Examination of Witnesses (Questions 640
- 659)
WEDNESDAY 5 MARCH 2003
RT HON
GEOFFREY HOON
MP, MR SIMON
WEBB CBE AND
AIR MARSHAL
SIR JOCK
STIRRUP KCB, AFC
640. I would agree with you on that. Are there
any lessons you have learned from Afghanistan in terms of how
you deal, for example, post-peace keeping or post dealing with
the civil population so your opponents are not then using use
of force as a way of recruiting more opponents to the cause?
(Mr Hoon) I do not think there were any new lessons.
I think it emphasised some lessons we had learned from previous
conflicts. It emphasises the importance of security in the immediate
aftermath of a conflict, ensuring that inherent instability is
not allowed to get out of control, of the international community
remaining again not only in a military sense but also in a financial
resource sense involved in the rebuilding of the country in question.
I think, unlike what has sometimes happened in past Afghanistan
conflicts, we recognise that that is part and parcel of our obligation
to the country or region in question.
641. Are there any specific lessons about how
you deal with the civil population, for example, because I know
from talking to some marines a couple of weeks ago that a lot
of the work they were doing was about getting to know the local
community and getting to know what was going on there and one
of them actually discussed how they did it compared to the Americans
and they said the example there was not good in terms of building
confidence with the local community. Are there things we have
learned from there and elsewhere that can actually be fed into
this process so that if we are dealing with post-conflict areas
people will not say it is just about the UK using force and it
not being recognised that there is a sensitivity?
(Mr Hoon) I do not think that is a particularly new
lesson that has been learned. I think it builds on a great deal
of experience that British forces have had in that kind of context
and probably much of it institutionally learned in Northern Ireland
where the experience of patrolling, for example, has been conducted
in a way that many people say to me is quite different from the
way in which patrols would be conducted by other countries. It
is specifically the contact with the local community and learning
and understanding the needs and concerns of that community that
perhaps differentiates the way in which British soldiers have
gone about that over the years. It is not a new lesson but certainly
something that I think is very valuable in terms of trying to
share our experience with others.
Chairman
642. One of the consequences of the SDR was
cuts in personnel, ships, aircraft, all sorts of things. Three
or four years on, do you wish you still had those personnel and
equipment that were jettisoned as part of the SDR? It seems to
me if we had stayed at the level of the SDR publication you would
not be in quite the same predicament you are in at the moment
of having too few people at your disposal.
(Mr Hoon) Chairman, I am sure you are not suggesting
that it is simply a question of the amount of equipment or the
number of people. What is at issue is having the right kind of
equipment and the right kind of trained people to do particular
jobs. We are not talking about numbers per se, we are talking
about having people trained and organised to do particular kinds
of jobs. It is the jobs that are crucial. It may well be the case
in terms of the results and the activity that those people engage
in that you could perfectly well contemplate carrying that out
with a different number of people. I do not think there is any
particular magic in any given figure, it is what those people
are trained to do. Indeed, the challenge for the Army today is
not the number of infantry regiments that we might have, the challenge
is in logistics, it is in signals, it is in a whole range of enablers
that support deployed forces, that is the challenge. We could,
almost certainly, go out and recruit large numbers of infantry
people relatively straightforwardly. It is much more difficult
to train and retain the kinds of skills that are required today
in signals, for example, not least because of a healthy economy
where those particular skills are in demand in the private sector.
So it is a very different sort of challenge and I think one that
is quite fundamental. Similarly with equipment, I have made the
point to the Committee before that HMS Victory is still part of
the Royal Navy but it is not on active service. We need to renew
that equipment constantly and requirements will change quite quickly.
The challenge for us is both to utilise existing equipment in
a way that might be different from that which was originally anticipated
but at the same time to get new equipment into service as quickly
as possible in time to deal with the threats that we have identified.
(Air Marshal Sir Jock Stirrup) I think one of the
most interesting things to emerge from the New Chapter work, which
was not entirely anticipated, was the way in which the equipment
capability requirements we had emerging from the Strategic Defence
Review were not overturned by the events of September 11, indeed
in most instances were reinforced. The lesson was that not only
did we have to stick with what we were doing but we had to do
it even faster and then events in Afghanistan served to underline
that even further.
Jim Knight
643. In response to Kevan's question you talked
about the lessons that you had learned from Afghanistan in terms
of post-conflict work. Obviously that mission was led by the United
States. Have you shared your conclusions with them and have they
come to the same conclusions in terms of post-conflict work and
lessons?
(Mr Hoon) I think there is a general recognition that
those countries engaged in a conflict have a continuing responsibility
for rebuilding the country in question, not least in order, we
would hope, to avoid having to go back in the short-term in order
to resolve the problem again, which is actually the lesson that
the broader international community learned in Afghanistan, because
arguably some of the problems of the civil war in the 1990s were
the result of a precipitate withdrawal by the Soviet Union and
abandoning the country to that kind of anarchy and chaos and that
is something that we recognise and want to avoid.
Chairman: Mr Howarth?
Mr Howarth
644. Chairman, I wanted to go back to the question
that you were raising with the Secretary of State on the question
of numbers. I note that HMS Victory is still on the inventory
of the Royal Navy and the Secretary of State will know that five
Spitfires and one Lancaster bomber are also on the inventory of
the Royal Air Force so we hope that they will not be called into
action. Can I challenge what I suspect is a slightly dismissive
approach towards numbers. The fact is that the Royal Air Force's
requirement has been reduced by nearly 4,000 since 1999 and the
strength has been reduced by 3,000 since 1999. What you are suggesting,
Secretary of State, is that this does not really matter because
we have got the right people and the right kit. How does that
square with the survey which was done last year which showed that
something like nine out of ten of those in the Royal Air Force
who were surveyed about attitude said that they thought that overstretch
is causing serious problems in the Royal Air Force? There is overstretch.
It is a matter of numbers, it is a matter of budget, is it not?
(Mr Hoon) I am not saying that numbers do not matter.
What I think is important, and I maintain my answer to the Chairman,
is what you do with those numbers. You and the Chairman appear
to be judging the Armed Forces according to the numbers and equipment
going in. What is crucial is what results you get from the use
of that equipment and the use of those people. Clearly there have
been times since October 1999, when I was appointed to this position,
when I have been concerned about the pressures on individuals
and certainly on enablers, for example, and it is not in any way
inconsistent with what I am saying to the Committee that there
could clearly be pressure on individuals. There was, for example,
in November 1999, as a result of two substantial deployments to
the Balkans, separately to Kosovo and to Bosnia, a huge impact
on specifically those kinds of people because they were responsible
for supporting the deployed forces in Bosnia and Kosovo. One of
the things that we have been doing consistently since then is
to reduce the numbers, reduce the pressure on enablers, but increasingly
to ensure that there is a degree of co-operation between those
historically two distinct operations into one, again lessening
the impact on the supporting elements in the chain. I stand absolutely
by what I said to you earlier which is that it is not just a question
of looking at the numbers going in, you need numbers in order
to be able to achieve your tasks. I would be much more interested
in the comment if it said you cannot carry out certain roles and
responsibilities because you do not have enough numbers. That
would be a proper approach to this issue, not simply to say you
need more numbers. You certainly need more people in certain key
areas, but we do not need more numbers overall.
645. I do not think there would be any dispute
with members of this Committee over the need to concentrate on
outputs rather than inputs, outputs should be the measure. The
point I am making is that those who currently serve take the view
overwhelmingly, nine out of ten, that there is a problem of over-stretch
and over-stretch could be defined as the number of people available
to carry out the tasks with the equipment that we all agree is
necessary.
(Mr Hoon) I think you are getting a little carried
away with your evidence because you do not have evidence to substantiate
your nine out of ten point. There are certainly indications that
in key areas we have asked people to do more than at any given
time I would like to ask of them. Nevertheless, I do not think
you can make that rather over-the-top point. I would be pleased
to see your evidence.
646. Let me just give you one example. I was
out in the Falkland Islands—
(Mr Hoon) No, the evidence, not an example.
Mr Howarth: The example is the evidence, Secretary
of State, surely.
Chairman: We should move on from this.
Patrick Mercer
647. Secretary of State, I am sorry I do not
have any firm evidence of this other than the 800 voices of your
and my county regiment who are deeply unhappy about having their
tour in South Armagh extended as a result of over-stretch. This
is an issue that is leading to a ruinous state of unhappiness
and dissatisfaction principally amongst the married men. Another
example is Kings Own Royal Border Regiment who are stuck for another
mindless length of time in Cyprus and they are extremely unhappy
as a result of this. I take issue with your comment that in a
time of high employment it is difficult to recruit soldiers.
(Mr Hoon) I did not say that. I said that in a time
of good economy it was difficult to retain particular skills that
were in demand in that economy. We have been improving our recruitment
dramatically lately, as you have pointed out.
648. Forgive me. I clearly misunderstood that
or perhaps I am referring back mentally to another statement you
made elsewhere. If it is easy to recruit soldiers, why have you
not? Why are you still 6,000/7,000 short? Why are battalions deploying
to the Gulf so horribly and so badly undermanned?
(Mr Hoon) It has not easy to recruit soldiers and
it has not been easy to recruit—
649. I thought you said that.
(Mr Hoon) I do not think I did. I am perfectly happy
to have the record read back. What I said was that lately there
had been a significant improvement in recruitment, but over many
years recruitment has been quite a challenge. Indeed, given the
declining numbers of the relevant segment of the population, we
anticipate it is going to be an even more difficult challenge
in the future. Lately, I suspect largely attributable to the activities
that the Armed Forces have been engaged in, there has been a very
welcome improvement in recruitment and one that we are seeking
to manage. It is certainly partly a reflection of the strength
of the economy, of the competition for skills in particular, and
part of the issue is to do with retention as much as it is to
do with recruitment and it is important to emphasise that. These
are things that we manage and I think we manage them very successfully.
650. Without being too dull about this subject,
can I just make the point that there is very grave unhappiness
about the level of over-stretch that is being imposed on the sort
of discussion that you have had before about—
(Mr Hoon) We have had, but unfortunately this argument,
if you will forgive me for saying so, only tends to be raised
in a party political context and one of the difficulties that
I think anyone raising the question of over-stretch has to face
up to is a simple challenge that I have made to other members
of your front bench on a previous occasion and it is this: which
particular operation in the last three and a half years would
you not have been engaged in? Again, I am afraid the answer has
always been a big deafening silence on that.
651. Can I raise it above party politics and
just say that if the Army were to be fully recruited—and
you know I contend that recruiting is simple, easy and there are
successful ways of doing it which are not being used at the moment—it
would be a happier place in which to serve.
(Mr Hoon) I think the challenge, as I have said already
in answer to the original question from the Chairman, is not simply
numbers. If we wanted to recruit large numbers of personnel to
the infantry I am pretty confident that could be done and that
is certainly the advice that I have been given consistently, but
that will not solve the problem that you are identifying. The
problem of over-stretch in that sense is not a problem of numbers
of infantry, it is a problem of enablers, a problem of all those
who have to support deployed forces and that is a very different
issue.
Patrick Mercer: Thank you.
Jim Knight
652. You said in your opening statement, Secretary
of State, that "the central New Chapter concept of network-centric
capability will have application to most types of operations and
in the long term may drive fairly fundamental changes in the doctrine
and structure of the Armed Forces." Does that mean that you
think we are in a revolution in terms of military affairs?
(Mr Hoon) I am always tempted to go for the glib sound
bite. I certainly think that we are facing a fundamental change
which I would compare to the impact of new technology in the private
sector. I think that the Armed Forces in most countries, even
including the United States, have been behind that revolution
that has affected the way most organisations do their business
and it is the key impact of new technology of communications and
of digitisation that in a sense lie at the heart of what I am
talking about. The creation of a network and the ability to pass
information both across organisations and up and down the chain
is something which most larger private sector organisations have
now come to terms with and in a sense it is that change that I
think the military are now facing up to and it is a revolution
in that sense. I accept it is a fundamental change to the way
in which decisions are taken, to the way in which information
is distributed and to the way in which the organisation of the
Armed Forces will flow from that, but Jock has spent a lot of
time thinking about this and I am sure he will have some more
detailed comments to make.
(Air Marshal Sir Jock Stirrup) We are in an era where
there is the potential to do things in a fundamentally different
way. The technology exists and is being developed. If you look
through the history of warfare and of Armed Forces, I think it
has generally been true to say that when we have had new technological
developments and innovation our great weakness has been our failure
to exploit them in the widest context in terms of doctrine. One
could point to the tank, one could point to the aircraft, one
could point to almost anything where we have failed in the first
few years because we have only thought in terms of equipment as
something new and applied that to our old way of doing things,
and that is why the crucial element of network-enabled capability
is dealing with all of what we call the lines of development in
a coherent way so that in an iterative fashion we develop concepts,
we develop the doctrine as we are developing technology and one
feeds off the another, no one of them leads.
653. Given that there is such a fundamental
shift and a revolution and often with revolutions it is difficult
to predict how it is all going to fall out and what the true potential
is, are you confident that we have got a grip of the implications
and the potential for this?
(Air Marshal Sir Jock Stirrup) I think that is, if
I may say, not quite the right way to look at it. One of the things
that strikes me indeed about some of the subjects we have already
discussed here this afternoon is that nobody has a perfect crystal
ball, none of us can say how the future is going to unfold in
terms of international events, in terms of technology and in terms
of the impact of that technology on the doctrines and process.
The critical issue is do you have the right kind of organisation,
do you have the right kind of knowledge base and learning organisation
that can take changes and adapt it to a fluid situation and apply
them in the best possible way. So it is not an issue of trying
to forecast what we ought to have and aim for that, it is a question
of being able to respond to an unforeseen future in the most effective
way possible.
654. Is it not the case that the way the Americans
clearly see it is they are in the middle of this revolution, they
are clearly leading the way and the reality is it is a response
to what they are doing and thinking and what we think is irrelevant?
(Air Marshal Sir Jock Stirrup) I do not think it is
true to say that the Americans are leading the way, I do not think
it is true at all. I have quite a lot to do with them and I see
this at first hand. It is the case that in a number of technical
areas they are ahead for obvious reasons. It is equally the case
that they look on us with undisguised envy because we are able
to put in place the crucial elements of doctrine and process and
tie that together with technical capability in a much more coherent
fashion than they can. You have staff in the Pentagon working
on this, you have got all three Services involved and if you count
the US Marines you have four Services involved. They have a very
large organisation. They are structured in a completely different
way. The Services under the Title 10 arrangements have their own
individual money for equipment and programming and it is a real
challenge for them to get the coherent defence-wide programme
going, it is much easier for us. Indeed some of the things we
are doing are a help to them in drawing their various strands
together.
655. So ours is independent thinking or is it
part of a network in its own way with the United States and allies
in terms of how we develop this?
(Air Marshal Sir Jock Stirrup) We work very closely
with our allies because if we are going into an operation there
can only be one network. You cannot have a series of different
ones that do not connect with one another otherwise you defeat
the objective. We do work very closely with them. The key point,
going back to the initial observation you made, is that we make
an important contribution to international thinking on this subject
which is a new and exciting area. We are not just following somebody
else's lead.
Mr Roy
656. Does the MoD or, by implication, the Armed
Forces now have an agreed understanding of the terminology surrounding
network-centric warfare, network-centric capability and, in particular,
what that terminology means especially in terms of developments
in equipment, command structures and doctrine?
(Air Marshal Sir Jock Stirrup) The key confusion normally
is between the United States use of network-centric warfare and
our use of network-enabled capability. One of the important strands
of transformation in the Americans' eyes is trying to move to
a capability-based approach away from their own systems-based
approach. We did that years ago. It is one of the areas where
we are well ahead of them. It is not surprising that they have
not moved all the way to this network-enabled capability approach
because they do not have the capability approach in their acquisition
system as a whole. Essentially, when you get right down to it,
there is not going to be a difference in the application. The
easiest way to think about network-enabled capability is linking
together sensors, decision-makers and weapons systems in a way
that enables us to transform information into precise and overwhelmingly
swift military effect. My doctrine friends behind me will tell
you that overwhelmingly swift is not strictly what you should
say at the appropriate tempo and that is true, but it does not
actually give you the sense of using speed as a weapon in its
own right.
Chairman: If you carry on, Air Marshal,
the media will construe there has been a further rebellion against
the Government so I am afraid we are going to have to go and vote
and we will move on to another question when we come back.
Chairman: Part two, Secretary of State.
James Cran?
Mr Cran
657. I am afraid we are still on network-centric
capability. I listened with some interest—
(Mr Hoon) Or whatever we call it!
658. Yes, network-enabled capabilities too.
I listened with some interest to the answer that you, Air Marshal,
gave to Mr Knight. It seemed to me that you were saying that there
were no real differences between the American vision of this and
our vision, at least that we are not compatible one with the other.
That gives me a problem because in quite a lot of the published
material one reads about those who understand these concepts say
that there are some very profound differences between our understanding
and the American understanding. Would you reject that or not as
the case may be?
(Air Marshal Sir Jock Stirrup) I would in essence
reject it. Does that mean that people do not have different ideas?
Of course it does not mean that. There are all sorts of thoughts
about how this can be implemented and the way that it should be
implemented and some of the technical solutions that will be important
in implementing it. None of those is anywhere near maturity yet
so naturally there will be divergences of view, there will be
divergences of view within the UK let alone between the UK, the
US and other partners. In terms of the essence of the thing, what
does it mean for operations, what does it mean for war fighting,
there is not a difference of view.
659. And therefore you would reject those who
say that in fact because of our very considerable differences
as between the two concepts it would endanger the interoperability
between our forces and the Americans over time? You would wholly
reject that?
(Air Marshal Sir Jock Stirrup) I would wholly reject
that because we will not allow that to happen.
|
