



House of Commons
Defence Committee

A New Chapter to the Strategic Defence Review

Sixth Report of Session 2002-03

Volume I: Report



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Report, together with formal minutes

*Ordered by The House of Commons
to be printed 7 May 2003.*

HC 93-I
Published on 15 May 2003
by authority of the House of Commons
London: The Stationery Office Limited
£0.00

The Defence Committee

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Footnotes

In the footnotes of this Report, references to oral evidence are indicated by 'Q' followed by the question number. References to written evidence are indicated by the page number as in 'Ev 12'.

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Summary

The New Chapter to the 1998 Strategic Defence Review (SDR) was published in July 2002. It was rooted in the events of 11 September 2001 and focused on the threat of strategic effect terrorism. It also discussed the impact of technological change on the military.

On home defence and security the New Chapter proposed a number of improvements in liaison functions in Land forces command in the UK. There was no new role for the regular Armed Forces. Instead the Reserves were to be called upon through the creation of volunteer reserve Civil Contingency Reaction Forces. We welcome these, but have concerns over the implications of their establishment on the normal activities of the volunteer Reserves. The coherence of this aspect of the New Chapter was also undermined because the consultation process with the volunteer Reserves continued beyond publication of the New Chapter itself.

The New Chapter asserts that overseas operations will be a more effective use of the military in fighting terrorism than home defence. But we found little evidence of a proper discussion of how to strike the right balance between operations away and at home.

The UK is well placed to exploit the opportunities of networking sensors and strike capabilities in military operations. Now the MoD has to show that it can do so through developing doctrine and through training, for all members of the UK's Armed Forces. It also needs to address important consequent equipment implications that flow from networking. The New Chapter highlighted a number of existing equipment programmes and some new developments, mainly in sensor technology. But, as experience with the Watchkeeper Unmanned Aerial Vehicle programme already demonstrates, even in these areas, ambition continues to run ahead of delivery and we have seen little evidence of the urgency that the MoD claims to be devoting to acquiring these new capabilities.

We are also concerned that the New Chapter will put further strain on the UK's already stretched Armed Forces. This is particularly true of those groups of personnel who provide the support essential to any operation, known collectively as 'key enablers'.

We welcome the MoD's assurance that military action will always be consistent with international law. But we have found some confusion regarding the law in respect of pre-emptive or preventative uses of armed force against terrorist threats.

We conclude that the MoD's determination to limit the scope of the New Chapter to the specific threat from international terrorism, when some of the issues raised clearly have a much wider relevance, has made the outcome untidy and unbalanced. By trying to avoid the broader picture the MoD has in fact drawn attention to the many areas where developments since 1998 are making the original SDR look increasingly out of date. It is disappointing that what has emerged is in fact a rather modest development of policy: in effect, a steady evolution of the same doctrine of fighting at distance as was set out in the SDR.

1 Introduction

1. On 18 July 2002 the Secretary of State for Defence, Rt Hon Geoffrey Hoon MP, published what he described as a “groundbreaking White Paper,”¹ *The Strategic Defence Review: A New Chapter*—

setting out further and more detailed conclusions, particularly in the area of capabilities to counter terrorism abroad.²

The work which led up to this document was launched following the terrorist attacks of September 2001 and announced by the Secretary of State in a speech to the Labour Party Conference of October 2001.³ He noted that the attacks on the United States (US) had brought home the question of “whether we are doing enough to cope with the full force of the new threats we face”, and while “military action alone is not the answer...there may not be an answer where military action does not play a vital part”. He added that—

we will be looking again at how we organise our defence. This will not be a new Strategic Defence Review, but an opportunity—if necessary—to rebalance our existing efforts.⁴

In the House he announced that it would be a new chapter to the 1998 Strategic Defence Review—

this will not be a new strategic defence review, but we need to add a new chapter to it and to look hard at our priorities in our plans and programmes...⁵

2. In a speech at King’s College, London in December 2001, the Secretary of State listed an “immensely challenging and complex” series of questions that the New Chapter would seek to answer. He said that the work would be “detailed and rigorous”, and would “leave the United Kingdom properly positioned to deal with the new threats”.⁶

3. In this report we attempt to examine how far the New Chapter has met the objectives set for it and to what extent it was an appropriate response to the events of 11 September 2001 and the new threats they represented. This report focuses on issues of doctrine, concepts and general policy. It also makes some comments on other elements of the New Chapter, such as equipment, force structure and personnel issues. We expect to return to these in future inquiries, including our forthcoming examination of the military campaign in Iraq. In undertaking this inquiry, the Committee is building on the work it did on two previous

¹ Statement on the SDR New Chapter, HC Deb, 18 July 2002, col 460.

² *Ibid*, Published as Ministry of Defence, *The Strategic Defence Review: A New Chapter*, Cm 5566 Vol I, and *Supporting Information and Analysis*, Cm 5566 Vol II, July 2002, hereafter SDR NC Vol I and Vol II.

³ ‘This fight will be long and hard’, speech by Defence Secretary Geoffrey Hoon to Labour Party Conference, Brighton, 2 October 2001.

⁴ *Ibid*

⁵ HC Deb, 4 October 2001, col 809–810.

⁶ “11 September—A New Chapter for the Strategic Defence Review”, speech by Secretary of State for Defence, Geoffrey Hoon, at King’s College, London, 5 December 2001, http://news.mod.uk/news/press/news_press_notice.asp?newsItem_id=1247.

reports: *The Threat from Terrorism*⁷ and *Defence and Security in the UK*,⁸ both of which dealt with aspects of the New Chapter.

4. During the course of our inquiry we took evidence from Ministry of Defence (MoD) officials and from academics and other experts. We visited 45 Commando Royal Marines in Arbroath, held an evidence session at the Joint Doctrine and Concepts Centre (JDCC) in Shrivenham, conducted a workshop on the New Chapter at King's College, London, took evidence from the Chief of the Defence Staff (CDS), Admiral Sir Michael Boyce GCB OBE ADC, representatives of the volunteer reserves and their employers, the Chief of Defence Logistics (CDL), Air Chief Marshal Sir Malcolm Pledger KCB OBE AFC, and held a number of other meetings. We concluded with an evidence session with the Secretary of State for Defence. We also received a number of written memoranda and are grateful to all those who contributed to the inquiry. We were assisted by our specialist advisers: Professor Michael Clarke, Rear Admiral Richard Cobbold, Air Vice-Marshal Professor Tony Mason, Dr Andrew Rathmell and Brigadier Austin Thorp.

⁷ Defence Committee, Second Report of Session 2001–02, *The Threat from Terrorism*, HC 348–I and HC 348–II.

⁸ Defence Committee, Sixth Report of Session 2001–02, *Defence and Security in the UK*, HC 518–I and HC 518–II.

2 The Original SDR

5. Following the General Election in the summer of 1997, the new Labour Government embarked on a Strategic Defence Review (SDR)—

to reassess Britain’s security interests and defence needs and consider how the roles, missions and capabilities of our Armed Forces should be adjusted to meet the new strategic realities.⁹

Its purpose was described by the then Secretary of State, in evidence to our predecessors, as being “to give the Armed Forces of this country a coherent and stable planning basis in the radically changing international and strategic context of the post-Cold War world”.¹⁰ It was set the task of addressing the UK’s defence requirements in the period up to 2015.¹¹ The review took over a year to complete and the SDR White Paper was published in July 1998.

6. Our predecessors examined the SDR in some detail. Their report, published on 10 September 1998, was a wide-ranging and substantial commentary on the Government’s work. Having set out the background to the SDR, it went on to examine security policy in a new world order. It then considered the strategy and force structure which that security policy would require and the equipment, personnel and funding which the Armed Forces would need to fulfil their tasks.

Strategic Realities

7. The SDR was published in fulfilment of a Labour Party manifesto commitment to conduct a defence review to reassess Britain’s security interests to meet the “new strategic realities”. Central to these new strategic realities was the assessment that “there is today no direct military threat to the United Kingdom or Western Europe”.¹² Instead there were a range of instabilities, both in Europe (e.g. the Balkans) and further afield. However, the SDR also identified a range of new risks “which threaten our security by attacking our way of life”.¹³ These included “new and horrifying forms of terrorism [which] can cause...dangerous instabilities”.¹⁴

8. According to the MoD, the SDR was “a foreign policy led review”¹⁵—

The Review has been foreign policy-led and the first stage conducted jointly by the Foreign and Commonwealth Office and the MoD provided the policy framework for subsequent work. Its analysis and conclusions...were tested against a range of outside views...¹⁶

⁹ Ministry of Defence, *The Strategic Defence Review*, Cm 3999, July 1998 (hereafter SDR Vol 1), p 5, para 1.

¹⁰ Defence Committee, Eighth Report of Session 1997-98, *The Strategic Defence Review*, HC 138-II, Q 101

¹¹ SDR Vol I, p 6, para 15.

¹² SDR Vol I, p 5, paras 1–3.

¹³ SDR Vol I, p 5, para 9.

¹⁴ *Ibid*

¹⁵ Q 2

¹⁶ Ministry of Defence, *The Strategic Defence Review: Supporting Essays*, July 1998 (hereafter SDR Vol 2), p. 2-1, para 2.

And as our predecessors noted—

The SDR was intended to be foreign policy led. While regretting that there was no White Paper setting out foreign policy conclusions in advance of the SDR, we believe the final document and the security posture it enunciates demonstrate that it was indeed foreign policy led.¹⁷

However, given its primacy, it was strange that the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) and MoD refused then, and have continued to refuse, to publish this framework.

9. The SDR led to a shift in thinking away from commitment-based planning and towards planning based on capabilities, with the emphasis on expeditionary operations. By defining the type of capabilities that the UK's Armed Forces should be able to *sustain*, the SDR hoped to provide a basis for prudent force planning and avoid excessive overstretch amongst the armed services. To this end, the SDR stated explicitly the number and scale of missions that the UK's Armed Forces could be expected to be able to conduct concurrently and sustain—the scale of effort benchmarks. These were that at any one time they could either deploy one “large” division-sized force, similar to that sent to the 1991 Gulf War, or two “medium”-sized forces, one equipped for war fighting and the other for peace-support operations.¹⁸ Geographically, the SDR concluded that UK forces were most likely to deploy to Europe, the Mediterranean and the Gulf regions. These concurrency capacity objectives have been stretched on a number of occasions since the publication of the SDR, for example, during the Kosovo crisis when—

Engaging in Kosovo risked bringing the UK to the very limits of, and quite possibly exceeding, the concurrency criteria set out in the Strategic Defence Review...without [the Territorial Army], making a significant UK contribution to an invasion force could not have even been contemplated.¹⁹

10. The SDR also discussed the implications of its conclusions for future procurement policy and was candid in noting that—

Military planners have sometimes been slow to recognise, and the procurement process slow to exploit, the opportunities offered by advances in technology.²⁰

Under the heading of the “Revolution in Military Affairs”, the SDR balanced the significant benefits of these technological advances against certain pitfalls including the “potential for multinational operations to become more difficult if compatible capabilities are not preserved”.²¹ In embracing new technologies, the UK would have to be careful to maintain its ability to operate with traditional European allies, while at the same time keeping up with a technologically innovating United States.

¹⁷ HC (1997–98) 138-I, para 155.

¹⁸ SDR Vol 2, p. 6–2, para 5.

¹⁹ Defence Committee, Fourteenth Report of Session 1999–2000, *Lessons of Kosovo*, HC 347-I, para 308.

²⁰ SDR Vol 2, p. 3–1, para 6.

²¹ SDR Vol 2, p.3–2, para 10.

How the SDR Looks Post-11 September

11. Overall, our predecessors concluded that the SDR had been conducted as an open and inclusive process and that it had been a positive advance in formulating defence policy for the future, providing a coherent framework for future planning. Their criticisms were focused on home defence, the lack of detail in discussing emerging threats under the heading ‘asymmetric warfare’ and certain of the assumptions underlying the document such as the role of nuclear weapons. Their report also noted that one of the risks (in a short list) to our vital national interests was—

a terrorist group...sufficiently motivated and competent to carry out a sustained campaign within Britain possibly using nuclear, biological or chemical weapons, that effectively destabilises large sectors of society.²²

The report also noted the lack of discussion of asymmetric challenges in the SDR, a lack of precision in discussing the trade-offs necessary to make the UK’s Armed Forces more flexible and mobile, the need to deal with the problems of overstretch and over-commitment, and an absence of any consideration of the dangers of weapons of mass destruction being used against troops at home, or of liaison with civil defence facilities for the protection of the civilian population.²³ **Subsequent events have clearly validated those criticisms.**

12. In its reply, the Government addressed the issue of home defence and argued that it had made an appropriate assessment—

...Home Defence was considered carefully in the SDR, and the policy we have adopted reflects our assessment of the current and future strategic environment. The key aspect of that strategic environment is that the threat of direct conventional military attack on Britain has receded to a degree where the warning time for such an attack can be measured in years. Consequently, we have concluded that it is possible to shift the emphasis of our planning away from preparedness to defend against a military assault on the UK towards an ability to conduct expeditionary operations.²⁴

13. On nuclear weapons the Government noted the Committee’s call for a clarification of the question of the strategic and sub-strategic role of Trident missile submarines and promised to identify a “suitable early opportunity” to do this. However, it failed to do so other than in a few “dribs and drabs”²⁵ and in its report on *The MoD’s Reporting Cycle 2000–01*, the Committee noted “we consider that the government...needs to address this issue more squarely”.²⁶ The MoD did not respond to this call in its response to that report.

14. The SDR was followed by *Defence Policy 2001* and *The Future Strategic Context for Defence*—both published in February 2001—which updated the analysis that underpinned

²² HC (1997–98) 138-I, para 97.

²³ HC (1997–98) 138-I, paras 406–414.

²⁴ Defence Committee, Sixth Special Report of Session 1997–98, HC 138-I, *The Strategic Defence Review—Government Response to the Eighth Report from the Defence Committee*, HC 1198, para 29–30.

²⁵ Defence Committee, Eighth Report of Session 2000–01, *The MOD’s Annual Reporting Cycle 2000–01*, HC 144, para 73.

²⁶ HC (2000–01) 144, para 73.

the SDR's policy framework. The MoD committed itself to updating the *Future Strategic Context for Defence* every three or four years, in a process which would be “underpinned by a programme of strategic analysis of the future security environment” to be produced by the Joint Doctrine and Concepts Centre.²⁷

15. *Defence Policy 2001* went even further than the SDR in placing the threat to the homeland at the lower end of the spectrum—

We assess that, for the foreseeable future, it is unlikely that a direct threat to the UK could re-emerge on a scale sufficient to threaten our strategic security, whether through conventional means or weapons of mass destruction.²⁸

Even in the *Future Strategic Context of Defence*, which sought to extend the SDR's assessment out to 30 years, the threat of asymmetric responses to conventional military capabilities merited only two paragraphs and terrorism only one.²⁹ No conventional military threats to the UK were judged likely over that period and home defence was barely mentioned. The then Defence Committee urged the MoD to set out clearly its thinking on asymmetric strategies at the earliest opportunity and warned that—

While the UK may be regarded as well geared up to deal with traditional terrorist threats in general, new forms of terrorism and other aspects of asymmetrical warfare...may find us rather less well prepared.³⁰

16. The Committee also believed that the MoD's approach to the production of policy statements was not as helpful as it might have been, noting that—

producing separate documents to be read in conjunction is not as useful a policy exercise, either for the MoD or Parliament, as producing a single document which integrates different issues and timescales.³¹

The Government did not accept this advice, saying its approach allowed for information to be transmitted more effectively.³²

²⁷ Defence Committee, Second Special Report (Session 2001–02) *The MoD's Reporting Cycle 2000-01*, *Government Observations on the Eighth Report for Session 2000–01*, HC 214, para 31.

²⁸ Ministry of Defence, *Defence Policy 2001* (February 2001), para 8.

²⁹ Ministry of Defence, *The Future Strategic Context for Defence* (February 2001) paras 68, 86 and 87.

³⁰ HC (2000–01), 144, para 74.

³¹ *Ibid*, para 77.

³² HC (2001–02) 214, para 37.

3 The New Chapter White Paper

17. In this section we set out the principal elements of the New Chapter White Paper in order to provide the context for our subsequent discussion of how it was drawn up and the conclusions it reached.

18. The New Chapter should be seen not only as an immediate and necessary response to terrible events, but also as part of a continuing process of defence policy review and publication by the MoD. Its starting point was that the original SDR had not fully contemplated the scale of asymmetric threats that emerged on 11 September 2001 and so another look at the UK's defence posture and plans was required. Its focus was—according to the Secretary of State—on “the way we want to use our forces against a determined, mobile, often disparate, and elusive enemy”.³³

19. At the same time the MoD continued to maintain that the SDR provided a firm foundation on which to build. Thus, one purpose of the work on the New Chapter was to check the conclusions of the SDR against lessons learnt not only from the events of 11 September, but also from campaigns such as Kosovo and, as it turned out, Afghanistan. It was also designed to contribute to the wider effort across government to develop a strategy to eliminate terrorism as “a force for change in international affairs”.³⁴

20. The New Chapter concluded that it was better to engage the enemy, where possible, at longer range (i.e. away from the UK itself) and therefore that the UK needed to have significant forces ready to deploy overseas to act against terrorist groups and regimes that harboured them. Military force could be used to “prevent, deter, coerce, disrupt or destroy” opponents.³⁵ To achieve these objectives, UK forces should aim for “knowledge superiority” over international terrorists.³⁶ Particular UK strengths were identified both in find-and-strike operations and in prevention and stabilisation operations. The former were identified as requiring high-intensity war fighting capacity and decision-making structures to enable forces to act rapidly and decisively. For stabilisation operations, a particular UK strength was identified as being in the early, more demanding stages of operations, such as in leading the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan and in Operation Essential Harvest in Macedonia.

21. In discussing the need for deterrent capability, the New Chapter argued that the UK needed to be able to deter not only any use of weapons of mass destruction against the UK, its interests or her allies, but also any attacks that caused (or intended) mass casualties, or grave damage to the economy, the environment, government or fabric of society.³⁷

22. Britain's nuclear weapons were identified as having a continuing use as a means of deterring a major strategic military threat and in guaranteeing the ultimate security of the UK, but at the same time all UK Armed Forces could be expected to contribute in different

³³ HC Deb, 18 July 2002, col 460.

³⁴ SDR NC Vol 1, para 5.

³⁵ SDR NC Vol 1, para 11.

³⁶ See chart on the MoD's conceptual approach to countering terrorism in Chapter 5 below.

³⁷ SDR NC Vol 1, para 21.

ways to the full spectrum of deterrence. The New Chapter did not announce in advance how Britain might respond to particular threats but merely stated that the response would be appropriate and proportionate—“It should be clear that legally the right to self defence includes the possibility of action in the face of an imminent attack”.³⁸

23. The New Chapter argued that the trend towards expeditionary operations would become even more pronounced. Furthermore, such operations might not be limited to the core geographical regions identified by the original SDR (i.e. Europe, the Gulf and the Mediterranean). UK forces would need to be ready to engage “further afield more often than perhaps we had previously assumed”.³⁹

24. It also reaffirmed the SDR’s conclusion that in most cases the UK’s Armed Forces would be working alongside allies, often with the US in the lead—

Our ability to operate alongside the United States and other allies, especially in Europe, will be essential to our future success.⁴⁰

It noted, however, that local infrastructure (otherwise known as Host Nation Support) might not always be available. Thus, operations might become more frequent, often with smaller, but possibly simultaneous deployments placing an increasing strain on “enabling assets” such as deployable headquarters, communications and logistic support. This has been called the challenge of concurrency.⁴¹

25. The analysis in the New Chapter also highlighted the importance of what it called “network-centric capability”—that is precision weapons and information technologies linked together to produce military effect at a qualitatively higher tempo, and often using smaller force structures than in the past. The three critical elements required to deliver this “military effect” were sensors, a network, and strike assets. Exploited to the full, these elements could provide a “common understanding among commanders at all levels” which in turn had the potential to offer: greater precision in the control of operations, greater precision in the application of force, greater rapidity of effect, and better force protection.⁴²

26. This capability was identified as being particularly important in operations to counter terrorism overseas. But its implementation would depend on the effectiveness of a number of advanced technologies. In this regard the New Chapter stated “we will accelerate and want to increase our investment in network-centric capabilities”⁴³ and identified areas in which investment had already begun, including airborne surveillance, communication systems, unmanned air vehicles (UAVs), and precision munitions. UAVs in particular were identified as a key element in improving operational effectiveness and the New Chapter announced the establishment of a joint UAV operational development unit. It also stated that the two consortia to work on the development of the Watchkeeper UAV project would be announced “next month” (i.e. August 2002) with practical experimentation to

³⁸ SDR NC Vol 1, para 22.

³⁹ SDR NC Vol 1, para 26.

⁴⁰ HC Deb, 18 July 2002, col 461.

⁴¹ See Chapter 7 on equipment and force structures below.

⁴² SDR NC Vol 1, p.15.

⁴³ SDR NC Vol 1, page 15, para 38.

“begin in the first part of next year”.⁴⁴ In the future, the New Chapter argued, it would be “specific effects”,⁴⁵ not simply platform numbers and people, which would be critical.

27. The New Chapter also acknowledged that Britain’s service men and women had been “working at or near, and in some cases beyond, the boundaries of what was planned in the SDR for some considerable time now”. It emphasised that they should not now simply be asked to do even more.⁴⁶ Admitting that fully manned and sustainable force structures were proving elusive, the New Chapter identified individuals in certain of the most heavily used specialisms as critical for the success of its approach. It noted that increasing use of civilians and contractors in operational deployments was to be expected.

28. Increasing co-operation with allies was also highlighted with the emphasis on working through international organisations such as the United Nations, NATO and the European Union. Particular mention was made of NATO’s work to improve its capacity to deal with weapons of mass destruction, enhance home defence and cooperate with other agencies and organisations.

29. In discussing home defence and security, the New Chapter acknowledged that the SDR’s assessment that there was no direct military threat to the UK needed to be readjusted in light of the events of 11 September, although it emphasised the lead role of the Home Office in counter-terrorism. In a continuation of the arguments in favour of fighting the enemy at distance, the New Chapter argued that “operations overseas are often the best form of home defence” and that threats at home must not be allowed to tie up significant numbers of the Armed Forces.⁴⁷

30. Nevertheless the New Chapter proposed a number of changes in how the regular and reserve forces support the civil authorities, including: a “clearer role” for the HQ Commander-in-Chief, Land Forces as the principal focus for the provision of military assistance to the civil authorities; joint regional liaison officers as single points of contact for civil authorities; more staff in regional Brigade Headquarters for contingency planning and emergencies; and the formalisation of 2 Signal Brigade’s role in providing a deployable national communications infrastructure, compatible with systems entering service with the civil police and emergency services.⁴⁸

31. In light of the emergence of suicide hijackers being prepared to use civil aircraft to attack city centres, the New Chapter also highlighted the need to refine the UK’s air defence arrangements, and specifically to adjust the provision and basing of Quick Reaction Alert (QRA) aircraft. In addition to enhancing existing radar systems, facilities would be upgraded at three airfields for QRA purposes, with most of the work to be completed within 12 months. Adjustments, as appropriate, would also be made to counter ship-borne threats.⁴⁹

⁴⁴ SDR NC Vol 1, para 48.

⁴⁵ SDR NC Vol 1, para 41.

⁴⁶ SDR NC Vol 1, para 61.

⁴⁷ SDR NC Vol 1, para 77.

⁴⁸ SDR NC Vol 1, paras 79 and 80.

⁴⁹ SDR NC Vol 1, paras 86 and 87.

32. The New Chapter proposed an enhanced role for the Reserves Forces in home defence and security (i.e. aiding the civil authorities in handling major incidents), through the creation of Reaction Forces (subsequently renamed Civil Contingency Reaction Forces, or CCRFs) of 500 reservists in each of the brigade districts of Britain, with an “initial reaction forces capability in place before the end of the year [2002] and then to build up to full capacity as soon as possible”.⁵⁰ The details would be agreed once a concurrent discussion process with interested parties had been completed in September 2002, but the intention was to be able eventually to deploy some 6,000 personnel nationwide.

33. The 2002 Spending Review (which was announced the same week as the publication of the New Chapter), provided that the annual Defence Budget would rise by £3.5 billion between 2002–03 and 2005–06 (£1.1 billion in real terms). The New Chapter stated—“Within this is some £1 billion of new capital and £½ billion of new resources for the equipment and capabilities needed to respond to the additional challenges”.⁵¹ This, the Secretary of State said, provided—“a mandate for accelerating the modernisation and evolution of the Armed Forces”.⁵²

34. The New Chapter concluded by noting that operationally, the Armed Forces had deployed on more operations concurrently than had been envisaged by the original SDR, risking overburdening particular units, such as key enablers (i.e. those working in key specialisms such as communications, engineering and logistics) for expeditionary deployments, although the scale of these deployments has in some respects been smaller than envisaged by the SDR.

35. The capability requirements that flowed from the New Chapter were judged to be consistent with other likely demands on UK Armed Forces and so should be seen as enhancing the existing rapid reaction forces, rather than as dedicated counter-terrorism capabilities.⁵³

While some enhancements to SDR military capabilities are needed, the scale of operations to counter terrorism is unlikely to be large, so only relatively small quantities of the new specialised equipment are likely to be needed.⁵⁴

36. The New Chapter raised, but did not answer, the question of how its conclusions might affect the balance between frontline combat capability and support (or enabling) capability in terms of both personnel and equipment. The Secretary of State merely noted that “some adjustments...to rebalance our force structure” will probably be required.⁵⁵

⁵⁰ SDR NC Vol 1, para 83.

⁵¹ SDR NC Vol 1, para 89.

⁵² HC Deb, 18 July 2002, col 461.

⁵³ SDR NC Vol 1, para 92.

⁵⁴ SDR NC Vol 1, para 93.

⁵⁵ HC Deb, 18 July 2002, col 463.

4 Producing the New Chapter

37. Even before the events of 11 September, a number of studies had been underway, updating aspects of the original SDR. As well as *Defence Policy 2001* and the *Future Strategic Context of Defence* which we discussed above, these included work on *Future Shocks* by the JDCC, the *UK Joint Vision* which was published in June 2001, and *British Defence Doctrine*.⁵⁶ However, in these published documents there is only scant discussion of asymmetric threats, virtually none of which is in the context of home defence.

38. Although a number of terrorist attacks in the mid-1990s had led certain commentators, notably in the United States, to become preoccupied with low-probability high-consequence mass-casualty terrorism, it was the attacks of 11 September 2001 which focused attention on the potential vulnerability of the UK to asymmetric threats. The Secretary of State, as we have noted, was quick to identify these challenges as requiring attention—

the attack on the United States has brought home to us, with brutal clarity, the question of whether we are doing enough to cope with the full force of the new threats we face. The changes we have made since the Defence Review have made our Armed Forces far more able to deal with these kinds of asymmetric threats. However, it is clear that we must build on what we have already achieved. As a result of the attacks on the United States, we will be looking again at how we organise our defence. This will not be a new Strategic Defence Review—but an opportunity—if necessary—to rebalance our existing efforts. We must have the right concepts, the right levels of forces, and the right capabilities to meet the additional challenges we face from international terrorism conducted on this scale.⁵⁷

As early as 12 September, in an “immediate reaction”⁵⁸, the head of the JDCC, Major-General Tony Milton moved to the Ministry of Defence to take charge of a strategic think-tank of staff from the JDCC which operated from 12 September to 5 October, at which point the SDR New Chapter work was formally announced by the Secretary of State.⁵⁹

39. The work was split into two phases, the first of which ran from October 2001 to January 2002 and sought to establish a policy and conceptual framework, identifying the questions to be answered and the issues to be addressed. This phase concluded with the release of the *SDR New Chapter Discussion Paper* on 14 February 2002. The second phase which focused on the practical implications for capabilities and resources, continued from February until publication of the New Chapter itself in July 2002.

40. Four working groups were set up at the start of the process, each under the direction of senior officials or military officers and involving some 150 staff from the MoD and other

⁵⁶ Q 545 and 564.

⁵⁷ Geoffrey Hoon, speech to Labour Party conference, 2 October 2001.

⁵⁸ Q 568

⁵⁹ Q 564

government departments, including the intelligence agencies, the FCO and the Treasury.⁶⁰ The Working Groups (and their heads) were as follows:

- i) Strategic Issues (Air Vice-Marshal David Hobart, Assistant Chief of Defence Staff, Policy);
- ii) Overseas Relations and Deterrence (Mr Brian Hawtin, Director General, International Security Policy);
- iii) Home Defence (Mr Bruce Mann, Director General, Financial Management);
- iv) Overseas Operations (Phase I: Major-General Tony Milton, Director General Joint Doctrine and Concepts; Phase 2: Major-General Rob Fulton, Capability Manager, Information Superiority).

A variety of secret elements to the work were swept up by what in effect was a fifth working group.⁶¹

41. In each of the groups, sub-groups were created as required to tackle particular elements and where the issues had implications across the working groups, these were coordinated centrally.⁶² The range of skills brought to the process, we were assured, was impressive.⁶³ Mr Simon Webb, MoD Policy Director, told us that the conclusions of the first two working groups emerged in the February public discussion document and the rest of the work emerged in the final New Chapter White Paper. An internal report was discussed with ministers and various government departments in late autumn 2001.⁶⁴

42. Like the original SDR, this New Chapter was intended to draw widely on advice and comment from agencies and advisers outside the Government, and, as far as possible, to be conducted as an open process. At the outset the Secretary of State assured the House—

Just as the strategic defence review itself benefited from an open and inclusive approach, so will this further work draw fully on wider opinion and expertise...I am determined that the work will be as open and inclusive as it can be.⁶⁵

Scope

43. When the Secretary of State came before us on 28 November 2001, he set out a list of questions which the New Chapter work would need to address—

- i) ...can we base our policy on getting intelligence of specific threats, with occasional misses, or do we have to assess our vulnerabilities to potential terrorist capabilities and counter these?

⁶⁰ Q 27 and Ev 8

⁶¹ Qq 14, 15

⁶² Ev 8

⁶³ Q 1

⁶⁴ Q 27

⁶⁵ HC Deb, 4 October 2001, col 809–810.

- ii) How far do we try to defend the homeland in a collective NATO and European sense and how should we try to deal with terrorists, in their bases or in transit?
- iii) In the UK, how far should the Armed Forces play an increased role in security? If so, what sort of forces are best suited for these tasks? Should the Reserve Forces have a different or enhanced role?
- iv) In the military dimension, is there a role for pre-emption? What is the role of Armed Forces in dealing with problems upstream, what capabilities do we need? What is clear already is that we need fast, integrated operations, involving high levels of military skill, improved intelligence-gathering capability and a deeper understanding of potential opponents.
- v) How do we engage the causes of terrorism as well as the terrorists themselves? How do we do so on a cross-governmental and coalition basis and what is the role of the military, if any, in this? How do we avoid the use of force becoming our opponent's own recruiting sergeant?
- vi) How do we deter or dissuade states from support or complicity with terrorism, especially in the chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear activities? What if the state has failed...?
- vii) ...what is the nature of asymmetric threats? How does this impact on our approach to operations?⁶⁶

The Secretary of State described this as a “formidable catalogue of questions”.⁶⁷

44. In his King's College speech on 5 December he set out some of his Department's emerging thinking. He cautioned that a sense of proportion was needed and that the New Chapter was designed to build upon, but not reopen the Strategic Defence Review's assumptions. He then considered to what extent the strategic context had changed following 11 September—

On the one hand, it could be said that the US national command chain was not seriously threatened and neither was their economy...on the other hand, the US homeland had never before experienced such an external attack...The scale and coordination of the attack on 11 September—and the willingness of educated terrorists to lose their lives—are also major differences from anything we have seen before. The threshold of terrorism has potentially been raised, and the risk of terrorists turning to chemical, biological and radiological means may have increased. Furthermore, it has demonstrated that we cannot dictate the geographic areas where our interests may be engaged. It is clear that there are groups and states that potentially have the reach to act against us, or our allies, in a manner that cannot be ignored...This means that, in future, we may be engaged across a different, and

⁶⁶ HC (2001–02) 348-II, Q 261.

⁶⁷ *Ibid.*

potentially wider canvas than we perhaps envisaged even at the time of the Strategic Defence Review.⁶⁸

45. Indeed, it might be argued that the extent and duration of operations in Sierra Leone, as well as the deployment to East Timor, had already indicated that the SDR's regional focus might have to be reconsidered. But the implications of an open-ended war on terrorism—particularly one that would address the problems of collapsing and failed states which created the political space for terror and crime networks to operate—suggested that operations elsewhere, such as Central Asia, East Africa, and perhaps the Indian sub-continent, could become necessary.

46. We concluded at that time that a widening of the SDR's geographical and regional assumptions was likely to have significant implications for UK force structures, scale of effort benchmarks and the future equipment programme at the very least. Taken with the terms of reference set out by the MoD and the list of questions raised by the Secretary of State, this struck us as requiring a more fundamental reappraisal of the SDR than was implied by the phrase “a new chapter”.⁶⁹ We see little reason to revise that judgement.

47. On 29 October 2001 the Secretary of State told the House “I would anticipate that we would be ready to publish conclusions in the spring of next year”.⁷⁰ He told us that “I have set a fairly tight timetable because I do think it is important to conclude this work fairly speedily”.⁷¹ He also confirmed that it was his intention to publish an outline, in the early part of 2002 which “would enable people to react without committing ourselves to anything very specific.”⁷² We welcomed this promised document and the intention of proceeding in as open and inclusive a way as possible. Nonetheless we had some reservations over the practicality of this approach, given that the subject matter included questions over the role of special forces and the potential vulnerabilities of the UK homeland.⁷³

The SDR New Chapter Discussion Paper

48. In February 2002 the MoD published the public discussion paper on the New Chapter with an even longer list of key questions (11) than that put to the Committee.⁷⁴ However, despite its title, the paper also clearly indicated the direction in which MoD thinking was going.

49. In the paper the MoD distinguished between actions to address the symptoms of terrorism and efforts to address the causes. Actions to address the symptoms of terrorism were listed under the headings of “coerce, disrupt and destroy”. What they had in common was that each attempted by pre-emptive action to prevent an attack being launched.

⁶⁸ Geoffrey Hoon speech at King's College, 5 December 2001.

⁶⁹ HC (2001–02) 348-I, para 101.

⁷⁰ HC Deb, 29 October 2001, col 613.

⁷¹ HC (2001–02) 348-II, Q 369.

⁷² HC (2001–02) 348-II, Q 371.

⁷³ HC (2001–02) 348-I, para 136.

⁷⁴ Ministry of Defence, *The Strategic Defence Review: A New Chapter—Public Discussion Paper*, 14 February 2002.

Actions to address the causes of terrorism came in two parts. Firstly there were efforts to prevent the conditions which allowed international terrorist organisations to develop. These included peace support operations in fragile states or regions and assistance with building up the capacity of states to act against international terrorists in their own country. Secondly there were steps that could be taken to—

deter would-be attackers by making sure that international terrorist groups and those that actively sponsor or harbour them, are aware of our capability, readiness and willingness to act against them.⁷⁵

Also included in this were efforts to deter and prevent the proliferation of chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear weapons and devices.

50. What these actions all had in common, whether they were to address the causes or the symptoms, was that they would be taken overseas. In other words the principal role of the Armed Forces was clearly still seen as being to participate in operations and tasks abroad, while by contrast “whatever its source, terrorist activity within the UK is criminal activity. The operational lead rests, in most cases, with the police”.⁷⁶ As we observed in our report on Defence and Security in the UK, over the years since the end of the Cold War, there has been a significant shift in the Government’s interpretation of how the Armed Forces should discharge their fundamental responsibility for the defence of the realm. This has occurred in response both to the changing nature of the military threat to the UK and to developments in the understanding of where the Armed Forces could most effectively make a contribution to the security of the UK.⁷⁷ **The discussion paper did not, however, clarify the MoD’s understanding of asymmetry and specifically how it related to existing doctrine. Similarly it left unclear how operations against asymmetric tactics might, in practice, be conducted.**

The Consultation Process

51. At an invited seminar in Birmingham to discuss the SDR New Chapter in late February 2002, some of the emerging conclusions were aired with representatives of other government departments, opposition parties, the Muslim community, NGOs and the police, as well as academics.⁷⁸ It was attended by the Secretary of State, the Permanent Under Secretary and the Chief of the Defence Staff.⁷⁹ Although this event was the only one of its type undertaken during the consultation, it did provide an opportunity for the MoD to test out its thinking. This has been carried out more thoroughly by other departments such as DFID, who have carried out regional consultations in conjunction with the publication of recent White Papers; the MoD could learn from their example.

52. The Secretary of State told us—

⁷⁵ SDR NC Discussion Paper, para 31.

⁷⁶ HC (2001–02), 518-II, Ev 28.

⁷⁷ HC (2001–02), 518-I, para 25.

⁷⁸ SDR NC Vol 2, para, 73.

⁷⁹ *Birmingham Post*, 1 March 2002.

One of the things that we were keen to do was emulate the consultation process that had taken place during the SDR and I think we were able to do that... Whilst I believe that we could use more outside expertise to build up the picture and...to contribute to these kinds of discussions...I was still very pleased at the willingness of people to give evidence...⁸⁰

In the event the discussion paper elicited 252 responses.⁸¹ Whether the discussion paper and the seminar in Birmingham together constituted wide consultation outside government, as the MoD claimed,⁸² remains questionable, although clearly an attempt was made.

53. The consultation process, however, was never intended to match the efforts made under the original SDR. As the Policy Director told us—

we had a consultation phase during the New Chapter which was somewhat different in style from the way consultation was done in the SDR...It was just different.⁸³

The Birmingham seminar, for example, with its select invitation list and limited distribution of its conclusions was very different from the process undertaken in the original SDR.⁸⁴

54. In May 2002, following the end of the consultation period, in a speech at the National Liberal Club the Secretary of State indicated much of what was to emerge in the New Chapter White Paper. He emphasised though that the publication of that White Paper would not be the end of the process.⁸⁵ The three key themes of his speech were the balance between addressing the causes as against the symptoms of terrorism; the balance of the defence role in protecting the home and contributing to operations overseas; and the balance between operations to disrupt potential threats and those to stabilise conflict zones. On capabilities, the Secretary of State set out some preliminary thinking on the centrality of networked capabilities for future defence planning and the need for what he called, effects-based thinking.⁸⁶

55. The drafting of the New Chapter was thus almost complete, although in the central area of planning for the use of reservists in homeland defence, the MoD decided to embark on a separate consultation process whose deadline was 13 September, well after the planned, and indeed actual, publication of the New Chapter.

⁸⁰ Q 628

⁸¹ SDR NC Vol 2, para 77.

⁸² Ev 8

⁸³ Q 627

⁸⁴ HC (1997–1998)138-I, para 80.

⁸⁵ *The New Chapter to the Strategic Defence Review: A Progress Report*, Speech by the Secretary of State for Defence to the City Forum, 23 May 2002, http://news.mod.uk/news/press/news_press_notice.asp?newsItem_id=1727.

⁸⁶ *Ibid*

56. The discussion document: *A New Chapter to the Strategic Defence Review: The Role of the Reserves in Home Defence and Security* was published on 12 June.⁸⁷ In setting the context for its proposals, the MoD stated—

A key issue is how to strike the right balance between the defence role in helping to protect the UK, and contributing to operations against international terrorism and other asymmetric threats overseas.⁸⁸

Although it seemed odd to us that the New Chapter would reach conclusions on that issue while the MoD's proposals for the use of the reserves for home defence were still under consultation, the Policy Director saw no logical flaw in this order—

First of all we needed to think before we asked people to come and give their time as reservists to the issue... We needed to talk about what we were going to do before we talked to the reserve community about whether they would do it... reservists are most available to be consulted during the summer... so we actually timed the consultation for that to run over the summer period.⁸⁹

Curiously, in February the Secretary of State had told the House that consulting with reservists and their employers was scheduled for “the coming weeks”.⁹⁰

57. We understand the arguments for consulting reservists during their summer camps, although we doubt whether it was essential to do so. What is surprising is that the MoD had apparently not considered these arguments when the timetable for the New Chapter work was originally planned. The result has been to undermine the coherence of the process and to contribute to an overall impression that this work has in practice lost out to other MoD priorities. We believe that the two strands could have been better co-ordinated. Given the importance of the issues—which was demonstrated by the early energy and commitment to the process by the MoD—it is surprising that some of the momentum appeared to have been lost in the later stages.

58. Ministers and MoD officials also emphasised that publication of the New Chapter was not the end of the work they had set in hand. They pointed to the planned Defence White Paper of 2003 as a next stage in the evolution of policy. The Secretary of State told us in March 2003 that—

Publication of the New Chapter White Paper was the start and not the conclusion of this exercise. We always intended to use the Department's normal planning process to determine exactly how best to allocate additional resources from Spending Review 2002... The planning process is in full swing and will continue for some time. My aim... is to reach decisions and present them in the next general Defence White

⁸⁷ Ministry of Defence, *A New Chapter to the Strategic Defence Review: The Role of the Reserves in Home Defence and Security—A Discussion Document*, 12 June 2002.

⁸⁸ *Ibid*, para 5.

⁸⁹ Q 9

⁹⁰ HC Deb, 14 February 2002, col 341.


Paper. I had hoped to publish this before the summer recess but, realistically in light of the current situation, I now envisage that it will appear in the Autumn.⁹¹

59. We conclude from this that the MoD is now engaged in a continuing process of reviewing defence policy, but believe it should be accompanied by appropriate consultation beyond the department. We expect to see the consequent developments in policy translated into practical results for the Armed Forces.

5 Policy Framework

60. The purpose of the New Chapter was, as we have seen, to establish a policy framework within which the MoD and the Armed Forces would be able to construct an appropriate and effective response to the threat from international terrorism. It set out a range of effects which military action might be able to contribute to a broader campaign to “eliminate terrorism as a force for change”.⁹² These were branded as actions to “prevent, deter, coerce, disrupt and destroy”. This conceptual framework is represented graphically by the MoD in the following chart—

THE MOD’S CONCEPTUAL APPROACH TO COUNTERING TERRORISM



Doctrine

61. The New Chapter exercise built on the doctrinal work previously underway in the MoD and attempted to develop a model for the military contribution to the war on terror.⁹³ Taking the lead in this doctrinal effort was the JDCC, which was established following the SDR in February 1999 to develop joint doctrine and provide long term conceptual underpinning for the future operations of the three armed services. The Centre is an integral part of the policy process in the MoD and, as we have seen, was deeply involved in the early stages of the New Chapter work.⁹⁴

62. The major publication of the JDCC is British Defence Doctrine. It lists the essential elements of British doctrine as—

⁹² SDR NC Vol 2, para 62.

⁹³ Since publication of the SDR New Chapter, this doctrinal work has resulted in a new JDCC publication on the topic Ministry of Defence, *Countering Terrorism: the UK Approach to the Military Contribution*, March 2003.

⁹⁴ Qq 544–564

- the principles of war (listed as, selection and maintenance of the aim, maintenance of morale, offensive action, security, surprise, concentration of force, economy of effort, flexibility, co-operation and sustainability);
- the war fighting ethos (that the UK's Armed Forces most important function is to prepare for and if necessary to be prepared to fight);
- the manoeuvrist approach (influencing the enemy's will to fight is as important as physical destruction of his ability to fight—but might involve both);
- the application of mission command (decentralised command, responsive to superior decision) ;
- the joint, integrated and multinational nature of operations; and
- the inherent flexibility and pragmatism of British doctrine.⁹⁵

It also notes that “military activity is about confronting risk and managing it. It is emphatically never about avoiding risk; the military profession is not for those who are risk-averse”.⁹⁶ Crucially it highlights the importance of attacking an enemy's “centre of gravity”, which may be military assets but equally may be “public opinion and national will; or an alliance or coalition structure”, and that—

Success...is achieved through identifying and neutralising or destroying the enemy's centre of gravity, and identifying and protecting one's own. At the higher strategic level, one's own centre of gravity may be the cohesion of the alliance or coalition.⁹⁷

63. In his evidence to us during our *Threat from Terrorism* inquiry, the then Director General Joint Doctrine and Concepts, Major-General Tony Milton, highlighted the doctrinal challenge of dealing with the “psychological element” of the terrorist threat.⁹⁸ Discussing how to apply the “deep, close and rear operations” of conventional warfighting to the new circumstances,⁹⁹ he told us that—

It is a little early to say, but that construct will actually serve us quite well in looking at counter-terrorist operations. The deep operations you can see going out, pre-empting, dealing with people before they have the capacity to mount an attack against you, or perhaps attacking them in transit. We will have a requirement for close operations. We will be dealing with terrorists head on, perhaps back in the UK, but we shall also have this responsibility of looking after the home base...Our instincts in conventional operations and in counter-terrorist operations tell us that the biggest pay-off is deep.¹⁰⁰

⁹⁵ Ministry of Defence, JWP 0-01, *British Defence Doctrine*, 2nd Ed, October 2001, Ch 3.

⁹⁶ *Ibid*, p 3.4.

⁹⁷ *Ibid* p 3.6.

⁹⁸ HC (2001-02) 348-II, Q 18.

⁹⁹ HC (2001-02) 348-II, Q 51.

¹⁰⁰ *Ibid*

We questioned whether this doctrine of “deep, close and rear” operations, derived as it is from manoeuvre warfare, would be flexible enough in the context of the present campaign against terrorism.

64. The current Director General of the JDCC, Air Vice-Marshal Ian McNicoll told us of the key conceptual challenges that had faced the MoD since 11 September—

The major changes that we are looking at in the conceptual area [are] how ideas such as network-enabled capability will affect things such as command and control in the future. These issues have not yet been fed into doctrine and will be in due course, but we are at the stage still of thinking about the implications of that.

In terms of doctrine, I think it was enormously reassuring that even immediately after the shocking events of 11 September 2001 we were able to look at our top level publications and say (although not in any complacent way), “Yes, the enduring principles enunciated in these are still valid”...The Chief of the Defence Staff did that personally. The top level, the enduring principles, I think we are comfortable with. At the lower level tactical doctrine and the way that we are developing it...we are taking account of developments as we incorporate them.¹⁰¹

He confirmed that the manoeuvrist approach remained central to the British approach to warfare—

The manoeuvrist approach is really at the heart of the UK approach to warfare or of the use of military force, which is to try and get inside the opponent’s decision-making cycle. It is the attempt to have your ability to think through something and act before the opponent has the chance to do his thinking and acting as well. Our network-enabled capability undoubtedly offers the prospect of being able to do that more quickly.¹⁰²

65. British Defence Doctrine refers to this as the “OODA Loop”, formulated by an American officer to explain how information can transform operations by speeding up the loop of Observing, Orientating, Deciding and Acting.¹⁰³ The SDR New Chapter’s approach encapsulated in the phrase ‘detect, decide, destroy’ appears rather similar to the OODA loop approach and therefore rather ‘old’ conceptually, a point accepted by Air Vice-Marshal McNicoll in evidence to the Committee—

I do not think there necessarily is a tremendous difference. It is an intellectual construct if you like for describing what we are talking about, which is going from a sensor through some sort of decision-making process which involves a decision maker through to what is called a shooter. “Detect, decide, destroy” is not much different from “Observe, orient, decide, act”.¹⁰⁴

66. The head of SDR New Chapter Implementation, Mr Hugh Kernohan, argued that the New Chapter’s approach was not actually a doctrine for warfare or campaigning at all—

¹⁰¹ Q 566

¹⁰² Q 582

¹⁰³ *British Defence Doctrine*, p3–5, p 3–6.

¹⁰⁴ Q 572. See para 20.

I think “detect, decide, destroy”, which has something of the character of a slogan about it, is describing a single sequence of events and almost implicit in the label is the concept that there is a target that you can destroy. I do not think it is intended to be a description of a campaign or a means of warfare. The loop has the idea that you keep going round it. I think “detect, decide, destroy” is, if you like, a description of a distinct discrete sequence.¹⁰⁵

‘Detect, decide, destroy’ appears to be merely the tactical application of the OODA loop concept. Furthermore, the use of term destroy in this connection is odd given the MoD’s current focus on effects-based operations which suggest a more nuanced approach than that conjured-up by destroy. The term also fails to reflect the importance of post-conflict reconstruction. **In this respect, then, the New Chapter may represent a relatively modest development of policy, potentially one so modest that it will not require any change to doctrine. Other concepts, however, may be more significant. One of these is asymmetry, not a new concept but one upon which a striking new light was thrown by the events of 11 September.**

67. Air Vice-Marshal McNicoll told us—

The whole point of warfare is to try and play to your strengths and against your opponent’s weaknesses and that applies to us as much as it might apply to potential opponents. That said, in the asymmetric situations that we find ourselves in at the moment, I think we have got a number of strengths. One of them of course is, as the Chief of the Defence Staff pointed out, integrated joint operations. The other is the sort of technology that we can bring to bear and the degree to which we can knit that together. I think that is lying at the heart of what we are talking about here with network-enabled capability. It is trying to get for us the asymmetric advantage.¹⁰⁶

We explore the opportunities for the UK and her allies to develop such network-enabled capabilities (our asymmetric advantage) in Chapter 6. In discussing whether there was a robust understanding of asymmetry within MoD and amongst those who needed to understand the concept, Air Vice-Marshal McNicoll referred to the JDCC publication *Joint Vision* and told the Committee that—

In the area of potential threats we have already recognised the increasing trend, particularly by non-state combatants, to use asymmetric attacks. We certainly understand that adversaries are likely to search out our weaknesses in order to undermine our own role...utilising high technology is something that we will continue to aspire to do in order to try to gain an asymmetric advantage. However, that dependence on higher technology is not the answer in all situations and the asymmetric actor will try and position himself in complex terrain, and by that I mean in urban situations or in jungle or in mountains where our high technology gives us less of an advantage, so that the possibility of a move towards high technology will drive our opponent to seek lower technology solutions which render our higher technology less effective.

¹⁰⁵ Q 575

¹⁰⁶ Q 603

We have also in our thinking looked at the subject of protection of our forces and understand that with regard to protection of our networks in the future, for example, if you rely on a network it is a potential area of vulnerability. We also understand that we need to protect all our rear area to a greater extent given that the enemy is likely to adopt asymmetric means to attack that.¹⁰⁷

68. *Joint Vision*, however, is a classified document. **Given its key role in setting out the MoD's understanding of the nature of asymmetry, we regret this. In the context of the war on terrorism, which involves a great many other agencies and outside bodies, its necessarily restricted circulation may reduce its effectiveness in disseminating the Armed Forces' understanding of the conceptual basis of the war on terror and how they see their part in it.**

69. Military doctrine for the campaign against international terrorism has a far longer history, stretching back through Britain's colonial past and developing a modern relevance out of the Northern Ireland experience since 1969.¹⁰⁸ There is no single, distinctive doctrinal contribution that has arisen from the events of 11 September 2001. Standard doctrine is reassessed at each appropriate level. At the military strategic level, the doctrine captures the fundamental principles that apply to counter terrorism. At the operational level the *UK Ops Doc* process covers all aspects of operations, including counter-terrorism, for senior commanders. At the tactical level, the Army's *Field Manual* deals with counter-terrorism and counter insurgency as part of the spectrum of normal operations, based in part on tactical procedures drawn from the Headquarters Land and Headquarters Northern Ireland commands.¹⁰⁹

70. Insofar as the military have a counter-terrorist role in home defence, the Government stresses that this must be led from Home departments rather than the MoD. There is, however, no doctrine of homeland defence as such. As Mr Kernohan pointed out, "A single national doctrine for homeland defence is not, I think, a concept that other people would recognise in those terms because they are military labels".¹¹⁰ He told us—

In one sense the outcome of, for example, the Civil Contingencies Bill, could be analogous in some ways to what in military terms is doctrine. Doctrine is a concept which means something within the military environment. It is not one that a policeman or an emergency planner in the National Health Service would necessarily recognise. That does not mean they do not do it but they may call it something different. Within our terms we are working on the doctrinal aspects of the military contributions, many of which are well established and will not change, in some of which, because we are expanding the capabilities, particularly in command and control and in the regional contingency planning, there is work going on that is being done within Land Command.¹¹¹

¹⁰⁷ Q 604

¹⁰⁸ Qq 606–607

¹⁰⁹ Q 608

¹¹⁰ Q 611

¹¹¹ Q 611

For home defence, liaison for both concepts and practice still resides predominantly within the Civil Contingencies Secretariat, inside the Cabinet Office.¹¹²

Home Versus Away

71. Nevertheless, the Secretary of State accepted that 11 September 2001 had changed the importance of the home defence role in MoD thinking—

I recognise that in one significant respect...the priority of defending the territory of the United Kingdom since 11 September has been given a much more significant place in our thinking than it was before 11 September and that is the inevitable consequence of the appalling events in the United States.¹¹³

72. That “significant place” for the task of home defence and security translates in the New Chapter only into measures to improve liaison between the civil and military authorities with what is described as a “clearer role” for Headquarters, Commander-in-Chief, Land Forces,¹¹⁴ as the principal focus for the provision of military assistance to civil authorities, joint regional liaison officers, and more staff in regional Brigade regions. However, in respect of military assistance to the civil authorities the New Chapter does not contemplate a greater role for the regular Armed Forces. Rather, it concludes that “there is a greater role for the Reserves to play”.¹¹⁵ As we have already noted, the SDR New Chapter’s assessment of the balance between home and away operations is qualified by the fact that the consultation period on the MoD’s proposals for a role for the Reserves in home defence extended beyond the publication of the New Chapter in July 2002. What has emerged therefore has the character of a steady and rather modest evolution of the doctrine of fighting at distance that was explicitly articulated in the original SDR.

73. The *Public Discussion Paper*, published in February, noted that the Reserves’ “wider geographical spread across the United Kingdom and associated local knowledge gives [them] a territorial focus and strength at the local and regional level” and asked “Are there additional or enhanced roles for our Reserve forces (both in home defence and security and in overseas operations)?”¹¹⁶

74. The results of the separate consultation process on a role for the Reserves were announced to the House by the Minister for the Armed Forces, Rt Hon Adam Ingram MP, on 31 October 2002. They were essentially the same as had been proposed in the discussion paper in June—the establishment of a capability to provide assistance to the civil authorities on a regional basis in the event of a home defence incident, drawn from existing members of the volunteer reserves. This capability would take the form of 14 Civil Contingency Reaction Forces (CCRF), one for each of the Army brigade regions in the UK, each comprising 500 volunteers.

¹¹² Q 612

¹¹³ Q 695

¹¹⁴ SDR NC Vol 1, para 79.

¹¹⁵ SDR NC Vol 1, para 81.

¹¹⁶ Public Discussion Paper, paras 25 and 26.

75. But, as Mr Ingram made clear, these forces would not necessarily be the first to be called upon in the event of a terrorist incident—

[The new arrangements] do not mean that we will use only volunteer reserves in this role. In future, as now, in the event of an incident, the regional commander will be able to judge which of the units at his disposal best match the needs of the authorities seeking support.¹¹⁷

This was confirmed by the Parliamentary Under Secretary of State for Defence, Dr Lewis Moonie MP, who stated that: “Regular forces are likely to be the first choice because CCRFs are designed to cater for exceptional events”.¹¹⁸ The Secretary of State set out the limited nature of the proposals in evidence to the Committee—

One of the New Chapter's innovations was a decision to give the Volunteer Reserves a civil contingencies role, as part of a possible request for assistance from the civil authorities. We are not creating a separate or self-contained force for this purpose. We are giving an extra role to existing Volunteer Reserves by allowing them to volunteer for the 14 regional civil contingencies reaction units. This provides a source of manpower to give commanders another option if the Armed Forces are asked for help, but it does not mean that these Reserves will always be called out or that regular units will not be used. We were also using Reserve posts to improve the mechanisms for contingency planning, liaison and command and control. They are essentially reinforcing what exists already, not creating a new or separate civil contingencies chain of command.¹¹⁹

76. The new proposals would also involve the establishment of 280 new reserve posts in Army division and brigade headquarters, as well as 29 new reserve posts in each of the 14 brigade districts supporting the CCRF role directly, a total of almost 700 volunteer reserve posts.¹²⁰ The annual cost of the CCRF scheme is estimated to be £4.5 million, with start-up costs in 2002–03 of £2 million.¹²¹ The total cost of the New Chapter's changes in this area is estimated at £60 million over four years.¹²²

77. Those individuals volunteering for CCRF duties are to receive five additional days training per year and all volunteer Reserves will receive two days additional training per year in civil support contingencies more generally. The MoD also decided that 2 (National Communications) Signals Brigade will be assigned the role of providing the communications infrastructure to support the regional command chain, with an interim capacity from the end of 2003, “although the achievement of a full national communications capability...will not be complete before 2006”.¹²³

We expect to have an initial operating capability in place by the end of the year. We plan a regional full operating capability by 31 December next year, which will include

¹¹⁷ HC Deb, 31 October 2002, col 1026.

¹¹⁸ HC Deb, 31 October 2002, col 1102.

¹¹⁹ Q 624

¹²⁰ HC Deb, 31 October 2002, cols 1023–1027.

¹²¹ HC Deb, 18 Mar 2003, col 625W.

¹²² HC Deb, 30 April 2003, col 391W.

¹²³ HC Deb, 31 October 2002, col 1027.

all new posts recruited and filled, and all regional plans fully in place and tested. The complete capability will not be in place until 2006 when the new national communications infrastructure is fully deployed.¹²⁴

78. We welcome the establishment of the CCRFs, but remain concerned that the present approach to their deployment runs the risk of developing a capability which will then not be used other than when all regular resources are already committed and that this may in turn have a damaging effect on the morale of those who have volunteered and trained for the new CCRFs.

79. We also welcome the steps to improve civil-military liaison capabilities across the 14 brigade districts through the establishments of the brigade reaction teams and note the decision to give the HQ Commander-in-Chief, Land Forces, a “clearer” role. **Nevertheless, we regret that the MoD has not taken the opportunity afforded by the New Chapter process to think more innovatively about supporting home defence. We are also concerned that only an interim communications system will be available for their first three years. We do not believe that the MoD has adequately established the appropriate balance between operations at home and away, an issue that we believe is at the centre of the New Chapter process.**

80. It emerged from our work on the *Defence and Security in the UK* inquiry that what the civil authorities wanted from the Armed Forces, in the event of a terrorist attack or emergency, was a predictable resource to call upon. But, “because the military could not guarantee to be available, they could not include them in their plans at all”.¹²⁵ The decision to create the CCRFs is a response to this requirement and does provide an element of certainty for civil emergency planners, who are now able to plan for reinforcement on the scale of a CCRF in each brigade region.

81. However, a number of issues remain. As we noted—

It is not clear to us how the MoD will ensure that the necessary skills and training for even these tasks [i.e. those set out for the CCRFs] are to be found in a volunteer reserve force of 500 persons per region and only 5 or 6 days training a year. The much more sophisticated tasks which our witnesses suggested they would actually look to the military to provide are even less likely to be available.¹²⁶

82. Another issue is the speed of response. The call out time for the availability of the full CCRF capability of 500 personnel remains somewhat vague. According to the MoD, within 24 hours of call-out the full CCRF would be available, but the numbers available at this stage would “realistically...be less than the full CCRF manning figure of 500 personnel” due to “sickness and so forth”.¹²⁷ However, lead elements would be “available within a few hours”.¹²⁸ These lead elements will, it appears, comprise command elements assessing likely tasks. As a representative of 145 Brigade told us—

¹²⁴ HC Deb, 31 October 2002, col 1027.

¹²⁵ HC (2001–02) 518-I, para, 227.

¹²⁶ HC (2001–02) 518-I, para 232.

¹²⁷ HC (2002–03) 557–ii, Q 215, fn.

¹²⁸ *Reserves Discussion Paper*, para 18.

...with regard to the ability of the Civil Contingency Reaction Force to react...Although we have yet to prove it (some other Divisions have exercised this already) it is six hours for what is called the reconnaissance group, that is the commanding officer and his company commanders, to assess the task and think through the planning prior to issuing orders to troops, and it is anticipated that in 12 hours we would hope at least 100 people would be available.¹²⁹

Witnesses to our *Defence and Security in the UK* inquiry indicated that they would be working to response times of minutes not hours.¹³⁰

83. Furthermore, in predicting what numbers would be available, the MoD could face the challenge of a relatively low rate of members of the volunteer Reserves being ready for call up, or “fit for role” (FFR). Under the SDR the FFR was set at only 55%. As the Council of the Reserve Forces’ and Cadets’ Associations told us—

The general assumption is we are talking of something around 60/70 per cent FFR, fit for role. That is the general assumption that is made for planning purposes...under SDR, there was only a requirement to be at the 55 per cent...The TA is not required to be 100 per cent ready for activity. That was one of the direct consequences of SDR...¹³¹

84. There are also wide discrepancies around the UK in recruitment by the volunteer Reserves which may prove a significant challenge to the MoD in creating the 14 regional CCRFs. In one of the most critical CCRF brigade regions—145 Brigade district based in Aldershot—recruitment of volunteers to the CCRF had reached some 300 by March 2003.¹³² Colonel Richard Putnam from the Council of Reserve Forces’ and Cadets’ Associations suggested that the inability to recruit the full complement in each district might lead to regulars being called upon to make up the numbers, which is clearly not what was intended in the New Chapter—

...there is no way that the Territorial Army or other territorial reserves in some areas will get to 500, because there are not 500 people fully trained on the ground to form the unit, so the brigade command will have to deploy full time service troops depending on circumstances. What we do not know and nobody will know until it actually happens is what they are going to be asked to do. It might just be a simple cordon around a small area; it might be picking up bits of stone and boulders—we simply do not know, but we do not want to kid ourselves, there will not be 14 times 500 or 7,000 troops on 6 or 12 hours standby at any one time of the day or night.¹³³

85. If the CCRFs are to be the predictable element for the civil authorities (even if the regulars are likely to be the first to be called upon), the concerns we raised in our *Defence and Security in the UK* report remain valid. The MoD’s list of possible tasks for the Reaction Forces includes “reconnaissance, assistance with mass casualties, site

¹²⁹ HC (2002–03) 557–ii, Q 219.

¹³⁰ HC (2001–02) 518–I, para 227.

¹³¹ Q 231

¹³² HC (2002–03) 557–ii, Q 215.

¹³³ Q 252

search and clearance, transport and communications, the operation of water and feeding points, control and co-ordination functions, access control, the control of movement of large numbers of the public, guarding or other tasks at the request of the civil police”.¹³⁴ Some of these clearly require more specialist skills and training than others. We are concerned that accurate data on the numbers recruited, their skills and their availability for call out are still to be provided.

86. We are also concerned that too little thought has gone into the implications of the establishment of the CCRFs in each region for the normal activities of the volunteer Reserve nationally. There is a risk that those volunteering for the CCRFs may be some of the most motivated individuals in the standing volunteer Reserve units and if they are deployed on CCRF duties the fit for role percentage for their home units may then drop below 55%. In other words will the 500 members of the CCRFs in each region be part of the 55% FFR of normal units? We seek assurances from the MoD in their reply to this report that the Fit For Role figures for the CCRF elements in each brigade region will not be the same as for the volunteer Reserves as a whole.

87. Overall, we have seen little evidence that the MoD has taken seriously the need to rethink the capacity of the Armed Forces to provide predictable support to the task of home defence in the event of a mass-effect terrorist attack in the UK.

¹³⁴ Reserves Discussion Paper, para 17.

6 The War on Terror and Military Transformation

88. A number of our witnesses drew attention to a fundamental principle of modern military operations which is particularly relevant for the purposes of the New Chapter, namely ‘effects-based operations’. The Secretary of State was in no doubt of its importance—

We must therefore move away from always assessing defence capability in terms of platforms or unit numbers. It is now more useful to think in terms of the effects that can be delivered—we must consider what effect we want to have on an opponent and at what time...There are traditional so-called “kinetic effects” [or] other effects designed to influence the will of an adversary...Effects-based planning has always been understood intuitively by good commanders.¹³⁵

89. Air Vice-Marshal McNicoll, however, told us that—

Effects-based operations is something we aspire to...I do not think we have got there yet but what we are starting to do now and has recently been introduced is something called effects-based targeting which is a step on the road towards effects based operations, where...we think...more closely about linking...to the wider campaign...¹³⁶

Despite the attention now being devoted to this concept, he went on to say that it—

would involve understanding to a greater degree than I think is possible at the moment every aspect of the strategic environment in which both you and your opponent are operating.¹³⁷

Nevertheless, if the principles of counter-terrorism laid out in the New Chapter and subsequent documents are relevant—to deter, disrupt, destroy terrorist activities—then effects-based operations, in full co-ordination with other government departments and international partners, will be critical to success.

90. The attempt to develop more precise effects-based operations therefore provides the context in which the UK views broader military transformations taking place. There is a lively debate over whether the ‘revolution in military affairs’ currently underway principally in the US is in fact a ‘revolution’ or rather a more mundane, though certainly rapid, ‘evolution’ of technological transformation.¹³⁸ Our witnesses generally agreed, however, that the key factor in the application of these changes was the creation of an explicit process through which military transformation could be applied.¹³⁹ Even for the

¹³⁵ Geoffrey Hoon, Secretary of State for Defence, speech at the Royal Institute of International Affairs, Chatham House, 10 March 2003.

¹³⁶ Q 577

¹³⁷ Q 577

¹³⁸ These issues were discussed during the Committee’s seminar at King’s College.

¹³⁹ Q 508, Q 541

United States, it is not necessary that all military systems should be “transformational”, as opposed to “legacy” (i.e. those systems acquired for military operations during the Cold War era). Mr David Gompert of RAND Corporation told us that there was a general consensus in US military circles that—

the types of platforms and weapons that are truly transformational, as opposed to legacy, could be as small as 10 or 15 per cent of the total force...but to me the key in enabling systems...is in the command and control, and particularly on the technical side in interoperable command and control.¹⁴⁰

91. For the UK, therefore, the key challenge raised by the revolution in military affairs is to monitor accurately how the process is altering the structure and operations of US forces, since they serve as the prototype for all the technical trends in new methods of warfare. The MoD also has to assess the advantages and disadvantages that the UK possesses in these regards and balance them against what is firstly feasible and affordable in the evolution of UK forces for the future, and secondly is consistent with the principles set out in the SDR New Chapter. The application of particular types of force modernisation, and their employment in the campaign against international terrorism also raise complex questions relating to the development of network centric capabilities, an area highlighted in the New Chapter.¹⁴¹

Network-centric Warfare

92. *Network-centric Warfare* is a formal US military concept that has been put at the heart of the transformation process of US forces, as they adjust to the technical opportunities and challenges of current and future technology. The Department of Defense (DoD) reported to Congress that the concept was “the embodiment of the information age transformation of the DoD”.¹⁴² According to evidence from the MoD, its central tenets in the US are robustly networked sensors, headquarters, units and weapon systems to improve situational awareness; the use of such awareness as a crucial contribution to the quality of command decision-making; and hence an ability to increase operational tempo, effectiveness and ultimately success.¹⁴³ In an example from the recent Iraq war, a US Global Hawk UAV was reportedly operated out of the United Arab Emirates, but its missions controlled from its home base in the US, where target imagery was also analysed before being passed to the Coalition Air Operations Centre in Saudi Arabia, which directed B-52 and B-2 bombers flown from bases in the UK and elsewhere. Despite the wide geographical spread of these networked components, targets (including Iraqi Medina Division forces around Baghdad) were able to be struck only 15 minutes after the UAV’s intelligence was collected.¹⁴⁴

¹⁴⁰ Q 518

¹⁴¹ SDR NC Vol 1, paras 35–54.

¹⁴² DoD, Report to Congress on Network Centric Warfare, July 2001.


¹⁴³ Ev 2.

¹⁴⁴ See *Aviation Week*, 28 April 2003.

93. UK defence planners take a broadly similar approach, but, in the knowledge that the UK's ability to go down this road will be resource-limited, have put the emphasis not on wholesale transformation of the forces but rather on the "key enablers" of operational effectiveness. This keeps the focus on effects-based warfare and emphasises the role of people and training in achieving the benefits of "network-enabled capabilities".¹⁴⁵ The people, as well as the technology of the network, are centric in the UK's approach.¹⁴⁶ The potential opportunities for the UK are great. As Mr Bill Robins, of BAE Systems, pointed out—

I believe that network-enabled capability offers the UK Armed Forces a chance to regain effectiveness, which should not have been lost in the first place. I do not see much scope for cost reductions in this. I believe that what we are trying to do is make sometimes paper-thin capability, which we have been left with in our Armed Forces, into the sort of reality that it should be.¹⁴⁷

THE NEW CHAPTER'S VISION OF NETWORK-CENTRIC CAPABILITIES



94. If such hopes are to be realised then the UK must adapt the opportunities offered by networking to its existing strengths. Such strengths include its progress in encouraging joint working (often termed 'jointery' by the MoD) between the three Services. This has

¹⁴⁵ Ev 2

¹⁴⁶ Q 509

¹⁴⁷ Q 540

avoided some of the ‘friction’ in networking forces that still affects the US, where the individual services have made less progress in thinking and acting jointly. Another advantage lies in the tradition within the UK’s Armed Forces of devolving responsibility down to low levels of command (mission command)¹⁴⁸ which can capitalise on the potential of new technologies to decentralise tactical command whilst centralising strategic command. Air Vice-Marshal McNicoll told us—

We are looking at how mission command in the information age can work. We are agreed that mission command encapsulates one of the best aspects out of the British approach to the use of military force, the ability for a commander to articulate his intent and for the people beneath him to decide on the best way of carrying that out. The information age should allow a much greater dissemination, a much clearer exposition, of the commander’s intent. The question that we are looking at at the moment—and this is ongoing work so please do not view it as policy—is whether we need in some way to decouple more than we do at the moment the command and control functions.¹⁴⁹

Thus, the mission command tradition in the UK is a crucial element in permitting the full exploitation of the benefits of network enabled capability. These benefits however have the potential to undermine the principle of mission command. As Air Vice-Marshal McNicoll told us—

...if, for example, there was a small operation going on somewhere and something was happening in that operation that might have a strategic impact, it may be possible in future (and it is to some extent possible now) for people at the strategic or grand strategic level to reach across the operational and tactical levels of command and make a decision and alter what is occurring there...[This does not mean] we get rid of the tactical and operational layers of command. There are still functions that these levels will have to carry out and the larger the operation the larger the burden on them because of the ability of somebody at the top of the tree to be able to see everything that is going on will obviously not be there regardless of how big the network is. This is one of the potential downsides of network-enabled capability, that it might allow what has been described as “long screwdrivers” to reach forward. What we want to try and do in our evolving thinking is try and work out procedures, a doctrine, for how we exercise that command such that control is exercised when it should be but is not over-control nor excessive control across the layers of command.¹⁵⁰

95. An American witness wrote, “the UK military leads the US military in jointness, decentralised C2 [command and control] and adaptability”.¹⁵¹ This judgement was echoed by the Deputy Chief of Defence Staff (Equipment Capability), Air Marshal Sir Jock Stirrup, who commented that though the US was clearly well in advance of the UK at a technical level, “they look on us with undisguised envy because we are able to put in place the crucial elements of doctrine and process and tie that together with technical capability in a much

¹⁴⁸ See Chapter 5 above.

¹⁴⁹ Q 594

¹⁵⁰ Q 594

¹⁵¹ Ev 87

more coherent fashion than they can”.¹⁵² This, however, contrasted somewhat with the view of the Secretary of State who told us—

I am not sure that we are good at doctrines. I think probably what we are better at is reacting pragmatically to the kind of threat we have to deal with...¹⁵³

96. UK forces have the advantage of extensive experience in handling low-intensity operations, where networking can be highly effective. It can help relatively small numbers of troops or platforms to cover large tasks or geographical areas through rapid and flexible deployments. For high-intensity operations some of our witnesses were doubtful that network-enabled capabilities would allow smaller networked units (such as brigades) to be as effective in combat as larger, non-networked units (such as divisions). However, some of our ex-Service and expert witnesses felt that this was a definite trend.¹⁵⁴ To benefit from this trend, however, they were also clear that smaller units could only be effective if they could also rely, through the network, on timely indirect firepower from other sources, and if network components had been built and trained to operate with confidence in genuinely joint and integrated battle environments.

97. The Committee was told that this was not, in itself, a distinct military doctrinal question. Networking technology will have an effect on the evolution of doctrine at all levels: “[it] is a physical capability; it is not a doctrine”, Air Vice-Marshal Ian McNicoll told us.¹⁵⁵ However, this contrasted with other evidence which emphasised that one had to understand that “network-enabled capability is not a technology thing, purely, it is dealing with the total enterprise”.¹⁵⁶ **We believe that the doctrinal basis for embracing these technologies needs to be rigorous and clearly understood if the benefits of the network are to be realised by the UK Armed Forces.**

Information Operations and the New Chapter

98. The current emphasis on effects-based operations indicates that the MoD has embraced many of the lessons of previous conflicts such as Kosovo. As the Committee noted in its report on the lessons of the Kosovo conflict, the MoD had acknowledged the importance of an integrated “information operations campaign”, including “co-ordinated pressure on a variety of fronts: economic, diplomatic etc as well as military”.¹⁵⁷ More recently, the JDCC told us that—

we now view the information campaign as being the central part of the campaign, information in the widest sense encompassing all actions of the campaign. The effects-based targeting...is very definitely part of that and our aspiration to move towards effects-based operations is also part of that.¹⁵⁸

¹⁵² Q 654

¹⁵³ Q 693

¹⁵⁴ Q 531

¹⁵⁵ Q 579

¹⁵⁶ Q 541

¹⁵⁷ HC (1999–2000) 347-I, para 231.

¹⁵⁸ Q 621

99. Effects-based targeting, and the associated intelligence support, are the first signs of a move to adopt Information Operations as an overarching strategic concept. At the same time, network-enabled capabilities depend on the robustness of their networks. Indeed, we were told that one of the obstacles to the transformation of the US Army was the natural reluctance of ground soldiers to reduce their organic firepower and to be dependent on supporting fire called up over digital networks.¹⁵⁹ As Mr David Gompert told us—

if those networks become vulnerable to information operations then the whole concept of network capability, network operations could become more vulnerable.¹⁶⁰

100. The dependence of ‘transformed’ military forces on information networks is evident to potential opponents who see disruption of US and allied networks as a source of asymmetric advantage.¹⁶¹ This was recognised by the JDCC, which concluded that “Opponents will seek to contest this [command system] advantage through electronic warfare, computer network attack and asymmetric techniques”.¹⁶² We were also told that the links could be jammed and opponents could adopt information operations to make us not believe what we are seeing.

101. We are concerned at the risks created by the potential vulnerabilities of “transformed” military forces and that they may act as a constraint on progress towards realising the full benefits of network-enabled capability. However, in the face of such vulnerabilities, the UK’s cautious approach has potential advantages.

Doctrine and Training Implications of Effects-based warfare

102. Air Vice-Marshal McNicoll told us that he did not believe that the advent of network-centric operations required a new doctrine. “What I do not think we need”, he said, “is a document entitled *Network-Enabled Capability Doctrine*.”¹⁶³ This was partly unnecessary because the UK already had “a well established doctrine structure”.¹⁶⁴ Moving to an effects-based concept of operations, on the other hand, and requirements for greater “agility”, did mean that as the technologies of network-enabled capabilities became integrated into the UK’s forces, they “will prompt another significant change”, though it was still too early to be specific about what that might involve.¹⁶⁵

103. In respect of the necessary integration between different levels of doctrine within the separate services and the relationship of that to major allies with whom the UK might expect to operate, particularly in this case, the United States, Air Vice-Marshal McNicoll accepted that naval and air forces are more easily fitted into network-centric frameworks, both physically and doctrinally, since—

¹⁵⁹ Q 514

¹⁶⁰ Q 506

¹⁶¹ Q 526

¹⁶² JDCC, *Strategic Trends: Strategic Concepts, Methodology, Key Findings and Shocks*, (March 2003) p. 1–16.

¹⁶³ Q 579

¹⁶⁴ Q 581

¹⁶⁵ Q 581–584, Q 591

[the] two services are more platform-centric, if you like, joining them on a net is in some respects easier, although it is technically challenging and quite expensive. The problem with land forces is the range of individuals that you will have to join up.¹⁶⁶

Naval and air forces also have had some 25 years experience of networking and so the cultural challenges are not as great as for land forces.

104. Though discussions are continuing between the JDCC and the Director, Land Warfare, there is as yet no agreed assessment of the implications for land forces doctrine of these developments. As far as integration of doctrines between likely allies is concerned, Mr Hugh Kernohan (responsible for New Chapter implementation) told the Committee that effective operations between allies are not necessarily impossible simply because relevant doctrines do not match at the tactical level, as long as there is compatibility and understanding at the operational or the strategic levels. Tactical doctrines are driven partly “by the nature of the equipment and technical capabilities”.¹⁶⁷ **Whilst we accept the logic of these propositions, we will monitor the development of doctrine very closely in these areas since most of it represents new frontiers in important aspects of military thinking.**

105. Training is essential in modern warfare and counter-terrorism alike. Doctrine is the formulation of principles at appropriate levels of authority from which all training follows. The process of translating doctrine into training is necessarily protracted since new doctrines or changes in doctrinal principles take some time to be explained, absorbed, and embedded in the operational units who will give practical expression to the concepts. **We accept that the UK now has a reasonably efficient structure to develop and embed doctrines at the various appropriate levels, and translate them into training regimes. We are still concerned, however, that the political and technical novelty of the developments the Secretary of State has outlined, and which other witnesses have elaborated, have taken some time to be addressed in a doctrinal context. Relevant work is clearly underway, but so are the evolving tactics of potential terrorists and those who would employ asymmetric tactics against the UK and our Armed Forces.**

¹⁶⁶ Q 592

¹⁶⁷ Q 587

7 Equipment and Force Structures

Equipment Implications of Network Enabled Capabilities

106. The development of network-enabled capability and the New Chapter's concentration on the campaign against international terrorism have important implications for attempts to create a more rapid 'sensor-to-shooter' linkage. As the Secretary of State explained, "We need the sensor and the shooter to be better linked by a real-time network".¹⁶⁸ The New Chapter highlighted a range of equipment programmes that were already in the pipeline before the events of 11 September to provide network-enabled capabilities.¹⁶⁹ These included:

a) Sensors:

- Airborne Stand-off Radar (ASTOR): five aircraft with a long-range all-weather surveillance and target acquisition radar system, together with eight ground-stations. This £1,013 million programme was begun more than 10 years ago, and is expected to be in service (with two aircraft operational) in 2005.¹⁷⁰
- Nimrod MRA4: a programme to refurbish 18 maritime reconnaissance and attack aircraft. This £2,838 million programme was also began a decade ago, but after delays will now not be in service until 2009.¹⁷¹
- RAPTOR: a reconnaissance pod for the Tornado GR4, which recently entered service.
- Battlefield UAVs (Phoenix).
- Soothsayer: an electronic warfare battlefield system.

b) Networks:

- Bowman: a tactical communication system for land and littoral operations, replacing the obsolete Clansman system. This £1,993 million programme began more than 15 years ago, and after a relaunched competition is expected to be in service from the end of next year (2004).¹⁷²
- Falcon: a £430 million tactical communications system to replace the Ptarmigan system, expected to be in service in 2006.

¹⁶⁸ HC Deb, 18 July 2002, col 462.

¹⁶⁹ SDR NC Vol 1, p 15.

¹⁷⁰ National Audit Office, Ministry of Defence, *Major Projects Report 2002*, Session 2002–03, HC 91, pp 49–53.

¹⁷¹ HC (2002–03) 91, pp 117–122; MoD Press Notice 037/03, 19 February 2003.

¹⁷² HC (2002–03) 91, pp 157–158.

c) Strike capabilities:

- Tomahawk Land Attack Missiles (TLAM): a submarine-launched¹⁷³ long-range cruise missile, already in service at the time of the 1999 Kosovo conflict.
- Storm Shadow missile: an aircraft-launched long-range cruise missile. This £980 million programme began in 1994.¹⁷⁴ The missile was first used in combat in the recent conflict in Iraq.
- Other precision-guided missiles and bombs (e.g. Precision Guided Missile, Enhanced Paveway and Maverick missiles): initiated in response to lessons flowing from the 1999 Kosovo conflict.

107. Many of these existing equipment capabilities either pre-dated or arose from the original SDR work. Indeed, in reporting progress with the implementation of the original SDR, the New Chapter highlighted other programmes which would provide “more flexible and rapidly deployable expeditionary forces”, including the Future Aircraft Carriers and their Future Joint Combat Aircraft and the additional strategic lift capabilities provided by leased C-17 aircraft and roll-on roll-off (Ro-Ro) ships.¹⁷⁵

108. But the New Chapter also announced some changes to specific programmes, and highlighted the importance of:

- An extra mission console for the E3-D Sentry AWACS aircraft—a £5 million programme to allow inter-operability with US Air Force AWACS aircraft in increasingly complex and high tempo operations.¹⁷⁶
- Enhancements of the UK’s Air Surveillance & Control System radars, costing £20 million.¹⁷⁷ Infrastructure at three air bases would also be upgraded at a cost of £5 million to provide a Quick Reaction Alert capability to operate air defence aircraft from these additional bases.¹⁷⁸
- A new Maritime Afloat Reach & Sustainability project, to provide more responsive and flexible support, probably to be based on a new design of fast multi-purpose ships.¹⁷⁹
- Watchkeeper, a UAV programme to provide imagery intelligence for land commanders.¹⁸⁰ The programme is to be supplemented by a Joint Service UAV

¹⁷³ The UK currently only deploys TLAM on submarines.

¹⁷⁴ HC (2002–03) 91, pp 79–84.

¹⁷⁵ SDR NC Vol II, paras 49–51.

¹⁷⁶ Ev 4

¹⁷⁷ Ev 4

¹⁷⁸ Ev 5

¹⁷⁹ SDR NC Vol I, para 52.

¹⁸⁰ Ev 4

Operational Development Unit to investigate and experiment the use of UAVs, separate from the Watchkeeper programme itself.¹⁸¹

- Other equipment for special forces and intelligence gathering.¹⁸²
- Future Rapid Effect System (FRES), a family of strategically and operationally transportable armoured fighting vehicles that will be designed to replicate the firepower and protection of the modern battle tank with the mobility of lighter vehicles and its associated systems. Initial approval of the programme is due in 2003 with a planned in-service date of 2009. FRES, the MoD told us, “will support the achievement of rapid effect and it is a capability therefore, that is fully coherent with the direction of the SDR New Chapter”.¹⁸³

Watchkeeper

109. Of these systems, Watchkeeper has attracted the greatest attention in terms of its applicability to the new environment of counter-terrorism, in part because of the apparently successful use of UAVs by American forces in Afghanistan, and armed UAVs in Yemen, in tackling fleeting targets—exactly the “fleeting opportunities to strike at the enemy” that the New Chapter identified.¹⁸⁴ At the time of the New Chapter’s publication in July 2002, the MoD announced its intention to invest an additional £50 million to bring forward Watchkeeper’s in-service date by two years (to 2005).¹⁸⁵ As part of this acceleration, the MoD would down-select the four consortia bidding for the Watchkeeper programme to two “next month”,¹⁸⁶ i.e. August 2002. In the event, however, this was delayed until February 2003.¹⁸⁷ Furthermore, at that stage, the Secretary of State put the anticipated in-service date at 2006—hardly a substantial acceleration from the original 2007 date.¹⁸⁸

110. The Secretary of State also did not explain why the project had been delayed other than to say “there were technical reasons why we judged it would be better delaying the process so that we had as much information as we needed in order to...make a proper decision”.¹⁸⁹ Given the pace of development in the US on UAVs, including armed UAVs such as the Predator which used Hellfire missiles in Afghanistan and in Yemen, we questioned our MoD witnesses about why UK capabilities in this area could not be accelerated further by buying equipment off-the-shelf. Their response emphasised the networking attributes of the programme—

...what we are really trying to achieve here...is the ability to inflict military effects...to disrupt and destroy terrorist groups. So we are having to have a cultural adjustment to the idea that what you see, the bits that fly around or the bits that

¹⁸¹ Q 711

¹⁸² Q 38, Q 208

¹⁸³ Ev 4; Q 17, Q 56

¹⁸⁴ HC Deb, 18 July 2002, col 462.

¹⁸⁵ Ev 4; SDR NC Vol I, p17, Q 56

¹⁸⁶ SDR NC Vol I, para 48.

¹⁸⁷ HC Deb ,7 February 2003, col 21W5.

¹⁸⁸ *Ibid*

¹⁸⁹ Q 700

drop the bombs, is very important but it is the network between them which is the difficult bit to get right, and which we must take time to achieve. Otherwise you are just putting money into something which does not get you to the effect. So I think [we] got a right balance here between those two objectives, of obviously getting capability quickly but getting it so it is an effective capability to create a military effect.¹⁹⁰

111. The MoD's response to suggestions that they might consider placing weapons on Watchkeeper was to say that this was not possible as it might delay the in-service date for the system: "clearly what we...do not want to do is start changing our mind and redefining what we want from Watchkeeper".¹⁹¹ American Predator UAVs (armed) are flying today in operations around the world while Britain's sole operational front-line (and unarmed) UAV, the Phoenix, is according to the MoD, "not one, but several generations behind".¹⁹² Indeed, the Phoenix contract was signed 18 years ago in 1985 and was itself much delayed, as our *Lessons of Kosovo* report discussed.¹⁹³

112. The MoD's declared determination to "make sure we really do keep our forces equipped with the most up-to-date technology"¹⁹⁴ does not sit with the lack of urgency in acquiring an effective networked UAV capability. The Secretary of State told us that: "What we want to ensure is that the next generation[of UAVs] available to the United Kingdom provides us with useful capabilities at the best price for the British taxpayer".¹⁹⁵ It is surely not too much to hope that an effective capability will be available to the Armed Forces of this generation of taxpayers.

113. As the Chief of Defence Staff put it, "We are very busy looking...at the moment to see what kit will be required, but that is not going to come in overnight".¹⁹⁶ Even given the restrictions of the normal procurement cycle, however, the changes to equipment programmes as a result of the New Chapter appear so far to be fairly limited. None of the new equipment announcements seem particularly dramatic in the context of the changes in the UK's security environment outlined by the Secretary of State, the stated need for UK forces to be more "agile" in response to them, and the consequent intention to apply 'network centricity' to key enablers to achieve such agility. The timescales for any changes in the equipment programme are inevitably lengthy and it may still be too soon to expect to see the effects of the "rebalancing", in the words of the Chief of the Defence Staff, of "what is no longer relevant or no longer necessary against the strategic context in which we are working".¹⁹⁷ **However, the Committee has seen little evidence of the urgency that the MoD has claimed to be devoting to acquiring new capabilities and embracing new technologies—it appears so far at least that pragmatic decision-making is also slow decision-making.**

¹⁹⁰ Q 64

¹⁹¹ Q 58

¹⁹² Q 58

¹⁹³ HC (1999–2000) 347-I, paras 162–164.

¹⁹⁴ Q 58

¹⁹⁵ Q 701

¹⁹⁶ Q 143

¹⁹⁷ Q 151

114. There is no doubt that the challenges and opportunities presented to UK Armed Forces by technological change, particularly in the United States, are considerable. To meet these challenges the UK will need robust sensor networks which will be capable of being shared with allies, particularly the US. Linking sensor networks in real time to appropriate weapons systems will be far more challenging, however, and raises the distinct prospect of national systems that are not compatible in all important respects with those of other partners.¹⁹⁸ In the view of Mr David Gompert, the United States in particular will value the UK's input if it can contribute meaningfully to “diverse strike operations from the outset” of a campaign, to the rapid insertion of “air deployable manoeuvre forces...in a fashion that is essentially integrated”, and then to “transition operations, or demanding stability operations”.¹⁹⁹ These are realistic, but demanding, scenarios that would make more “agile” UK forces and “effects-based capabilities” highly relevant to the military relationship with the United States. **It remains to be seen whether present equipment programmes, and the pragmatic adjustments that the MoD is still considering, will be sufficient to fulfil them.**

Implications for Force Structures

115. One effect on defence policy that the New Chapter highlights would be the closer integration between military and civil agencies and the consideration given to the particular role of the Armed Forces in countering terrorist threats.²⁰⁰ As the Secretary of State pointed out, “neither the Government nor the MoD believes that there is a specific military solution to the wide ranging problems of international terrorism”. Many government agencies would be involved, particularly intelligence and law enforcement agencies, and while “countering international terrorism fitted well with the trends identified by the SDR”, UK Armed Forces, “did not need fundamentally to restructure”, though “we needed to do more of some things and to do some things better”.²⁰¹ Military force, the Secretary of State told us, is only one of the different mechanisms available to Government to counter terrorism, “and indeed may well come a long way down the track having used diplomatic, political and perhaps economic means in order to try and deal with the threat”.²⁰²

116. An aspect of the original SDR which the Secretary of State re-emphasised was that in using the Armed Forces to counter terrorist threats—

we are likely to be much better off going to deal with the threat at source rather than waiting for the threat to arrive in the United Kingdom and trying to fend it off at the last stage...in truth, our judgement would be that an expeditionary capability to the source of the threat would be much more likely to deal with it.

This general orientation “runs through the work we have done on the New Chapter”,²⁰³ but it may imply a larger commitment in the future than the Secretary of State indicated.

¹⁹⁸ Q 533

¹⁹⁹ Q 533

²⁰⁰ SDR NC Vol I, paras 5–8.

²⁰¹ Q 624

²⁰² Q 683

²⁰³ Q 674, SDR NC Vol I, para 26.

At the Royal Institute of International Affairs, he asserted that “while the original assumptions [of the SDR] were correct in terms of prioritising regional threats, the global nature of terrorism means that we have to operate now outside them”.²⁰⁴ As he told the Committee—“the attempt to delineate in the future where threats might arise is going to be even more difficult than it ever was...a threat could come from any quarter of the world and we have to be in a position to deal with it”.²⁰⁵

117. Countering terrorism in a way more integrated with other government departments, as far forward as possible, and in a situation where the threat could arise from anywhere in the world, would certainly require the Armed Forces to operate with greater “agility”.²⁰⁶ This is because “targets are likely to be fleeting, once again setting a premium on rapid small, or medium-scale deployments supported by effective intelligence”²⁰⁷ and this may imply “using the Armed Forces in a whole range of different ways, more flexible, more agile...not assuming that that necessarily always leads to a large-scale engagement by British forces [which] leads to the need for smaller, more discrete, more mobile, more agile forces”.²⁰⁸

118. The Chief of the Defence Staff also told us—

We need to watch the balance of commitments against the resources...that is why we try very hard when we get involved in operations to complete them in an expeditious way and pull out as soon as we sensibly can...the brilliant operation...in Macedonia last August was a very good example of that and likewise in our operation in Kabul when we actually ran the first of the ISAF operations...²⁰⁹

Overall, therefore, the MoD’s approach appears to be that the UK’s Armed Forces should primarily be involved at the start and at the end of operations, offering agile expeditionary forces which can change their operational focus very quickly. So far, however, the Committee has little indication of what specific choices and trade-offs are likely to be involved in this process which, the MoD insists, is underway but still at a relatively early stage.²¹⁰

119. Furthermore, this requires forces which are even more adaptable than those which the UK possesses at present. The New Chapter gives few clues on how this change is to be achieved. What was constantly emphasised to us by the MoD was that it was not simply a matter of numbers but that the focus needed to be on key enablers—the specialist personnel vital for expeditionary operations. As the Secretary of State told us—

We are not talking about numbers *per se*, we are talking about having people trained and organised to do particular jobs. It is the jobs which are crucial. It may well be the

²⁰⁴ Speech by Secretary of State, Chatham House, 10 March 2003.

²⁰⁵ Q 634

²⁰⁶ Q 8, Q 11, Q 685, Speech by Secretary of State, Chatham House, 10 March 2003.

²⁰⁷ Speech by Secretary of State, Chatham House, 10 March 2003.

²⁰⁸ Q 685

²⁰⁹ Q 137

²¹⁰ Q 8

case in terms of the results and the activity that those people engage in that you could perfectly well contemplate carrying [them] out with a different number of people.²¹¹

In the New Chapter itself, this suggestion of not needing to focus on numbers alone is, however, followed by a discussion on people in which it is acknowledged that Britain's service men and women have been "working at or near, and in some cases beyond, the boundaries of what was planned in the SDR for some considerable time now".²¹²

120. **But logically this implies a need either for fewer missions or for more people.** Since the original SDR was produced in 1998, the MoD has found that concurrent small operations have been an unexpected strain on manpower and resources and this has undermined the SDR's assumptions on the number of operations that are sustainable.²¹³ Multiple small operations place a greater relative strain on resources, through the need to duplicate logistics chains, rotate forces more frequently in ways that interfere with normal training cycles, and put particular strains on specialist units and individuals.²¹⁴

121. Furthermore, many of the people who are essential to every operation are also essential to enable training to take place. And in many respects training, especially overseas exercises, can be more demanding than some operations because of the need for planners, an enemy, a control net, safety staff etc. Thus, many people are caught in a double bind of being essential for operations and then on return, essential for training. More smaller operations obviously make this situation worse for these key people. In the case of the Army, the need to bring units up to war establishment means raiding units that should be training for individuals to make up the numbers and skills. This erodes the quality of training in units that should be training because numbers are down and key personnel are missing. The Chief of Defence Staff, acknowledging the problem, told us that—

We have had to draw down on our exercises because of the pressures in going to Afghanistan... We must try to make sure that we measure very carefully where our people are falling behind in their training schedules and try to make room in the programme without further wrecking their quality of life.²¹⁵

122. The New Chapter was careful not to suggest that personnel should now simply be asked to do even more.²¹⁶ Admitting that fully manned and sustainable structures are proving elusive, the New Chapter identified individuals in the most heavily used specialisms as critical for the success of its approach. It also noted the increasing use of reservists, civilians and contractors in operational deployments as a trend likely to continue. But, in a move which could exacerbate rather than alleviate the pressure, the Secretary of State showed interest in ideas for developing more agile forces from large numbers of existing formations (not just key enablers)—

I think we need to develop more of those skills across more of our armed forces, in the light of the threat that we currently have to deal with. I think that is one of the

²¹¹ Q 642

²¹² SDR NC Vol I, para 61.

²¹³ See Chapter 2 on the Original SDR above.

²¹⁴ SDR NC Vol I, paras 31–32.

²¹⁵ Q 138

²¹⁶ SDR NC Vol I, pp.19–20.

things that we shall look at very hard in the course of the work we are currently undertaking, to have more of our forces available at short notice...I think one of the preliminary assumptions that I have is that we are going to have to have more people available at short periods of notice...²¹⁷

He envisaged that perhaps more troops like the Parachute Regiment and the Royal Marines might be needed in the future—

...one of the things we need to look at very carefully is whether we have enough of these kinds of people, whether we need to extend the training and readiness requirements to other sharp end members of the Armed Services.²¹⁸

123. The problem is that what the MoD hopes will be small operations do not always turn out that way and many do not remain of short-duration. Even if large numbers of troops are withdrawn from operations the key enablers may often be left deployed because their functions still need to be carried out even if there are fewer troops deployed. **In sum, the MoD has not addressed the risk of over-commitment leading to overstretch. The Committee believes that these issues need to be urgently considered by the MoD in an open and inclusive manner.**

124. Unusually, Special Forces also merited a mention in the New Chapter. In November 2001 the Secretary of State had told us that “I am not commenting on special forces”,²¹⁹ but in the New Chapter, Special Forces were identified as a key capability that would be receiving extra resources to maximise their utility and flexibility. The Secretary of State publicly added—

There will also be an increasing role for the use of the Special Forces in the present environment...we are also involved in upgrading capabilities in this area.²²⁰

But no structural changes to how they operate with other high-readiness forces was proposed. On the prospect of a Special Forces Command, for example, the MoD merely noted that—

Following our analysis, it was decided there would be no operational benefit in changing present arrangements [for special forces command structures]. Improving arrangements for the integration of Special, and other Forces, into the JRRF [Joint Rapid Reaction Force] have been implemented as a result of the New Chapter work and lessons learned during recent operations.²²¹

125. The MoD has made it clear that it does not anticipate any major changes in UK force structures, over and above those already set in train by the original SDR, as a result of the circumstances identified in the New Chapter. **The problems of overstretch, however, are still significant and may be exacerbated by developments foreshadowed in the New**

²¹⁷ HC (2001–02) 348-II, Q 346.

²¹⁸ HC (2001–02) 348-II, Q 364.

²¹⁹ HC (2001–02) 348-I, Q 345.

²²⁰ Secretary of State, speech to RUSI, 30 July 2002.

²²¹ Ev 3

Chapter. The Secretary of State stressed that in modern conditions the “straight” numbers of personnel available were less important than the effect they would be able to exert—

I do not think there is any particular magic in any given figure, it is what those people are trained to do...It is a very different sort of challenge and I think one that is quite fundamental.²²²

He went on, “The problem of overstretch in that sense is not a problem of numbers of infantry, it is a problem of enablers, a problem of all those who have to support deployed forces”.²²³ The Chief of the Defence Staff confirmed the importance that was attached to this particular exercise in “the rebalancing process”—

We are very much in the process of seeing how we actually put more emphasis into something...enablers in particular, and where there are areas in the programmes which are not so important...but that is something that we are actually still undergoing at the moment.²²⁴

126. On the basis of the evidence, we remain to be convinced that implementing the New Chapter will not put further strain on the UK’s Armed Forces, particularly in those branches that serve as “key enablers” to greater combat effectiveness in an era of rapid technological transformation. The MoD’s emphasis on the more sophisticated demands of “effects-based operations” and its adoption of “network-enabled capabilities” as primarily a skills and training requirement more than a technological system means that more will be expected of our Service personnel at a time when the private sector offers attractive rewards to those so trained and motivated.²²⁵

The New Chapter and the Spending Review

127. The 2002 Spending Review, published around the same time as the New Chapter, announced a 3.8% increase in MoD’s Departmental Expenditure Limit (DEL), which it presented as an average annual real terms increase of 1.2% over three years of the Review period. The table below summarises the Spending Review figures.

	2002–03	2003–04	2004–05	2005–06
Resource DEL ²²⁶	£31,376m	£33,016m	£33,755m	£34,690m
Capital DEL ²²⁷	£5,549m	£6,009m	£6,327m	£6,880m
Total DEL ²²⁸	£29,326m	£30,921m	£31,756m	£32,779m

²²² Q 642

²²³ Q 651

²²⁴ Q 169

²²⁵ Qq 642, 644

²²⁶ ‘Resource DEL’ (i.e. operating costs), a control figure for departments.

²²⁷ ‘Capital DEL’ (i.e. new capital investment), a control figure for departments.

These included a 2.7% real terms increase in ‘Resource’ DEL, but a 15% real terms increase in Capital DEL—from £5.5 billion in 2002–03 to £6.9 billion by 2005–06:

Year-on-year increases in real terms ²²⁹				
	2003–04	2004–05	2005–06	2002/3–2005/6
Resource DEL	2.7%	– 0.2%	0.2%	2.7%
Capital DEL	5.6%	2.7%	6.1%	15.2%
Total DEL	2.9%	0.2%	0.7%	3.8%

Cm 5570 Her Majesty's Treasury

128. Specific equipment enhancements²³⁰ and other works announced in the New Chapter (see below) have relatively modest price tags, when compared with the £1,600 million (in real terms) added to the capital budgets for the three years of the Spending Review. Indeed, the New Chapter stated that “the scale of operations to counter terrorism is unlikely to be large, so only relatively small quantities of the new specialised equipment are likely to be needed”.²³¹ When we questioned our MoD witnesses on this last October, they were unable to provide details of the Equipment Programme, which was then being put together. Quoting from the Secretary of State, however, they noted that the New Chapter “means being prepared to take a hard look at other areas which no longer add capability in the way they once did, and to prioritise in favour of critical capabilities”.²³²

Watchkeeper UAVs (to bring its in-service date forward 2 years)	£50m
Joint-service UAV Operational Development Unit	£60–£70m
New mission console for E3-D AWACS	£5m
Linking ‘Air Surveillance and Control System’ to civil airfield radars	£20m
Upgrading RAF stations to take Quick Reaction Alert aircraft	£5m

Ev 4

129. The results of the Spending Review were described as—

[providing] for substantial new investment in the SDR New Chapter. This will provide our Armed Forces with the latest technology and network centric capabilities, enabling them to act together with our allies in the war against international terrorism and to achieve greater precision and control of military operations. It will enable our Armed Forces to continue to achieve success in the tasks they undertake now and will enable them to respond to the range of contingencies envisaged in the SDR.²³³

However, the link between the Spending Review and the New Chapter remains unclear. The MoD has yet to set out how the significant increase in the capital budget will be used to reshape the MoD’s equipment and infrastructure to reflect the capabilities

²²⁸ ‘Total Spending’ or ‘Total DEL’, comprises Resource DEL plus Capital DEL, less the capital depreciation element in Resource DEL (to avoid double-counting asset consumption costs). This is the main control figure.

²²⁹ Assuming inflation over the period of 2.5% pa.

²³⁰ *Ev 4*

²³¹ SDR NC Vol I, para 93.

²³² Q 40

²³³ HM Treasury, *2002 Spending Review*, Cm 5570, July 2002, para 12.1.

highlighted in the New Chapter, or indeed to what extent the Spending Review addresses such new requirements rather than rectifying existing and long-standing deficiencies. We will be examining equipment funding issues further as part of our inquiry of defence procurement. More generally, however, **we expect the MoD to set out—in its response to this report, or at the latest in the forthcoming White Paper—how the Spending Review settlement will be utilised to secure New Chapter and other capabilities, to address existing strains on Armed Forces personnel and to enable the tempo of operations implied by the New Chapter.**

Policy versus Practicality

130. While the New Chapter has addressed some of the policy questions left unanswered by the original SDR, notably the role of the Reserves in home defence and the implications of network-centric capabilities for Britain's Armed Forces, **it is not clear how those policy conclusions have been matched with practical effect such as changes in force structures or equipment programmes.** Indeed, MoD has argued that the lack of such changes reflects the robustness of the original SDR framework. The Policy Director read out to the Committee a letter from the Secretary of State dated 11 October 2001—

The New Chapter made clear the Strategic Defence Review provided a firm foundation on which to build in our response to the challenges we now face after September 11. At the same time the additional resources made available in the Spending Review provided a mandate for accelerating the modernisation and evolution of the armed forces and for investing in new technologies.²³⁴

131. The Secretary of State has since gone even further in articulating a radical agenda for the future of Britain's Armed Forces, most notably in a speech in March 2003 when he spoke of radical changes being required in the areas of equipment and force structures.

We must be prepared to take difficult decisions to rebalance our force structures...We should expect the Armed Forces of the future to be radically different to those we possess today, indeed we must demand that they are.²³⁵

132. **We are not persuaded that the robustness of the original SDR is the reason for the modest practical changes to date. We have the impression that too often the practical implications of the policy developments set out in the New Chapter have not been properly thought through. To date virtually all the equipment programmes which have been linked with the New Chapter have been existing programmes, which in a few cases the department has said are being accelerated. We are concerned that this suggests the policy making process and the ability to deliver the implementation of that process quickly enough are out of step with each other, or that the MoD has scaled back its practical ambition from the vision set out by the early stages of the New Chapter work.**

²³⁴ Q 40

²³⁵ Speech by Secretary of State, Chatham House, 10 March 2003.

8 International Issues

New Warfare and the Allies

133. The fact that the United States is moving ahead so rapidly in networking its armed forces raises some important issues for the UK. On the one hand the UK appears to have been modestly successful, so far, in exploiting those technical areas where it has been able to integrate with US forces in specific operations. However, as our report on the Kosovo campaign pointed out, there have been some problems of interoperability between UK and US air forces.²³⁶ Some of these have been addressed. The MoD told us clearly that “currently our focus is on our interface with the US”; interoperability with other countries is something to be considered “in due course”.²³⁷ In his speech of 10 March 2003, the Secretary of State moved British defence policy on from the original SDR which spoke of future operations being multinational²³⁸ to a clearer focus on integration with the US—

It is highly unlikely that the United Kingdom would be engaged in high intensity large-scale operations without the United States, a judgement born of past experience, shared interest and our assessment of strategic trends.²³⁹

134. Apart from the United States, it appears that the only allies the UK has so far considered in any detail in these respects are Australia and Sweden, since, they see the evolution in warfare in a similar way to the United Kingdom. The MoD assured us that allied countries were fully informed of progress on the New Chapter, but we have no evidence that the extent of this information went beyond the circulation of the discussion document of 14 February 2002 to “NATO and EU allies and aspirant states, to the NATO Secretary General and the EU’s High Representative, and to the Foreign Defence Attaches resident in London”.²⁴⁰ New Chapter thinking was also aired in formal bilateral contacts with allies and partners and with “in-coming dignitaries”.²⁴¹ **This may be regarded as something less than close interaction with allies since the discussion document of 14 February was produced for general public, rather than for detailed private, discussion.**

135. In addressing the possibility of drawing European allies into the developing discussion of new warfare and the role that partners of the United States might seek to perform, the MoD adds an interesting rider: although the UK “would wish to be able to provide similar connectivity, possibly at lesser scale, with EU partners in due course... much will depend on their ability to invest appropriately”.²⁴² Yet independent experts thought that the UK could play a “pivotal” role in keeping open technical and doctrinal links between the United States and European allies. Mr David Gompert felt that on present trends the European allies would find it increasingly difficult to achieve interoperability with the

²³⁶ HC (1999–2000) 347-I.

²³⁷ Ev 2

²³⁸ SDR Vol 1, p 6–4, para 13

²³⁹ Speech by Secretary of State, Chatham House, 10 March 2003.

²⁴⁰ Ev 8

²⁴¹ Ev 8

²⁴² Ev 2

United States.²⁴³ This was not merely a technical issue, but also one of training and operational doctrine, since network-centric capabilities were as much about process as hardware.²⁴⁴ The Prague initiatives may be the last chance, “to avoid a de facto NATO division of labor—high-low as well as geographic”.²⁴⁵

136. In its report on the original SDR, our predecessors noted that the European allies had not been involved in the process at a formative stage, but rather kept abreast of the conclusions as they emerged.²⁴⁶ The same appears to have happened in the case of the New Chapter. **The Government should recognise the potential impact it can have both in providing a model of efficient US-UK technical and doctrinal co-operation, and in helping influence other European allies to embrace the implications of new trends in warfare. We are not so far convinced that the MoD appreciates the potential implications of this role, or is yet prepared for the efforts it would require.**

Legal Aspects

137. The New Chapter had nothing explicit to say about the legal implications for defence matters and the roles played by the UK’s Armed Forces in the campaign against terrorism. United States policy has caused some disquiet in articulating a “doctrine of pre-emption” as part of what Washington calls the ‘War on Terrorism’.²⁴⁷ When questioned on this matter, the Secretary of State gave assurances that the use of a UK expeditionary capacity to attack the source of a terrorist threat, “clearly has to be consistent with our obligations in international law...which is based on self-defence in this area”.²⁴⁸ The British Government,

behaves consistently with our understanding of the relevant principles of international law, which are not...solely dependent upon, for example, the underlying agreed common law principles of international law, such as self defence, but of course crucially depend on decisions of the United Nations.”²⁴⁹

And this view was echoed clearly by officials responsible for doctrine and concepts.²⁵⁰

138. The principle that UK operations would always be in accordance with the Government’s interpretation of international law applies in the same way to the rules of engagement (RoE) for the Armed Forces. “Rules of engagement will reflect the relevant international law and will reflect the overall position of the Government”, said the Secretary of State, “It is certainly not changed by the New Chapter”.²⁵¹ RoE are defined from the tactical level, where the right of any Armed Service personnel to self-defence is fundamental, up to the strategic level where they may be set, and adjusted, according to circumstances.²⁵² Such RoEs, the Chief of the Defence Staff told us, “are very carefully

²⁴³ Q 506

²⁴⁴ Q 508

²⁴⁵ Ev 86–87

²⁴⁶ HC (1997–98) 138-I.

²⁴⁷ *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America*, September 2002.

²⁴⁸ Q 674

²⁴⁹ Q 676 and Q 688

²⁵⁰ Q 617

²⁵¹ Q 681

²⁵² Q 188

articulated and passed down the command chain”.²⁵³ As one official commented, “Everything we do, whether military officers or civil servants, is governed wherever we do it by UK law. Any action must therefore be legal in terms of statute”.²⁵⁴

139. Other evidence presented to the Committee, however, suggested a more equivocal legal picture in the context of the scope of counter-terrorist operations contemplated in the New Chapter. Professor Sir Adam Roberts suggested to the Committee that the New Chapter did not deal in any detail with the problems of addressing terrorist issues in the absence of truly applicable “laws of war”. Counter-terrorism, he thought, would require far more detailed interpretation of existing international law when specific problems arise. In later evidence, Sir Adam told the Committee that the Secretary of State’s evidence of 5 March 2003, “indicates some unease at, and possible confusion regarding, doctrines of pre-emptive or preventative uses of armed force, e.g. against terrorist threats.”²⁵⁵ In particular, pre-emptive action may be generally regarded as falling within the right of states to exercise self-defence “against an absolutely imminent threat”.²⁵⁶ The problem today, however, is that it may be very difficult to demonstrate in a legally robust fashion the imminence of a particular terrorist threat.²⁵⁷ Actions taken against threats which do not conform to the rubric that they be ‘absolutely imminent’ are in the nature of ‘preventative’ rather than pre-emptive actions, and are far harder to justify under the right of national self-defence.

Today, a difficulty with the legal rationale for many actual or envisaged preventative or pre-emptive military actions taken partly or wholly on counter-terrorist grounds is that it is hard to argue that there was no choice of means and no moment for deliberation. If only that were the case!²⁵⁸

140. In a debate in October 2002, the Secretary of State quoted “a well-established 19th Century doctrine of pre-emption based on the concept of self-defence”. “The US National Security Strategy” he claimed, “is based firmly on that tradition”.²⁵⁹ Sir Adam Roberts, however, argued that the US National Security Strategy of September 2002 blurs the distinction it draws between pre-emption and prevention, and then appears to assert a general right to preventative intervention without giving equal weight to the principle of the norm of non-intervention in international affairs. He concluded that the document was therefore unlikely to attract widespread international support on this basis, and for this reason its legal status must remain doubtful. While the US-led intervention in Afghanistan in 2001 could undoubtedly be legally justified as self-defence following an actual terrorist attack on the United States, Sir Adam counselled against relying on this subsequent legal doctrine as a basis for the UK’s military actions.

the UK should be very cautious about appearing to subscribe to a doctrine which is internationally contentious, and which may actually hamper the process of coalition

²⁵³ Q 188

²⁵⁴ Q 617

²⁵⁵ Ev 187–88

²⁵⁶ Ev 187

²⁵⁷ Q 675

²⁵⁸ Ev 187

²⁵⁹ HC Deb, 17 October 2002, col 496.

and consensus-building that is an essential basis on effective international action against terrorism.²⁶⁰

141. An MoD witness acknowledged that—

There is a gap that we can see...at one extreme which is that of domestic law enforcement, which is underpinned by a focus on the individual [and] the classic concept of warfare where the focus is not on an individual but on a collective, the enemy...There is a sense that at the moment, as a result of 11 September, there is an area of activity, a series of threats that we are having to face that somehow fall in the middle. That is the question that we are wrestling with and I am not sure we have got the answer.²⁶¹

Some of those more obvious questions concern the ways in which network-enabled warfare could affect the interpretation of rules of engagement and personal legal responsibility. The MoD Policy Director, Simon Webb, told the Committee that greater speed of decision-making in the ‘sensor-to-shooter’ loop might make for more sensitively applied rules of engagement in ways that could increase the legal standing of ongoing operations—though this was speculative for the moment.²⁶² The Chief of the Defence Staff, however, was concerned that such networking technologies would make more acute demands on the RoE system, “We will have to have a sharper understanding of what our rules of engagement might be, which means that we have to get the legal processes properly sorted out”.²⁶³ This would often require compatibility with US work on RoE, an area which remained challenging and something the UK was still “working on...to try and make sure that we stay in touch with them”.²⁶⁴

142. We raised the legal implications of the more extensive use of UAVs, widely foreshadowed in the New Chapter, on a number of occasions. We were assured that the same legal process applied to operators of UAVs, who may be thousands of miles away from the battlespace, as to any other personnel involved in close battle.²⁶⁵ We were also assured that the role of the individual in all high-technology decision-making loops, such as that implied by the use of UAVs, remained fundamental.²⁶⁶ **We welcome the MoD’s assurances that UK military operations will always be conducted in accordance with international law. It is of fundamental importance that our Armed Forces can be confident, whenever we call upon them, that they are operating on the basis of, and within, applicable international law.**

²⁶⁰ Ev 188

²⁶¹ Q 616

²⁶² Q 53 and Q 619

²⁶³ Q 153

²⁶⁴ Q 157

²⁶⁵ Q 189

²⁶⁶ Q 54

9 Conclusion

143. The original SDR was published more than three years before al Qaeda attacked New York and Washington on 11 September 2001. The world did not stand still in those three years. We are now 20 months on from 11 September and much has changed over that time too.

144. In the New Chapter the MoD attempted to assess the implications of the threat from international terrorism for the Armed Forces. This was not a new threat but 11 September brought home its reality and urgency in a uniquely dramatic and horrifying manner.

145. At the same time, however, the MoD emphasised that it was not embarking on a review of the SDR as a whole. The New Chapter was to be exactly that—an addition to existing, still valid, policy in order to address a specific additional threat. In theory at least this appears to be a logical approach. Furthermore any fundamental reappraisal of the SDR itself would have been both hugely more time-consuming and, given that many elements of the SDR are still in the process of implementation, might have seriously disrupted current planning.

146. But the MoD's chosen approach has made the New Chapter process untidy. Many of the developments in fields as apparently far apart as doctrine and equipment, which are discussed in the New Chapter in the context of counter-terrorist operations, have a wider relevance to other types of military operations. This is particularly true in the complex and rapidly-moving area of Network-Enabled Capability. A policy paper on what these developments mean only in the context of counter-terrorist operation risks appearing perversely narrow in scope. At the very least, by trying to avoid the broader picture, the New Chapter has in fact served to draw attention to the many areas where developments since 1998 are making the SDR look increasingly out of date. We have been told that these gaps will be filled by the Defence Policy White Paper which is to be published this autumn. That, in our view, will be a major challenge, particularly as the lessons from the conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq will have to be absorbed. We await that publication with interest.

Conclusions and recommendations

Producing the New Chapter

1. We concluded in December 2001 that a widening of the SDR's geographical and regional assumptions was likely to have significant implications for UK force structures, scale of effort benchmarks and the future equipment programme at the very least. Taken with the terms of reference for the New Chapter work set out by the MoD and the list of questions raised by the Secretary of State, this struck us as requiring a more fundamental reappraisal of the SDR than was implied by the phrase "a new chapter". We see little reason to revise that judgement. (Paragraph 46)
2. The discussion paper of February 2002 did not clarify the MoD's understanding of asymmetry and specifically how it related to existing doctrine. Similarly it left unclear how operations against asymmetric tactics might, in practice, be conducted. (Paragraph 50)
3. We understand the arguments for consulting reservists during their summer camps, although we doubt whether it was essential to do so. What is surprising is that the MoD had apparently not considered these arguments when the timetable for the New Chapter work was originally planned. The result has been to undermine the coherence of the process and to contribute to an overall impression that this work has in practice lost out to other MoD priorities. We believe that the two strands could have been better co-ordinated. Given the importance of the issues—which was demonstrated by the early energy and commitment to the process by the MoD—it is surprising that some of the momentum appeared to have been lost in the later stages. (Paragraph 57)
4. We conclude that the MoD is now engaged in a continuing process of reviewing defence policy, but believe it should be accompanied by appropriate consultation beyond the department. We expect to see the consequent developments in policy translated into practical results for the Armed Forces. (Paragraph 59)

Policy Framework

5. The New Chapter represents a relatively modest development of policy, potentially one so modest that it will not require any change to doctrine. Other concepts, however, may be more significant. One of these is asymmetry, not a new concept but one upon which a striking new light was thrown by the events of 11 September. (Paragraph 66)
6. We regret that the document *Joint Vision* is classified, given its key role in setting out the MoD's understanding of the nature of asymmetry. In the context of the war on terrorism, which involves a great many other agencies and outside bodies, its necessarily restricted circulation may reduce its effectiveness in disseminating the Armed Forces' understanding of the conceptual basis of the war on terror and how they see their part in it. (Paragraph 68)

Home versus Away

7. That “significant place” for the task of home defence and security translates in the New Chapter only into measures to improve liaison between the civil and military authorities with what is described as a “clearer role” for Headquarters, Commander-in-Chief, Land Forces, as the principal focus for the provision of military assistance to civil authorities, joint regional liaison officers, and more staff in regional Brigade regions. However, in respect of military assistance to the civil authorities the New Chapter does not contemplate a greater role for the regular Armed Forces. Rather, it concludes that “there is a greater role for the reserves to play”. The SDR New Chapter’s assessment of the balance between home and away operations is qualified by the fact that the consultation period on the MoD’s proposals for a role for the Reserves in home defence extended beyond the publication of the New Chapter in July 2002. What has emerged therefore has the character of a steady and rather modest evolution of the doctrine of fighting at distance that was explicitly articulated in the original SDR. (Paragraph 72)
8. We welcome the establishment of the Civil Contingency Reaction Forces, but remain concerned that the present approach to their deployment runs the risk of developing a capability which will then not be used other than when all regular resources are already committed and that this may in turn have a damaging effect on the morale of those who have volunteered and trained for the new CCRFs. (Paragraph 78)
9. We regret that the MoD has not taken the opportunity afforded by the New Chapter process to think more innovatively about supporting home defence. We are also concerned that only an interim communications system will be available for their first three years. We do not believe that the MoD has adequately established the appropriate balance between operations at home and away, an issue that we believe is at the centre of the New Chapter process. (Paragraph 79)
10. If the CCRFs are to be the predictable element for the civil authorities (even if the regulars are likely to be the first to be called upon), the concerns we raised in our *Defence and Security in the UK* report remain valid. The MoD’s list of possible tasks for the Reaction Forces includes “reconnaissance, assistance with mass casualties, site search and clearance, transport and communications, the operation of water and feeding points, control and co-ordination functions, access control, the control of movement of large numbers of the public, guarding or other tasks at the request of the civil police”. Some of these clearly require more specialist skills and training than others. We are concerned that accurate data on the numbers recruited, their skills and their availability for call out are still to be provided. (Paragraph 85)
11. We are also concerned that too little thought has gone into the implications of the establishment of the CCRFs in each region for the normal activities of the volunteer Reserve nationally. (Paragraph 86)
12. We seek assurances from the MoD in their reply to this report that the Fit For Role figures for the CCRF elements in each brigade region will not be the same as for the volunteer Reserves as a whole. (Paragraph 86)

13. Overall, we have seen little evidence that the MoD has taken seriously the need to rethink the capacity of the Armed Forces to provide predictable support to the task of home defence in the event of a mass-effect terrorist attack in the UK. (Paragraph 87)

The War on Terror and Military Transformation

14. For the UK the key challenge raised by the revolution in military affairs is to monitor accurately how the process is altering the structure and operations of US forces, since they serve as the prototype for all the technical trends in new methods of warfare. The MoD also has to assess the advantages and disadvantages that the UK possesses in these regards and balance them against what is firstly feasible and affordable in the evolution of UK forces for the future, and secondly is consistent with the principles set out in the SDR New Chapter (Paragraph 91)
15. We believe that the doctrinal basis for embracing network enabling technologies needs to be rigorous and clearly understood if the benefits of the network are to be realised by the UK Armed Forces. (Paragraph 97)
16. We are concerned at the risks created by the potential vulnerabilities of “transformed” military forces and that they may act as a constraint on progress towards realising the full benefits of network-enabled capability. However, in the face of such vulnerabilities, the UK’s cautious approach has potential advantages. (Paragraph 101)
17. We accept that the UK now has a reasonably efficient structure to develop and embed doctrines at the various appropriate levels, and translate them into training regimes. We are still concerned, however, that the political and technical novelty of the developments the Secretary of State has outlined, and which other witnesses have elaborated, have taken some time to be addressed in a doctrinal context. Relevant work is clearly underway, but so are the evolving tactics of potential terrorists and those who would employ asymmetric tactics against the UK and our Armed Forces. (Paragraph 105)

Equipment and Force Structures

18. The MoD’s declared determination to “make sure we really do keep our forces equipped with the most up-to-date technology” does not sit with the lack of urgency in acquiring an effective networked UAV capability. The Secretary of State told us that: “What we want to ensure is that the next generation [of UAVs] available to the United Kingdom provides us with useful capabilities at the best price for the British taxpayer”. It is surely not too much to hope that an effective capability will be available to the Armed Forces of this generation of taxpayers. (Paragraph 112)
19. The Committee has seen little evidence of the urgency that the MoD has claimed to be devoting to acquiring new capabilities and embracing new technologies—it appears so far at least that pragmatic decision-making is also slow decision-making. (Paragraph 113)

20. It remains to be seen whether present equipment programmes, and the pragmatic adjustments that the MoD is still considering, will be sufficient to allow UK Armed Forces to fulfil the realistic but demanding scenarios which will be most relevant in our military relationship with the United States. (Paragraph 114)
21. The MoD has not addressed the risk of over-commitment leading to over-stretch in the New Chapter. The Committee believes that these issues need to be urgently considered by the MoD in an open and inclusive manner. (Paragraph 123)
22. On the basis of the evidence, we remain to be convinced that implementing the New Chapter will not put further strain on the UK's Armed Forces, particularly in those branches that serve as "key enablers" to greater combat effectiveness in an era of rapid technological transformation. (Paragraph 126)

The New Chapter and the Spending Review

23. The link between the Spending Review and the New Chapter remains unclear. The MoD has yet to set out how the significant increase in the capital budget will be used to reshape the MoD's equipment and infrastructure to reflect the capabilities highlighted in the New Chapter, or indeed to what extent the Spending Review addresses such new requirements rather than rectifying existing and long-standing deficiencies. (Paragraph 129)
24. We expect the MoD to set out—in its response to this report, or at the latest in the forthcoming White Paper—how the Spending Review settlement will be utilised to secure New Chapter and other capabilities, to address existing strains on Armed Forces personnel and to enable the tempo of operations implied by the New Chapter. (Paragraph 129)

Policy versus Practicality

25. We are not persuaded that the robustness of the original SDR is the reason for the modest practical changes to date. We have the impression that too often the practical implications of the policy developments set out in the New Chapter have not been properly thought through. To date virtually all the equipment programmes which have been linked with the New Chapter have been existing programmes, which in a few cases the department has said are being accelerated. We are concerned that this suggests the policy making process and the ability to deliver the implementation of that process quickly enough are out of step with each other, or that the MoD has scaled back its practical ambition from the vision set out by the early stages of the New Chapter work. (Paragraph 132)

New Warfare and the Allies

26. The level of consultation with allies during the New Chapter work may be regarded as something less than close interaction since the discussion document of 14 February was produced for general public, rather than detailed private, discussion. (Paragraph 134)

27. The Government should recognise the potential impact it can have both in providing a model of efficient US-UK technical and doctrinal co-operation, and in helping influence other European allies to embrace the implications of new trends in warfare. We are not so far convinced that the MoD appreciates the potential implications of this role, or is yet prepared for the efforts it would require. (Paragraph 136)

Legal Aspects

28. We welcome the MoD's assurances that UK military operations will always be conducted in accordance with international law. It is of fundamental importance that our Armed Forces can be confident, whenever we call upon them, that they are operating on the basis of, and within, applicable international law. (Paragraph 142)

Witnesses

Wednesday 16 October 2002	<i>Page</i>
Mr Simon Webb CBE , Policy Director, Mr Bruce Mann , Director General, Finance Management, and Major-General Rob Fulton , Capability Manager (Information Superiority), Ministry of Defence.	Ev 9
Wednesday 6 November 2002	
Admiral Sir Michael Boyce GCB OBE ADC , Chief of the Defence Staff, Ministry of Defence	Ev 32
Wednesday 20 November 2002	
Colonel Michael Taylor CBE TD DL , Colonel Sir David Trippier RD JP DL and Colonel Richard Putnam CBE TD DL , Council of Reserve Forces' and Cadets' Associations	Ev 46
Mr John Bridgeman CBE TD DL , National Employers' Advisory Board for the Reserves of the Armed Forces	Ev 57
Wednesday 4 December 2002	
Air Chief Marshal Sir Malcolm Pledger KCB OBE AFC , Chief of Defence Logistics, Ministry of Defence	Ev 64
Tuesday 28 January 2003	
Mr David Gompert , Vice President, Emeritus, RAND Corporation and Mr Bill Robins CB OBE , Director, Advanced Concepts C4ISR group, BAE Systems	Ev 86
Wednesday 5 February 2003	
Air Vice-Marshal Iain McNicoll CBE , Director General, Joint Doctrine and Concepts Centre, Shrivenham, and Mr Hugh Kernohan , SDR New Chapter Implementation, Ministry of Defence	Ev 103
Wednesday 5 March 2003	
Rt Hon Geoffrey Hoon MP , a Member of the House, Secretary of State for Defence, Mr Simon Webb CBE , Policy Director and Air Marshal Sir Jock Stirrup KCB AFC , Deputy Chief of Defence Staff (Equipment Capability), Ministry of Defence	Ev 117

Written evidence

Ministry of Defence	Ev 1, Ev 31, Ev 83, Ev 134, Ev 185
Mr David Gompert	Ev 86
Mr Zahid Nawaz	Ev 138
Professor Ian Bellany	Ev 147, Ev 148
Professor Malcom Chalmers	Ev 150
Professor Sir Adam Roberts	Ev 155, Ev 161, Ev 187
Dr Alice Hills	Ev 156
Reserve Forces' and Cadets' Association	Ev 158

Unprinted written evidence

Additional papers have been received from the following and have been reported to the House but to save printing costs they have not been printed and copies have been placed in the House of Commons library where they may be inspected by members. Other copies are in the Record Office, House of Lords and are available to the public for inspection. Requests for inspection should be addressed to the Record Office, House of Lords, London SW1 (Tel 020 7219 3074). Hours of inspection are from 9:30am to 5:00pm on Mondays to Fridays.

Ministry of Defence
Mr Alan McLachlan
Mr Jeremy Harbord

Formal minutes

Wednesday 7 May 2003

Members present:

Mr Bruce George, in the Chair

Mr James Cran	Jim Knight
Mr David Crausby	Patrick Mercer
Mr Mike Hancock	Syd Rapson
Mr Gerald Howarth	Mr Frank Roy
Mr Kevan Jones	Rachel Squire

The Committee deliberated.

Draft Report (*A New Chapter to the Strategic Defence Review*), proposed by the Chairman, brought up and read.

Ordered, That the Chairman's draft Report be read a second time, paragraph by paragraph.

Paragraphs 1 to 146 read and agreed to.

Annex [Summary] agreed to.

Resolved, That the Report be the Sixth Report of the Committee to the House.

Ordered, That the provisions of Standing Order No. 134 (select committees (reports)) be applied to the Report.

Ordered, That the Appendices to the Minutes of Evidence taken before the Committee be reported to the House.

[Adjourned till Wednesday 13 May at half past two o'clock.]

Reports from the Defence Committee since 2001

Session 2002–03

First Report	Missile Defence	HC 290 (HC 411)
Second Report	Annual Report for 2002	HC 378
Third Report	Arms Control and Disarmament (Inspections) Bill	HC 321
Fourth Report	The Government's Proposals for Secondary Legislation under the Export Control Act	HC 620
Fifth Report	Strategic Export Controls: Annual Report for 2001, Licensing Policy and Parliamentary Scrutiny	HC 474

Session 2001–02

First Report	Ministry of Defence Police: Changes in jurisdiction proposed under the Anti-terrorism Crime and Security Bill 2001	HC 382 (HC 621)
Second Report	The Threat from Terrorism	HC 348 (HC 667)
Third Report	The Ministry of Defence Reviews of Armed Forces' Pension and Compensation Arrangements	HC 666 (HC 115)
Fourth Report	Major Procurement Projects	HC 779 (HC 1229)
Fifth Report	The Government's Annual Report on Strategic Export Controls for 2000, Licensing Policy and Prior Parliamentary Scrutiny (Joint with Foreign Affairs Committee, International Development Committee and Trade and Industry Committee)	HC 718 (Cm 5629)
Sixth Report	Defence and Security in the UK	HC 518 (HC 1230)
Seventh Report	The Future of NATO	HC 914 (HC 1231)

Government Responses to Defence Committee reports are published as Special Reports from the Committee. They are listed here in brackets by HC (or Cm) No. after the report they relate to.