Examination of Witnesses (Questions 700
- 719)
WEDNESDAY 5 MARCH 2003
RT HON
GEOFFREY HOON
MP, MR SIMON
WEBB CBE AND
AIR MARSHAL
SIR JOCK
STIRRUP KCB, AFC
Mr Crausby
700. You said in the New Chapter (July 2002)
that you wanted to push forward on UAVs. You went on to say that
"we expect to select next month the two consortia to work
with us on the next phase of the Watchkeeper project". So
can you tell us why the decision was delayed for over six months
into February of this year?
(Mr Hoon) There were technical reasons why we judged
it would be better delaying the process so that we had as much
information as we needed in order to be able to take a proper
decision. It is not uncommon in procurement. It has not in any
way lessened our determination to have that kind of equipment
available, but obviously we want to have the best equipment available
at the best price.
701. You also stated in that Chapter that the
two consortia would begin practical experimentation in the first
part of this year. Has that practical experimentation begun, or
has that been delayed as a result of the appointment?
(Mr Hoon) A great deal of work is going on in any
event. These are major international defence businesses who have
been able to supply this kind of equipment to other countries
in the past. We have already examples of remote aircraft that
provide limited functionality, but some useful capabilities, that
we have used previously in the Balkans, for example. What we are
looking at is to build on that experience with the expertise that
these companies have. So we are not talking about something that
is novel. UAVs are flying probably as we speak. What we want to
ensure is that the next generation available to the United Kingdom
provides us with useful capabilities at the best price for the
British taxpayer.
702. You said that "we shall invite each
of them to provide us with an appropriate prototype system . .
. to enable practical experimentation". Has that happened?
(Air Marshal Sir Jock Stirrup) We have set up our
programme, the joint UAV experimental programme. This too is an
issue about thinking about concepts, doctrines and processes as
much as about technology. We have already started on that. We
have not yet got to the stage where we are flying UAVs as part
of that experimentation, but that is only one strand of that.
So the work is under way.
703. So when will that practical experimentation
take place?
(Air Marshal Sir Jock Stirrup) Certainly by the middle
of the year.
704. Will the delays that you have experienced
so far be made up? When we met Major General Fulton on 16 October
he said that 2005 was the in-service date for an initial operating
capability. Will that be caught up on, and is 2005 still the date?
(Air Marshal Sir Jock Stirrup) Are we talking about
Watchkeeper now or the experimentation?
705. Watchkeeper.
(Air Marshal Sir Jock Stirrup) It remains our clear
determination to bring forward the dates of Watchkeeper, as was
announced, so we hope to keep to that target.
706. I accept that network-centric warfare/network
enabled capabilities will inevitably be a complicated and difficult
business, but is it indicative that there will be delays of this
kind, and can we expect any further delays?
(Air Marshal Sir Jock Stirrup) In programmes of this
sort in particular it is important to sort the issues out upfront.
Time spent thinking about it and laying the groundwork is not
wasted and is likely to lead to a quicker programme in the long
term than rushing into something.
Mr Howarth
707. Can I just say, Air Marshal, that I do
think that it is necessary to concentrate on obtaining 80 per
capability and getting into action as quickly as possible, rather
than hanging around and waiting to get to 110 per cent capability.
One of the things that particularly concerns me on FOAS—the
future offensive air system—is that the assessment phase
of that is not due to be completed until 2010, so I hope that
Watchkeeper is going to progress quickly.
(Air Marshal Sir Jock Stirrup) As far as future offensive
air system is concerned, the issue is, when do we need the capability
in service, and it is worked from that. So the dates for ending
the assessment phase are not really relevant to today, if you
see what I mean, it is how does that relate to the date we require
it in service. As far as the 80:20 rule is concerned, absolutely,
that is precisely how we work. It is our intent—as I think
I mentioned to you last time I was in front of you—to improve
our ability to pull through technology into frontline capability
more rapidly, and we remain committed to that.
708. That is good news. Can I then ask you,
on the question of whether to go for an armed or an unarmed UAV,
which do you think, Secretary of State, is better—to get
an unarmed UAV quickly or an armed UAV a little bit later—bearing
in mind that I think both are available on the market?
(Mr Hoon) There is no current requirement for Watchkeeper
programme for it to be armed, but it is something that we keep
under review. It is certainly something that we are looking at
as far as the more experimental programme is concerned. I think
I am right in saying that the Predator was not originally an armed
vehicle, and that the adjustments were made quite far into its
life to allow for that capability, but it is certainly something
that we have seen the advantage of in the way in which Predator
has been used, so certainly not something about which we have
a closed mind.
709. When you do you think you might make up
your mind, then, about that ?
(Mr Hoon) It is something that we keep under review,
as I have indicated already. It is not a decision that is required
to be taken next week or next month.
710. So you do not see an armed UAV as being
a part of your desired capability in the foreseeable future, by
which I mean the next two or three years or so?
(Mr Hoon) I am not ruling it out, but it was not in
the original design specifications for Watchkeeper.
711. Do you think it has a role to play?
(Air Marshal Sir Jock Stirrup) First of all, we need
to be clear that our UAV experimentation is separate from Watchkeeper.
Watchkeeper is a specific programme to meet specific information
requirements for the Land Component Commander command, and the
UAV plays an integral part in that. Separately, UAVs are likely
to play a significant role in future force structures, and we
need to find out how they would best fit in and what they would
best do. That is what the experimentation programme is about.
As to whether we need an armed UAV, of course we do not think
in those terms. We think of the effects that we would want to
achieve, and then work out how we can most effectively get to
those effects. It may be that an armed UAV has a part to play
in all that, but at the moment we do not know. This experimentation
programme will leave us much better informed.
Mr Howarth: It is not rocket science, though,
is it? In fact, the Americans are already doing this. Sorry, it
is rocket science, my friend tells me! What I meant by that was
that I was using the terminology—
Chairman: We know what you meant.
Mr Howarth
712. There is already a very substantial body
of knowledge not only about UAVs but also the kind of doctrine
that can be applied to UAVs. Can I put it to you that, hesitating
as I do, as an aviator, there is a role for an armed UAV, is there
not, to reduce the risk to personnel, the ability to loiter for
a long time over a target? We have seen Predator operating very
successfully in Yemen in taking out a pretty precise target, without
any risk to allied forces.
(Air Marshal Sir Jock Stirrup) There are certainly
attributes of UAV operation in general which we all recognise
and some of which you have outlined. Equally, there are other
ways to carry out tasks. I do not think I quite agree with you
that there is a huge body of opinion on doctrine for employing
armed UAVs. Certainly the United States is still working its way
through this, largely by trial and error, because of the circumstances
in which they find themselves, and of course we are not averse
to learning from other people's experiences, so we are watching
very closely what they are doing and what they have learnt and
in fact adding to that as well. We are working over the next several
months to decide precisely which way we want to go.
713. Over the next several months. So you expect
to have a kind of decision on that within this calendar year?
(Air Marshal Sir Jock Stirrup) We will certainly have
moved our thinking on. I would not want to say when we are specifically
going to be making a decision about specific projects.
(Mr Hoon) Can I again emphasise that this is not about
a particular platform; it is about the delivery of a particular
kind of military capability. Certainly as far as the evolution
of unmanned air vehicles in this country is concerned, and by
and large internationally, they have been sensors, they have been
to give us a better picture of the battlefield or to obtain information
that cannot be obtained in another way. The whole point of that
is that at the front end of a network it then allows us to take
rapid decisions and strike. Certainly an armed UAV does that in
the most direct way possible. It is actually short-circuiting
the network system in one sense, by having on board the strike
capability to react to the information that it has secured. But
I think it is to miss the point about network-centric capability
that we concentrate on the strike part rather than the obtaining
of the information. That is what its primary function will be.
Mr Howarth: I understand that.
Chairman: We will have to move on.
Patrick Mercer
714. The question of identification, friend
or foe (IFF) is vexed enough as it is. Have network enabled operations
made this particular issue even more complex? How confident are
you that we will have sufficiently robust answers to this difficulty?
(Mr Hoon) As I have indicated to the House previously,
a great deal of work has been done in order to improve our ability
to work in coalition operations with the United States, a great
deal of information has been shared, equipment has been purchased.
We are far more confident of those systems as a result of learning
previous painful lessons from the past, and I am confident that
we have a much better arrangement in place than any that has previously
existed.
715. Thank you. You have actually answered the
second part of my question, but may I develop that. What forms
of IFF are currently deployed (if you can answer)?
(Mr Hoon) I think what is important is to recognise
that this is not simply about a particular system; it is
about sharing information, it is about ensuring that coalition
forces understand that there may well be forces of other countries
engaged, it is about ensuring that particular operations are conducted
within defined areas, and in addition there are some technological
helpers that can reduce the risks of friendly fire incidence.
But there is no one simple technological solution to what is a
complex problem.
Jim Knight
716. How far have you so far incorporated the
potentially dramatic implications for command and control of real
time information being shared across networks?
(Mr Hoon) I think this is something that will continue
to evolve. On board any Royal Navy ship you will see an example
of network capability. The sophistication of the systems these
days is such that they both allow the obtaining a network of information
as well as perhaps decisions on strike. That is part of a system
that we would want to see expanded both in terms of its broad
coverage of our deployed military forces in any operation and
arguably, as the Americans have demonstrated in recent times,
even back to headquarters on the mainland of the United States,
or in our case the United Kingdom. So a great deal more information
could be distributed, as I indicated earlier.
717. When we saw Simon Webb he told us that
further work was being done on the likely need for delegation
in decision-making, inherent in the `detect, decide and destroy'
approach. What are the implications that you have identified in
that work about such delegation and the increasingly rapid decision-making
cycle inherent in network enabled operations?
(Mr Hoon) I do not think it is necessarily helpful
to generalise about delegation, but there will be circumstances
in which it is necessary, for obvious military reasons, to delegate
decisions on taking particular decisions in a conflict as low
down as is consistent with the need for speed and efficiency.
On the other hand, I think what the network does provide is a
range of information right across the system that actually, for
example, might mean that a very senior commander, perhaps located
in Tampa or Northwood, would be able to take a decision which
previously could only have been allocated, because there simply
would not have been the time to take the decision.
718. I will develop that one stage further in
a second. First of all, has there been any work on pre-delegation
of decisions? We have talked a bit about armed UAVs. We heard
the notion that automatic authority for weapons would be given
as part of the whole thing.
(Mr Hoon) I think that is, not to misunderstand, but
to misrepresent the nature of what a network allows you to do.
If in fact that network allows that information to be transmitted
in real time to Tampa or, as I say, to Northwood, that actually
means that delegation is much less required, rather than more
being required.
719. Let us push that one further, in that if
you can get it to Tampa or Northwood, you can get it to Whitehall.
Would there not be a temptation for politicians such as yourself
or in the future to get involved in the military decisions, rather
than simply asking for, in effect, actually getting too involved
in some military aspects?
(Mr Hoon) I think in practice there is a risk of that,
but on the other hand clearly all military decisions do have profound
political implications, and that is why ministers are appointed,
in order to address the wider implications of those military decisions.
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