APPENDIX 10
Letter from Ministry of Defence to Committee
Specialist summarising key points of Birmingham Seminar 28 February
2002[191]
DEFINITION OF
TERRORISM: INTERNATIONAL
LAW
— There is no unique blueprint for
dealing with international terrorism, nor a simple definition
of international terrorism.
— War on terrorism is not necessarily
a helpful term and the elimination of terrorism is not a realistic
objective. Need to drive level of violence down to a level where
it is no longer having a political effect.
— Laws of war are not well suited to
counter terrorist operations.
— Threshold of terrorism has risen.
Terrorism could be described as a franchise. It has become increasingly
more difficult to define the loosely grouped disparate organisations.
— While we should not limit our ability
to act, we must maintain principle of acting in accordance to
international law. To win hearts and minds we need to be sure
we do not provide a recruiting sergeant for the terrorists. Clear
usable evidence is the key to legal base.
— A definition of terrorism is needed
for international mechanisms dealing with these acts; no state
wishes to be perceived as the "world's policeman" or
acting unilaterally. It will also be useful in maintaining coalitions.
— Pre-emptive action—and particularly
a series of pre-emptive actions—is likely to create serious
difficulties for coalition cohesion. We cannot be dogmatic in
pursuing pre-emptive action: a case by case analysis will be required
before any action is undertaken.
— The issue of host nation consent
needs to be addressed.
— There is a need to disconnect domestic
law enforcement and international law such as self defence.
APPROACH TO
CAMPAIGN AGAINST
TERRORISM: SYMPTOMS
AND CAUSES
— The strength of the SDR lies in its
treatment of causes and symptoms. Acceptance of need to do both.
— Elements of Arab/Muslim view: as
yet no evidence has been proffered in any court of law to substantiate
the allegations made against AQ; US activity is dictated by its
interest in oil; US carried out these attacks in order to justify
their actions in Afghanistan and therefore secure a presence in
Central Asia. The Arab/Muslim world is still colonised by Europe
and dominated by the US; no serious effort on MEPP front/double
standards.
— A greater understanding of the Muslim
world and their underlying religious principles is needed.
— Should also be putting more resources
into special constabulary.
— Reserve forces are stretched and
there are some limits on footprint. While willing to help we just
may not be able to. Current employer support is on the basis of
current contract. Their views will have to be heard if there is
to be a fundamental review of the TA.
— Regional views differ on roles of
Reserves. In North-West there is more enthusiasm for home roles;
in South-West more enthusiasm for overseas deployments.
— TA would not be very enamoured with
idea of guarding key points. There used to be a separate Home
Service Force for that.
— Should not be relying on reservists
for things as crucial as intelligence or medical assets. Public
would support the additional resources for this.
AQ OBJECTIVES
— Not clear to what extent AQ had foreseen,
and intended, the consequences of 11 September. One assessment:
AQ have a 25-year strategy to get the US out of the Gulf and Israel
and install a new regime in Saudi Arabia. Wanted a strong US reaction
leading to greater engagement in South East and Central Asia,
leading in turn to a greater counter reaction and more terrorists/support
of terrorism.
— However, room for doubt that the
attacks were so well thought through eg AQ might have assumed
that the US would be more heavily engaged and their presence in
Afghanistan more long term. May not have expected that the US
would essentially take the side of the Northern Alliance. They
also probably did not foresee changes in Russia and Pakistan,
or strength of coalition.
— AQ have made the mistake of making
itself a strategic threat.
— Six months on things look good from
US perspective. Taleban gone. AQ capability lessened.
— But AQ do have a long term view:
have pursued objectives over 10 years; still early days as far
as they are concerned.
BATTLE FOR
HEARTS AND
MINDS
— Al Jazeera and the Internet are shaping
youthful Arab/Muslim opinion. AQ manipulating this medium effectively.
The West/UK does not seem effectively engaged in communicating
its case. Losing battle for hearts and minds.
— Campaign against terrorism is not
an attack on the Muslim/Arab world: we need to get this message
across.
— A superpower to some extent will
always attract opposition from the disaffected.
— Information technology has changed
the terms of debate. Impact of 11 September especially high because
carried on live T.V. cp Angola—no pictures, no Western involvement.
THREAT
— International co-operation and threat
assessment is key. Must have unified definition of threat to guarantee
global coalition.
— Presence of unknown number of sleeper
cells, in a large number of countries, exploiting lawless areas
to train and thrive (Somalia, Afghanistan) makes AQ a threat to
the US and Europe.
KEY CAPABILITIES/MOD
COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE
— MOD must get best value for money
and not try and do everything. Discussion paper just one part
of wider Government efforts.
— MOD can make an improved contribution
in intelligence, surveillance, disruption and deterrence. Increasing
role for prevention.
— Intelligence is key. Need enhanced
Armed Forces intelligence capability, including human intelligence
eg more Arabic speakers. Need improved mechanisms for filtering
intelligence.
— Need for greater specialist capability
(including medical) to deal with CBRN threats: compare with massive
US investment in this area.
LIMITS OF
UK AMBITION
— Unrealistic to have no geographical
limits to where we might operate campaign against terrorism, but
need to potentially widen area in which we plan to operate, and
number of concurrent operations. Terrorist networks geographically
dispersed—ideally wish to tackle in multiple locations,
concurrently.
— But significant operations in eg
Pacific region unlikely to be practicable for UK. Need to rely
on/develop partners eg Australia, Japan. How far do we get engaged
in Africa?
191 This MoD note summarises the key issues raised
during an invited seminar held by the Ministry of Defence to discuss
the New Chapter public discussion paper. It is not a formal record
agreed by the participants. The seminar was held under the Chatham
House rule so comments are not attributable to individuals. Some
30 people attended, led by the Secretary of State for Defence,
and including the Conservative Defence Spokesman, the Chief of
the Defence Staff, the Permanent Secretary at the Ministry of
Defence, academics, representatives of Non-Governmental Organisations
(from International Alert and Save the Children Fund UK), Muslim
representatives, and representatives of other Government Departments,
the Reserve Forces, and the Police. It took place at the University
of Birmingham on 28 February 2002. Back
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