Select Committee on Defence Minutes of Evidence


Examination of Witnesses (Questions 700 - 719)

WEDNESDAY 5 MARCH 2003

RT HON GEOFFREY HOON MP, MR SIMON WEBB CBE AND AIR MARSHAL SIR JOCK STIRRUP KCB, AFC

Mr Crausby

  700. You said in the New Chapter (July 2002) that you wanted to push forward on UAVs. You went on to say that "we expect to select next month the two consortia to work with us on the next phase of the Watchkeeper project". So can you tell us why the decision was delayed for over six months into February of this year?
  (Mr Hoon) There were technical reasons why we judged it would be better delaying the process so that we had as much information as we needed in order to be able to take a proper decision. It is not uncommon in procurement. It has not in any way lessened our determination to have that kind of equipment available, but obviously we want to have the best equipment available at the best price.

  701. You also stated in that Chapter that the two consortia would begin practical experimentation in the first part of this year. Has that practical experimentation begun, or has that been delayed as a result of the appointment?
  (Mr Hoon) A great deal of work is going on in any event. These are major international defence businesses who have been able to supply this kind of equipment to other countries in the past. We have already examples of remote aircraft that provide limited functionality, but some useful capabilities, that we have used previously in the Balkans, for example. What we are looking at is to build on that experience with the expertise that these companies have. So we are not talking about something that is novel. UAVs are flying probably as we speak. What we want to ensure is that the next generation available to the United Kingdom provides us with useful capabilities at the best price for the British taxpayer.

  702. You said that "we shall invite each of them to provide us with an appropriate prototype system . . . to enable practical experimentation". Has that happened?
  (Air Marshal Sir Jock Stirrup) We have set up our programme, the joint UAV experimental programme. This too is an issue about thinking about concepts, doctrines and processes as much as about technology. We have already started on that. We have not yet got to the stage where we are flying UAVs as part of that experimentation, but that is only one strand of that. So the work is under way.

  703. So when will that practical experimentation take place?
  (Air Marshal Sir Jock Stirrup) Certainly by the middle of the year.

  704. Will the delays that you have experienced so far be made up? When we met Major General Fulton on 16 October he said that 2005 was the in-service date for an initial operating capability. Will that be caught up on, and is 2005 still the date?
  (Air Marshal Sir Jock Stirrup) Are we talking about Watchkeeper now or the experimentation?

  705. Watchkeeper.
  (Air Marshal Sir Jock Stirrup) It remains our clear determination to bring forward the dates of Watchkeeper, as was announced, so we hope to keep to that target.

  706. I accept that network-centric warfare/network enabled capabilities will inevitably be a complicated and difficult business, but is it indicative that there will be delays of this kind, and can we expect any further delays?
  (Air Marshal Sir Jock Stirrup) In programmes of this sort in particular it is important to sort the issues out upfront. Time spent thinking about it and laying the groundwork is not wasted and is likely to lead to a quicker programme in the long term than rushing into something.

Mr Howarth

  707. Can I just say, Air Marshal, that I do think that it is necessary to concentrate on obtaining 80 per capability and getting into action as quickly as possible, rather than hanging around and waiting to get to 110 per cent capability. One of the things that particularly concerns me on FOAS—the future offensive air system—is that the assessment phase of that is not due to be completed until 2010, so I hope that Watchkeeper is going to progress quickly.
  (Air Marshal Sir Jock Stirrup) As far as future offensive air system is concerned, the issue is, when do we need the capability in service, and it is worked from that. So the dates for ending the assessment phase are not really relevant to today, if you see what I mean, it is how does that relate to the date we require it in service. As far as the 80:20 rule is concerned, absolutely, that is precisely how we work. It is our intent—as I think I mentioned to you last time I was in front of you—to improve our ability to pull through technology into frontline capability more rapidly, and we remain committed to that.

  708. That is good news. Can I then ask you, on the question of whether to go for an armed or an unarmed UAV, which do you think, Secretary of State, is better—to get an unarmed UAV quickly or an armed UAV a little bit later—bearing in mind that I think both are available on the market?
  (Mr Hoon) There is no current requirement for Watchkeeper programme for it to be armed, but it is something that we keep under review. It is certainly something that we are looking at as far as the more experimental programme is concerned. I think I am right in saying that the Predator was not originally an armed vehicle, and that the adjustments were made quite far into its life to allow for that capability, but it is certainly something that we have seen the advantage of in the way in which Predator has been used, so certainly not something about which we have a closed mind.

  709. When you do you think you might make up your mind, then, about that ?
  (Mr Hoon) It is something that we keep under review, as I have indicated already. It is not a decision that is required to be taken next week or next month.

  710. So you do not see an armed UAV as being a part of your desired capability in the foreseeable future, by which I mean the next two or three years or so?
  (Mr Hoon) I am not ruling it out, but it was not in the original design specifications for Watchkeeper.

  711. Do you think it has a role to play?
  (Air Marshal Sir Jock Stirrup) First of all, we need to be clear that our UAV experimentation is separate from Watchkeeper. Watchkeeper is a specific programme to meet specific information requirements for the Land Component Commander command, and the UAV plays an integral part in that. Separately, UAVs are likely to play a significant role in future force structures, and we need to find out how they would best fit in and what they would best do. That is what the experimentation programme is about. As to whether we need an armed UAV, of course we do not think in those terms. We think of the effects that we would want to achieve, and then work out how we can most effectively get to those effects. It may be that an armed UAV has a part to play in all that, but at the moment we do not know. This experimentation programme will leave us much better informed.

  Mr Howarth: It is not rocket science, though, is it? In fact, the Americans are already doing this. Sorry, it is rocket science, my friend tells me! What I meant by that was that I was using the terminology—

  Chairman: We know what you meant.

Mr Howarth

  712. There is already a very substantial body of knowledge not only about UAVs but also the kind of doctrine that can be applied to UAVs. Can I put it to you that, hesitating as I do, as an aviator, there is a role for an armed UAV, is there not, to reduce the risk to personnel, the ability to loiter for a long time over a target? We have seen Predator operating very successfully in Yemen in taking out a pretty precise target, without any risk to allied forces.
  (Air Marshal Sir Jock Stirrup) There are certainly attributes of UAV operation in general which we all recognise and some of which you have outlined. Equally, there are other ways to carry out tasks. I do not think I quite agree with you that there is a huge body of opinion on doctrine for employing armed UAVs. Certainly the United States is still working its way through this, largely by trial and error, because of the circumstances in which they find themselves, and of course we are not averse to learning from other people's experiences, so we are watching very closely what they are doing and what they have learnt and in fact adding to that as well. We are working over the next several months to decide precisely which way we want to go.

  713. Over the next several months. So you expect to have a kind of decision on that within this calendar year?
  (Air Marshal Sir Jock Stirrup) We will certainly have moved our thinking on. I would not want to say when we are specifically going to be making a decision about specific projects.
  (Mr Hoon) Can I again emphasise that this is not about a particular platform; it is about the delivery of a particular kind of military capability. Certainly as far as the evolution of unmanned air vehicles in this country is concerned, and by and large internationally, they have been sensors, they have been to give us a better picture of the battlefield or to obtain information that cannot be obtained in another way. The whole point of that is that at the front end of a network it then allows us to take rapid decisions and strike. Certainly an armed UAV does that in the most direct way possible. It is actually short-circuiting the network system in one sense, by having on board the strike capability to react to the information that it has secured. But I think it is to miss the point about network-centric capability that we concentrate on the strike part rather than the obtaining of the information. That is what its primary function will be.

  Mr Howarth: I understand that.

  Chairman: We will have to move on.

Patrick Mercer

  714. The question of identification, friend or foe (IFF) is vexed enough as it is. Have network enabled operations made this particular issue even more complex? How confident are you that we will have sufficiently robust answers to this difficulty?
  (Mr Hoon) As I have indicated to the House previously, a great deal of work has been done in order to improve our ability to work in coalition operations with the United States, a great deal of information has been shared, equipment has been purchased. We are far more confident of those systems as a result of learning previous painful lessons from the past, and I am confident that we have a much better arrangement in place than any that has previously existed.

  715. Thank you. You have actually answered the second part of my question, but may I develop that. What forms of IFF are currently deployed (if you can answer)?
  (Mr Hoon) I think what is important is to recognise that this is not simply about a particular system; it is about sharing information, it is about ensuring that coalition forces understand that there may well be forces of other countries engaged, it is about ensuring that particular operations are conducted within defined areas, and in addition there are some technological helpers that can reduce the risks of friendly fire incidence. But there is no one simple technological solution to what is a complex problem.

Jim Knight

  716. How far have you so far incorporated the potentially dramatic implications for command and control of real time information being shared across networks?
  (Mr Hoon) I think this is something that will continue to evolve. On board any Royal Navy ship you will see an example of network capability. The sophistication of the systems these days is such that they both allow the obtaining a network of information as well as perhaps decisions on strike. That is part of a system that we would want to see expanded both in terms of its broad coverage of our deployed military forces in any operation and arguably, as the Americans have demonstrated in recent times, even back to headquarters on the mainland of the United States, or in our case the United Kingdom. So a great deal more information could be distributed, as I indicated earlier.

  717. When we saw Simon Webb he told us that further work was being done on the likely need for delegation in decision-making, inherent in the `detect, decide and destroy' approach. What are the implications that you have identified in that work about such delegation and the increasingly rapid decision-making cycle inherent in network enabled operations?
  (Mr Hoon) I do not think it is necessarily helpful to generalise about delegation, but there will be circumstances in which it is necessary, for obvious military reasons, to delegate decisions on taking particular decisions in a conflict as low down as is consistent with the need for speed and efficiency. On the other hand, I think what the network does provide is a range of information right across the system that actually, for example, might mean that a very senior commander, perhaps located in Tampa or Northwood, would be able to take a decision which previously could only have been allocated, because there simply would not have been the time to take the decision.

  718. I will develop that one stage further in a second. First of all, has there been any work on pre-delegation of decisions? We have talked a bit about armed UAVs. We heard the notion that automatic authority for weapons would be given as part of the whole thing.
  (Mr Hoon) I think that is, not to misunderstand, but to misrepresent the nature of what a network allows you to do. If in fact that network allows that information to be transmitted in real time to Tampa or, as I say, to Northwood, that actually means that delegation is much less required, rather than more being required.

  719. Let us push that one further, in that if you can get it to Tampa or Northwood, you can get it to Whitehall. Would there not be a temptation for politicians such as yourself or in the future to get involved in the military decisions, rather than simply asking for, in effect, actually getting too involved in some military aspects?
  (Mr Hoon) I think in practice there is a risk of that, but on the other hand clearly all military decisions do have profound political implications, and that is why ministers are appointed, in order to address the wider implications of those military decisions.


 
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