CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Producing the New Chapter
1. We concluded in December 2001 that a widening
of the SDR's geographical and regional assumptions was likely
to have significant implications for UK force structures, scale
of effort benchmarks and the future equipment programme at the
very least. Taken with the terms of reference for the New Chapter
work set out by the MoD and the list of questions raised by the
Secretary of State, this struck us as requiring a more fundamental
reappraisal of the SDR than was implied by the phrase "a
new chapter". We see little reason to revise that judgement.
(Paragraph 46)
2. The discussion paper of February 2002 did
not clarify the MoD's understanding of asymmetry and specifically
how it related to existing doctrine. Similarly it left unclear
how operations against asymmetric tactics might, in practice,
be conducted. (Paragraph 50)
3. We understand the arguments for consulting
reservists during their summer camps, although we doubt whether
it was essential to do so. What is surprising is that the MoD
had apparently not considered these arguments when the timetable
for the New Chapter work was originally planned. The result has
been to undermine the coherence of the process and to contribute
to an overall impression that this work has in practice lost out
to other MoD priorities. We believe that the two strands could
have been better co-ordinated. Given the importance of the issues—which
was demonstrated by the early energy and commitment to the process
by the MoD—it is surprising that some of the momentum appeared
to have been lost in the later stages. (Paragraph 57)
4. We conclude that the MoD is now engaged in
a continuing process of reviewing defence policy, but believe
it should be accompanied by appropriate consultation beyond the
department. We expect to see the consequent developments in policy
translated into practical results for the Armed Forces. (Paragraph
59)
Policy Framework
5. The New Chapter represents a relatively modest
development of policy, potentially one so modest that it will
not require any change to doctrine. Other concepts, however, may
be more significant. One of these is asymmetry, not a new concept
but one upon which a striking new light was thrown by the events
of 11 September. (Paragraph 66)
6. We regret that the document Joint Vision
is classified, given its key role in setting out the MoD's
understanding of the nature of asymmetry. In the context of the
war on terrorism, which involves a great many other agencies and
outside bodies, its necessarily restricted circulation may reduce
its effectiveness in disseminating the Armed Forces' understanding
of the conceptual basis of the war on terror and how they see
their part in it. (Paragraph 68)
Home versus Away
7. That "significant place" for the
task of home defence and security translates in the New Chapter
only into measures to improve liaison between the civil and military
authorities with what is described as a "clearer role"
for Headquarters, Commander-in-Chief, Land Forces, as the principal
focus for the provision of military assistance to civil authorities,
joint regional liaison officers, and more staff in regional Brigade
regions. However, in respect of military assistance to the civil
authorities the New Chapter does not contemplate a greater role
for the regular Armed Forces. Rather, it concludes that "there
is a greater role for the reserves to play". The SDR New
Chapter's assessment of the balance between home and away operations
is qualified by the fact that the consultation period on the MoD's
proposals for a role for the Reserves in home defence extended
beyond the publication of the New Chapter in July 2002. What has
emerged therefore has the character of a steady and rather modest
evolution of the doctrine of fighting at distance that was explicitly
articulated in the original SDR. (Paragraph 72)
8. We welcome the establishment of the Civil
Contingency Reaction Forces, but remain concerned that the present
approach to their deployment runs the risk of developing a capability
which will then not be used other than when all regular resources
are already committed and that this may in turn have a damaging
effect on the morale of those who have volunteered and trained
for the new CCRFs. (Paragraph 78)
9. We regret that the MoD has not taken the opportunity
afforded by the New Chapter process to think more innovatively
about supporting home defence. We are also concerned that only
an interim communications system will be available for their first
three years. We do not believe that the MoD has adequately established
the appropriate balance between operations at home and away, an
issue that we believe is at the centre of the New Chapter process.
(Paragraph 79)
10. If the CCRFs are to be the predictable element
for the civil authorities (even if the regulars are likely to
be the first to be called upon), the concerns we raised in our
Defence and Security in the UK report remain valid. The
MoD's list of possible tasks for the Reaction Forces includes
"reconnaissance, assistance with mass casualties, site search
and clearance, transport and communications, the operation of
water and feeding points, control and co-ordination functions,
access control, the control of movement of large numbers of the
public, guarding or other tasks at the request of the civil police".
Some of these clearly require more specialist skills and training
than others. We are concerned that accurate data on the numbers
recruited, their skills and their availability for call out are
still to be provided. (Paragraph 85)
11. We are also concerned that too little thought
has gone into the implications of the establishment of the CCRFs
in each region for the normal activities of the volunteer Reserve
nationally. (Paragraph 86)
12. We seek assurances from the MoD in their
reply to this report that the Fit For Role figures for the CCRF
elements in each brigade region will not be the same as for the
volunteer Reserves as a whole. (Paragraph 86)
13. Overall, we have seen little evidence that
the MoD has taken seriously the need to rethink the capacity of
the Armed Forces to provide predictable support to the task of
home defence in the event of a mass-effect terrorist attack in
the UK. (Paragraph 87)
The War on Terror and Military Transformation
14. For the UK the key challenge raised by the
revolution in military affairs is to monitor accurately how the
process is altering the structure and operations of US forces,
since they serve as the prototype for all the technical trends
in new methods of warfare. The MoD also has to assess the advantages
and disadvantages that the UK possesses in these regards and balance
them against what is firstly feasible and affordable in the evolution
of UK forces for the future, and secondly is consistent with the
principles set out in the SDR New Chapter (Paragraph 91)
15. We believe that the doctrinal basis for embracing
network enabling technologies needs to be rigorous and clearly
understood if the benefits of the network are to be realised by
the UK Armed Forces. (Paragraph 97)
16. We are concerned at the risks created by
the potential vulnerabilities of "transformed" military
forces and that they may act as a constraint on progress towards
realising the full benefits of network-enabled capability. However,
in the face of such vulnerabilities, the UK's cautious approach
has potential advantages. (Paragraph 101)
17. We accept that the UK now has a reasonably
efficient structure to develop and embed doctrines at the various
appropriate levels, and translate them into training regimes.
We are still concerned, however, that the political and technical
novelty of the developments the Secretary of State has outlined,
and which other witnesses have elaborated, have taken some time
to be addressed in a doctrinal context. Relevant work is clearly
underway, but so are the evolving tactics of potential terrorists
and those who would employ asymmetric tactics against the UK and
our Armed Forces. (Paragraph 105)
Equipment and Force Structures
18. The MoD's declared determination to "make
sure we really do keep our forces equipped with the most up-to-date
technology" does not sit with the lack of urgency in acquiring
an effective networked UAV capability. The Secretary of State
told us that: "What we want to ensure is that the next generation
[of UAVs] available to the United Kingdom provides us with useful
capabilities at the best price for the British taxpayer".
It is surely not too much to hope that an effective capability
will be available to the Armed Forces of this generation of taxpayers.
(Paragraph 112)
19. The Committee has seen little evidence of
the urgency that the MoD has claimed to be devoting to acquiring
new capabilities and embracing new technologies—it appears
so far at least that pragmatic decision-making is also slow decision-making.
(Paragraph 113)
20. It remains to be seen whether present equipment
programmes, and the pragmatic adjustments that the MoD is still
considering, will be sufficient to allow UK Armed Forces to fulfil
the realistic but demanding scenarios which will be most relevant
in our military relationship with the United States. (Paragraph
114)
21. The MoD has not addressed the risk of over-commitment
leading to over-stretch in the New Chapter. The Committee believes
that these issues need to be urgently considered by the MoD in
an open and inclusive manner. (Paragraph 123)
22. On the basis of the evidence, we remain to
be convinced that implementing the New Chapter will not put further
strain on the UK's Armed Forces, particularly in those branches
that serve as "key enablers" to greater combat effectiveness
in an era of rapid technological transformation. (Paragraph 126)
The New Chapter and the Spending Review
23. The link between the Spending Review and
the New Chapter remains unclear. The MoD has yet to set out how
the significant increase in the capital budget will be used to
reshape the MoD's equipment and infrastructure to reflect the
capabilities highlighted in the New Chapter, or indeed to what
extent the Spending Review addresses such new requirements rather
than rectifying existing and long-standing deficiencies. (Paragraph
129)
24. We expect the MoD to set out—in its
response to this report, or at the latest in the forthcoming White
Paper—how the Spending Review settlement will be utilised
to secure New Chapter and other capabilities, to address existing
strains on Armed Forces personnel and to enable the tempo of operations
implied by the New Chapter. (Paragraph 129)
Policy versus Practicality
25. We are not persuaded that the robustness
of the original SDR is the reason for the modest practical changes
to date. We have the impression that too often the practical implications
of the policy developments set out in the New Chapter have not
been properly thought through. To date virtually all the equipment
programmes which have been linked with the New Chapter have been
existing programmes, which in a few cases the department has said
are being accelerated. We are concerned that this suggests the
policy making process and the ability to deliver the implementation
of that process quickly enough are out of step with each other,
or that the MoD has scaled back its practical ambition from the
vision set out by the early stages of the New Chapter work. (Paragraph
132)
New Warfare and the Allies
26. The level of consultation with allies during
the New Chapter work may be regarded as something less than close
interaction since the discussion document of 14 February was produced
for general public, rather than detailed private, discussion.
(Paragraph 134)
27. The Government should recognise the potential
impact it can have both in providing a model of efficient US-UK
technical and doctrinal co-operation, and in helping influence
other European allies to embrace the implications of new trends
in warfare. We are not so far convinced that the MoD appreciates
the potential implications of this role, or is yet prepared for
the efforts it would require. (Paragraph 136)
Legal Aspects
28. We welcome the MoD's assurances that UK military
operations will always be conducted in accordance with international
law. It is of fundamental importance that our Armed Forces can
be confident, whenever we call upon them, that they are operating
on the basis of, and within, applicable international law. (Paragraph
142)
| 
