The War on Terror and Military Transformation
For the UK the key challenge raised by the revolution
in military affairs is to monitor accurately how the process is
altering the structure and operations of US forces, since they
serve as the prototype for all the technical trends in new methods
of warfare. The MoD also has to assess the advantages and disadvantages
that the UK possesses in these regards and balance them against
what is firstly feasible and affordable in the evolution of UK
forces for the future, and secondly is consistent with the principles
set out in the SDR New Chapter (Paragraph 91)
24. We agree that one of the our challenges is tracking
how the USA is evolving its military capability, although it is
not true that it provides the prototype for all the technical
trends in new methods of warfare. As well as tracking events,
we shall also wish to continue to achieve a degree of influence
on US thinking by exploiting the considerable intellectual capital
that exists in the United Kingdom.
We believe that the doctrinal basis for embracing
network-enabling technologies needs to be rigorous and clearly
understood if the benefits of the network are to be realised by
the UK Armed Forces. (Paragraph 97)
25. This is entirely correct. Much has already been
invested in trying to understand the conceptual basis for network-enabled
capabilities. This currently exists in the form of a draft High
Level Operational Concept that has already influenced the research
and equipment programmes as well as other lines of development.
We are concerned at the risks created by the potential
vulnerabilities of "transformed" military forces and
that they may act as a constraint on progress towards realising
the full benefits of network-enabled capability. However, in the
face of such vulnerabilities, the UK's cautious approach has potential
advantages. (Paragraph 101)
26. The MOD recognises the risks and vulnerabilities
in network-enabled capability. All military capabilities are developed
to be robust and resilient in the face of potential counter-measures.
We will take account in particular of the potential for interference
and disruption to nodes, sensors and communications systems, and
vulnerabilities in commercially developed software such as databases
and operating systems.
We accept that the UK now has a reasonably efficient
structure to develop and embed doctrines at the various appropriate
levels, and translate them into training regimes. We are still
concerned, however, that the political and technical novelty of
the developments the Secretary of State has outlined, and which
other witnesses have elaborated, have taken some time to be addressed
in a doctrinal context. Relevant work is clearly underway, but
so are the evolving tactics of potential terrorists and those
who would employ asymmetric tactics against the UK and our Armed
Forces. (Paragraph 105)
27. The Government notes the Committee's observation.
Equipment and Force Structures
The MoD's declared determination to "make
sure we really do keep our forces equipped with the most up-to-date
technology" does not sit with the lack of urgency in acquiring
an effective networked UAV capability. The Secretary of State
told us that: "What we want to ensure is that the next generation
[of UAVs] available to the United Kingdom provides us with useful
capabilities at the best price for the British taxpayer ".
It is surely not too much to hope that an effective capability
will be available to the Armed Forces of this generation of taxpayers.
(Paragraph 112)
28. The Government does not accept there has been
a lack of urgency in acquiring a networked UAV capability. It
is important to ensure we have an effective capability in service
with the Armed Forces as quickly as possible and the Watchkeeper
programme has therefore been brought forward to provide an advanced
UAV system in 2006. Although based primarily on commercial off-the-shelf
aerial vehicles, Watchkeeper represents a significant advance
on currently available systems, utilising a common ground station
fully integrated into command and control systems such as Bowman
(due into service from 2004). Network integration is essential
to enable exploitation and dissemination of imagery as rapidly
as possible to ensure maximum effect. Delivery of such a comprehensive
capability in 2006 remains a challenging target.
The Committee has seen little evidence of the
urgency that the MoD has claimed to be devoting to acquiring new
capabilities and embracing new technologies—it appears so
far at least that pragmatic decision-making is also slow decision-making.
(Paragraph 113)
29. The Government does not accept that little has
been done to acquire new capabilities and embrace new technologies.
The key is ensuring that we develop optimal capabilities which
can be effectively operated and sustained within the funding available.
Much has been completed within a short space of time; the Watchkeeper
programme has been advanced; a Joint UAV experimental unit has
been approved and is being established now; and we are re-focusing
our research programme on experimentation, in particular through
work to enable rapid pull-through of innovative technical solutions.
We are also allocating significant funds to investment in a range
of information system applications to analyse, exploit and disseminate
information across the battlespace.
It remains to be seen whether present equipment
programmes, and the pragmatic adjustments that the MoD is still
considering, will be sufficient to allow UK Armed Forces to fulfil
the realistic but demanding scenarios which will be most relevant
in our military relationship with the United States. (Paragraph
114)
30. The Government agrees that the most demanding
and realistic future scenarios are likely to be those involving
operations with the USA. Improving interoperability with US forces
is a priority in the annual equipment planning round and close
consultation is maintained at all levels to ensure we can maximise
the effect of UK forces in US-led operations. Recent operations
in Iraq provided a timely example of how effectively UK forces
can operate alongside their US colleagues. The Urgent Operational
Requirement (UOR) mechanism was used during Op TELIC to provide
key enhancements—many of which advanced programmes already
in the Equipment Plan—to facilitate UK/US interoperability.
Examples are tactical data-link capabilities and direct US exploitation
of UK sensor imagery. The experience from operations in Iraq is
being carefully analysed to ensure that interoperability lessons
are identified and that the enduring benefits of capability delivered
through the UOR process are maximised.
The MoD has not addressed the risk of over-commitment
leading to over-stretch in the New Chapter. The Committee believes
that these issues need to be urgently considered by the MoD in
an open and inclusive manner. (Paragraph 123)
31. The New Chapter was focused deliberately and
specifically on the impact of September 11th on the Armed
Forces and their capabilities and was thus never intended as a
vehicle to consider the wider issue of over-stretch.
32. The Government recognises the problem of asking
too much of the Armed Forces: the MOD constantly manages its commitments
to achieve a balance and reduce adverse impacts on individuals
and capabilities. Commitments are not determined arbitrarily in
advance but are subject to specific decisions in the light of
circumstances. We aim to commit personnel to operations for no
longer than is necessary to achieve the military aim and personnel
are withdrawn from operations at the earliest opportunity.
On the basis of the evidence, we remain to be
convinced that implementing the New Chapter will not put further
strain on the UK's Armed Forces, particularly in those branches
that serve as "key enablers" to greater combat effectiveness
in an era of rapid technological transformation. (Paragraph 126)
33. Some of the additional resources made available
in Spending Review 2002 are being focused on the sort of critical
areas the Committee identifies. The level of operational activity
required of the Armed Forces over time in countering terrorism
remains to be seen but we do not expect implementing the New Chapter
to put a further strain on them.
The New Chapter and the Spending Review
The link between the Spending Review and the New
Chapter remains unclear. The MoD has yet to set out how the significant
increase in the capital budget will be used to reshape the MoD's
equipment and infrastructure to reflect the capabilities highlighted
in the New Chapter, or indeed to what extent the Spending Review
addresses such new requirements rather than rectifying existing
and long-standing deficiencies. (Paragraph 129)
We expect the MoD to set out—in its response
to this report, or at the latest in the forthcoming White Paper—how
the Spending Review settlement will be utilised to secure New
Chapter and other capabilities, to address existing strains on
Armed Forces personnel and to enable the tempo of operations implied
by the New Chapter. (Paragraph 129)
34. The conclusions of the New Chapter working groups
were the basis of advice to the Defence Council and of the subsequent
bid presented to the Treasury as part of the Spending Review process.
The New Chapter elements were considered alongside the remainder
of the MOD's Spending Review proposals. Treasury participation
in the New Chapter process ensured that in considering the Spending
Review they understood fully the basis of the bid.
35. As we set out in the New Chapter, the Spending
Review settlement has allowed us to invest in the further development
of a network-enabled capability and a range of other capabilities
providing better-controlled and precise military effect. For example
it has allowed the Watchkeeper UAV programme to be brought forward,
the establishment of a Joint Service UAV Experimentation Programme
and enhancements to our E3D aircraft. We also expect to invest
further in experimentation, which has a growing and important
role in developing the NEC concept. Initially we aim to establish
an industry-led programme which will enable us to investigate
promising technology and concepts in parallel and create options
for the rapid exploitation of results through new projects, adjusted
priorities and technology insertion.
36. An additional £1½ billion was specifically
earmarked in the Spending Review settlement for new equipment
and capabilities to respond to the new strategic environment.
The Defence White Paper to be published later in the year will
lay out how the Defence programme is addressing the requirements
identified in the New Chapter.
Policy versus Practicality
We are not persuaded that the robustness of the
original SDR is the reason for the modest practical changes to
date. We have the impression that too often the practical implications
of the policy developments set out in the New Chapter have not
been properly thought through. To date virtually all the equipment
programmes which have been linked with the New Chapter have been
existing programmes, which in a few cases the department has said
are being accelerated. We are concerned that this suggests the
policy making process and the ability to deliver the implementation
of that process quickly enough are out of step with each other,
or that the MoD has scaled back its practical ambition from the
vision set out by the early stages of the New Chapter work. (Paragraph
132)
37. A key conclusion of the New Chapter was we need
a series of adjustments and refinements to existing military means,
not a step change in capability or concept of operations. That
was a reasoned and legitimate conclusion based on a clear analysis
of how the Armed Forces can be used.
38. While the New Chapter was focused on the implications
of international terrorism, the Government must also take account
of the roles and commitments which drive other core capabilities
of the Armed Forces. We must maximise the value of new investment
by seeking improvements with utility beyond counter-terrorism.
39. The publication of the New Chapter White Paper
was not the end of the exercise. We always intended to use the
MOD's normal planning process to determine exactly how best to
allocate the additional resources from Spending Review 2002. We
were able to begin delivery of some of the improved capabilities
very quickly; others which are long-term projects or involve significant
expenditure will be pursued through our normal project-management
disciplines. No-one received a blank cheque under the New Chapter.
New Warfare and the Allies
The level of consultation with allies during the
New Chapter work may be regarded as something less than close
interaction since the discussion document of 14 February was produced
for general public, rather than detailed private, discussion.
(Paragraph 134)
The Government should recognise the potential
impact it can have both in providing a model of efficient US-UK
technical and doctrinal co-operation, and in helping influence
other European allies to embrace the implications of new trends
in warfare. We are not so far convinced that the MoD appreciates
the potential implications of this role, or is yet prepared for
the efforts it would require. (Paragraph 136)
40. The Committee describes as a "role"
what the Government perceives as one facet of the normal dialogues
at all political and military levels between allies individually
and collectively. Nonetheless the Government is and will continue
to be proactive in influencing and assisting allies in the face
of international terrorism. In the areas of military technology
and doctrine there are many international forums and institutions
where this will take place. As one example, the United Kingdom
is taking a leading role in its development of the NATO Response
Force which aims to ensure that, inter alia, all NATO nations
can make some contribution to a robust, credible, flexible, technologically
advanced and interoperable joint force that is held at very high
readiness.
Legal Aspects
We welcome the MoD's assurances that UK military
operations will always be conducted in accordance with international
law. It is of fundamental importance that our Armed Forces can
be confident, whenever we call upon them, that they are operating
on the basis of, and within, applicable international law. (Paragraph
142)
The Government concurs with the importance the Committee
attributes to operating within international law. We will always
act in accordance with legal obligations but also effectively
to defend the UK's people and interests and secure international
peace and stability. The New Chapter made clear as a matter of
policy that HMG is ready and willing to use military force overseas
against terrorism when non-military tools failed.
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