Examination of Witnesses (Questions 560
- 579)
WEDNESDAY 5 FEBRUARY 2003
AIR VICE
MARSHAL IAIN
MCNICOLL
CBE AND MR
HUGH KERNOHAN
560. Do you foresee all elements of doctrine
becoming truly joint in the future?
(Air Vice Marshal McNicoll) No, I do not. I think
there is a key place for a single service tactical doctrine, and
certainly if you get to the training tactics and procedures level
of doctrine, I think that very firmly is single service business.
It would not matter whether you were in the air or not. How you
actually employ a fast jet aircraft tactically is very definitely
a single service light blue lead. We do not do all of the joint
doctrine ourselves. We have what we call a federated approach
to the production of doctrine. If a single service environment
or organisation is more sensible to take the lead in producing
joint doctrine for the community, then we do that while retaining
the process ownership of it.
Chairman
561. What about a joint doctrine between the
Royal Navy and the Air Force over UAVs? Does that come into what
you are doing? How do you go about co-ordinating and devising
something that is relevant?
(Air Vice Marshal McNicoll) The UAVs that the Army
have operated up until now have sat at the tactical level if you
like of Army doctrine, but we are, as I know you are aware, introducing
Watchkeeper in the not too distant future, and beyond that we
have got the UAV experimental bit which is being led by the equipment
capability area. There is a UAV Management Group which is being
chaired by the Assistant Chief of the Air Staff and it is not
a question yet of being ready for doctrine because we have not
yet got the kit in service nor fully evaluated the possibilities
for it, but we are engaged in thinking at the moment about the
conceptual matters relating to it.
562. How quickly will you have to come up with
something because the Government is making a decision even though
the procurement process can be fairly protracted? When will you
kick in?
(Air Vice Marshal McNicoll) I am not an authority
on the exact timing for the procurement but I understand that
we are looking at 2005/2006 for Watchkeeper. We would expect to
be involved conceptually from now (as we are) and doctrinally
where it is joint we can react quite rapidly, so that would be
further down the procurement cycle.
563. What about Air Force and Army over Apache
operations? Is there anything you are doing on that front?
(Air Vice Marshal McNicoll) Yes, we are engaged as
part of the Air Manoeuvre Policy Group and we are working closely
with the Army who have the lead in this federated approach for
air manoeuvre developments conceptually and doctrinally.
Syd Rapson
564. Following 9/11 the MoD had to react rather
quickly. How did the Concepts Centre get involved in that issue?
Did you get involved? What did you do to help?
(Air Vice Marshal McNicoll) Yes, we very much did
so. As you say, it was before my involvement and I have got some
notes which, if I may, I will refer to. There was work before
11 September 2001 which I should probably start off by mentioning
which was relevant to what happened afterwards that JDCC have
been involved in. For example, there had been work done on potential
shocks in the strategic environment and future issues for defence,
and there has been a seminar actually here in this conference
centre in February 2001. Also, JDCC had started a strategic analysis
programme looking at different dimensions of the strategic environment
and, of course, as I mentioned earlier, Joint Vision was coming
to fruition and was endorsed by the Chiefs of Staff and produced
in June 2001, and British Defence Doctrine had been produced but
in fact the timing was such that it had not come out of the printers
by the time of 11 September but the Chief of the Defence Staff
personally reviewed it to ensure that the enduring principles
within it were still relevant. There was a large knowledge base
and work base prior to 11 September. When 11 September occurred
the very next day, 12 September, my predecessor, Major General
Milton, was deployed into the Ministry of Defence to form a strategic
think-tank with staff from the JDCC and that work took place between
12 September and 5 October. At about that time the SDR New Chapter
work was announced by the Secretary of State. Working Group Four
was countering terrorism overseas and Major General Milton led
phase one of that work until it was handed over to Major General
Fulton. There were also staff from the JDCC involved in each of
the working groups. I was the deputy to Air Vice Marshal Hobart
at that time in Working Group One, which was the strategic context,
and there were people from the JDCC who were involved in that
working group as well, so, as I say, the JDCC was closely knitted
into all of the thinking throughout that and played a major role
led by Major General Milton during the SDR New Chapter. There
were also, in the published White Papers that were produced for
SDR New Chapter, specific elements of concepts and doctrine which
were dealt with by the JDCC which were put into that.
565. Has that work been concluded or is it still
ongoing?
(Air Vice Marshal McNicoll) I think it is fair to
say that the work of doctrine and concepts is never going to be
concluded because it is a changing process. It was concluded in
that that was the final input to that document produced in July
of last year, but we have not, I hope, stood still from that point.
Since 18 July we have been working on a number of things. I know
that in previous evidence that you have taken from the MoD you
have asked questions about a particular bit of work that we have
been engaged in. It is Countering Terrorism: the UK Approach
to the Military Contribution. I am pleased to say that we
have finally got to the stage when that will be printed by next
week. This is an advance copy of double size. It will be an A5
publication. We shall be issuing that next week and obviously
I will make sure that not only the Chairman but also every member
of the Committee gets a copy of that particular work. We have
also been engaged in other work. For example, in doctrine we are
engaged in updating the top level, sitting just underneath British
Defence Doctrine, of something that we will call the future doctrine
structure. In all of that work we are very conscious of the effort
that was put into the counter-terrorism work and we are feeding
that into that work as appropriate as well. We have been engaged
on home defence and security operations doctrine and that in fact
has been led by the joint planning staff of Headquarters Land.
We have been engaged with NATO's allied joint doctrine process
and we have continued the strategic analysis work as well which
I mentioned. We did not stop in July last year. We got a lot done
and both in doctrine and in concepts we expect to continue moving
forward.
Chairman: Much of what you are saying is new
to us. When you see the documents that are put out and, in fairness,
the MoD is putting out a lot of documents, it represents hardly
even the tip of the iceberg and if people make a judgement on
what is being done on the basis of the flimsy eight pages of glossy
paper with the nice pictures then they simply do not understand
the work that is being done. What you are saying clearly indicates
that the correlation between work done and publication is a little
indeterminate and that is why what you have been telling us is
so helpful.
Mr Jones
566. Can I follow on from Syd's point? In terms
of the doctrinal thinking what have been the major changes post-September
11?
(Air Vice Marshal McNicoll) I think probably it would
be easier to answer that question if you had asked about concepts
rather than doctrine. The major changes that we are looking at
in the conceptual area, how ideas such as network enabled capability
will affect things such as command and control in the future,
these issues have not yet been fed into doctrine and will be in
due course, but we are at the stage still of thinking about the
implications of that. In terms of doctrine, I think it was enormously
reassuring that even immediately after the shocking events of
11 September 2001 we were able to look at our top level publications
and say (although not in any complacent way), "Yes, the enduring
principles enunciated in these are still valid". As I said,
the Chief of the Defence Staff did that personally. The top level,
the enduring principles, I think we are comfortable with. At the
lower level tactical doctrine and the way that we are developing
it, as I say, we are taking account of developments as we incorporate
them.
Mr Cran
567. Air Vice Marshal, you spoke earlier about
the general role of the JDCC. What the Committee would now like
you to move on to and explain to us is what your role has been
in relation to the SDR New Chapter. Simon Webb, whom you are of
course acquainted with, told the Committee at an earlier session
that there were a number of working groups that had been set up.
What I would like to know is where did you fit into all of this
and what did you bring to the table?
(Air Vice Marshal McNicoll) If the question is addressed
to me personally rather than the post, perhaps I will answer both
parts of that.
Chairman: If the people behind you can make
a contribution I see no procedural reason why you could not decentralise
the people who might have been closer to the coal face than you.
Please do not feel any constraints.
Mr Cran
568. Let me just clarify that I did not mean
your personal role. I mean the organisation's role.
(Air Vice Marshal McNicoll) The Joint Doctrine and
Concepts Centre, as I said, under Major General Milton at the
time, moved straight in immediately afterwards to think about
immediate consequences, if you like, and immediate actions. It
was a strategic think-tank though, so they were trying to think
a little bit further forward. It was an immediate reaction and
there was a month's worth of effort put into that. The output
from that sort of work was papers which were considered by ministers,
amongst others, as an input to policy making at the time. The
SDR New Chapter bit started in October 2001 and involved looking
with Working Group Four at countering terrorism overseas. The
thinking behind that was that the balance between what effort
was going to be put into home defence and overseas was going to
be an important one but the emphasis from our doctrine and our
thinking and experience was that countering things overseas before
they became a threat at home was probably going to be our preferred
option, even though we would not always have that option. Countering
terrorism overseas was a major part of it and the JDCC looked
at a number of areas during that process in order to try and determine
whether the sort of capabilities that we had at the time were
appropriate or to see what other capabilities might be more appropriate
for the future. This is where the thinking came out, particularly
in network enabled capability, but there were other aspects—rapidity
of deployment, enhancements to Special Forces capabilities, enhancements
to intelligence activities. There was a range of ideas and thinking
that came out of the countering terrorism overseas exercise. That
was the input which was then handed on by the JDCC to the equipment
capability area, and that particularly led to second phase work
by Major General Fulton in Working Group Four, which led ultimately
to the White Paper that came out in July.
569. I just have a feeling that I have heard
this in one or other of the Committee's meetings, but was work
already under way in the JDCC before the New Chapter process got
under way?
(Air Vice Marshal McNicoll) The JDCC was up and running
at that stage and was engaged in a whole range of work, some of
which was directly relevant and some of which was in part relevant
to the SDR New Chapter work.
570. One final question about this dreadful
collection of words, network centric warfare. At what point did
your organisation undertake its contribution to this concept?
(Air Vice Marshal McNicoll) It was during that working
group that it took place. If I may add a small bit on the terminology,
the US expression tends to be "network centric warfare"
and the UK have coined the term "network enabled capability".
I do not think that the difference in terminology is in itself
too important. I think perhaps initially we felt that the US was
perhaps running further ahead than we envisaged and that they
were perhaps thinking in a more revolutionary rather than evolutionary
sense. I do not now feel that. I think that we are very much heading
in the same direction on this.
Rachel Squire
571. Picking up on what you just said, do you
not think that US military doctrine is still dominated by the
warfare, war-fighting concept whereas our military doctrine recognises
more the dual roles of both war-fighting and peacekeeping and
that is why we are referring to it as capability as opposed to
warfare?
(Air Vice Marshal McNicoll) I do not think that is
the origin of the difference. Without directly contradicting you,
can I say that the war-fighting ethos is very much at the heart
of British defence doctrine as well and we believe that if you
do have that war-fighting capability and ethos you are much more
likely to be able to do the other things that you may be called
upon to do whereas the reverse is not true. I cannot comment on
the US position.
Patrick Mercer
572. Gentlemen, in the British Defence Doctrine
we used to have the OODA Loop. That seems to have been superseded
by the SDR New Chapter DDD, "detect, decide, destroy".
What is the difference?
(Air Vice Marshal McNicoll) I do not think there necessarily
is a tremendous difference. It is an intellectual construct if
you like for describing what we are talking about, which is going
from a sensor through some sort of decision-making process which
involves a decision maker through to what is called a shooter.
"Detect, decide, destroy" is not much different from
"Observe, orient, decide, act".
573. Why replace it then?
(Air Vice Marshal McNicoll) I am not sure it makes
a tremendous difference. I think it is just a different way of
describing the same thing. Sometimes we get US bumper sticker
technology which catches on in the UK and "sensor to shooter"
is very much an American sort of expression.
574. Referring to bumper sticker slogans, I
seem to recall in manoeuvre warfare that we were taught that it
was not necessarily "destruction" but "defeat"
which was quite often the thing that one ought to aim for. Why
"destroy" rather than "act" or "defeat"?
Surely, with the nuances of counter-terrorist warfare, "act"
or "defeat" would be a better word than "destroy"?
(Air Vice Marshal McNicoll) I think this is the danger
of describing what can be complicated concepts with bumper stickers,
so perhaps we should retract the bumper sticker bit out of that.
You are absolutely right: manoeuvre warfare emphasises shattering
the enemy's cohesion and its will rather than some attritional
model of destruction that perhaps people might have thought of
in the past.
575. Thank you. I look forward to seeing the
next bumper sticker.
(Mr Kernohan) I think "detect, decide, destroy",
which has something of the character of a slogan about it, is
describing a single sequence of events and almost implicit in
the label is the concept that there is a target that you can destroy.
I do not think it is intended to be a description of a campaign
or a means of warfare. The loop has the idea that you keep going
round it. I think "detect, decide, destroy" is, if you
like, a description of a distinct discrete sequence.
576. A finite sequence?
(Mr Kernohan) Yes.
Patrick Mercer: Deeply intellectual and I am
sure will help the soldier in the trench.
Rachel Squire
577. The Chief of the Defence Staff in his December
speech to the Royal United Services Institute talked of the effects
based approach to military strategy being at the heart of the
new British thinking. To what extent has that effects based strategic
thinking inherent in the SDR New Chapter actually been adopted
by British doctrine?
(Air Vice Marshal McNicoll) Effects based operations
is something we aspire to, which means that you understand exactly
not just the military dimension but the other dimensions of the
strategic environment which may be diplomatic or economic and
you can say what impact some action will have in the mind of your
opponent if you are trying to destroy his will or shatter his
cohesion in order to achieve your object. I do not think we have
got there yet but what we are starting to do now and has recently
been introduced is something called effects based targeting which
is a step on the road towards effects based operations where,
instead of in the attritional manner that I was talking about
earlier, taking a list of targets and saying, "We can destroy
that and destroy that", we think now much more closely about
linking that to the wider campaign, perhaps the information campaign
if you can describe it like that, so that the effect you are achieving
is not a simple destruction; the effect you are trying to achieve
is something rather more subtle in the mind of your opponent.
We have already started down that route but, as I say, effect
based operations, which we are doing a lot of conceptual thinking
about at the moment, would involve understanding to a greater
degree than I think is possible at the moment every aspect of
the strategic environment in which both you and your opponent
are operating.
Chairman: Most of us are avid readers of anything
the MoD puts out, some of which is very relevant. Could you put
us on your mailing list? You are going to have to get authority,
at least from the Secretary of State or above, before that request
will be agreed to but it would be really helpful if we could have
copies of your documents, and certainly the Joint Vision paper
2001 because we do not have that.
Syd Rapson
578. The Secretary of State in July last year
said that network centricity would have significant doctrinal
implications. Simon Webb from the MoD, who knows everything, said
some months afterwards, in October, that work was still to be
done. How would you characterise the significance of the doctrinal
implications of network centric capabilities?
(Air Vice Marshal McNicoll) I think it is immense
and there is still a lot to be done but we have certainly started
thinking about the challenges and engaging with our allies, particularly
the US, on these challenges. Network centric or network enabled
capability is really just a way of tying everything together better,
but what it does give you the opportunity to do is think differently
about how you exercise command and control and about whether existing
layers of command and control are appropriate in all circumstances
or in some circumstances. I have no doubt that as things evolve
it will have a really significant impact.
579. You agree with the Secretary of State,
but we have not found them yet? Is the SDR New chapter going to
lead to a New Chapter in the British Defence Doctrine?
(Air Vice Marshal McNicoll) No, I do not think it
will. Our doctrine evolves with each document that we produce
and as we reproduce previous documents and produce fresh iterations.
What I do not think we need is a document entitled Network
Enabled Capability Doctrine. That is a physical capability;
it is not a doctrine. What we need to do is think about how we
do the other things which are in our doctrine, whether it is commanding
and controlling our forces or how we operate these forces. We
already have doctrine in these areas. It will evolve as we think
through the implications.
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