Implications for Force Structures
115. One effect on defence policy that the New
Chapter highlights would be the closer integration between military
and civil agencies and the consideration given to the particular
role of the Armed Forces in countering terrorist threats.[200]
As the Secretary of State pointed out, "neither the Government
nor the MoD believes that there is a specific military solution
to the wide ranging problems of international terrorism".
Many government agencies would be involved, particularly intelligence
and law enforcement agencies, and while "countering international
terrorism fitted well with the trends identified by the SDR",
UK Armed Forces, "did not need fundamentally to restructure",
though "we needed to do more of some things and to do some
things better".[201]
Military force, the Secretary of State told us, is only one of
the different mechanisms available to Government to counter terrorism,
"and indeed may well come a long way down the track having
used diplomatic, political and perhaps economic means in order
to try and deal with the threat".[202]
116. An aspect of the original SDR which the
Secretary of State re-emphasised was that in using the Armed Forces
to counter terrorist threats—
we are likely to be much better off going to
deal with the threat at source rather than waiting for the threat
to arrive in the United Kingdom and trying to fend it off at the
last stage…in truth, our judgement would be that an expeditionary
capability to the source of the threat would be much more likely
to deal with it.
This general orientation "runs through the work
we have done on the New Chapter",[203]
but it may imply a larger commitment in the future than the Secretary
of State indicated. At the Royal Institute of International Affairs,
he asserted that "while the original assumptions [of the
SDR] were correct in terms of prioritising regional threats, the
global nature of terrorism means that we have to operate now outside
them".[204]
As he told the Committee—"the attempt to delineate
in the future where threats might arise is going to be even more
difficult than it ever was…a threat could come from any quarter
of the world and we have to be in a position to deal with it".[205]
117. Countering terrorism in a way more integrated
with other government departments, as far forward as possible,
and in a situation where the threat could arise from anywhere
in the world, would certainly require the Armed Forces to operate
with greater "agility".[206]
This is because "targets are likely to be fleeting, once
again setting a premium on rapid small, or medium-scale deployments
supported by effective intelligence"[207]
and this may imply "using the Armed Forces in a whole range
of different ways, more flexible, more agile…not assuming
that that necessarily always leads to a large-scale engagement
by British forces [which] leads to the need for smaller, more
discrete, more mobile, more agile forces".[208]
118. The Chief of the Defence Staff also told
us—
We need to watch the balance of commitments against
the resources…that is why we try very hard when we get involved
in operations to complete them in an expeditious way and pull
out as soon as we sensibly can…the brilliant operation…in
Macedonia last August was a very good example of that and likewise
in our operation in Kabul when we actually ran the first of the
ISAF operations…[209]
Overall, therefore, the MoD's approach appears
to be that the UK's Armed Forces should primarily be involved
at the start and at the end of operations, offering agile expeditionary
forces which can change their operational focus very quickly.
So far, however, the Committee has little indication of what
specific choices and trade-offs are likely to be involved in this
process which, the MoD insists, is underway but still at a relatively
early stage.[210]
119. Furthermore, this requires forces which
are even more adaptable than those which the UK possesses at present.
The New Chapter gives few clues on how this change is to be achieved.
What was constantly emphasised to us by the MoD was that it was
not simply a matter of numbers but that the focus needed to be
on key enablers—the specialist personnel vital for expeditionary
operations. As the Secretary of State told us—
We are not talking about numbers per se,
we are talking about having people trained and organised to do
particular jobs. It is the jobs which are crucial. It may well
be the case in terms of the results and the activity that those
people engage in that you could perfectly well contemplate carrying
[them] out with a different number of people.[211]
In the New Chapter itself, this suggestion of not
needing to focus on numbers alone is, however, followed by a discussion
on people in which it is acknowledged that Britain's service men
and women have been "working at or near, and in some cases
beyond, the boundaries of what was planned in the SDR for some
considerable time now".[212]
120. But logically this implies a need either
for fewer missions or for more people. Since the original
SDR was produced in 1998, the MoD has found that concurrent small
operations have been an unexpected strain on manpower and resources
and this has undermined the SDR's assumptions on the number of
operations that are sustainable.[213]
Multiple small operations place a greater relative strain on resources,
through the need to duplicate logistics chains, rotate forces
more frequently in ways that interfere with normal training cycles,
and put particular strains on specialist units and individuals.[214]
121. Furthermore, many of the people who are
essential to every operation are also essential to enable training
to take place. And in many respects training, especially overseas
exercises, can be more demanding than some operations because
of the need for planners, an enemy, a control net, safety staff
etc. Thus, many people are caught in a double bind of being essential
for operations and then on return, essential for training. More
smaller operations obviously make this situation worse for these
key people. In the case of the Army, the need to bring units up
to war establishment means raiding units that should be training
for individuals to make up the numbers and skills. This erodes
the quality of training in units that should be training because
numbers are down and key personnel are missing. The Chief of Defence
Staff, acknowledging the problem, told us that—
We have had to draw down on our exercises because
of the pressures in going to Afghanistan…We must try to make
sure that we measure very carefully where our people our falling
behind in their training schedules and try to make room in the
programme without further wrecking their quality of life.[215]
122. The New Chapter was careful not to suggest
that personnel should now simply be asked to do even more.[216]
Admitting that fully manned and sustainable structures are proving
elusive, the New Chapter identified individuals in the most heavily
used specialisms as critical for the success of its approach.
It also noted the increasing use of reservists, civilians and
contractors in operational deployments as a trend likely to continue.
But, in a move which could exacerbate rather than alleviate the
pressure, the Secretary of State showed interest in ideas for
developing more agile forces from large numbers of existing formations
(not just key enablers)—
I think we need to develop more of those skills
across more of our armed forces, in the light of the threat that
we currently have to deal with. I think that is one of the things
that we shall look at very hard in the course of the work we are
currently undertaking, to have more of our forces available at
short notice…I think one of the preliminary assumptions that
I have is that we are going to have to have more people available
at short periods of notice…[217]
He envisaged that perhaps more troops like the Parachute
Regiment and the Royal Marines might be needed in the future—
…one of the things we need to look at very
carefully is whether we have enough of these kinds of people,
whether we need to extend the training and readiness requirements
to other sharp end members of the Armed Services.[218]
123. The problem is that what the MoD hopes will
be small operations do not always turn out that way and many do
not remain of short-duration. Even if large numbers of troops
are withdrawn from operations the key enablers may often be left
deployed because their functions still need to be carried out
even if there are fewer troops deployed. In sum, the MoD has
not addressed the risk of over-commitment leading to overstretch.
The Committee believes that these issues need to be urgently considered
by the MoD in an open and inclusive manner.
124. Unusually, Special Forces also merited a
mention in the New Chapter. In November 2001 the Secretary of
State had told us that "I am not commenting on special forces",[219]
but in the New Chapter, Special Forces were identified as a key
capability that would be receiving extra resources to maximise
their utility and flexibility. The Secretary of State publicly
added—
There will also be an increasing role for the
use of the Special Forces in the present environment…we are
also involved in upgrading capabilities in this area.[220]
But no structural changes to how they operate with
other high-readiness forces was proposed. On the prospect of a
Special Forces Command, for example, the MoD merely noted that—
Following our analysis, it was decided there would
be no operational benefit in changing present arrangements [for
special forces command structures]. Improving arrangements for
the integration of Special, and other Forces, into the JRRF [Joint
Rapid Reaction Force] have been implemented as a result of the
New Chapter work and lessons learned during recent operations.[221]
125. The MoD has made it clear that it does not
anticipate any major changes in UK force structures, over and
above those already set in train by the original SDR, as a result
of the circumstances identified in the New Chapter. The problems
of overstretch, however, are still significant and may be exacerbated
by developments foreshadowed in the New Chapter. The Secretary
of State stressed that in modern conditions the "straight"
numbers of personnel available were less important than the effect
they would be able to exert—
I do not think there is any particular magic
in any given figure, it is what those people are trained to do…It
is a very different sort of challenge and I think one that is
quite fundamental.[222]
He went on, "The problem of overstretch in that
sense is not a problem of numbers of infantry, it is a problem
of enablers, a problem of all those who have to support deployed
forces".[223]
The Chief of the Defence Staff confirmed the importance that was
attached to this particular exercise in "the rebalancing
process"—
We are very much in the process of seeing how
we actually put more emphasis into something…enablers in
particular, and where there are areas in the programmes which
are not so important…but that is something that we are actually
still undergoing at the moment.[224]
126. On the basis of the evidence, we remain
to be convinced that implementing the New Chapter will not put
further strain on the UK's Armed Forces, particularly in those
branches that serve as "key enablers" to greater combat
effectiveness in an era of rapid technological transformation.
The MoD's emphasis on the more sophisticated demands of "effects-based
operations" and its adoption of "network-enabled capabilities"
as primarily a skills and training requirement more than a technological
system means that more will be expected of our Service personnel
at a time when the private sector offers attractive rewards to
those so trained and motivated.[225]
The New Chapter and the Spending
Review
127. The 2002 Spending Review, published around
the same time as the New Chapter, announced a 3.8% increase in
MoD's Departmental Expenditure Limit (DEL), which it presented
as an average annual real terms increase of 1.2% over three years
of the Review period. The table below summarises the Spending
Review figures.
| |
2002-03
| 2003-04
| 2004-05
| 2005-06
|
| Resource DEL[226]
| £31,376m | £33,016m
| £33,755m | £34,690m
|
| Capital DEL[227]
| £5,549m | £6,009m
| £6,327m | £6,880m
|
| Total DEL[228]
| £29,326m | £30,921m
| £31,756m | £32,779m
|
These included a 2.7% real terms increase in 'Resource' DEL, but
a 15% real terms increase in Capital DEL—from £5.5
billion in 2002-03 to £6.9 billion by 2005-06:
| Year-on-year increases in real terms[229]
|
| | 2003-04
| 2004-05
| 2005-06
| 2002/3-2005/6
|
| Resource DEL | 2.7%
| -0.2% | 0.2%
| 2.7% |
| Capital DEL | 5.6%
| 2.7% | 6.1%
| 15.2% |
| Total DEL | 2.9%
| 0.2% | 0.7%
| 3.8% |
Cm 5570 Her Majesty's Treasury
128. Specific equipment enhancements[230]
and other works announced in the New Chapter (see below) have
relatively modest price tags, when compared with the £1,600
million (in real terms) added to the capital budgets for the three
years of the Spending Review. Indeed, the New Chapter stated that
"the scale of operations to counter terrorism is unlikely
to be large, so only relatively small quantities of the new specialised
equipment are likely to be needed".[231]
When we questioned our MoD witnesses on this last October, they
were unable to provide details of the Equipment Programme, which
was then being put together. Quoting from the Secretary of State,
however, they noted that the New Chapter "means being prepared
to take a hard look at other areas which no longer add capability
in the way they once did, and to prioritise in favour of critical
capabilities".[232]
| Watchkeeper UAVs (to bring its in-service date forward 2 years)
| £50m |
| Joint-service UAV Operational Development Unit
| £60-£70m |
| New mission console for E3-D AWACS | £5m
|
| Linking 'Air Surveillance and Control System' to civil airfield radars
| £20m |
| Upgrading RAF stations to take Quick Reaction Alert aircraft
| £5m |
Ev 4
129. The results of the Spending Review were described as—
[providing] for substantial new investment in the SDR New
Chapter. This will provide our Armed Forces with the latest technology
and network centric capabilities, enabling them to act together
with our allies in the war against international terrorism and
to achieve greater precision and control of military operations.
It will enable our Armed Forces to continue to achieve success
in the tasks they undertake now and will enable them to respond
to the range of contingencies envisaged in the SDR.[233]
However, the link between the Spending Review and the New Chapter
remains unclear. The MoD has yet to set out how the significant
increase in the capital budget will be used to reshape the MoD's
equipment and infrastructure to reflect the capabilities highlighted
in the New Chapter, or indeed to what extent the Spending Review
addresses such new requirements rather than rectifying existing
and long-standing deficiencies. We will be examining equipment
funding issues further as part of our inquiry of defence procurement.
More generally, however, we expect the MoD to set out—in
its response to this report, or at the latest in the forthcoming
White Paper—how the Spending Review settlement will be utilised
to secure New Chapter and other capabilities, to address existing
strains on Armed Forces personnel and to enable the tempo of operations
implied by the New Chapter.
Policy versus Practicality
130. While the New Chapter has addressed some of the policy
questions left unanswered by the original SDR, notably the role
of the Reserves in home defence and the implications of network-centric
capabilities for Britain's Armed Forces, it is not clear how
those policy conclusions have been matched with practical effect
such as changes in force structures or equipment programmes.
Indeed, MoD has argued that the lack of such changes reflects
the robustness of the original SDR framework. The Policy Director
read out to the Committee a letter from the Secretary of State
dated 11 October 2001—
The New Chapter made clear the Strategic Defence Review provided
a firm foundation on which to build in our response to the challenges
we now face after September 11. At the same time the additional
resources made available in the Spending Review provided a mandate
for accelerating the modernisation and evolution of the armed
forces and for investing in new technologies.[234]
131. The Secretary of State has since gone even further in
articulating a radical agenda for the future of Britain's Armed
Forces, most notably in a speech in March 2003 when he spoke of
radical changes being required in the areas of equipment and force
structures.
We must be prepared to take difficult decisions to rebalance
our force structures…We should expect the Armed Forces of
the future to be radically different to those we possess today,
indeed we must demand that they are.[235]
132. We are not persuaded that the robustness of
the original SDR is the reason for the modest practical changes
to date. We have the impression that too often the practical implications
of the policy developments set out in the New Chapter have not
been properly thought through. To date virtually all the equipment
programmes which have been linked with the New Chapter have been
existing programmes, which in a few cases the department has said
are being accelerated. We are concerned that this suggests the
policy making process and the ability to deliver the implementation
of that process quickly enough are out of step with each other,
or that the MoD has scaled back its practical ambition from the
vision set out by the early stages of the New Chapter work.
168
HC Deb, 18 July 2002, col 462. Back
169
SDR NC Vol 1, p 15. Back
170
National Audit Office, Ministry of Defence, Major Projects
Report 2002, Session 2002-03, HC 91, pp 49-53. Back
171
HC (2002-03) 91, pp 117-122; MoD Press Notice 037/03, 19 February
2003. Back
172
HC (2002-03) 91, pp 157-158. Back
173
The UK currently only deploys TLAM on submarines. Back
174
HC (2002-03) 91, pp 79-84. Back
175
SDR NC Vol II, paras 49-51. Back
176
Ev 4 Back
177
Ev 4 Back
178
Ev 5 Back
179
SDR NC Vol I, para 52. Back
180
Ev 4 Back
181
Q 711 Back
182
Q 38, Q 208 Back
183
Ev 4; Q 17, Q 56 Back
184
HC Deb, 18 July 2002, col 462. Back
185
Ev 4; SDR NC Vol I, p17, Q 56 Back
186
SDR NC Vol I, para 48. Back
187
HC Deb ,7 February 2003, col 21WS. Back
188
Ibid Back
189
Q 700 Back
190
Q 64 Back
191
Q 58 Back
192
Q 58 Back
193
HC (1999-2000) 347-I, paras 162-164. Back
194
Q 58 Back
195
Q 701 Back
196
Q 143 Back
197
Q 151 Back
198
Q 533 Back
199
Q 533 Back
200
SDR NC Vol I, paras 5-8. Back
201
Q 624 Back
202
Q 683 Back
203
Q 674, SDR NC Vol I, para 26. Back
204
Speech by Secretary of State, Chatham House, 10 March 2003. Back
205
Q 634 Back
206
Q 8, Q 11, Q 685, Speech by Secretary of State, Chatham House,
10 March 2003. Back
207
Speech by Secretary of State, Chatham House, 10 March 2003. Back
208
Q 685 Back
209
Q 137 Back
210
Q 8 Back
211
Q 642 Back
212
SDR NC Vol I, para 61. Back
213
See Chapter 2 on the Original SDR above. Back
214
SDR NC Vol I, paras 31-32. Back
215
Q 138 Back
216
SDR NC Vol I, pp.19-20. Back
217
HC (2001-02) 348-II, Q 346. Back
218
HC (2001-02) 348-II, Q 364. Back
219
HC (2001-02) 348-I, Q 345. Back
220
Secretary of State, speech to RUSI, 30 July 2002. Back
221
Ev 3 Back
222
Q 642 Back
223
Q 651 Back
224
Q 169 Back
225
Qq 642, 644 Back
226
'Resource DEL' (i.e. operating costs), a control figure
for departments. Back
227
'Capital DEL' (i.e. new capital investment), a control
figure for departments. Back
228
'Total Spending' or 'Total DEL', comprises Resource
DEL plus Capital DEL, less the capital depreciation element in
Resource DEL (to avoid double-counting asset consumption costs).
This is the main control figure. Back
229
Assuming inflation over the period of 2.5% pa. Back
230
Ev 4 Back
231
SDR NC Vol I, para 93. Back
232
Q 40 Back
233
HM Treasury, 2002 Spending Review, Cm 5570, July 2002,
para 12.1. Back
234
Q 40 Back
235
Speech by Secretary of State, Chatham House, 10 March 2003. Back
