WEDNESDAY 5 FEBRUARY 2003

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Members present:

Mr Bruce George, in the Chair
Mr James Cran

Mr Kevan Jones
Patrick Mercer
Syd Rapson
Rachel Squire

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AIR VICE MARSHAL IAIN McNICOLL CBE, Director General, Joint Doctrine and Concepts Centre, Shrivenham, and MR HUGH KERNOHAN, SDR New Chapter Implementation, Ministry of Defence, examined.

Chairman

Good afternoon, Air Vice Marshal. Could you introduce your team behind you and tell us what their jobs are?

(Air Vice Marshal McNicoll) I am sure I can let Mr Kernohan speak for himself, but if I can turn round and speak about the people in uniform behind me, on my left I have my Military Assistant, Lt Commander Mark Hart, who is taking notes for me so that I can write something coherent at the end of this. Behind me on my right I have Lt Colonel Rupert Wieloch, who was one of the JDCC staff who was closely involved in the SDR New Chapter work that I have just explained, and I have also behind me Commander Steven Haines who was drafter - perhaps one would say the lead author - of British Defence Doctrine.

I cannot say welcome as I would normally as this is not our territory; it is yours. It is not often that we travel abroad to pursue our search for truth and I hope this is a most informative session. Can you start by giving us a little background on how the team was got together and how it has been operating? What time did it take to find the staff, to get up and running, how long since you started working on the doctrine itself?

(Air Vice Marshal McNicoll) If I talk about the Joint Document and Concepts Centre and where it started from I hope that will cover it. It was of course part of the Strategic Defence Review 1997-98 which suggested that there should be a centre responsible for pulling together the three services, thinking about both doctrine and concepts. That was mid 1998 when the SDR was published. The Chiefs of Staff endorsed the recommendations after a study on a Joint Document and Concepts Centre in February 1999 and the Centre was up and running by September 1999, so it has been in operation for just over three years now. We were at full establishment in October 2000 so it was almost a year to get everybody up to full establishment. The principal outputs in the first three years of operation were concentrated at the top level of both doctrine and concepts in the British Defence Doctrine which I believe you have had copies of.

This (indicating) is one of the earlier ones. What date was that?

(Air Vice Marshal McNicoll) This was signed by the Chief of Defence Staff in October 2001 and Joint Vision likewise came out in the second half of 2001. That said, I think the team was up and running pretty quickly and got on with a lot of other work which I could expand on later if you wish. As I say, it has now been in operation for just over three years and is getting at the heart particularly of the doctrinal and increasingly the conceptual side.

Who chose the staff?

(Air Vice Marshal McNicoll) The first Director General, my immediate predecessor, was Major General Tony Milton whom I believe you have met, and he had a major input into who the staff were, but the single service posting systems also had a major input to that and the service secretaries and manning authorities from each of the three single services proposed people to fill the posts on the establishment.

Had all the people who had been selected had sufficient experience in jointery, because if you are devising a joint doctrine one would assume that all the people involved were imbued with the spirit of jointness?

(Air Vice Marshal McNicoll) You have to start from somewhere and if you start a Joint Doctrine and Concepts Centre, never having had one, then inevitably you are starting with single service building blocks and trying to pull it together. That said, there were other joint organisations and you have just been to the Joint Service Command and Staff College, so people had come from either a joint staff training background or indeed, if they had been at the Permanent Joint Headquarters, from a joint operational background as well.

That is what I was really getting at. We have interviewed very senior people in the military who have never served outside their single service. Some have got to a very high position. I presume younger people now will have been compelled to go through quite some experience of working with other services.

(Air Vice Marshal McNicoll) I am not sure if they have been compelled. I hope some of them want to but yes, I think you are absolutely right, Chairman, that the times are definitely changing and it is unusual now to find an officer of middle rank who does not have joint experience.

Can you give the Committee some insights into how the functions of the JDCC have developed? You talk about timing. Perhaps you can answer the question thematically, conceptually.

(Air Vice Marshal McNicoll) The Joint Doctrine and Concepts Centre was really set up to do three things, so its mission, if you like, has got three parts to it. In general it is the centre of excellence for developing Joint Doctrine and future Joint Vision for the armed forces, but the three parts of that are to formulate, review and develop the Joint Doctrine at the military strategic level down to the Joint Tactical Weapon, to co-ordinate the single service tactical doctrine and also to provide the UK input to allied and multinational doctrines. That is the doctrine element out of the three bits. On the conceptual side we are required to provide the long term conceptual underpinning for the future operation of the three armed services involving such aspects as systems doctrine, force development and indeed we contribute to the MoD's defence planning process as well. I should mention that the JDCC is part of the policy area of the central staff of the Ministry of Defence. The third part of our mission is to formulate doctrine for peace support operations and also to promote the UK approach to peace support operations and that is a separate function of the organisation. I think that describes our mission.

Once you have put out the document what is the timescale for implementation, real implementation? Are we talking about a year, five years, ten years?

(Air Vice Marshal McNicoll) To answer that I would separate out the doctrinal side from the conceptual side. If we are looking at the doctrine, once a doctrine publication has been signed off, and at a higher level that might be by the Chief of Defence Staff on behalf of the Chiefs of Staff; at a lower level it might be by myself, that is then immediate. That is the current way of doing business. If we are looking at the conceptual side of the business then it is much more a question of how we influence thinking. What we are trying to deal with is looking as far as we reasonably can into the future and that may be some considerable time. It may be ten, 15, perhaps even 30 years into the future. What we are trying to do is influence thinking about how the military develop across all the lines of development, whether that is equipment or personnel or sustainability. A concept, when it is delivered, does not mean that that is how we are going to do things immediately. It is an idea about how we might operate in the future.

Would you prioritise and tell people or would they assume, "This is short term", "This is medium term", "This is long term"?

(Air Vice Marshal McNicoll) Yes, very much so. It would be clear from what we were producing whether that was intended to be for now or for later.

Mr Kernohan's presence here indicates that the MoD is not very far away from the process, so where would they fit into what you do? I do not suppose you are allowed too much freedom because they will seek to influence what you are doing.

(Air Vice Marshal McNicoll) As I said, we are an integral part of the policy area in the central staff of MoD. We have strong interactions within the policy area with the Director of Force Development and with the Director of Policy Planning. Also in the central staff we interact closely with the equipment capability area, with the science and technology area and with the resources and programmes area and, in the single services, both with the single service from my level, the single service Assistant Chiefs, effectively with the single service view, and also with their doctrinal and conceptual organisations. In terms of how much we are let off the leash, obviously there is a higher level endorsement of what we are doing, particularly if it is the immediate work for doctrine, but the majority of our work in the conceptual area is pushed from our side as much as it is pulled from elsewhere.

Would you not have been better off in the main building somewhere, assuming it was functioning? What is the advantage of being in this part of the world?

(Air Vice Marshal McNicoll) There are pros and cons to the location.

I do not want to know about housing prices. Tell me the pros and cons.

(Air Vice Marshal McNicoll) On the pro side we are not in the daily round of business all the time with immediate deadlines and answers required by tomorrow, so there is space and time to think. Also on the pro side we have got good interaction with the Staff College and with the Royal Military College of Science. There is with the Defence Academy that academic and educational and training link. We also interact with the single service organisations and they are not necessarily in the centre of town. The Maritime Warfare Centre is down near Portsmouth; Upham for the Army's Directorate General Doctrine Development and, in the case of the Air Force, they also have an Air Warfare Centre which is in Lincolnshire. Being in town or being in the country does not make a lot of difference. On the down side -----

Be careful now. I do not want you to end your career. The MoD does not like people talking about the down side of anything. Mr Kernohan is at least three feet away from you so do not look at him, or watch his right foot. Do tell me the down side.

(Air Vice Marshal McNicoll) There is only one down side and that is that obviously I have to interact with all the people that I listed to you earlier and that does involve travelling into London more than it involves them coming to visit us here. Similarly, for all the staff, they do not just sit in an ivory tower developing it. They do need to be in town frequently.

How do the single service doctrine writers feed into the process and how do you try to unravel what they are thinking about as opposed to the approach that you are taking?

(Air Vice Marshal McNicoll) We are the owner, if you like, the processor, of all the joint doctrines and anything above a certain level now is joint. For single service tactical doctrine we are also the co-ordinator of that part. I chair the Joint Operational Doctrine Committee which has representatives from each of the three services, and my Assistant Director Doctrine chairs the Joint Operational Tactical Doctrine Committee. We have a regular formal basis therefore for ensuring that we are on the same sheet of music but we also have regular informal contacts and my Assistant Director Doctrine and his team of doctrine people are interacting daily with me and with people from the three service organisations.

How do you interact with NATO and the French, the Germans, the two other major significant military powers in the region, and the United States and others? Is it possible for us to go swinging off in one direction whilst jointery as seen in the United States or in other parts of the alliance is moving in another direction? How do you calibrate all the different shooting stars?

(Air Vice Marshal McNicoll) If I take NATO first, can I say that the UK adopts NATO doctrine unless there is a good reason not to, and that means that we adopt NATO doctrine in most cases, and we are also heavily involved with the NATO doctrine production because even though the NATO Standardisation Agency under Rear Admiral Eriksson owns NATO doctrine, we, the UK, in the shape of my deputy for doctrine, chair the Allied Joint Operational Doctrine Committee and we are also the owners of some key publications for NATO, including intelligence, peace support operations and in fact the top level allied joint publication as well. What we find, looking at the European nations, is that the UK - and I hesitate to boast about them; I do not mean it in that sense - is actually the fleet leader amongst NATO nations. I do not we think have a problem at all in the European theatre and we are well linked up. The US situation is rather different because the US obviously is much more diverse and they have forces which are not assigned to NATO or part of NATO, whether they are working in the Pacific or elsewhere, and their single service organisations - and of course they have four if you include the US Marine Corps in it - have very powerful doctrine organisations and development organisations themselves. For instance, the US Army has TRADOC which is a leader in US thinking. We do though have interaction with Joint Forces Command and again my Assistant Director Doctrine, who I regret is not here because he is employed on operations, is a key participant with the US on bilateral joint doctrine development. I will not pretend that the challenge in interacting with the US, given its size and diversity, is in some ways greater than it is with the rest of the European NATO operation.

Chairman: Yes, I think you are right.

Patrick Mercer

How are the efforts of each service and the JDCC fully co-ordinated?

(Air Vice Marshal McNicoll) Could you just expand on the question please?

Each of the services works on its own individual doctrine. How do you pull that together?

(Air Vice Marshal McNicoll) We manage that through the Joint Operational Doctrine Committee and through my personal interaction, for example, with Major General Bailey who is Director General Doctrine Development for the Army and, similarly, with the Air Force and Navy equivalents. It is a personal interaction and it is a process interaction. As I said earlier, we are the acknowledged processor for this level of co-ordination.

Do you foresee all elements of doctrine becoming truly joint in the future?

(Air Vice Marshal McNicoll) No, I do not. I think there is a key place for a single service tactical doctrine, and certainly if you get to the training tactics and procedures level of doctrine, I think that very firmly is single service business. It would not matter whether you were in the air or not. How you actually employ a fast jet aircraft tactically is very definitely a single service light blue lead. We do not do all of the joint doctrine ourselves. We have what we call a federated approach to the production of doctrine. If a single service environment or organisation is more sensible to take the lead in producing joint doctrine for the community, then we do that while retaining the process ownership of it.

Chairman

What about a joint doctrine between the Royal Navy and the Air Force over UAVs? Does that come into what you are doing? How do you go about co-ordinating and devising something that is relevant?

(Air Vice Marshal McNicoll) The UAVs that the Army have operated up until now have sat at the tactical level if you like of Army doctrine, but we are, as I know you are aware, introducing Watchkeeper in the not too distant future, and beyond that we have got the UAV experimental bit which is being led by the equipment capability area. There is a UAV Management Group which is being chaired by the Assistant Chief of the Air Staff and it is not a question yet of being ready for doctrine because we have not yet got the kit in service nor fully evaluated the possibilities for it, but we are engaged in thinking at the moment about the conceptual matters relating to it.

How quickly will you have to come up with something because the Government is making a decision even though the procurement process can be fairly protracted? When will you kick in?

(Air Vice Marshal McNicoll) I am not an authority on the exact timing for the procurement but I understand that we are looking at 2005/2006 for Watchkeeper. We would expect to be involved conceptually from now (as we are) and doctrinally where it is joint we can react quite rapidly, so that would be further down the procurement cycle.

What about Air Force and Army over Apache operations? Is there anything you are doing on that front?

(Air Vice Marshal McNicoll) Yes, we are engaged as part of the Air Manoeuvre Policy Group and we are working closely with the Army who have the lead in this federated approach for air manoeuvre developments conceptually and doctrinally.

Syd Rapson

Following 9/11 the MoD had to react rather quickly. How did the Concepts Centre get involved in that issue? Did you get involved? What did you do to help?

(Air Vice Marshal McNicoll) Yes, we very much did so. As you say, it was before my involvement and I have got some notes which, if I may, I will refer to. There was work before 11 September 2001 which I should probably start off by mentioning which was relevant to what happened afterwards that JDCC have been involved in. For example, there had been work done on potential shocks in the strategic environment and future issues for defence, and there has been a seminar actually here in this conference centre in February 2001. Also, JDCC had started a strategic analysis programme looking at different dimensions of the strategic environment and, of course, as I mentioned earlier, Joint Vision was coming to fruition and was endorsed by the Chiefs of Staff and produced in June 2001, and British Defence Doctrine had been produced but in fact the timing was such that it had not come out of the printers by the time of 11 September but the Chief of Defence Staff personally reviewed it to ensure that the enduring principles within it were still relevant. There was a large knowledge base and work base prior to 11 September. When 11 September occurred the very next day, 12 September, my predecessor, Major General Milton, was deployed into the Ministry of Defence to form a strategic think-tank with staff from the JDCC and that work took place between 12 September and 5 October. At about that time the SDR New Chapter work was announced by the Secretary of State. Working Group Four was countering terrorism overseas and Major General Milton led phase one of that work until it was handed over to Major General Fulton. There were also staff from the JDCC involved in each of the working groups. I was the deputy to Air Vice Marshal Hobart at that time in Working Group One, which was the strategic context, and there were people from the JDCC who were involved in that working group as well, so, as I say, the JDCC was closely knitted into all of the thinking throughout that and played a major role led by Major General Milton during the SDR New Chapter. There were also, in the published White Papers that were produced for SDR New Chapter, specific elements of concepts and doctrine which were dealt with by the JDCC which were put into that.

Has that work been concluded or is it still ongoing?

(Air Vice Marshal McNicoll) I think it is fair to say that the work of doctrine concepts is never going to be concluded because it is a changing process. It was concluded in that that was the final input to that document produced in July of last year, but we have not, I hope, stood still from that point. Since 18 July we have been working on a number of things. I know that in previous evidence that you have taken from the MoD you have asked questions about a particular bit of work that we have been engaged in. It is Countering Terrorism: the UK Approach to the Military Contribution. I am pleased to say that we have finally got to the stage when that will be printed by next week. This is an advance copy of double size. It will be an A5 publication. We shall be issuing that next week and obviously I will make sure that not only the Chairman but also every member of the Committee gets a copy of that particular work. We have also been engaged in other work. For example, in doctrine we are engaged in updating the top level, sitting just underneath British Defence Doctrine, of something that we will call in the future doctrine structure. In all of that work we are very conscious of the effort that was put into the counter-terrorism work and we are feeding that into that work as appropriate as well. We have been engaged on home defence and security operations doctrine and that in fact has been led by the joint planning staff of Headquarters Land. We have been engaged with NATO's allied joint doctrine process and we have continued the strategic analysis work as well which I mentioned. We did not stop in July last year. We got a lot done and both in doctrine and in concepts we expect to continue moving forward.

Chairman: Much of what you are saying is new to us. When you see the documents that are put out and, in fairness, the MoD is putting out a lot of documents, it represents hardly even the tip of the iceberg and if people make a judgement on what is being done on the basis of the flimsy eight pages of glossy paper with the nice pictures then they simply do not understand the work that is being done. What you are saying clearly indicates that the correlation between work done and publication is a little indeterminate and that is why what you have been telling us is so helpful.

Mr Jones

Can I follow on from Syd's point? In terms of the doctrinal thinking what have been the major changes post-September 11?

(Air Vice Marshal McNicoll) I think probably it would be easier to answer that question if you had asked about concepts rather than doctrine. The major changes that we are looking at in the conceptual area, how ideas such as network enabled capability will affect things such as command and control in the future, these issues have not yet been fed into doctrine and will be in due course, but we are at the stage still of thinking about the implications of that. In terms of doctrine, I think it was enormously reassuring that even immediately after the shocking events of 11 September 2001 we were able to look at our top level publications and say (although not in any complacent way), "Yes, the enduring principles enunciated in these are still valid". As I said, the Chief of Defence Staff did that personally. The top level, the enduring principles, I think we are comfortable with. At the lower level tactical doctrine and the way that we are developing it, as I say, we are taking account of developments as we incorporate them.

Mr Cran

Air Vice Marshal, you spoke earlier about the general role of the JDCC. What the Committee would now like you to move on to and explain to us is what your role has been in relation to the SDR New Chapter. Simon Webb, whom you are of course acquainted with, told the Committee at an earlier session that there were a number of working groups that had been set up. What I would like to know is where did you fit into all of this and what did you bring to the table?

(Air Vice Marshal McNicoll) If the question is addressed to me personally rather than the post, perhaps I will answer both parts of that.

Chairman: If the people behind you can make a contribution I see no procedural reason why you could not decentralise the people who might have been closer to the coal face than you. Please do not feel any constraints.

Mr Cran

Let me just clarify that I did not mean your personal role. I mean the organisation's role.

(Air Vice Marshal McNicoll) The Joint Doctrine and Concepts Centre, as I said, under Major General Milton at the time, moved straight in immediately afterwards to think about immediate consequences, if you like, and immediate actions. It was a strategic think-tank though, so they were trying to think a little bit further forward. It was an immediate reaction and there was a month's worth of effort put into that. The output from that sort of work was papers which were considered by ministers, amongst others, as an input to policy making at the time. The SDR New Chapter bit started in October 2001 and involved looking with Working Group Four at countering terrorism overseas. The thinking behind that was that the balance between what effort was going to be put into home defence and overseas was going to be an important one but the emphasis from our doctrine and our thinking and experience was that countering things overseas before they became a threat at home was probably going to be our preferred option, even though we would not always have that option. Countering terrorism overseas was a major part of it and the JDCC looked at a number of areas during that process in order to try and determine whether the sort of capabilities that we had at the time were appropriate or to see what other capabilities might be more appropriate for the future. This is where the thinking came out, particularly in network enabled capability, but there were other aspects - rapidity of deployment, enhancements to Special Forces capabilities, enhancements to intelligence activities. There was a range of ideas and thinking that came out of the countering terrorism overseas exercise. That was the input which was then handed on by the JDCC to the equipment capability area, and that particularly led to second phase work by Major General Fulton in Working Group Four, which led ultimately to the White Paper that came out in July.

I just have a feeling that I have heard this in one or other of the Committee's meetings, but was work already under way in the JDCC before the New Chapter process got under way?

(Air Vice Marshal McNicoll) The JDCC was up and running at that stage and was engaged in a whole range of work, some of which was directly relevant and some of which was in part relevant to the SDR New Chapter work.

One final question about this dreadful collection of words, network centric warfare. At what point did your organisation undertake its contribution to this concept?

(Air Vice Marshal McNicoll) It was during that working group that it took place. If I may add a small bit on the terminology, the US expression tends to be "network centric warfare" and the UK have coined the term "network enabled capability". I do not think that the difference in terminology is in itself too important. I think perhaps initially we felt that the US was perhaps running further ahead than we envisaged and that were perhaps thinking in a more revolutionary rather than evolutionary sense. I do not now feel that. I think that we are very much heading in the same direction on this.

Rachel Squire

Picking up on what you just said, do you not think that US military doctrine is still dominated by the warfare, war-fighting concept whereas our military doctrine recognises more the dual roles of both war-fighting and peacekeeping and that is why we are referring to it as capability as opposed to warfare?

(Air Vice Marshal McNicoll) I do not think that is the origin of the difference. Without directly contradicting you, can I say that the war-fighting ethos is very much at the heart of British defence doctrine as well and we believe that if you do have that war-fighting capability and ethos you are much more likely to be able to do the other things that you may be called upon to do whereas the reverse is not true. I cannot comment on the US position.

Patrick Mercer

Gentlemen, in the British Defence Doctrine we used to have the OODA Loop. That seems to have been superseded by the SDR New Chapter DDD, "detect, decide, destroy". What is the difference?

(Air Vice Marshal McNicoll) I do not think there necessarily is a tremendous difference. It is an intellectual construct if you like for describing what we are talking about, which is going from a sensor through some sort of decision-making process which involves a decision maker through to what is called a shooter. "Detect, decide, destroy" is not much different from "Observe, orient, decide, act".

Why replace it then?

(Air Vice Marshal McNicoll) I am not sure it makes a tremendous difference. I think it is just a different way of describing the same thing. Sometimes we get US bumper sticker technology which catches on in the UK and "sensor to shooter" is very much an American sort of expression.

Referring to bumper sticker slogans, I seem to recall in manoeuvre warfare that we were taught that it was not necessarily "destruction" but "delete" which was quite often the thing that one ought to aim for. Why "destroy" rather than "act" or "defeat"? Surely, with the nuances of counter-terrorist warfare, "act" or "defeat" would be a better word than "destroy"?

(Air Vice Marshal McNicoll) I think this is the danger of describing what can be complicated concepts with bumper stickers, so perhaps we should retract the bumper sticker bit out of that. You are absolutely right: manoeuvre warfare emphasises shattering the enemy's cohesion and its will rather than some attritional model of destruction that perhaps people might have thought up in the past.

Thank you. I look forward to seeing the next bumper sticker.

(Mr Kernohan) I think "detect, decide, destroy", which has something of the character of a slogan about it, is describing a single sequence of events and almost implicit in the label is the concept that there is a target that you can destroy. I do not think it is intended to be a description of a campaign or a means of warfare. The loop has the idea that you keep going round it. I think "detect, decide, destroy" is, if you like, a description of a distinct discrete sequence.

A finite sequence?

(Mr Kernohan) Yes.

Patrick Mercer: Deeply intellectual and I am sure will help the soldier in the trench.

Rachel Squire

The Chief of Defence Staff in his December speech to the Royal United Services Institute talked of the effects based approach to military strategy being at the heart of the new British thinking. To what extent has that effects based strategic thinking inherent in the SDR New Chapter actually been adopted by British doctrine?

(Air Vice Marshal McNicoll) Effects based options is something we aspire to, which means that you understand exactly not just the military dimension but the other dimensions of the strategic environment which may be diplomatic or economic and you can say what impact some action will have in the mind of your opponent if you are trying to destroy his will or shatter his cohesion in order to achieve your object. I do not think we have got there yet but what we are starting to do now and has recently been introduced is something called effects based targeting which is a step on the road towards effects based operations where, instead of in the attritional manner that I was talking about earlier, taking a list of targets and saying, "We can destroy that and destroy that", we think now much more closely about linking that to the wider campaign, perhaps the information campaign if you can describe it like that, so that the effect you are achieving is not a simple destruction; the effect you are trying to achieve is something rather more subtle in the mind of your opponent. We have already started down that route but, as I say, effect based operations, which we are doing a lot of conceptual thinking about at the moment, would involve understanding to a greater degree than I think is possible at the moment every aspect of the strategic environment in which both you and your opponent are operating.

Chairman: Most of us are avid readers of anything the MoD puts out, some of which is very relevant. Could you put us on your mailing list? You are going to have to get authority, at least from the Secretary of State or above, before that request will be agreed to but it would be really helpful if we could have copies of your documents, and certainly the Joint Vision paper 2001 because we do not have that.

Syd Rapson

The Secretary of State in July last year said that network centricity would have significant doctrinal implications. Simon Webb from the MoD, who knows everything, said some months afterwards, in October, that work was still to be done. How would you characterise the significance of the doctrinal implications of network centric capabilities?

(Air Vice Marshal McNicoll) I think it is immense and there is still a lot to be done but we have certainly started thinking about the challenges and engaging with our allies, particularly the US, on these challenges. Network centric or network enabled capability is really just a way of tying everything together better, but what it does give you the opportunity to do is think differently about how you exercise command and control and about whether existing layers of command and control are appropriate in all circumstances or in some circumstances. I have no doubt that as things evolve it will have a really significant impact.

You agree with the Secretary of State, but we have not found them yet? Is the SDR New chapter going to lead to a New Chapter in the British Defence Doctrine?

(Air Vice Marshal McNicoll) No, I do not think it will. Our doctrine evolves with each document that we produce and as we reproduce previous documents and produce fresh iterations. What I do not think we need is a document entitled Network Enabled Capability Doctrine. That is a physical capability; it is not a doctrine. What we need to do is think about how we do the other things which are in our doctrine, whether it is commanding and controlling our forces or how we operate these forces. We already have doctrine in these areas. It will evolve as we think through the implications.

Talking about defence doctrinal publications, is there anything innovative that we will see? It all seems to be about the same and taken care of but if we are looking for innovation and change do you think there will be any significant ones?

(Air Vice Marshal McNicoll) I am not sure that is quite an accurate reflection of what I was trying to convey, which is that things do evolve. There will be significant changes. They will happen in an evolutionary manner. I mentioned earlier the work that we are doing in our future doctrine structure which is looking at the UK operational level of doctrine and trying to position that better for the future. We are already working on defining better the strategic context in which the operational commander is operating and giving rather better guidance on how he builds and campaigns the joint force and within that will be these command and control ideas. We will have to build in command and control ideas and also base them on the lessons that we are learning from past and current operations. There are significant changes in prospect which mean that it will happen in an evolutionary fashion in the doctrine field. Just on the timetable of our future doctrine work, we are looking at a process which will carry us through at least to the end of this year to get subordinate publications in line with our new higher level publications and probably into the beginning of next year as well.

Excuse me if I do not seem to read the answers correctly, but it seems to be fine-tuning of a well-established process. There is nothing innovative or fantastic that we are going to see and I take it that that is the way it is. It is fine-tuning of an already established system that has gone on for years and years, re-adjusting it to modern thinking, rather than something that gives you the "wow" factor.

(Air Vice Marshal McNicoll) Yes, I think partly it is a reflection of the fact that we do have already a well-established doctrine structure. I do think that once we have thought through and incorporated the effects of network enabled capability it will be fundamentally different in future. I really do think that there are changes in prospect. We are certainly, both in our work leading up to the White Paper, which is due to come out this summer, and in the work for our future doctrine structure and in our high level concept work, trying to understand the notion of agility better, for example. Certainly during the Cold War our thinking had become sclerotic, I suppose you could describe it as. It was in stasis. We have evolved drastically since then and I think a change such as network enabled capability will prompt another significant change.

One of the benefits of being a Member of Parliament is that they give us documents like this and I have received one that I can read on the train; very boring. Because of the questions that came up I had to concentrate on it and inside the document it sets out four or five themes which are key to the British approach to doctrine. One of these is mission command and that will be discussed later, but how will the others - war-fighting, ethos, joint integrated and multinational operations and the manoeuvre approach - be affected by network centricity?

(Air Vice Marshal McNicoll) That is a very big question. Can I start with the joint and integrated aspect first? There is obviously a challenge inherent in this, that you cannot nationally build a network that is not interoperable with the allies with whom you are going to work, so there is a technical challenge in there, but that is the lesser part of it in my view. The real challenge is to get the procedures that underlie it more coherent. We are working closely with the US on their devising what they are calling capstan concept at the moment and we are calling it a high level operational concept, which will try and get at some of the issues involved in this. On the first point of that, the joint and integrated, the challenge is as much about how you think in future as in terms of the technical bit, important though the technical bit will be. The manoeuvrist approach is really at the heart of the UK approach to warfare or of the use of military force, which is to try and get inside the opponent's decision-making cycle. It is the attempt to have your ability to think through something and act before the opponent has the chance to do his thinking and acting as well. Our network enabled capability undoubtedly offers the prospect of being able to do that more quickly. There are vulnerabilities attached to that as well which I can outline later. The third out of your four was?

The third was joint integrated and multinational operations and the manoeuvre approach. Basically you have covered them. Your students are obviously being trained on accepting the new processes and the air manoeuvribility exercises we saw today. How much more difficult is it to get more senior members of the military to absorb the concept of network centricity? What worries me is that you can teach all these people but unless we have got our senior people grasping it to their chests and saying, "This is great", it does not seem to follow through. Is there a problem with that? Am I assuming that there is a problem or are our admirals and senior officers grasping that this is the way to go?

(Air Vice Marshal McNicoll) I think there is the potential for a problem there. Can I just mention though that they are not my students. In other words, the Joint Doctrine and Concepts Centre is not part of the Defence Academy. That said, we have a very strong link with them and try and educate them in conceptual and doctrinal thinking as well. In terms of whether people get it or not, I am enormously encouraged because I think all parts of the organisation now understand that there are opportunities as well as threats. There are tremendous opportunities in network enabled capabilities, and I do not detect at any level within the Ministry of Defence doubters saying, "We do not think this is a good idea".

Mr Cran

Air Vice Marshal, unfortunately we are still on this subject of network centric warfare and I wish we could find a better collection of words to make it understandable for the rest of us but that may not be your responsibility. In the light of the answers you have given to my colleague, Mr Rapson, I suppose it would not be too strong to say that in a way this is almost a revolution in military thinking, is it? You used the word "significant" in answer to Mr Rapson. Is it a revolution in military thinking and what are the practical effects going to be on our armed forces?

(Air Vice Marshal McNicoll) I think the effects will be significant and I am not sure it will be tremendously helpful to get into the debate as to whether it is a revolution or an evolution.

You can dismiss that if you want.

(Air Vice Marshal McNicoll) No. I accept that others characterise it thus and a revolution in military affairs has been talked about in terms of how the information age affects it. There have certainly been some things which have been revolutionary. The introduction of global positioning systems, giving everybody at least the possibility of knowing exactly where they are, has been a revolution in how the military conduct their affairs. You can describe it as that. Similarly, network enabled capability, the ability to link everybody together, could be described as a revolution but I do not think it is important to get hung up on the words as to understand the concept and the opportunities.

When you and I last spoke you spent a little bit of time telling us about the differences in the terminology used by the Americans and the British. What I would be interested in knowing is, is there any difference between the American vision of this concept and the British vision, or is it a shared vision?

(Air Vice Marshal McNicoll) I think it would be strange if it was identical in every respect, but I am enormously encouraged - and I have been just recently in fact to Joint Forces Command and discussed with my opposite number who is involved in concept development and experimentation there - by the work that they are doing and we are looking to have a liaison with them as well. I have also been engaged in discussions slightly longer ago with people in the joint staff in the Pentagon on this, and I am very encouraged by the convergence that there is. People are encountering the same issues, the same problems, and coming up with very similar ideas as to how to solve these and the impact that they are going to have.

But if the American vision - let us hypothecate for a minute - diverts from the British one and, let us say, your counterpart in the United States has a different vision from you, which one prevails? Do we just have to like it or lump it?

(Air Vice Marshal McNicoll) I was always taught not to answer a hypothetical question. The situation has not arisen. The idea, I think, is to work together to see if there is a common view and a consensus there. The idea is not to try and diverge. We have not encountered any major divergence in our thinking so far.

(Mr Kernohan) It is also true to comment that you can, by divergence at one level, have a different tactical doctrine for carrying out the task, but it does not mean that you cannot operate effectively alongside each other because your doctrines at the operational level, or even at the strategic level, do match. You can achieve advantage by alignment at higher levels. It does not mean you have to align at the lower levels, which are partly determined by the nature of the equipment and the technical capabilities.

Rachel Squire

Air Vice Marshal, you have talked about some of the fundamentals in the changes in prospect. It has been argued that enabling technologies and the network capabilities will enable militaries to achieve with brigades what they previously required divisions to do. Do you agree?

(Air Vice Marshal McNicoll) I do not think I would make my answer to that just a simple yes or no. In some circumstances you might achieve the effect with a fewer number of forces. If I take something from my own background and my own environment, it is very apparent that the number of aircraft, for example, that you require to carry out some tasks now are an order of magnitude fewer than was required, let us say, 15 or 20 years ago. In the land environment the situation is rather different because, depending on the task that you are engaged in, it may require boots to be on the ground and that may require numbers of people who cannot be everywhere at the same time. I think the answer in the land environment, saying somehow that a brigade can carry out what a division used to, is rather too simple a description. It would depend on what was being asked and even though the capability in some respects of the land formation could be enormously increased it may not carry across to all missions that might be asked to perform.

Especially if you are taught that it is too easy to think that forces on the ground will be much more thinned out than perhaps they have been in the past or even atomised or in individual groups. Is doctrinal thinking able to deal with those challenges and be that flexible in really saying that you have got to almost look at every operation differently perhaps because of what you think may be required?

(Air Vice Marshal McNicoll) Yes, I think you do need to be flexible and pragmatic about it. If you have a network which incorporates all the elements of the land forces that you are employing in operation, for example, you would not necessarily have to form them up in one place before you carried out an operation. You could, because everybody was on the same net, mass for effect at a time and place of your choosing, so that is possible, or could become so.

Listening to you,and thinking how forces were used in Afghanistan, certain ground forces reflected that when it came to the war-fighting aspects of it.

(Air Vice Marshal McNicoll) Yes, I absolutely agree. Again, that is one example and the situation on the ground there was such that the opponents did not mass their forces, so we were able to use our forces and American forces were able to be much more flexible about how they parcelled their forces out to carry out missions.

Patrick Mercer

We have heard before how network centric capabilities will probably be easier for the Royal Air Force and the Royal Navy to grasp rather than the Army and your last answer explored that a little further. As network centric capabilities increase and improve what are the implications for the current force structures? What are the changes that we are going to see?

(Air Vice Marshal McNicoll) I think it really is too early to say. You are talking about force structures amongst the land forces here, are you?

I would be interested to know about the other two forces as well.

(Air Vice Marshal McNicoll) I think you are absolutely right in suggesting that because the other two services are more platform centric, if you like, joining them on a net is in some respects easier, although it is technically challenging and quite expensive. The problem with land forces is the range of individuals that you will have to join up in it. It is certainly not clear to me yet, although we are engaged in discussions with Director Land Warfare and others on this, exactly what changes in structure might be involved. The Army are working on a paper for their vision of where they may be in 2020 and in fact I am attending an Army Doctrine Committee tomorrow where they are going to expose some of their thinking to me, so perhaps we will move further forward then.

What are the realistic implications, do you think, in the short term, in the next year? What changes are we likely to see, particularly as we face some pretty challenging operations within the next 12 months, or indeed within the next couple of years after that?

(Air Vice Marshal McNicoll) I would not envisage radical force structure changes in the next year or two because you are looking at issues relating to equipment which will take rather longer than that to bring into service.

What are the implications for mission command?

(Air Vice Marshal McNicoll) That is a really interesting question. We are looking at how mission command in the information age can work. We are agreed that mission command encapsulates one of the best aspects out of the British support approach to the use of military force, the ability for a commander to articulate his intent and for the people beneath him to decide on the best way of carrying that out. The information age should allow a much greater dissemination, a much clearer exposition, of the commander's intent. The question that we are looking at at the moment - and this is ongoing work so please do not view it as policy - is whether we need in some way to decouple more than we do at the moment the command and control functions. If I can just expand on that slightly, if, for example, there was a small operation going on somewhere and something was happening in that operation that might have a strategic impact, it may be possible in future (and it is to some extent possible now) for people at the strategic or grand strategic level to reach across the operational and tactical levels of command an make a decision and alter what is occurring there. How do we see that happening in the future? We do not see that that means that we get rid of the tactical and operational layers of command. There are still functions that these levels will have to carry out and the larger the operation the larger the burden on them because of the ability of somebody at the top of the tree to be able to see everything that is going on will obviously not be there regardless of how big the network is. This is one of the potential downsides of network enabled capability, that it might allow what has been described as long screwdrivers to reach forward. What we want to try and do in our evolving thinking is try and work out procedures, a doctrine, for how we exercise that command such that control is exercised when it should be but is not over-control nor excessive control across the layers of command.

It is difficult to envisage, is it not, because I quite see the point that a patrol, particularly in the sort of operations that are likely to lie ahead in the next five or ten years, is involved in an action which has strategic implications and yet we are talking potentially of a very senior officer, perhaps a politician, becoming involved directly at the patrol level. Is that a reasonable vision or is that wholly unreasonable?

(Air Vice Marshal McNicoll) I do not think it is just a theoretical issue. Let me give an example. The apprehension of indicted war criminals in the former Yugoslavia or in Bosnia is an operation which could easily have strategic impact. It would probably be carried out, and I cannot comment on events that have happened or may occur in the future, by a relatively small number of people, and certainly you are looking at the tactical level there, and yet I can imagine that people at the most senior levels would be interested should that operation not go to according to plan and might wish to be involved in the decision making process if something had to be done rapidly. A suitable network might give you the ability to do that and that would actually enhance your capability and not detract from it.

Mr Jones

There is obviously going to be an emphasis on more technology as these concepts are developed. Has any thought been given to the challenges that are going to be faced in terms of recruitment, in terms of the type of people that you will have to recruit in the future to carry out this type of doctrine or actual work and equipment technology that will be used?

(Air Vice Marshal McNicoll) I will hand over to Hugh in a second but I think it is true to say that the armed forces today are recruiting in many ways different people from those that we wanted 20 or 30 years ago across all levels. We do need to recruit people who are more technologically aware, who are more aware of the opportunities presented by technology and who are more capable of using them. In terms of implementation, I do not know if Hugh has anything to add.

(Mr Kernohan) A general point is that as the nature of the equipment changes it is not the ability to become better at making equipment that does not break down that matters. It is the ability to be aware of what it offers which may be more important. As you know, recruitment is a continuing challenge. We cannot get enough people with all the technical skills that we need at the moment, and as to the longer term impact of that, we do not know.

Is this not going to put some more pressure on you in terms of recruitment, if you are looking for people who, as the Air Vice Marshal said, have an understanding of technology or an ability to learn technology? Should not the MoD be doing something around that if the average squaddie you want to employ, say, in 20 years' time, will be very different from the one you are going to recruit today? Is there any thought going into that?

(Mr Kernohan) Yes, there is. One of the themes in the Defence Training Review is one of the things that underpins the Armed Forces Foundation College, the sense that we need to train the people in the way that we want them and what we want them to be. The issue is as much attracting them into the service in the first place. Why do people want to join the armed services? The recruiting effort is and continues to be considerable and we do not see it getting any smaller.

Syd Rapson

At the risk of being facetious, 15-year olds now can use computers like nobody on earth and it would be much better to have a lot of 15-year olds fighting the war than a lot of old people like us. I wonder sometimes how we will get this concept right when I see them operating faster than the speed of light. I cannot believe it, so perhaps we need to think about that and also probably about whether or not women would be more useful in a dextrous way to fight these warfares in future. Those things are out of the loop of your thinking presumably.

(Air Vice Marshal McNicoll) There is a serious point in there as well. Obviously, we are not about to start employing child soldiers but the sorts of skills that people are acquiring due to the computer age and the information age are skills which will be valuable, so perhaps the challenge in future will not be as high as has been suggested in that more people will have these skills.

(Mr Kernohan) It picks up a point that you made earlier about those up the chain, that actually those responsible for running the training and determining what sort of people we want have to recognise that this change is taking place.

Chairman

I shall arrange for Mr Rapson to receive the documents I received recently on child soldiers. I think 17 is beyond the pale, as do the people who have been sending us letters. What work has been done on the trialling implications of delegated decision making inherent in the detect, decide, destroy approach?

(Air Vice Marshal McNicoll) We have been involved in some exercises and some experimentation work in the United States on this but I think we are very conscious that we need to experiment here in the UK as well. You may have been briefed on an experimental network integration facility which the equipment capability area is planning to bring in which will give us, I hope, as well as the ability to integrate in the technical sense, also the ability to do experimentation on these aspects.

Is Joint Service Doctrine a subject for any of the forces int his complex, or should it be, or will it be?

(Mr Kernohan) It certainly should be and it is.

(Air Vice Marshal McNicoll) I have addressed both the Advanced Command Staff Course and the Higher Command Staff Course since my arrival and appointment and staff at the JDCC are regularly engaged at the Staff College to ensure that what we are writing is what is taught and what is challenged.

The Chief of Defence Staff has expressed the view that integrated joint operations represent the UK's advantage in asymmetric warfare. How does this play in doctrinal terms?

(Air Vice Marshal McNicoll) Could you ask the question again?

Yes. The section really is on asymmetric warfare and the New Chapter of the SDR based on expectations. Asymmetric warfare would be the norm for the future but asymmetrical operations are inherently difficult to plan for. The Chief of Defence Staff at RUSI on 18 December said that "integrated joint operations are our asymmetric advantage". Of course now you remember everything the Chief of Defence Staff said. It did need me to remind you and now you know it.

(Air Vice Marshal McNicoll) Regrettably I was not present but I did read the speech.

Of course. I will repeat the question. The Chief of the Defence Staff has expressed the view that integrated joint operations represent the UK's advantage in asymmetric warfare. How do you think this plays out as far as you are concerned in doctrinal terms?

(Air Vice Marshal McNicoll) Can I say a couple of things on asymmetry first? Asymmetric warfare is not anything new. The whole point of warfare is to try and play to your strengths and against your opponent's weaknesses and that applies to us as much as it might apply to potential opponents. That said, in the asymmetric situations that we find ourselves in at the moment, I think we have got a number of strengths. One of them of course is, as the Chief of Defence Staff pointed out, integrated joint operations. The other is the sort of technology that we can bring to bear and the degree to which we can knit that together. I think that is lying at the heart of what we are talking about here with network enabled capability. It is trying to get for us the asymmetric advantage.

Have you been writing about this or thinking very seriously about it, or will it appear in any revision to your document?

(Air Vice Marshal McNicoll) I have a number of points here in Joint Vision which relate to asymmetry. As I said earlier, we will try and get that to you but we have already been writing some themes on asymmetric threats. In the area of potential threats we have already recognised the increasing trend, particularly by non-state combatants, to use asymmetric attacks. We certainly understand that adversaries are likely to search out our weaknesses in order to undermine our own role. We understand, as I was talking about technology, that utilising high technology is something that we will continue to aspire to do in order to try to gain an asymmetric advantage. However, that dependence on higher technology is not the answer in all situations and the asymmetric actor will try and position himself in complex terrain, and by that I mean in urban situations or in jungle or in mountains where our high technology gives us less of an advantage, so that the possibility of a move towards high technology will drive our opponent to seek lower technology solutions which render our higher technology less effective. We have also in our thinking looked at the subject of protection of our forces and understand that with regard to protection of our networks in the future, for example, if you rely on a network it is a potential area of vulnerability. We also understand that we need to protect all our rear area to a greater extent given that the enemy is likely to adopt asymmetric means to attack that.

It will be interesting when you have developed your thinking, if it is not just confined to the normal readership of British defence publications. It seems to have a direct relevance to intelligence services and the Fire Service, etc. It not just a military reaction.

Patrick Mercer

Gentlemen, we have already touched on counter-terrorism, but how useful has Britain's previous experience and indeed doctrinal thinking been for counter-terrorism been since 11 September?

(Air Vice Marshal McNicoll) Enormously so. As you rightly point out, there is a history which stretches over - well, it does not matter whether we start in Malaya or Northern Ireland or wherever.

The Indian Mutiny perhaps.

(Air Vice Marshal McNicoll) Yes, or any part of UK military history. In that sense, if it can be put as an advantage the UK was rather better placed than perhaps it might have been on the back of these events. What of course was different about 11 September was the scale and severity and some of the aspects of the people involved as well.

What new doctrinal work has that caused to be undertaken? For instance, are you trying to work to a counter-terrorist doctrine? You may already be there; I do not know.

(Air Vice Marshal McNicoll) There are different levels in that. If I just go down through the various levels of doctrine, at the military strategic level I think we are content that the British defence doctrine actually captures the enduring fundamental principles that apply to counter-terrorism operations as much as they apply to any other operations. At the operational level we have a publication which is usually abbreviated as UK Ops Doc which covers how the senior level commander looks at all aspects of operations, including counter-terrorist operations. We are though very conscious that if we are looking in the home framework rather than overseas, it is not our lead. We cannot have an operational or strategic level doctrine for a counter-terrorism operations which is a defence lead. We do have, for example, such things as the Military Aid to the Civil Authorities handbook, the so-called green book, which you will be familiar with. We also are working to try and ensure that our thinking post-11 September actually is consistent with what was there pre-11 September. Turning to the tactical level doctrine, if we get down to the lowest level, and here I am speaking on behalf of my Army colleagues who happen to have the lead on these tactical level doctrines for counter-terrorists, there is, for example, the Army Field Manual which deals with this and also with counter-insurgency, and it really gives generic guidance for techniques, tactics and procedures which are applicable across the spectrum of operations, including counter terrorism. The tactical procedures were written at Headquarters Land and Headquarters Northern Ireland based on that and the training aspect of that is done through the Operational Training and Advisory Team. If you work from the top to the bottom the detail and the specificity of counter-terrorist operations increases until down at the tactical level, which is mainly, as I say, a land environment function, it is dealt with in increasing detail.

The business of home defence, and I fully appreciate that it should not be a defence-led issue: who is tackling that at the moment?

(Air Vice Marshal McNicoll) This is an implementation thing as much as anything else, so in broad outline it is a Home Office lead and obviously the Home Secretary chairs the Civil Contingencies Committee and there is a Civil Contingencies Secretariat which takes the lead in co-ordinating this.

Chairman

We know about it in great detail.

(Air Vice Marshal McNicoll) In that case I am going to hand over to Hugh to answer the remainder of the implementation aspects.

(Mr Kernohan) I am tempted to quote your own annual report and say that the answer is Sir David Oman and Susan Schofield who are driving the work forward at one level.

Patrick Mercer

May I press you on this? Are we going to have a doctrine for homeland defence or whatever phrase you wish to use?

(Air Vice Marshal McNicoll) We are working on the military aspects of homeland defence and security operations. The point we are trying to make, which I am sure you do understand from what you have just said, is that this is not in the strategic sense a military lead. We are contributing.

(Mr Kernohan) In one sense the outcome of, for example, the Civil Contingencies Bill, could be analogous in some ways to what in military terms is doctrine. Doctrine is a concept which means something within the military environment. It is not one that a policeman or an emergency plan in the National Health Service would necessarily recognise. That does not mean they do not do it but they may call it something different. Within our terms we are working on the doctrinal aspects of the military contributions, many of which are well established and will not change, in some of which, because we are expanding the capabilities, particularly in command and control and in the regional contingency planning, there is work going on and that is being done within Land Command. A single national doctrine for a homeland defence is not, I think, a concept that that other people would recognise in those terms because they are military labels.

Chairman

They might not recognise it but it is necessary. This goes back to an earlier question. We are still operating in the digging of trenches. You are working on how to bring the Army, Air Force and the Navy together and somebody - it could be Ms Schofield who knows the MoD - should be working also in bringing the military and the MoD in closer liaison with the other government departments.

(Mr Kernohan) That is exactly right. It is also bringing them in closer liaison with each other, not just us with them. That is what the role of the Civil Contingency Secretariat is and that is certainly how Susan sees it.

Oh, she does?

(Mr Kernohan) Yes. She is there to drive forward a set of aspects related to what we label homeland defence, a term I do not like because it has all sorts of connotations of Russian Special Forces combing the beach.

Patrick Mercer

If I may come to the business of countering terror in this country, we have seen some clear articulations about how terror must be addressed abroad in order to stop it striking in this country and that is therefore clearly a military function, led by the Home Office, led by the Ministry of Defence or a combination of the two. What I am hoping you are going to say is that as it is extremely difficult now to distinguish between internal security and external threat there is going to be an overarching policy which guides the fireman, the policeman, the soldier, the territorial, the reserve sailor, whatever, so that, as this threat evolves into missiles, rogue aircraft, anthrax attacks, we have a guiding principle that that will assist us to overcome this.

(Mr Kernohan) Yes, there is work which is going on also within the Cabinet Office under Sir David Oman to put a long term counter-terrorist strategy to ministers. It is intended to be completed later in the course of the year, which will cover all these strands, both home and overseas, and which will identify the areas for action on things that need to be improved in addition to those things which are already in progress.

Just repeat the timings please when we might see this work.

(Mr Kernohan) It is in progress at the moment. I think it is planned to put it to ministers in the late spring. I am not sure exactly what public form it will take thereafter and it will have layers as far as the domestic package is concerned.

(Air Vice Marshal McNicoll) Can I just add to that? From perhaps too narrow a perspective the MoD is completely clear about what it is doing in this area and whether it is countering the rogue aircraft threat, for example, or measures which we are already well aware of in terms of reserves. All of these aspects following SDR New Chapter in the homeland side have been followed up. The integration that you talk about, which I understand is taking place, is an external to the MoD lead which we are assisting in.

Patrick Mercer: I do understand that. Thank you for clarifying it.

Chairman: We were less concerned in our report about what the MoD were doing and more concerned about what other departments were doing or not doing.

Rachel Squire

We have briefly touched on some other areas that we can spend hours talking about individually: pre-emptive doctrine, rules of engagement and international law. We have certainly in the public arena heard a great deal about the Bush administration's reference to a doctrine of pre-emption and some would say that in a military sense it makes no difference whether an operation is pre-emptive or not, but we are curious about the significance a pre-emptive doctrine has for the legality of rules of engagement and also international law and its interpretation when it comes to armed service personnel in operation. Can I first of all ask you a more general question? To what extent do you think this development of a doctrine of pre-emption affects the parameters of UK doctrine?

(Air Vice Marshal McNicoll) If I can come at that slightly obliquely, the first point is, if I may quote a couple of lines out of the White Paper, "We have made clear that our responses will be proportionate and in accordance with our international legal obligations and it should be clear that legally the right to self-defence includes the possibility of action in the face of an imminent attack". With regard to the question that you are posing in the specific form, we from the JDCC would say that the full range of effects that we are trying to achieve - prevent, deter, coerce, disrupt, destroy - are open to us in the face of an imminent threat and that we would want to start at the "prevent" end rather than at the "destroy" end. That said, it is not a JDCC function, in fact, it is not even strictly a military function at all, to decide on the legality of the use of force. As you may be aware, the MoD Legal Adviser is part of the Treasury Solicitor's Office and is ultimately responsible to the Attorney General on advice on the legality of the use of force in armed conflict, and that decision, whether or not any proposed action would meet these legal tests, is one that is not taken lightly and is taken at the level of the MoD Legal Adviser and potentially the Secretary of State and others. That is not to say that in our doctrinal thinking we have not thought through the implications of the statements here that we may obviously be required to act speedily in the face of an imminent threat. In fact, that is the thrust of the SDR New Chapter, that we want to be able to have the ability to react precisely and speedily to a threat wherever it presents itself.

(Mr Kernohan) It does not, as you say, make in many cases a lot of difference to military doctrine the purpose for which the operation is taking place. If the decision is that in the operation the use of force is legal and that ministers direct that the MoD carry it out, then the doctrine that Ian and his team write is what guides how that is carried out. There is a gap that we can see, if you like. There is a concept in play at one extreme which is that of domestic law enforcement, which is underpinned by a focus on the individual, innocent until proven guilty, and a series of statutory constraints on the use of force by the state. At the other extreme you have the classic concept of warfare where the focus is not on an individual but on a collective, the enemy. It is not about life and death. It is about the enemy's objectives, his will to fight and his capabilities and the constraints in the use of force are different and they are a matter of political choice in circumstances at the time. There is a sense that at the moment, as a result of 11 September, there is an area of activity, a series of threats that we are having to face that somehow fall in the middle and that is the question that we are wrestling with and I am not sure we have got the answer. The answer, when it is formed, - and it probably does not bear directly on military doctrine, on how military force is applied, -----

Mr Jones

Can I ask you a question on that point? We went to Operation SAIF SAREEA last year and in the planning stage there one thing that was emphasised as part of the exercise was, for example, running by the lawyers that what the engagement was going to be was within the law as you have described it. If we are going to get a situation though whereby it is a pre-emptive type of doctrine or way forward, surely that is going to be different from what is there at the moment which is really governed, as you say, by law, and I know it is taken very seriously by military in terms of making sure that the action they actually take does fall within international law and the rules of engagement in that theatre of war.

(Mr Kernohan) Everything we all do, whether military officers or civil servants, is governed wherever we do it by UK law. Any action must therefore be legal in terms of statute. The question of international law is open to interpretation in the light of the circumstances of the event and policy does not necessarily determine the answer in advance.

The commander in the field, for example is not going to take some action without ensuring that what he or she is doing falls within that law, whereas what we are talking here surely is, if we are following what Bush and the administration in the United States is saying, perhaps stepping outside what is both at the moment legal in terms of UK law and potentially in terms of the international situation. Where does that leave the commander in terms of consulting the lawyer?

(Mr Kernohan) The commander's position - and this is defined in doctrine - will always be clearly stated in advance. He will be given his mission, he will be given the constraints on his actions. This is the purpose of rules of engagement that we were talking about at various different levels in order to ensure that the action the commander takes is within the boundaries of law.

(Air Vice Marshal McNicoll) I see this as being less of a tactical problem as you have described than it is at the strategic level. The real question is: is what is being proposed consistent with the UK's obligations under international law? That is perhaps the determination that is made at the strategic level within the MoD. You would not expect a commander off his own bat to take some pre-emptive action, for example. The authority for doing so will remain at the highest level in the MoD and outside the MoD indeed.

Chairman: Yes. Military personnel are subject to international law as well as domestic law.

Mr Jones

But do you not think it needs clarifying? Does it not muddy the waters if you talk about pre-emptive action? I can understand the difference you have made between the strategic level and the command level, but if, for example, we get a situation where more decisions are going to be taken at the front line very quickly, the onus is going to be pushed on to the commander in certain situations where pre-emptive -----

(Air Vice Marshal McNicoll) I think that is what the Chief of Defence Staff was talking about when he was talking about how we may need to examine the structures for that decision making process. The key point is that the decision maker must be the appropriate person to make that level of decision and it may, in circumstances where you are trying to apply the rapid and precise use of force, require a decision at the tactical end very quickly and that may require you to reach back and cut across the structures in order to get the decision. I still feel that that is a problem for the system to assist the commander in the field and it is not, I suggest, basically a problem at the tactical level.

(Mr Kernohan) One of the significances of the network is that it may give us the opportunity to take action that we would not otherwise be able to take precisely because it gives a speed of decision at the highest level, whatever level is determined as necessary. It may allow us to contemplate operations that ordinarily we would not because we could not take the proper decision in enough time.

Mr Cran

Can we move on to doctrines for special forces? If I understood you, Mr Kernohan, I agree with your views about the use of the word "doctrines". I think it is not the right word. Anyway, for the purposes of now we would be interested to know how the doctrine for Special Forces is integrated with all other aspects of military doctrine. Of course, we are asking this question because of the enhanced role which the Special Forces now have. We are of course aware of the fact that much surrounding Special Forces is classified, so I am merely asking you to speak in general terms.

(Air Vice Marshal McNicoll) I can answer your question in part but not in whole. We have recently produced a Special Forces doctrine at JDCC in conjunction with the UK Special Forces. That document obviously is classified but it is intended to inform the wider audience within the UK armed forces of the utility of Special Forces and how they are employed. What we are not engaged in and what I understand the MoD does not make a practice of commenting on anyway is actual details of Special Forces' internal doctrine.

Mr Cran: You anticipated my next two questions, which were, are you involved and who else is involved. You have answered those, so we can move on, Chairman.

Chairman

Should information operations become an overarching strategic concept for UK defence planners?

(Air Vice Marshal McNicoll) We now view the information campaign as being the central part of the campaign, information in the widest sense encompassing all actions of the campaign. The effects based targeting that I talked about earlier is very definitely part of that and our aspiration to move towards effects based operations is also part of that. I think I am agreeing with your position.

Is specialist information superiority training needed and is it being taught all over again?

(Air Vice Marshal McNicoll) People do require specialist training for specialist appointments but I think there is a generality which means that everybody involved needs to have a better picture and that in fact is part of policy on information operations.

How are you going to keep current with doctrine? Once you produce your most recent documents you will still be functioning, I presume, and topping up, or will you be disbanded?

(Air Vice Marshal McNicoll) I think producing doctrine from scratch the way this organisation did was a bit like building the Forth Bridge, but we are now into painting it.

Chairman: You will still be here. Thank you so much for coming.