Examination of Witnesses (Questions 660
- 679)
WEDNESDAY 5 MARCH 2003
RT HON
GEOFFREY HOON
MP, MR SIMON
WEBB CBE AND
AIR MARSHAL
SIR JOCK
STIRRUP KCB, AFC
660. In what manner? What is the modus operandi?
(Air Marshal Sir Jock Stirrup) We will ensure that
we have one network with anyone with whom we have to go on an
operation because there can only be one network of operation.
That is a fundamental tenet of network-enabled capability.
661. I suppose the obverse of the question is
that if there are no differences between our understanding and
the Americans' understanding what that does is lock us into American-led
operations and excludes us over time. I am not saying this is
my view, I am saying this is the view of many who are writing
about it and that would separate us from operations with our European
partners. What do you say to that?
(Air Marshal Sir Jock Stirrup) I reject that as well.
What will be true is if some partners in a coalition or an alliance
do not have the full range of capabilities then their operations
will inevitably be somewhat constrained, but that is true now.
Mr Cran: Thank you, Chairman.
Syd Rapson
662. The core element of network-centric capability
was the fusion of networks together and the strike assets, you
said that just now. In an earlier evidence session Major General
Fulton of the Royal Marines said that "knowledge superiority
was the key enabler without which we could not focus the military
effort". Then in January 2003, three months later, he said
he thought that Britain could acquire the critical enabling assets
required in the future. Do we have the ability to require the
critical enabling assets for network centred operations in the
short and medium term?
(Air Marshal Sir Jock Stirrup) I think it is perhaps
important to understand the critical characteristic of a network.
We are not talking about a series of serial connections, A to
B and B to C. When you start to interconnect things and manage
information in a certain way, you get beyond a certain level of
complexity when the network begins to behave in a wholly different
way from just a series of communication connections. That is what
is crucial about it and, as the Secretary of State said earlier,
we will not reach that stage for some time yet, so we do not have
now what we would envisage as true network-enabled capability.
What we do have is a road map of how to get there and that is
what we are developing, but it will take some considerable time
and the same is true for the Americans, so in terms of whether
we can procure whatever items of equipment we need, we do not
actually know what they are in all cases yet.
663. So any operations in the short to medium
term will not be network-centric as a concept?
(Mr Hoon) Can I just make two further observations
on what you have said. We have sensors already. The question is
whether you need a different kind, a different capability, but
a reconnaissance patrol is a sensor in this sense. Obviously a
sophisticated reconnaissance aircraft is a more sophisticated
sensor, but identifying the nature of the threat is only part
of the use that a network would make of that information. The
further characteristic and, possibly arguably, a more important
characteristic, because, as I say, a simple reconnaissance patrol
is providing information to the system, is how you distribute
the information that the sensor identifies and in what time-frame
that information is distributed. Part of what a network allows
for is a much more rapid distribution of the information in exactly
the way that a modern commercial business distributes information
across its organisation, in order to allow both rapid decision-making,
but to ensure that a much greater range of decision-makers have
access to that information in rapid time and then to distribute
that information again in the direction of those who are responsible
for executing whatever decision the decision-makers have reached.
It is not just about a particular piece of equipment that senses
a threat; it is about what you do with that information and how
you distribute that information across a network.
664. I recognise that and it is difficult getting
Service personnel around the idea of change as well and this separate
issue of the time to plan which is reducing all the time is critical.
It just means to say that if something is going to happen in the
future, the network system will work very well, but we are not
there yet and we have not got it under control to be able to use
it in the short to medium term, so we are obviously not operating
blindly, we are operating very effectively, but the step change
into the network-centric concept, it is hard to visualise what
the difference is going to be and when it is going to happen.
(Mr Hoon) A radio network is a network, but it is
not distributing the information as widely as modern information
technology allows for. What we are talking about is a step change
both in terms of the amount of information that is collected by
the system, but also the way in which that information is distributed.
In one sense, you can say that there is nothing fundamentally
different about what will happen, except we know that the application
of information technology through a whole range of commercial
organisations has not only made those organisations better at
what they already did, but it has actually changed the way in
which they do it and I think, to answer Jim's question earlier
on, that is the revolutionary change, that this is likely to have
a profound impact on the way in which the organisation behaves
because it is able to obtain and distribute information in a far
more sophisticated way than ever before.
(Air Marshal Sir Jock Stirrup) I just want to make
sure we are clear. It is not that we have no improvement until
suddenly we get the network and then we leap up; we are improving
all the time. The discrete bits of the network where we are forming
improved linkages and improved information flows are improving
our capability all the time, but it will not take us to the full
effect until we get the entire network.
665. What are the realistic implications that
you judge that the UK will see in the next, say, five years using
this evolving system?
(Air Marshal Sir Jock Stirrup) Well, let me give you
an example. In the Gulf War we had enormous difficulty locating
attacking Scuds and this is true of any fleeting target. You have
got to locate it, you have got to find out precisely what it is,
precisely where it is and precisely when it is going to be where
before you can attack it. To deal with that sort of fleeting opportunity,
you have to have a hugely responsive system and that is the kind
of advantage that a network is going to give you. That is just
one example of many.
Mr Hancock
666. Well, seven years on and you still had
difficulty with tanks in Kosovo, so I would be interested to know
how the time-frame works. I did ask the question previously and
you quoted scuds in the Gulf War. We know from the high expectations
of what was being said at briefings that the MoD were planning
successes, but anyone who went to Kosovo knew that that could
not be true because the wrecked tanks were not there, so the network
then did not actually produce a better result on the targets.
My real question to you, Air Marshal, is what is actually the
thing that sets the pace of this development? Is it the resource
which is being put into it or is it the developments in the United
States which we have to keep up with and, therefore, have the
resources or do we have our own agenda which is funded over the
next five to ten years through the life of the Strategic Defence
Review and beyond? What is it?
(Air Marshal Sir Jock Stirrup) We have our own plan
and resource plan for developing network-enabled capability in
conjunction with our allies because we have to have interoperability.
There was not a network in Kosovo and actually our success rates
were very high.
(Mr Hoon) I do think, Chairman, I cannot allow that
particular observation to pass unchallenged. There was a step
change improvement in the accuracy of the bombing campaign as
from the Gulf to Kosovo and a further step change in Afghanistan.
I was in Pristina very shortly after the British forces went in
and was taken on a tour by some Canadian pilots showing me the
very, very precise bombing that had been conducted by Allied aircraft,
absolutely remarkable.
667. You saw hundreds of wrecked tanks, did
you?
(Mr Hoon) I saw a great number of very accurately
executed bombing sorties.
668. You did not see all of the wrecked tanks
that we claimed to have hit? You did not because they were not
there.
(Mr Hoon) I think what is important is to deal with
the facts.
669. They were not there, were they?
(Mr Hoon) There is a very, very detailed assessment
of the bombing campaign which demonstrates the point that I have
just made, which is that as between the Gulf and the campaign
in Kosovo and Serbia, there was a huge improvement in the accuracy
of the bombing and a further improvement in Afghanistan and it
is something which is demonstrable by the facts of the case.
Syd Rapson
670. Is there a problem with the too speedy
reaction because the Predator unmanned vehicle shot a man on horseback
and there is a problem with that, that it went too quickly?
(Mr Hoon) I think certainly what is important is that
the opportunity of making more rapid decisions has to be informed
by the appropriate evidence and I think that the more information
available to those taking the decisions, the less likely they
are to make mistakes.
Chairman
671. Thank you for your remarks on Kosovo. We
have to withdraw our report on lessons from Kosovo because obviously
it is totally incorrect.
(Mr Hoon) Good.
Chairman: We move on to pre-emptive doctrine,
Secretary of State.
Mr Howarth
672. Before I ask a question on that, Chairman,
I would like to respond to a challenge that the Secretary of State
put to the Conservatives on this Committee just as he has responded
to a challenge from Mr Hancock. The point the Secretary of State
has to accept is that he is in charge. This Government is in charge
and they have to decide what operations they want to undertake.
Once they have decided what those operations are that they want
to undertake, they have got to make sure that they have the kit
and the men to achieve the desired result. That is the point,
that, "We are in government. We shall decide what operations
we wish to undertake and we shall make sure that they are properly
funded".
(Mr Hoon) I am grateful to Mr Howarth for pointing
this out, but he will recall that we had a long experience in
opposition and in the course of that long experience in opposition
sought to adjust our decision-making to the realities of being
in power and that is what we have successfully done. Eventually
perhaps after a long, long period in opposition, the Conservatives
might do the same, but clearly Mr Howarth is admitting that they
are not yet prepared to do that.
673. Secretary of State, I am not going to pursue
that. I am not going to rise to the bait.
(Mr Hoon) You started it!
674. There are some very serious issues we need
to address and the Secretary of State needs to address. Looking
at the pre-emptive doctrine, when you spoke in the Defence of
the World debate last October, you argued that "there is
a well-established 19th Century doctrine of pre-emption based
on the concept of self-defence, which allows a sovereign state
to take action to protect itself in the event of an imminent threat".
You went on to say that the US National Security Strategy "is
based firmly on that tradition". If I may say, it sounds
a bit more like Old Chapter than New Chapter, but can you tell
us to what extent the Bush Administration's development of what
has been called a `doctrine of pre-emption' has affected the parameters
of the United Kingdom's approach to military operations?
(Mr Hoon) One of the things we have recognised in
dealing with the kind of threats that manifested themselves in
the United States on September 11th is that in practice we are
likely to be much better off going to deal with the threat at
source rather than waiting for the threat to arrive in the United
Kingdom and trying to fend it off at the last stage. Clearly we
have systems in place to try and deal with threats if they did
get to the United Kingdom, but, in truth, our judgment would be
that an expeditionary capability to get to the source of the threat
would be much more likely to deal with it than waiting and seeing.
That runs through the work we have done on the New Chapter, but
it clearly has to be consistent with our obligations in international
law, which is why we would only respond consistently with international
law which is based on self-defence in this area.
675. So faced by terrorists and the risk of
the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, how do you demonstrate
in a legally robust fashion the imminence of that threat?
(Mr Hoon) I think that clearly depends on the particular
circumstances of each case and inevitably they will differ from
case to case.
676. And you say that obviously these actions
would be taken consistent with international law, but you will
be aware that there is a range of views as to what constitutes
the correct interpretation of international law. We have heard
today of stories about, for example, the validity of the extension
of the no-fly policy to deal with surface-to-surface missiles.
Who is to determine what constitutes internationally valid law?
(Mr Hoon) Having practised for a number of years as
a lawyer, I have always recognised that the continuation of the
legal profession depended on there being more than one view of
what was the law, so I am not at all surprised that there are
different interpretations. There are systems in place, including
ultimately the International Court at The Hague, for reaching
that judgment, but what I can say to you is that the British Government
behaves consistently with its advice and that it behaves consistently
with our understanding of the relevant principles of international
law, which are not, if your question is implying this, solely
dependent upon, for example, the underlying agreed common law
principles of international law, such as self-defence, but of
course crucially depend on decisions of the United Nations.
677. The no-fly zones have up until now been
justified both in terms of the humanitarian approach and also
in terms of dealing with the concept of self-defence, so that
a Royal Air Force aeroplane locked on to it is entitled to take
out that which has locked on to it.
(Mr Hoon) I think you need to distinguish a number
of things there. The no-fly zones themselves were based partly
on humanitarian principles and partly on United Nations Security
Council Resolution 688 and the response that those aircraft are
entitled to make and indeed others acting on behalf of the United
Kingdom and the United States is in self-defence when those aircraft
themselves are threatened, so there are two separate legal principles
at work in that situation.
678. Specifically how would you address this
issue of surface-to-surface missiles which manifestly do not affect
the safety and security of the aircraft policing the no-fly zones
and clearly also are probably not involved in activities which
might represent a threat to humanitarian interests?
(Mr Hoon) I do not actually recall, Chairman, this
being dealt with in detail in the New Chapter Report, but I am
perfectly willing to engage in this debate if the Committee are
interested in it, but it is somewhat beyond the terms of what
we agreed to come to talk to you about.
679. Secretary of State, I will stop you there
because, as you know, I am largely on your side on this matter.
I thought you were going to say that if we had British troops
in the vicinity and you thought there was a potential threat to
those troops, it would be right to adopt a pre-emptive approach.
(Mr Hoon) I set out the position as recently as Monday
and I am certainly very pleased to tell the Committee that the
position has not changed since Monday.
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