The metrics
with which we are measuring smart procurement and showing that
it is doing UK forces a lot of good tend to start at main gate.
What we have not done is looked at what happens before main gate,
at the concept phase, when we are starting to see where this thing
fits together, where we are starting to look at the risks of the
programme, and the assessment phase where we are actually focusing
much more on those aspects. And I believe what we have to take
into account is the fact that we are not just dealing with equipment
and technology, we are dealing with people, with training, with
development, with concepts and doctrine and sustainment, and look
at the entirety of this process and have a much more holistic
view, really, of the equipment as it is coming in, in its relationship
to those other lines of development, concepts and doctrine and
sustainment, etc., and to other pieces of equipment, and we can
only do that with the sort of approach to simulation and modelling
that I illustrated earlier. That has really to be amde a more
formal part of the early phase of acquistion.
(Mr Gompert) May I add to that, exercises, especially
exercises with the United States, that really challenge these
concepts of operations, really challenge the grid, you want to
find short-comings, deficiencies, imperfections, not only in the
way we operate as two countries trying to operate together but
in the systems themselves. Because it is absolutely right that
this has to be viewed in a holistic fashion, and the only way
you can do that ultimately is in an operation, and the next best
thing to an operation is an exercise. And then down the ladder
you get into simulations and models, and so on. But I think that
the more intimate the co-operation is between the two uniform
militaries, in concept development, experimentation, modelling
simulation, exercises, including real exercises in which you are
really pushing the command and control system as hard as you possibly
can, the better for both countries, it is going to be good for
our ability to operate together, and ultimately good for pulling
along the rest of the alliance.
Mr Crausby
542. Back, to some extent, to Mr Gompert's points
earlier on, about British motivation in comparison to our allies.
Do you want to say something about what your assessment is of
the debate about which allies will keep up; and could any sub-state
groups benefit from network-centric capabilities?
(Mr Gompert) Just in terms of our closest allies,
European allies, that is, the motivation that still seems to occupy
many of them, including Germany, is to be able to deal with stability
operations, meet the demands of stability operations, in and near
Europe, and to be able to do so even if the Americans do not participate.
That is sort of the post-Kosovo definition of what the European
initiative is about, we need to be able to deal with the problems
we face here in Europe, even if the Americans are not involved.
That is a worthy objective, to be sure, but it is not an objective
that is going to drive transformation. It is not going to present
those who are faced with that objective with the kind of demands
that currently are pushing the United States and the United Kingdom
to transform their forces to implement network-centric operations,
and so on. So as long as any of our allies feel that the purpose
of their forces and the uses of those forces are limited to conducting
stability operations in and near Europe, I think they will not
have sufficient motivation to make the necessary investment and
to change the way they operate and to change the way they organise
their forces. I have just sort of given you a caricature of Germany,
but it is one I would stand behind. As for non-state actors, they
could very well move in this direction. There is really nothing
crtical about scale. It is a coincidence that the United States
happens to be the largest power and is doing this. As I tried
to indicate earlier, I think in many facets the United Kingdom
will move as quickly, if not more quickly, with some of the concepts,
and maybe even some of the technology applications, precisely
because it is not so big. So I do not think scale really matters
here. It helps to be aligned with a country of great scale, a
country that, in any case, will have these technologies. But I
also see great opportunities for trouble as smaller units, smaller
organisations, like al-Qaeda, take advantage of networks. In fact,
they already have taken advantage of networks to be able to arrange
their finances, to acquire skills, to plan, and so on. In fact,
a great deal of work at RAND has been about how we need to develop
network concepts to respond to network dangers, because a for
adversaries like al-Qaeda, that is pretty much what they have
got going for them, in addition to the ability to concentrate
damage on civilians. So networking is not in any way reserved
for the advanced and the powerful and the good.
Chairman: Thank you very much to you both; it
was very, very interesting indeed. And maybe we will come back
to you later on, if we have any further questions to ask. Thank
you very much.
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