Examination of Witnesses (Questions 600
- 619)
WEDNESDAY 5 FEBRUARY 2003
AIR VICE
MARSHAL IAIN
MCNICOLL
CBE AND MR
HUGH KERNOHAN
600. Is Joint Service Doctrine a subject for
any of the forces in this complex, or should it be, or will it
be?
(Air Vice Marshal McNicoll) It certainly should be
and it is. I have addressed both the Advanced Command Staff Course
and the Higher Command Staff Course since my arrival and appointment
and staff at the JDCC are regularly engaged at the Staff College
to ensure that what we are writing is what is taught and what
is challenged.
601. The Chief of the Defence Staff has expressed
the view that integrated joint operations represent the UK's advantage
in asymmetric warfare. How does this play in doctrinal terms?
(Air Vice Marshal McNicoll) Could you ask the question
again?
602. Yes. The section really is on asymmetric
warfare and the New Chapter of the SDR based on expectations.
Asymmetric warfare would be the norm for the future but asymmetrical
operations are inherently difficult to plan for. The Chief of
the Defence Staff at RUSI on 18 December said that "integrated
joint operations are our asymmetric advantage". Of course
now you remember everything the Chief of Defence Staff said. It
did need me to remind you and now you know it.
(Air Vice Marshal McNicoll) Regrettably I was not
present but I did read the speech.
603. Of course. I will repeat the question.
The Chief of the Defence Staff has expressed the view that integrated
joint operations represent the UK's advantage in asymmetric warfare.
How do you think this plays out as far as you are concerned in
doctrinal terms?
(Air Vice Marshal McNicoll) Can I say a couple of
things on asymmetry first? Asymmetric warfare is not anything
new. The whole point of warfare is to try and play to your strengths
and against your opponent's weaknesses and that applies to us
as much as it might apply to potential opponents. That said, in
the asymmetric situations that we find ourselves in at the moment,
I think we have got a number of strengths. One of them of course
is, as the Chief of the Defence Staff pointed out, integrated
joint operations. The other is the sort of technology that we
can bring to bear and the degree to which we can knit that together.
I think that is lying at the heart of what we are talking about
here with network enabled capability. It is trying to get for
us the asymmetric advantage.
604. Have you been writing about this or thinking
very seriously about it, or will it appear in any revision to
your document?
(Air Vice Marshal McNicoll) I have a number of points
here in Joint Vision which relate to asymmetry. As I said earlier,
we will try and get that to you but we have already been writing
some themes on asymmetric threats. In the area of potential threats
we have already recognised the increasing trend, particularly
by non-state combatants, to use asymmetric attacks. We certainly
understand that adversaries are likely to search out our weaknesses
in order to undermine our own role. We understand, as I was talking
about technology, that utilising high technology is something
that we will continue to aspire to do in order to try to gain
an asymmetric advantage. However, that dependence on higher technology
is not the answer in all situations and the asymmetric actor will
try and position himself in complex terrain, and by that I mean
in urban situations or in jungle or in mountains where our high
technology gives us less of an advantage, so that the possibility
of a move towards high technology will drive our opponent to seek
lower technology solutions which render our higher technology
less effective. We have also in our thinking looked at the subject
of protection of our forces and understand that with regard to
protection of our networks in the future, for example, if you
rely on a network it is a potential area of vulnerability. We
also understand that we need to protect all our rear area to a
greater extent given that the enemy is likely to adopt asymmetric
means to attack that.
605. It will be interesting when you have developed
your thinking, if it is not just confined to the normal readership
of British defence publications. It seems to have a direct relevance
to intelligence services and the Fire Service, etc. Its not just
a military reaction.
Patrick Mercer
606. Gentlemen, we have already touched on counter-terrorism,
but how useful has Britain's previous experience and indeed doctrinal
thinking been for counter-terrorism been since 11 September?
(Air Vice Marshal McNicoll) Enormously so. As you
rightly point out, there is a history which stretches over—well,
it does not matter whether we start in Malaya or Northern Ireland
or wherever.
607. The Indian Mutiny perhaps.
(Air Vice Marshal McNicoll) Yes, or any part of UK
military history. In that sense, if it can be put as an advantage
the UK was rather better placed than perhaps it might have been
on the back of these events. What of course was different about
11 September was the scale and severity and some of the aspects
of the people involved as well.
608. What new doctrinal work has that caused
to be undertaken? For instance, are you trying to work to a counter-terrorist
doctrine? You may already be there; I do not know.
(Air Vice Marshal McNicoll) There are different levels
in that. If I just go down through the various levels of doctrine,
at the military strategic level I think we are content that the
British defence doctrine actually captures the enduring fundamental
principles that apply to counter-terrorism operations as much
as they apply to any other operations. At the operational level
we have a publication which is usually abbreviated as UK Ops
Doc which covers how the senior level commander looks at all
aspects of operations, including counter-terrorist operations.
We are though very conscious that if we are looking in the home
framework rather than overseas, it is not our lead. We cannot
have an operational or strategic level doctrine for counter-terrorism
operations which is not a defence lead. We do have, for example,
such things as the Military Aid to the Civil Authorities
handbook, the so-called green book, which you will be familiar
with. We also are working to try and ensure that our thinking
post-11 September actually is consistent with what was there pre-11
September. Turning to the tactical level doctrine, if we get down
to the lowest level, and here I am speaking on behalf of my Army
colleagues who happen to have the lead on these tactical level
doctrines for counter-terrorists, there is, for example, the Army
Field Manual which deals with this and also with counter-insurgency,
and it really gives generic guidance for techniques, tactics and
procedures which are applicable across the spectrum of operations,
including counter terrorism. The tactical procedures were written
at Headquarters Land and Headquarters Northern Ireland based on
that and the training aspect of that is done through the Operational
Training and Advisory Team. If you work from the top to the bottom
the detail and the specificity of counter-terrorist operations
increases until down at the tactical level, which is mainly, as
I say, a land environment function, it is dealt with in increasing
detail.
609. The business of home defence, and I fully
appreciate that it should not be a defence-led issue: who is tackling
that at the moment?
(Air Vice Marshal McNicoll) This is an implementation
thing as much as anything else, so in broad outline it is a Home
Office lead and obviously the Home Secretary chairs the Civil
Contingencies Committee and there is a Civil Contingencies Secretariat
which takes the lead in co-ordinating this.
Chairman
610. We know about it in great detail.
(Air Vice Marshal McNicoll) In that case I am going
to hand over to Hugh to answer the remainder of the implementation
aspects.
(Mr Kernohan) I am tempted to quote your own annual
report and say that the answer is Sir David Omand and Susan Scholefield
who are driving the work forward at one level.
Patrick Mercer
611. May I press you on this? Are we going to
have a doctrine for homeland defence or whatever phrase you wish
to use?
(Air Vice Marshal McNicoll) We are working on the
military aspects of homeland defence and security operations.
The point we are trying to make, which I am sure you do understand
from what you have just said, is that this is not in the strategic
sense a military lead. We are contributing.
(Mr Kernohan) In one sense the outcome of, for example,
the Civil Contingencies Bill, could be analogous in some ways
to what in military terms is doctrine. Doctrine is a concept which
means something within the military environment. It is not one
that a policeman or an emergency planner in the National Health
Service would necessarily recognise. That does not mean they do
not do it but they may call it something different. Within our
terms we are working on the doctrinal aspects of the military
contributions, many of which are well established and will not
change, in some of which, because we are expanding the capabilities,
particularly in command and control and in the regional contingency
planning, there is work going on that is being done within Land
Command. A single national doctrine for homeland defence is not,
I think, a concept that that other people would recognise in those
terms because they are military labels.
Chairman
612. They might not recognise it but it is necessary.
This goes back to an earlier question. We are still operating
in the digging of trenches. You are working on how to bring the
Army, Air Force and the Navy together and somebody—it could
be Ms Scholefield who knows the MoD—should be working also
in bringing the military and the MoD in closer liaison with the
other government departments.
(Mr Kernohan) That is exactly right. It is also bringing
them in closer liaison with each other, not just us with them.
That is what the role of the Civil Contingency Secretariat is
and that is certainly how Susan sees it.
613. Oh, she does?
(Mr Kernohan) Yes. She is there to drive forward a
set of aspects related to what we label homeland defence, a term
I do not like because it has all sorts of connotations of Russian
Special Forces coming over the beach.
Patrick Mercer
614. If I may come to the business of countering
terror in this country, we have seen some clear articulations
about how terror must be addressed abroad in order to stop it
striking in this country and that is therefore clearly a military
function, led by the Home Office, led by the Ministry of Defence
or a combination of the two. What I am hoping you are going to
say is that as it is extremely difficult now to distinguish between
internal security and external threat there is going to be an
overarching policy which guides the fireman, the policeman, the
soldier, the territorial, the reserve sailor, whatever, so that,
as this threat evolves into missiles, rogue aircraft, anthrax
attacks, we have a guiding principle that that will assist us
to overcome this.
(Mr Kernohan) Yes, there is work which is going on
also within the Cabinet Office under Sir David Omand to put a
long term counter-terrorist strategy to ministers. It is intended
to be completed later in the course of the year, which will cover
all these strands, both home and overseas, and which will identify
the areas for action on things that need to be improved in addition
to those things which are already in progress.
615. Just repeat the timings please when we
might see this work.
(Mr Kernohan) It is in progress at the moment. I think
it is planned to put it to ministers in the late spring. I am
not sure exactly what public form it will take thereafter and
it will have layers as far as the domestic package is concerned.
(Air Vice Marshal McNicoll) Can I just add to that?
From perhaps too narrow a perspective the MoD is completely clear
about what it is doing in this area and whether it is countering
the rogue aircraft threat, for example, or measures which we are
already well aware of in terms of reserves. All of these aspects
following SDR New Chapter in the homeland side have been followed
up. The integration that you talk about, which I understand is
taking place, is an external to the MoD lead which we are assisting
in.
Patrick Mercer: I do understand that.
Thank you for clarifying it.
Chairman: We were less concerned in our
report about what the MoD were doing and more concerned about
what other departments were doing or not doing.
Rachel Squire
616. We have briefly touched on some other areas
that we can spend hours talking about individually: pre-emptive
doctrine, rules of engagement and international law. We have certainly
in the public arena heard a great deal about the Bush administration's
reference to a doctrine of pre-emption and some would say that
in a military sense it makes no difference whether an operation
is pre-emptive or not, but we are curious about the significance
a pre-emptive doctrine has for the legality of rules of engagement
and also international law and its interpretation when it comes
to armed service personnel in operation. Can I first of all ask
you a more general question? To what extent do you think this
development of a doctrine of pre-emption affects the parameters
of UK doctrine?
(Air Vice Marshal McNicoll) If I can come at that
slightly obliquely, the first point is, if I may quote a couple
of lines out of the White Paper, "We have made clear that
our responses will be proportionate and in accordance with our
international legal obligations" and "it should be clear
that legally the right to self-defence includes the possibility
of action in the face of an imminent attack". With regard
to the question that you are posing in the specific form, we from
the JDCC would say that the full range of effects that we are
trying to achieve—prevent, deter, coerce, disrupt, destroy—are
open to us in the face of an imminent threat and that we would
want to start at the "prevent" end rather than at the
"destroy" end. That said, it is not a JDCC function,
in fact, it is not even strictly a military function at all, to
decide on the legality of the use of force. As you may be aware,
the MoD Legal Adviser is part of the Treasury Solicitor's Office
and is ultimately responsible to the Attorney General on advice
on the legality of the use of force in armed conflict, and that
decision, whether or not any proposed action would meet these
legal tests, is one that is not taken lightly and is taken at
the level of the MoD Legal Adviser and potentially the Secretary
of State and others. That is not to say that in our doctrinal
thinking we have not thought through the implications of the statements
here that we may obviously be required to act speedily in the
face of an imminent threat. In fact, that is the thrust of the
SDR New Chapter, that we want to be able to have the ability to
react precisely and speedily to a threat wherever it presents
itself.
(Mr Kernohan) It does not, as you say, make in many
cases a lot of difference to military doctrine the purpose for
which the operation is taking place. If the decision is that in
the operation the use of force is legal and that ministers direct
that the MoD carry it out, then the doctrine that Iain and his
team write is what guides how that is carried out. There is a
gap that we can see, if you like. There is a concept in play at
one extreme which is that of domestic law enforcement, which is
underpinned by a focus on the individual, innocent until proven
guilty, and a series of statutory constraints on the use of force
by the state. At the other extreme you have the classic concept
of warfare where the focus is not on an individual but on a collective,
the enemy. It is not about life and death. It is about the enemy's
objectives, his will to fight and his capabilities. The constraints
in the use of force are different and they are a matter of political
choice in circumstances at the time. There is a sense that at
the moment, as a result of 11 September, there is an area of activity,
a series of threats that we are having to face that somehow falls
in the middle. That is the question that we are wrestling with
and I am not sure we have got the answer. The answer, when it
is formed, it probably does not bear directly on military doctrine,
on how military force is applied.
Mr Jones
617. Can I ask you a question on that point?
We went to Operation SAIF SAREEA last year and in the planning
stage there one thing that was emphasised as part of the exercise
was, for example, running by the lawyers that what the engagement
was going to be was within the law as you have described it. If
we are going to get a situation though whereby it is a pre-emptive
type of doctrine or way forward, surely that is going to be different
from what is there at the moment which is really governed, as
you say, by law, and I know it is taken very seriously by military
in terms of making sure that the action they actually take does
fall within international law and the rules of engagement in that
theatre of war.
(Mr Kernohan) Everything we all do, whether military
officers or civil servants, is governed wherever we do it by UK
law. Any action must therefore be legal in terms of statute. The
question of international law is open to interpretation in the
light of the circumstances of the event and policy does not necessarily
determine the answer in advance.
618. The commander in the field, for example
is not going to take some action without ensuring that what he
or she is doing falls within that law, whereas what we are talking
here surely is, if we are following what Bush and the administration
in the United States is saying, perhaps stepping outside what
is both at the moment legal in terms of UK law and potentially
in terms of the international situation. Where does that leave
the commander in terms of consulting the lawyer?
(Mr Kernohan) The commander's position—and this
is defined in doctrine—will always be clearly stated in
advance. He will be given his mission, he will be given the constraints
on his actions. This is the purpose of rules of engagement that
we were talking about at various different levels in order to
ensure that the action the commander takes is within the boundaries
of law.
(Air Vice Marshal McNicoll) I see this as being less
of a tactical problem as you have described than it is at the
strategic level. The real question is: is what is being proposed
consistent with the UK's obligations under international law?
That is perhaps the determination that is made at the strategic
level within the MoD. You would not expect a commander off his
own bat to take some pre-emptive action, for example. The authority
for doing so will remain at the highest level in the MoD and outside
the MoD indeed.
Chairman: Yes. Military personnel are
subject to international law as well as domestic law.
Mr Jones
619. But do you not think it needs clarifying?
Does it not muddy the waters if you talk about pre-emptive action?
I can understand the difference you have made between the strategic
level and the command level, but if, for example, we get a situation
where more decisions are going to be taken at the front line very
quickly, the onus is going to be pushed on to the commander in
certain situations where pre-emptive—
(Air Vice Marshal McNicoll) I think that is what the
Chief of the Defence Staff was talking about when he was talking
about how we may need to examine the structures for that decision
making process. The key point is that the decision maker must
be the appropriate person to make that level of decision and it
may, in circumstances where you are trying to apply the rapid
and precise use of force, require a decision at the tactical end
very quickly and that may require you to reach back and cut across
the structures in order to get the decision. I still feel that
that is a problem for the system to assist the commander in the
field and it is not, I suggest, basically a problem at the tactical
level.
(Mr Kernohan) One of the significances of the network
is that it may give us the opportunity to take action that we
would not otherwise be able to take precisely because it gives
a speed of decision at the highest level, whatever level is determined
as necessary. It may allow us to contemplate operations that ordinarily
we would not because we could not take the proper decision in
enough time.
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