APPENDIX 6
Memorandum submitted by Professor Sir
Adam Roberts (28 October 2002)[67]
1. This memorandum is a short response in
note form to The Strategic Defence Review: A New Chapter, July
2002 (Cm 5566 vols. I and II). I had a very minor involvement
in the process that led to this document in the form of participation
in a seminar at Birmingham University on 28 February 2002. Some
points below reflect issues I raised there.
2. I strongly support the government's emphasis
on the importance of addressing international terrorism, and on
the necessity of taking the new terrorist threats into account
in considering the UK's defence posture and plans. The New Chapter
is a key part of this, and there is much in it to commend. However
it may be more useful if in these short notes I concentrate on
possible lines of criticism.
3. Goal of UK policy. The New Chapter (pp
4 and 7) strongly reflects the view that the goal of the Government's
efforts is "to eliminate terrorism as a force in international
affairs". This is a carefully thought-out phrase, and of
course it is properly recognized that "countering terrorism
is usually a long-term business" (p.10). Nonetheless, I have
two main reservations about proclaiming this as a goal:
(a) Terrorism is notoriously difficult to
"eliminate". One of the strongest arguments against
terrorism is precisely that, once started, it easily becomes endemic.
The experience of it in the Middle East, Latin America, and Ireland
confirms how, after it has been taken up in one cause, it gets
adopted by others, and by splinter-groups; and how difficult it
is to reach a definitive end to terrorist activities. The unofficial,
decentralized, and hydra-headed character of terrorism provides
the main explanation for the difficulty of eliminating it.
(b) If "elimination" is the proclaimed
goal, then every subsequent terrorist incident represents a victory
for the terrorists. In our own UK experience we faced this problem
in Northern Ireland. A number of government pronouncements in
the 1970s and early 1980s had indicated the UK's aim was the complete
ending of terrorist activity. Thereafter, every terrorist assault,
including the IRA's mainland campaign, had a possible added bonus
of "proving" that the government had failed to achieve
its proclaimed goal. Eventually the UK's aims were re-stated in
more modest terms as being the reduction of terrorist activities.
It therefore seems to me desirable to find a
choice of words to describe the overall policy with regard to
terrorism that convey its toughness but do not rely so heavily
on the idea of complete elimination. The core idea has to be a
vigorous and sustained countering of terrorist threats, involving
action at many levels, and aimed at achieving a significant reduction
of terrorist activities.
4. Potential of Terrorism for Strategic
Effect. In several passages the New Chapter states or implies
that international terrorist attacks have "the potential
for strategic effect" (p 7). There is an important distinction
to be made here between intended and actual strategic effect.
Terrorist actions frequently have huge effects, but they are very
seldom those that the terrorists intended. Sometimes terrorist
actions lead to public revulsion against the terrorists; to the
isolation of terrorist groups; to vigorous political or military
campaigns against the terrorists; or to the outbreak of international
wars, as in Europe in 1914 and the Lebanon in 1982. These are
all strategic effects, but not necessarily intended ones. This
point is important because the UK should not be seen to give terrorists
more credit than they deserve either for the accuracy of their
political calculations or the effectiveness of their actions.
We should not feed the central delusion of most terrorist movements
and individuals, namely that a spectacular act of political violence
will transform the political landscape in the manner sought by
terrorists.
5. Is it best to engage an enemy at longer
range? A central argument of the New Chapter is stated clearly:
"Experience shows that it is better where possible to engage
an enemy at longer range, before they get the opportunity to mount
an assault on the UK." (p 9.) This argument is very attractive,
but two serious limitations should be noted:
(a) It presents a false choice. However desirable
it may be to engage the enemy at longer range, there is no substitute
for defensive anti-terrorist and counter-terrorist activities.
The astonishing casualness of US airport security before 11 September
2001 illustrates the point.
(b) The history of counter-terrorist operations
suggests no such clear conclusion. Many counter-terrorist campaigns
have been successfully conducted with only limited capacity to
engage the enemy at longer range. The protracted campaign in Malaya
after 1948 against Communist Terrorists supported (after 1949)
by the People's Republic of China is one case in which geographical
restraint had to be exercised and was not crippling. Likewise
the conduct of UK operations in Northern Ireland has operated
under certain obvious and important constraints. Contrariwise,
some counter-terrorist operations that have aimed at attacking
what is believed to be the source of terrorist attacks have ended
in disaster: the Austrian attack on the terrorist "hornet"s
nest" in Serbia in 1914, and the Israeli invasion of Lebanon
in 1982.
6. The right to take action in face of imminent
attack. The New Chapter states: "It should be clear that
legally the right to self-defence includes the possibility of
action in the face of an imminent attack." (p 12.) This is
a proper reminder that existing international customary law does
encompass a degree of recognition of such action. However in certain
cases it may be very difficult indeed to prove to a sceptical
international audience, or to the UK public, that a particular
threat is imminent. In some recent statements of the US administration
there have been indications of trying to fit Iraq into this framework.
The nature of the threat posed by certain regimes
(such as that in Iraq) or by certain terrorist organizations may
not be exactly one of "imminent attack", but rather
one of representing a serious and long-term threat. The new White
House publication, The National Security Strategy of the United
States of America (September 2002), does recognise this point,
including in President Bush's covering letter of 17 September
2002. That type of threat, on which existing international law
relating to the use of force is somewhat less forthcoming, needs
to be addressed. An important part of the answer has to be that
in such cases the focus should, if possible, be on securing a
consensus within the UN Security Council.
7. Observance of the laws of war. The New
Chapter rightly states: "We have made it clear that our responses
will be proportionate and in accord with our international legal
obligations." (p 12.) It also states that "it is important
that the conduct of military action is in accordance with our
obligations under international humanitarian law". (Vol.
II, p 16. The term "international humanitarian law"
is quite widely used as a near-synonym for the laws of war.) These
statements are necessary but of course are bland and lacking in
specificity. Issues relating to the application of international
humanitarian norms are particularly salient because so far, in
the course of the war on terror, there has been an unusual and
worrying degree of tension between humanitarian organizations
on the one hand and the leading members of the Coalition on the
other.
In the paper that I have supplied separately,
"The Laws of War in the War on Terror", I have identified
certain issues that do need specific attention because of the
circumstances of the war on terror. These issues include the harmonization
of practices among allies generally, especially because they are
not all bound by the same treaties; the different interpretations
of contemporary rules on targeting; the need to press local allies
(eg the Northern Alliance in Afghanistan) to observe fundamental
legal norms; the legal status of detainees, and whether they qualify
as Prisoners of War; the prosecution of terrorists and others;
and whether any revision or adaptation of the laws of war is needed
to reflect the realities of the "war on terror".
A perception that the states involved in a coalition
are observing basic international standards may contribute to
public support for military operations within the member states;
support (or at least tacit consent) from other states for coalition
operations; and avoidance of disputes within and between coalition
member states. In short, there can be strong prudential considerations
(not necessarily dependent on reciprocity in observance of the
law by all the parties to a war) which militate in favour of observing
the laws of war.
67 My job is Montague Burton Professor of International
Relations at Oxford University. I have written extensively on
the laws of war, on strategic issues, on terrorism, and on wars
and military occupations in the Middle East. My principal recent
publication relevant to this memorandum is (co-edited with Richard
Guelff), Documents on the Laws of War, 3rd edition, Oxford
University Press, 2000. Back
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