House of Commons - Defence

Select Committee on Defence Sixth Report

4 Producing the New Chapter

37. Even before the events of 11 September, a number of studies had been underway, updating aspects of the original SDR. As well as Defence Policy 2001 and the Future Strategic Context of Defence which we discussed above, these included work on Future Shocks by the JDCC, the UK Joint Vision which was published in June 2001, and British Defence Doctrine.[56] However, in these published documents there is only scant discussion of asymmetric threats, virtually none of which is in the context of home defence.

38. Although a number of terrorist attacks in the mid-1990s had led certain commentators, notably in the United States, to become preoccupied with low-probability high-consequence mass-casualty terrorism, it was the attacks of 11 September 2001 which focused attention on the potential vulnerability of the UK to asymmetric threats. The Secretary of State, as we have noted, was quick to identify these challenges as requiring attention—

As early as 12 September, in an "immediate reaction"[58], the head of the JDCC, Major-General Tony Milton moved to the Ministry of Defence to take charge of a strategic think-tank of staff from the JDCC which operated from 12 September to 5 October, at which point the SDR New Chapter work was formally announced by the Secretary of State.[59]

39. The work was split into two phases, the first of which ran from October 2001 to January 2002 and sought to establish a policy and conceptual framework, identifying the questions to be answered and the issues to be addressed. This phase concluded with the release of the SDR New Chapter Discussion Paper on 14 February 2002. The second phase which focused on the practical implications for capabilities and resources, continued from February until publication of the New Chapter itself in July 2002.

40. Four working groups were set up at the start of the process, each under the direction of senior officials or military officers and involving some 150 staff from the MoD and other government departments, including the intelligence agencies, the FCO and the Treasury.[60] The Working Groups (and their heads) were as follows:

ii) Overseas Relations and Deterrence (Mr Brian Hawtin, Director General, International Security Policy);

iii) Home Defence (Mr Bruce Mann, Director General, Financial Management);

iv) Overseas Operations (Phase I: Major-General Tony Milton, Director General Joint Doctrine and Concepts; Phase 2: Major-General Rob Fulton, Capability Manager, Information Superiority).

A variety of secret elements to the work were swept up by what in effect was a fifth working group.[61]

41. In each of the groups, sub-groups were created as required to tackle particular elements and where the issues had implications across the working groups, these were coordinated centrally.[62] The range of skills brought to the process, we were assured, was impressive.[63] Mr Simon Webb, MoD Policy Director, told us that the conclusions of the first two working groups emerged in the February public discussion document and the rest of the work emerged in the final New Chapter White Paper. An internal report was discussed with ministers and various government departments in late autumn 2001.[64]

42. Like the original SDR, this New Chapter was intended to draw widely on advice and comment from agencies and advisers outside the Government, and, as far as possible, to be conducted as an open process. At the outset the Secretary of State assured the House—

Scope

43. When the Secretary of State came before us on 28 November 2001, he set out a list of questions which the New Chapter work would need to address—

i) …can we base our policy on getting intelligence of specific threats, with occasional misses, or do we have to assess our vulnerabilities to potential terrorist capabilities and counter these?

ii) How far do we try to defend the homeland in a collective NATO and European sense and how should we try to deal with terrorists, in their bases or in transit?

iii) In the UK, how far should the Armed Forces play an increased role in security? If so, what sort of forces are best suited for these tasks? Should the Reserve Forces have a different or enhanced role?

iv) In the military dimension, is there a role for pre-emption? What is the role of Armed Forces in dealing with problems upstream, what capabilities do we need? What is clear already is that we need fast, integrated operations, involving high levels of military skill, improved intelligence-gathering capability and a deeper understanding of potential opponents.

v) How do we engage the causes of terrorism as well as the terrorists themselves? How do we do so on a cross-governmental and coalition basis and what is the role of the military, if any, in this? How do we avoid the use of force becoming our opponent's own recruiting sergeant?

vi) How do we deter or dissuade states from support or complicity with terrorism, especially in the chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear activities? What if the state has failed…?

vii) …what is the nature of asymmetric threats? How does this impact on our approach to operations?[66]

The Secretary of State described this as a "formidable catalogue of questions".[67]

44. In his King's College speech on 5 December he set out some of his Department's emerging thinking. He cautioned that a sense of proportion was needed and that the New Chapter was designed to build upon, but not reopen the Strategic Defence Review's assumptions. He then considered to what extent the strategic context had changed following 11 September—

45. Indeed, it might be argued that the extent and duration of operations in Sierra Leone, as well as the deployment to East Timor, had already indicated that the SDR's regional focus might have to be reconsidered. But the implications of an open-ended war on terrorism—particularly one that would address the problems of collapsing and failed states which created the political space for terror and crime networks to operate—suggested that operations elsewhere, such as Central Asia, East Africa, and perhaps the Indian sub-continent, could become necessary.

46. We concluded at that time that a widening of the SDR's geographical and regional assumptions was likely to have significant implications for UK force structures, scale of effort benchmarks and the future equipment programme at the very least. Taken with the terms of reference set out by the MoD and the list of questions raised by the Secretary of State, this struck us as requiring a more fundamental reappraisal of the SDR than was implied by the phrase "a new chapter".[69] We see little reason to revise that judgement.

47. On 29 October 2001 the Secretary of State told the House "I would anticipate that we would be ready to publish conclusions in the spring of next year".[70] He told us that "I have set a fairly tight timetable because I do think it is important to conclude this work fairly speedily".[71] He also confirmed that it was his intention to publish an outline, in the early part of 2002 which "would enable people to react without committing ourselves to anything very specific."[72] We welcomed this promised document and the intention of proceeding in as open and inclusive a way as possible. Nonetheless we had some reservations over the practicality of this approach, given that the subject matter included questions over the role of special forces and the potential vulnerabilities of the UK homeland.[73]

The SDR New Chapter Discussion Paper

48. In February 2002 the MoD published the public discussion paper on the New Chapter with an even longer list of key questions (11) than that put to the Committee.[74] However, despite its title, the paper also clearly indicated the direction in which MoD thinking was going.

49. In the paper the MoD distinguished between actions to address the symptoms of terrorism and efforts to address the causes. Actions to address the symptoms of terrorism were listed under the headings of "coerce, disrupt and destroy". What they had in common was that each attempted by pre-emptive action to prevent an attack being launched. Actions to address the causes of terrorism came in two parts. Firstly there were efforts to prevent the conditions which allowed international terrorist organisations to develop. These included peace support operations in fragile states or regions and assistance with building up the capacity of states to act against international terrorists in their own country. Secondly there were steps that could be taken to—

Also included in this were efforts to deter and prevent the proliferation of chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear weapons and devices.

50. What these actions all had in common, whether they were to address the causes or the symptoms, was that they would be taken overseas. In other words the principal role of the Armed Forces was clearly still seen as being to participate in operations and tasks abroad, while by contrast "whatever its source, terrorist activity within the UK is criminal activity. The operational lead rests, in most cases, with the police".[76] As we observed in our report on Defence and Security in the UK, over the years since the end of the Cold War, there has been a significant shift in the Government's interpretation of how the Armed Forces should discharge their fundamental responsibility for the defence of the realm. This has occurred in response both to the changing nature of the military threat to the UK and to developments in the understanding of where the Armed Forces could most effectively make a contribution to the security of the UK.[77] The discussion paper did not, however, clarify the MoD's understanding of asymmetry and specifically how it related to existing doctrine. Similarly it left unclear how operations against asymmetric tactics might, in practice, be conducted.

The Consultation Process

51. At an invited seminar in Birmingham to discuss the SDR New Chapter in late February 2002, some of the emerging conclusions were aired with representatives of other government departments, opposition parties, the Muslim community, NGOs and the police, as well as academics.[78] It was attended by the Secretary of State, the Permanent Under Secretary and the Chief of the Defence Staff.[79] Although this event was the only one of its type undertaken during the consultation, it did provide an opportunity for the MoD to test out its thinking. This has been carried out more thoroughly by other departments such as DFID, who have carried out regional consultations in conjunction with the publication of recent White Papers; the MoD could learn from their example.

52. The Secretary of State told us—

In the event the discussion paper elicited 252 responses.[81] Whether the discussion paper and the seminar in Birmingham together constituted wide consultation outside government, as the MoD claimed,[82] remains questionable, although clearly an attempt was made.

53. The consultation process, however, was never intended to match the efforts made under the original SDR. As the Policy Director told us—

The Birmingham seminar, for example, with its select invitation list and limited distribution of its conclusions was very different from the process undertaken in the original SDR.[84]

54. In May 2002, following the end of the consultation period, in a speech at the National Liberal Club the Secretary of State indicated much of what was to emerge in the New Chapter White Paper. He emphasised though that the publication of that White Paper would not be the end of the process.[85] The three key themes of his speech were the balance between addressing the causes as against the symptoms of terrorism; the balance of the defence role in protecting the home and contributing to operations overseas; and the balance between operations to disrupt potential threats and those to stabilise conflict zones. On capabilities, the Secretary of State set out some preliminary thinking on the centrality of networked capabilities for future defence planning and the need for what he called, effects-based thinking.[86]

55. The drafting of the New Chapter was thus almost complete, although in the central area of planning for the use of reservists in homeland defence, the MoD decided to embark on a separate consultation process whose deadline was 13 September, well after the planned, and indeed actual, publication of the New Chapter.

56. The discussion document: A New Chapter to the Strategic Defence Review: The Role of the Reserves in Home Defence and Security was published on 12 June.[87] In setting the context for its proposals, the MoD stated—

Although it seemed odd to us that the New Chapter would reach conclusions on that issue while the MoD's proposals for the use of the reserves for home defence were still under consultation, the Policy Director saw no logical flaw in this order—

Curiously, in February the Secretary of State had told the House that consulting with reservists and their employers was scheduled for "the coming weeks".[90]

57. We understand the arguments for consulting reservists during their summer camps, although we doubt whether it was essential to do so. What is surprising is that the MoD had apparently not considered these arguments when the timetable for the New Chapter work was originally planned. The result has been to undermine the coherence of the process and to contribute to an overall impression that this work has in practice lost out to other MoD priorities. We believe that the two strands could have been better co-ordinated. Given the importance of the issues—which was demonstrated by the early energy and commitment to the process by the MoD—it is surprising that some of the momentum appeared to have been lost in the later stages.

58. Ministers and MoD officials also emphasised that publication of the New Chapter was not the end of the work they had set in hand. They pointed to the planned Defence White Paper of 2003 as a next stage in the evolution of policy. The Secretary of State told us in March 2003 that—

59. We conclude from this that the MoD is now engaged in a continuing process of reviewing defence policy, but believe it should be accompanied by appropriate consultation beyond the department. We expect to see the consequent developments in policy translated into practical results for the Armed Forces.

56 Q 545 and 564. Back

57 Geoffrey Hoon, speech to Labour Party conference, 2 October 2001. Back

58 Q 568 Back

59 Q 564 Back

60 Q 27 and Ev 8 Back

61 Qq 14, 15 Back

62 Ev 8 Back

63 Q 1 Back

64 Q 27 Back

65 HC Deb, 4 October 2001, col 809-810. Back

66 HC (2001-02) 348-II, Q 261. Back

67 Ibid. Back