Oral evidence

Taken before the Defence Committee

on Wednesday 18 June 2003

Members present:

Mr Bruce George, in the Chair
Mr James Cran
Mr Mike Hancock
Mr Gerald Howarth
Jim Knight
Patrick Mercer
Syd Rapson
Mr Frank Roy
Rachel Squire

__________

Witness: MR BALTHASAR STAEHELIN, Delegate General for the Middle East and North Africa, International Committee of the Red Cross, examined.

Q429  Chairman: Thank you very much for making the journey, Mr Staehelin. As you know, we are undertaking an inquiry into the lessons of Iraq. We look forward to hearing of your experience and that of your organisation. Would you like to make any preliminary remarks?

Mr Staehelin: Yes, very briefly. On behalf of the ICRC, we would like to thank you for your invitation to this session. The ICRC is a neutral, independent humanitarian organisation which strives to bring protection and assistance to victims of armed conflict and internal strife, according to its mandate under international humanitarian law. Having been present in Iraq since 1980, it decided to remain operational during the recent conflict, as we did in 1991, with a focus on life-saving activities and on visit to prisoners. I am happy to provide the perspective of a humanitarian organisation which situates its role and its activities in a legal framework and to talk about our activities prior, during and after the combat phase. A dense interaction has indeed taken place with all parties to the conflict, including of course the United Kingdom, both in and outside Iraq. I would also like to thank you in advance for your understanding that I will not be able to elaborate on certain issues, namely issues related to the bilateral confidential dialogue between the ICRC and the authorities concerned. Indeed, this confidential approach of the ICRC has allowed it to access victims of armed conflict all over the world, in the accomplishment of its mandate.

Q430  Chairman: A really difficult question for you to answer first. You have partly answered it already. For those of us who are not excessively familiar with the ICRC, could you give us a brief outline of your aims and functions, and what makes you believe that the ICRC is different from most other NGOs?

Mr Staehelin: First, I would refer to the legal framework of the Geneva Conventions, which give precise tasks to the International Committee of the Red Cross and provide guidance for our operations. In an international armed conflict our role is very clearly stipulated. The protection activities are among the functions which are the best known, namely visits to prisoners of war, to protect the persons according to the Fourth Geneva Convention, and the central tracing agency of the ICRC is also mentioned in the Convention. So, in the name of protection, we have a very clear-cut role, which we strive to accomplish as best we can. Assistance to victims of armed conflict is also mentioned in the Convention, and the ICRC sees its approach as trying to combine protection and assistance activities in a comprehensive whole. As regards Iraq, we have been involved in the previous wars --- in the Iran-Iraq war, where we visited prisoners of war. Only recently did we see repatriation of prisoners of war of that conflict, which dates back to 1988. We remained operational in 1991 and carried out our activities, including again visits to prisoners of war; the re-establishment of family links, which is very important and where we work together with the national societies --- the Red Cross and Red Crescent societies of the world, including the British Red Cross Society --- and, in this most recent conflict, where we have decided, in spite of considerable risks, to remain operational with expatriate staff in Baghdad in the north and, very rapidly, also in Basra in the south.

Q431  Chairman: What makes you very different from most of the other NGOs, apart from history?

Mr Staehelin: To a certain extent perhaps others would be in a better position to talk about the differences, but I would say that we have a sui generis status according to international law, which means that we are not an international organisation with states on the board. It means that we have the independence necessary for the accomplishment of our mandate. We are not an NGO, because international law gives us a status. This is also reflected, for instance, in the observer status we have with the United Nations, et cetera. There are the headquarters agreements which we have in many countries of the world. In this sense there is a combination of the independence of our action and an obligation of the High Contracting Parties to the Geneva Conventions, in international armed conflict, to allow the ICRC to work in a variety of fields. Afterwards, that provides an excellent platform and clarity to become operational. One thing which is of great importance is to have a dialogue with all parties to the conflict; a relationship of trust with all parties to the conflict. In this sense also the ICRC insists on talking to all the parties to the conflict, regardless of whether they perceive each other as enemies or as people one should not talk to. Referring to the recent experience, this meant that we had a dialogue with the government of Iraq prior to this conflict, on our work and on our planned operations. We had an interaction with that government --- and this is absolutely clear --- as a party to the conflict.

Q432  Mr Cran: Yours is obviously a very important humanitarian organisation. If I heard you properly, and I think I did, you said that your organisation had been in Iraq since 1980. Thus, you would be in an ideal position to outline to the Committee what the humanitarian crisis was in Iraq before the conflict. Could you set that out for us?

Mr Staehelin: The country has greatly suffered from two consecutive wars and the general situation has further deteriorated, due to the sanctions. The situation prior to the war was already a difficult situation and this is also why the ICRC has, over the last year, conducted rehabilitation work in hospitals, in water and in sanitation systems --- rehabilitation work which has given us a capacity and knowledge of these systems to act on them during the combat phase, because we knew the systems and we knew the interlocutors. This has helped us greatly. Certainly it was not a normal situation prior to March 2003.

Q433  Mr Cran: Could you give us a little more about the dimensions of the humanitarian crisis as you see it? You have mentioned water, sanitation and so on. Can you widen this out a little, to give a feel, to somebody who may not have been there, for what this crisis was like? Because you have not given that to me yet.

Mr Staehelin: I cannot pretend that the ICRC itself conducted data-gathering, so I cannot provide you with precise ICRC-established data on child mortality, on the precise state of the health system. However, from the experience of my colleagues in Iraq --- and perhaps that is not the type of precise figure you would wish to have --- what we have seen is a health system which has struggled to cope. We have also seen, for instance in the medical field --- this is an illustration --- that doctors did not have access to training, to medical literature. We have been active in this field, providing training and literature. We have realised that, to a certain extent, Iraq being isolated from the rest of the world has had a negative impact on the health system, on the water system, on the education system. But I cannot provide you with precise data on the situation.

Q434  Mr Cran: That is understood, but what we can perhaps say is that the crisis we are talking about, the humanitarian crisis, is a very serious one indeed on, so to speak, the Richter scale of these things. You would be able to say that, would you?

Mr Staehelin: Our president, when recently visiting Iraq, has said that, today, we do not face an acute humanitarian crisis.

Q435  Mr Cran: We do or do not?

Mr Staehelin: We do not face an acute humanitarian crisis. What we face is a situation in which insecurity, a certain absence of administration, has created a precarious situation; but that if security can be re-established, if salaries can be paid again, if local administration, et cetera, can resume its function, then we do not have a major humanitarian crisis. So we are at a moment where ICRC feels the evolution could go in two ways, and it is critical to have improvements in the spheres I have mentioned. But we do not qualify it as an acute humanitarian crisis.

Q436  Mr Cran: I am conscious of the fact that you are not able to produce statistics and so on, but what you can do is give us a very informed opinion. Are you able to tell us in what ways --- because there must have been ways --- in which the humanitarian crisis, or whatever words you wish to use, was exacerbated by the conflict itself?

Mr Staehelin: What we have seen is that the impact of the breakdown of law and order was massive, and perhaps even went beyond the impact of destruction caused by the hostilities themselves. In terms of international humanitarian law we regard the situation in Iraq as a situation of occupation, which means that there are responsibilities of the occupying powers. One responsibility is the establishment and upholding of law and order. It is true, however, that the destruction and the insecurity after the conflict probably had a greater humanitarian impact than the hostilities themselves.

Q437  Mr Cran: Against the background of the conflict, at least in formal terms, being over, are you in a position to tell the Committee in which areas is this humanitarian crisis improving, receding --- whatever words you wish to use? Is the water under control? The sanitation? The health service --- whatever?

Mr Staehelin: I think that we have a mixed picture, but I would also like to say that, to the best of my knowledge, it has not been officially declared that the conflict is over. If that were the case --- if all the active hostilities were really over --- that would induce the obligation to release all prisoners of war, according to the Third Geneva Convention. We still see combat operations in parts of the country. To the best of my knowledge, therefore, it has not yet been declared as over. We have seen certain improvements. For instance, I understood, when talking to my colleague in Basra, that the water and electricity situation has improved and has almost reached prewar levels; but the prewar levels were not necessarily satisfactory for the population. There is therefore still much to be done, and the insecurity nevertheless remains a widespread problem. Perhaps it is not the type of collective looting that we saw in the early days, but I would say that crime is a major problem and also a major element hampering, or at least making difficult, the operations of humanitarian institutions.

Q438  Mr Cran: It is a fluid situation that we are dealing with, presumably, and a changing situation within Iraq. Is that leading to any changes in your own organisation's activities or priorities within Iraq?

Mr Staehelin: During the major combat period we concentrated essentially on life-saving activities, with our people who remained in Baghdad all through this conflict. That basically meant interventions in the hospital system, but also in connection with the water system. The priority we identified before the hostilities broke out --- water --- proved to be crucial in this conflict. I would refer back to the question as to what is the added value of the ICRC and what makes the ICRC specific. There was one operation which we were able to carry out in Basra, when an ICRC team, with the agreement of the Iraqi government who at that time still controlled Basra, managed to reach the main pumping station, which was in an area controlled by the British forces. We also had the agreement of the British forces to this operation. I would argue that that is a typical situation where we had the trust and dialogue, as a totally neutral, apolitical, purely humanitarian actor, to go across international borders --- because we came from Kuwait to go across front lines which were unstable --- and to carry out such an intervention, preventing a massive displacement of the population of Basra. I would say that, for me, is an example of why it is so important to be able to preserve the independence of the ICRC, and its operational ability is linked to it.

Q439  Mr Hancock: I was very interested to hear you say that relationships are important for your organisation. I would be interested to pursue that point. Could you tell us a little about your relationships before the conflict started with the Iraqi authorities? Not at national level but at city level, local government level, in places like Basra and Baghdad. And whether or not they saw you in any way as a threat to what they were trying to achieve, or if you were there in any role other than a purely humanitarian one, trying to assist them?

Mr Staehelin: I believe that they did not see us as a threat. I think that they have observed the ICRC at work since 1980. Perception-wise, with the authorities but also the Iraqi population, there has been a close association with our work on behalf of prisoners of war. For many people in Iraq, the ICRC was the institution visiting prisoners of war, repatriating prisoners of war. So I think that was perhaps the main element, perception-wise. The ICRC was not able, in the previous situation in Iraq, to communicate, to have dissemination programmes, to further explain its principles and its mandate. In terms of access to the interlocutors, we enjoyed access at ministerial level prior to the eruption of this conflict. I myself went to Baghdad and met with the minister of foreign affairs, mainly to discuss our operational preparation for a possible outbreak of a fully-fledged war. We had contacts in Basra. We were one of the very few international organisations being tolerated in Basra; being able to operate in Basra. We had contact with the governor in Basra. I met with the governor in November. I think that we therefore had a correct access to the authorities and could raise a variety of issues, including important issues on which I cannot elaborate. Also, for instance, the issue of persons unaccounted for since the 1991 war --- a file which, for many cases, is still unsolved.

Q440  Mr Hancock: Air Marshal Burridge, who is Commander-in-Chief of the British Forces engaged in the coalition action and who gave evidence here, said that he did not believe there was a humanitarian crisis in Iraq; that it was a crisis of failure of the infrastructure, and that was not primarily the responsibility of the current action but more the regrettable lack of rebuilding which took place after both the Iraq-Iran war and the first Gulf War. Do you share that view?

Mr Staehelin: I have not seen his testimony. What I would like to state is that, in my view, the current authorities are the occupying powers. In this sense they have a responsibility for the well-being of the population. The failure of the infrastructure, regardless of its source, is a real humanitarian problem for the population, which needs to be addressed. So I am not sure that I would be able to make a distinction between failure of the infrastructure and humanitarian needs if the failure of the infrastructure is such that it induces humanitarian needs.

Q441  Mr Hancock: But you were there for most of that 10-year period, were you not?

Mr Staehelin: Yes.

Q442  Mr Hancock: Surely your organisation was making reports about what was going on? It was not uncommon for the water supply to Basra to fail, from what I gather, and the infrastructure was shot. On many occasions the water was imperfect: so much so that warnings were issued to the population not to drink the water until plant had been rectified or until something had been added to the water supply. Surely you were very critical of the Iraqi regime for not dealing with that --- or were you not?

Mr Staehelin: What we try to do is make a contribution to the improvement of this water system. Indeed, prior to the last war there was already a problem in terms of water. If you look at an infrastructure which has difficulty in coping, you have a variety of impacts. Let me take as an example the breakdown of public transport. Today there is a difficulty with public transport and there is the difficulty of salaries not being paid. Our delegates realised that this meant the cleaning staff in hospitals could not come to work. It seems trivial, but it is quite a delicate issue. If a hospital is not cleaned constantly, you can quickly have a difficult humanitarian situation. Some Iraqi staff have been so dedicated that they have shown up without being paid for months; but if there is no public transport they do not necessarily have the financial resources to pay for a taxi to access the hospital, without being paid. That would reduce the very little cash reserve, if any, they still have. That is a new problem, because the public transport functioned beforehand. So there is a problem linked to infrastructure problems, and to a certain extent absence of local administration, which goes beyond the problems which we saw beforehand.

Q443  Mr Hancock: Your colleagues alleged that, in the early days of the British participation, British soldiers were actually selling water to people. Have you any proof to substantiate that claim?

Mr Staehelin: To which statement do you refer?

Q444  Mr Hancock: One of your colleagues representing your organisation made a public statement to the effect that water was being sold by coalition forces south of Basra in the early days.

Mr Staehelin: I am not at all aware of the statement. I would be happy to check it, if you wish, if you could give me the reference. I am not aware of such a statement being made.

Q445  Mr Hancock: Your colleagues, giving evidence at the Council of Europe on this, made that statement again. I am interested to know where and how you have attempted to substantiate that, because I thought that it was a very poor slur.

Mr Staehelin: I am not even aware of one of my colleagues having appeared, so I wonder whether that was really a representative of the International Committee of the Red Cross or another ----

Q446  Mr Hancock: But you are not aware of any such incidents happening?

Mr Staehelin: I am not aware of water being sold to the population. Personally, I am not aware of that and I am not aware of a statement made to that effect by the ICRC.

Q447  Mr Hancock: Are you satisfied that the right conditions are now prevailing to ensure that the aid that is going into the country is being directed to those who most need it? Is it being properly monitored by the coalition forces there?

Mr Staehelin: I do not think that I have the knowledge to answer this question.

Q448  Mr Hancock: You do not have people on the ground who are reporting back to you on these matters? You say that there is still a problem there. I am interested to know how you can say that there is still a problem, but you cannot tell us whether or not the aid that is going there is being directed to the right people.

Mr Staehelin: It is easier for us, by our observations which are on the humanitarian needs of the population, to pronounce on the humanitarian needs of the population. It is probably more difficult to pronounce on whether or not the aid which is invested is used correctly. I cannot pretend that the ICRC has the capacity or even the willingness to monitor aid flows and has access to all the information to form ----

Q449  Mr Hancock: How do you know if it is better or not then? How do you know that it is not being sold on the black market?

Mr Staehelin: We monitor the relief assistance which we bring in. So I can certainly pronounce on what we do. I do not think that it is the task of the ICRC, however, to monitor the overall aid effort provided to Iraq. We can and do go to hospitals; we look at the situation; we look to see if there is a functioning system. In the early days we sometimes saw, within two or three days, three or four different hospital directors --- which makes it extremely difficult to know who to talk to. We can see whether the water is functioning in these hospitals; whether the patients are returning; whether there is security provided, or whether local militias have taken over the hospital. So I think that we can have observations on those situations in humanitarian terms, but we cannot necessarily have an overall idea of the ----

Q450  Mr Hancock: Are you in a position to make an observation to us, based on your experience and that of your colleagues, that people who were in need of humanitarian aid before the war started are now in receipt of the humanitarian aid that they needed? Is their position effectively better now than it was before the war?

Mr Staehelin: You mean the overall Iraqi population, in all its different aspects?

Q451  Mr Hancock: I imagine that a considerable number of Iraqis did not have a problem. Those who were Ba'ath Party members and supporters of the regime appeared not to have a problem; but a substantial number of Iraqis had severe problems. I want to know whether or not the war has made a significant change in their humanitarian needs. Are they in fact better off now than they were before the war?

Mr Staehelin: I do not think that, as of now, they are better off. I was recently in Baghdad myself. What struck me was the number of people who do not go to work because they feel that insecurity obliges them to stay at home with a gun to protect their property. People feel that the insecurity is so great that they do not dare to venture out. I was sleeping in a residence where the neighbour is up all night with a machine gun in his hands, in fear of being looted. I think that the insecurity is not only a problem for the population, in the sense that it is very unpleasant to experience it, but it also has a negative impact on the possibility of the population to conduct economic activities. In this sense the situation is certainly not better right now than the situation before the war, in terms of humanitarian needs.

Q452  Mr Hancock: Can I take you back to something you said regarding the role you had, where you crossed out of Iraq into Kuwait and then back from Kuwait to go to Basra, to sort out the problem with the pumping station and with water? That was under the control of the British forces there?

Mr Staehelin: Yes.

Q453  Mr Hancock: What was your role when you got to the plant? What was your organisation's role? The British army were in control of that situation and presumably aware of this. You are not suggesting that the British were deliberately not allowing the water to flow to Basra, are you?

Mr Staehelin: No, on the contrary. I wanted to mention it as a very positive example of the dense interaction we have had with the British armed forces. I feel that all parties to the conflict have accepted our role. We have had a good access to the British forces, and there was a willingness to have the ICRC, as a strictly independent organisation, operate in a very difficult combat situation. I wanted to give it as a positive example and certainly not as a negative example.

Q454  Mr Hancock: But what was your role?

Mr Staehelin: The problem was that you had, in the north of Basra, a raw water pumping station, providing water to treatment stations for Basra and its surroundings. We are talking of well over one and a half million people. Due to electricity failure, the raw water pumping station could not operate. Our role was basically to try to ensure that the back-up generators to this raw water pumping station could be hooked to the system. The problem is that these systems are very complex. It needs local engineers of the local water boards to perform these operations, because we are talking about huge generators. If not properly switched on, they can actually destroy the whole system. So there was an interest on the part of the Iraqi water board and ICRC engineers --- because we have our own national staff engineers in the water and sanitation field in Basra --- to access this raw water pumping station and to hook up generators. There were six generators.

Q455  Mr Hancock: So they physically did the work?

Mr Staehelin: We had the agreement of the Iraqi authorities inside Basra and of the British forces --- both having an interest that the water came back to the town --- to have a team composed of Iraqi technicians from the water board, under the umbrella of ICRC technicians, to go out and perform the work themselves, with the agreement of the parties to the conflict. So the work in this instance was indeed carried out by us.

Q456  Mr Hancock: Can I ask you an unconnected question, about the role which kept you in there? That is, the issue of the prisoners and the unaccounted-for people, going right back to the Iran-Iraq war. When one of your colleagues was giving evidence at a previous session, not of this Committee but another organisation, they made the point that they believed there were literally hundreds, if not thousands, of Iranian prisoners of war in Iraq. Has that materialised since the regime disappeared? Have those people shown up?

Mr Staehelin: No, they have not. We have had one interesting operation, which I would also mention as a positive example of co-operation between the British forces and the ICRC. In Az-Zubayr, in the south of the country, a warehouse was identified and found to contain a few hundreds of mortal remains. We were approached by the Iranian authorities, who were under the impression that Iranian mortal remains were in this warehouse, and they asked us to intervene. We approached the British authorities to secure this warehouse, because we felt that it was very important that the mortal remains were not disturbed --- which was done and subsequently, on 18 May, we repatriated 45 mortal remains of Iranian soldiers. At the same time, 84 mortal remains of Iraqi prisoners of war and former soldiers were handed back. I think that is an example of a successful operation where the ICRC, in its humanitarian role according to the Geneva Convention, managed to facilitate the repatriation of mortal remains between Iran and Iraq. It was no longer the Iraqi authorities on the Iraq side but it was indeed British officers signing the handover certificates.

Q457  Mr Hancock: Were you surprised about the mass graves that were found around Basra, containing people who had recently been killed? As you had people on the ground in that area, was there no knowledge of this having happened?

Mr Staehelin: I think that the scope of it surprised everybody. It is one of the most pressing humanitarian issues we face today. There are an enormous number of Iraqi families who have suffered from a person unaccounted for, due to three wars but also due to internal violence. I think that it must be addressed. We have argued in favour of securing these grave sites, so that they are not disturbed. We argue very strongly in favour of an approach which is centred on the family. We think that, when looking into the issue of persons unaccounted for, we should put the families first, and we hope that this will be the approach chosen by the authorities.

Q458  Jim Knight: I want to return to the running order that we have agreed, but would just comment in passing on that last point. Last night I saw a film from a Member of Parliament who was in Iraq a week or so ago, showing families digging through plastic sacks of remains, with ID cards in them. They were completely insecure, and it was very difficult to stop them because they were so keen to find their families. Returning to our script, what operations were your personnel able to carry out during the conflict and, on the flip side of that, what operations were they not able to carry out because of the conflict?

Mr Staehelin: When we decided to remain operational in Iraq, we said that we only wanted to do this if we could really make a difference in terms of life-saving operations. In this sense, we built up an operational capacity to act with a logistic system; but we also reinforced the dialogue with all parties to the conflict, prior to the conflict, in order to be sure that we had their support for our independent humanitarian mission. We identified as priority areas the water supply to towns; we identified the health system, emergency assistance to hospitals; we identified prisoners of war who needed to be visited. We also built the capacity to be able to assist up to 150,000 internally displaced persons. Luckily, there have been far fewer cases. There have been massive movements in the north of Iraq, but people have found shelter and have not needed humanitarian assistance. Luckily, this last priority --- for internal displacement --- has not materialised. However, revisiting the issue of the water repair in Basra, if we had not been able, with the agreement of the parties to the conflict, to be able to repair the water in Basra, we would have seen hundreds of thousands of people looking for water and we could have seen a problem on a major scale. Looking at the issues, I think that we have been able successfully to visit the prisoners of war held by the coalition forces. We have received early access. As of 31 March we have been able to carry out those visits, and we have since extended the operations, not only to prisoners of war and civilian internees but also to recently arrested persons accused of common-law crimes, and indeed protected by the Fourth Geneva Convention which gives us the right to visit them too. It has certainly been important to carry that out. Very unfortunately, we have not been able to have access to the prisoners of war held by the Iraqi authorities. This is extremely regrettable and I can assure you that we have not spared any efforts to be able to have this access. But the very speed of the operation has meant that our initial confidence, based on the public and bilateral affirmations of the Iraqi ministers at the time, has not been borne out. This is something we regret very much and where we feel that we have failed.

Q459  Jim Knight: Was there anything else that you would have liked to have done?

Mr Staehelin: In terms of water we have been able to make very important interventions, in Basra and in Baghdad, namely in vital structures such as hospitals but also water-trucking and repair. We have had mobile workshops which were repairing all the back-up generators which would otherwise have failed. So I think that we have had a major impact in terms of water. The same goes for the health system. The health system was well stocked. The Iraqi authorities had taken measures beforehand to stock an enormous amount of drugs and medical equipment in the hospitals. Where we have not been able to succeed is that large parts of Iraq were not accessible to the ICRC. We have very much concentrated on the northern government, where we could freely move. We have been in Basra and the southern region; but, for instance, only very latecould we access Nasiriyah, Karbala, and all these towns. So there was, south of Baghdad, a part of Iraq where our teams could not deploy their efforts. Luckily, when we returned after the end of the active combat phase, we realised that the humanitarian needs were perhaps less than feared.

Q460  Jim Knight: Have you been positively assisted by the Ministry of Defence, by DFID, to enable you to do the work you want to do? How would you compare the co-operation of our Government to the US Government in those areas where they were in control?

Mr Staehelin: We certainly felt that there was a great understanding. I would like to pronounce on the British forces now, without comparing them with others. We have had an understanding of our role, also of our limits, of our modus operandi, and of the law which underlies our operations. We have had access to appropriate levels, in the field and outside of Iraq. In this sense I think that we can say that we have had support for our mission, without any attempts to go against our independence, and this was certainly appreciated by us.

Q461  Jim Knight: Did you have any consultation immediately prior to the conflict as to what sort of reconstruction work might be required, given the level of the infrastructure that you would be aware of because you were there? Was there any discussion of post-conflict work with you?

Mr Staehelin: The discussions before the conflict were essentially on our own conflict preparation and on the legal framework regulating conflicts. There was also dialogue on the law of armed conflict.

Q462  Jim Knight: What impression did your personnel get of what life was like for civilians living in Basra and Baghdad during the conflict?

Mr Staehelin: I think that life changed dramatically, in the sense that, in the early days of the conflict --- and this applies also to our delegates --- air raids were made at night. During the daytime you had an astonishingly normal situation, with people venturing out and moving around. Bombardments at night represented a great stress for everybody living there, including our delegates, but it was clear when air raids would take place. As the conflict went on, this became less and less clear, in the sense that you would have air bombardments during the daytime. Indeed, the alarm system of Iraq became less and less reliable; sirens would go off and on without any apparent link to air movements and bombardments. It became more and more hazardous for our delegates to move around town because, inevitably, if you moved around town you might pass a ministerial building --- so moving around became more and more an issue of concern. Once electricity stopped functioning --- luckily, at the very end --- that had a major impact on the town in terms of security, or rather insecurity. No lights, no street lights. That represented a considerably changed climate. So, for the population, a stressful situation which became more difficult.

Q463  Jim Knight: Finally, on 25 March there were reports of a civilian uprising in Basra. Did your personnel who were there at the time offer you any evidence that such an uprising was taking place and, if so, were there any implications for civilians in Basra and for your staff?

Mr Staehelin: To the best of my knowledge, we have not observed such an uprising.

Q464  Mr Roy: Can I continue on the Basra theme at that particular point in time? We know that expatriate personnel returned to Basra on 29 March but why did you withdraw them in the first place, before the conflict?

Mr Staehelin: We decided to keep expatriate personnel in Baghdad, six persons and, in the north, four persons. We decided not to keep expatriate personnel in Basra but to keep a national staff team --- for the simple reason that we felt we were not known well enough in Basra. We were afraid that, in a situation of chaos, we would become the targets of a mob. We felt that in the north and in Baghdad we had a more solid anchorage, explained by the historic depth of our presence, which we did not have in Basra. Also, whilst ICRC, as you know, wants to be operational on all sides and not move in a theatre of operations behind enemy lines on one side --- and this is one reason why we wanted to remain in Baghdad --- in Basra we expected a relatively sweeping advance, with the front line established behind this advance. It is true that we said that it was logistically more feasible to come in this time behind the lines. We did not anticipate that Basra would at one stage be a besieged town. We had not anticipated that at all. We had not anticipated the nonlinear situation in the south --- where our teams were operating almost as the only international humanitarian organisation --- in a situation where the front line was not very clear. In terms of security management that was a challenge, because if you have a clear front line you can establish a contact with commanding officers on both sides even over the front line; but if you are in a sort of patchwork situation, it is far more difficult to operate. Retroactively, it was easier for us to come back, after having pulled out of Kuwait; to have contact with the commanding officers at the different levels; establish contact, and enter Basra from outside. I fear that if we had kept the team inside, we would have found it more difficult to establish contact with the British forces. It also has to be said that, one day after the British forces moved into Basra, contact was established at the regimental level and, two days later, at the brigade level.

Q465  Mr Roy: Were those the reasons that you were able to cross the front line at that particular point? It is our understanding that was the only occasion when you were actually able to cross the lines and you did not do it anywhere else.

Mr Staehelin: There were several moves. You had a convoy of aid entering Basra on 4 April with medical goods. The very first repair work took place on the 26^th Marchand then we redeployed our staff to Basra on the 29^th. We had various movements of teams from Kuwait to Basra, and also from Basra to the pumping station. We had international border, cross-border, operations and cross-line operations on various occasions.

Q466  Mr Roy: Was that the only region though where you were able to cross the military lines in such a manner --- south of Basra?

Mr Staehelin: I think that it probably was, yes. We have had international cross-border operations, for instance, from Iran into Iraq; but it is true that, in terms of an open front line in a combat zone, it is probably the most significant example.

Q467  Mr Roy: If that was the only area where you did cross the lines, was it because of the relationship you had built up with, for example, the army personnel that were there? I am trying to get to exactly what were the circumstances that allowed you to cross those lines.

Mr Staehelin: I cannot now think of other cases where we tried to do it and we did not have the support of the parties to the conflict to do so. It is true, however, that if we managed to do so it was because there was a good understanding by the British forces of who we are and, I think, a degree of trust that we are a purely humanitarian actor. Similarly, the Iraqi governor at the time felt that we were trustworthy, and that Iraqi water board officials sent out to repair a water pumping station under the auspices of the ICRC with ICRC technicians would only do that and nothing else. To a certain extent, without wanting to level everything, in the type of work we have, you need a relationship with all parties to the conflict to be able to have these cross-border operations. But I think that the fact that British troops knew us --- they had some previous operations in other countries, or by training --- and the fact that we have been able to have good access to the officers proved instrumental. I think that they were very supportive of our mission, and indeed happy that the water was reinstalled --- as were the Iraqi authorities inside the town.

Q468  Chairman: You obviously operate, almost by definition, in a precarious environment where, although you try to be very prudent, it can be very risky. Do you have in your headquarters a security department? When you move around in dangerous areas do you have to hire people to come in to stand guard over your property, or protect you personally? Or would you just have to rely on the armed forces or the police who happened to be in control when you were operating? When you transport food and water, do you have to make arrangements to protect that from people who would come and steal it, or harm your personnel?

Mr Staehelin: We do have a security unit at our headquarters, providing advice and working on approaches. We have a security concept based on seven pillars, which is in the public domain and on the website. One of the main pillars is the acceptability by the parties to the conflict. Everything rests upon the fact that everybody basically agrees with our presence and agrees that we should carry out our humanitarian mandate --- which means a sustained dialogue with all actors carrying weapons in a conflict. That can be states, as in the recent conflict, but in certain areas of the world it is a patchwork of groups and it is extremely complicated. Security management is very much exercised by the field staff. One important aspect is notification. Notification of buildings, in order that you are not targeted or hit. It can also mean notification of movements. Prior to the conflict, we established with Central Command protocols on air movements, land movements, communication --- respectful, of course, of our independence. We were very happy that we were granted, as the law stipulated, unhindered access in the field and an unhindered right to move in the field. We insisted on having liaison officers on all sides, including the Iraqi side, to be able to notify our movements and the purpose of those movements. Normally, we do not use armed guards because we consider them as a source of insecurity rather than security. If you use the armed guards in a conflict zone, you transform yourself into a possible target. We therefore prefer to go on our own. We do not ever carry weapons, and we rely heavily on being accepted by the parties to the conflict. The only exception is that in some countries you have crime. It can happen in some exceptional circumstances that, for instance, a warehouse is protected by armed guards against criminals. But we would never ever try to impose our presence with arms upon one party to the conflict. That would be totally contrary to our way of operating.

Q469  Chairman: Have you lost people? Have people been killed?

Mr Staehelin: We have very sadly lost one Canadian colleague, who was killed in Baghdad during a crossfire incident. We were not targeted, we established later. It was one of the six expatriate volunteers who remained in Baghdad.

Q470  Patrick Mercer: Between the end of the fighting and the arrival of the other humanitarian agencies there was a gap in both time and circumstance.

Mr Staehelin: Yes.

Q471  Patrick Mercer: How did you manage then? Were you able to plug this vacuum?

Mr Staehelin: It was an extremely precarious situation in terms of security. We were still under the shock of the death of one of our delegates. We were in a situation where we feared that our delegation in Baghdad would be looted, and we were happy that coalition forces there established law and order in the part of town where our delegation was situated, and where also a hospital was situated. That was helpful in terms of not being looted. What we also realised was that our in-depth knowledge of the systems, of the water and health infrastructure systems, proved useful to the joint efforts of all concerned to get these systems up and running again. We had interesting situations where Iraqi technicians approached us and told us that they would be ready to work with coalition forces to restore these systems under an ICRC umbrella, but they would not be ready to meet with foreign soldiers bilaterally, because that would be treason to their country. However, if it was overseen by the ICRC and within a framework guaranteed to deal only with the re-establishment of these public services to their population, they would be ready to meet with them. For instance, in Basra we very rapidly had such meetings, which were facilitated by the ICRC and which I think were conducive to re-establishing water and electricity in the town. A similar experience took place in Baghdad.

Q472  Patrick Mercer: When the other agencies began to arrive, how did that affect your work?

Mr Staehelin: It is certainly welcome that other humanitarian actors come in. It was a tremendous weight on our shoulders during the phase of major combat to intervene, with limited means, on life-saving matters. We realised that there was a certain gap between what humanitarian organisations can deliver and the expectations of the Iraqi population. The Iraqi population today appears to be most concerned about security. Obviously, humanitarian organisations are not in a position to provide security. They are very much concerned about having a government which functions again. Again, humanitarian organisations are not in a position to deliver. They are interested in receiving salaries. Humanitarian organisation may intervene on salaries, but it would not be the prime action. So there was a certain gap. Some of the NGOs came and said, "There isn't a humanitarian catastrophe. What we can bring to the table is therefore not the most appropriate answer", and left. We have had instances of NGOs actually pulling out again.

Q473  Rachel Squire: I am very interested in whether there are any particular new lessons that the ICRC has learned from the Iraq conflict. For instance, I was listening carefully to your comments about water-trucking, the mobile workshops, the focus on hospitals, your comments about the need for a family approach to bodies that are uncovered in mass graves, and your comment just now about the gap between what you can deliver as a humanitarian organisation and what the population of Iraq is looking for. My first question, therefore, is whether any of those that I have just mentioned, picking up on your earlier comments, are new lessons for your organisation? Are those things that you have learned and had experience of in previous conflicts?

Mr Staehelin: To be perfectly frank with you, we have not yet carried out an internal review on this operation, which is still ongoing. It would be thinking aloud if I gave you my personal comments on it. For me, the lessons are reconfirmations rather than new lessons. I think that our insistence on our independence, our insistence on having a dialogue with all parties to the conflict --- even parties which are regarded as parties one should not talk to --- is right. We need to talk to everybody who carries arms in conflict zones, in order to accomplish our mandate. We need to defend this independence space. It was not really necessary in this conflict. We felt there was a large support for our way of operating; but, in other conflicts, I think that it is very important that we defend this humanitarian independence space , which is not instrumentalised by one or other party to the conflict. Secondly, we had the difficult situation of seeing a war coming --- as nevertheless a distinct possibility, without wanting to take it as a foregone conclusion. Rather than to speculate on possible scenarios, we tried hard to prepare solidly for this eventuality, whilst of course hoping that a peaceful solution could be reached by other means. Much of our capacity to work during the conflict was built upon very solid and serious preparation. That also means the preparation of the hospitals, for instance, in Baghdad, in terms of water; an acknowledgement that interventions on systems are far more efficient, even if they are less visible than, for instance, water-trucking. It is true that we did some water-trucking, but it is a drop in the ocean. It is far more efficient to repair the water systems, the big water pumps, because the water trucks will never reach a sufficient number of persons. For instance, the distribution of bottled water is really a drop in the ocean in most situations. This approach, focussed on reinforcing systems with a solid preparation, is certainly something which we want to pursue in similar situations. Water has also rightly emerged as an important problem in times of armed conflict. Some years ago there was a debate even in the ICRC whether water was really an issue in which the ICRC should be involved. Is it really relevant in a conflict situation? Is it really part of our mandate? I think that Iraq has nevertheless shown that, in such a situation, water was absolutely vital. People had food stocks. Food was not the problem in this war. But if the water had been cut, it would have been a major problem. I think that also one lesson is that sometimes you have to prepare, even if you cannot be sure that your preparation will pay off. We prepared for 150,000 IDPs. We bought relief items; we established a system of warehouses; ICRC trucks --- because we know that ICRC trucks with expatriate drivers can cross front lines whereas local drivers often cannot, because people do not trust them. So we have invested in certain fields which were not necessary to that extent. For me, the lesson learned is that it was right to do so --- even if I am very happy that this internal displacement has not taken place on that scale. I would still regard it as the right decision to have this capacity. Lastly, it is important to communicate what you do. What the ICRC has done in this war, perhaps more than in previous conflicts, is try to be transparent as far as possible on what it does and why it does it. We have issued daily bulletins; we have put them on the website. We have communicated in English and French, but also in Arabic. We have had a large investment in trying to put across our priorities and our independent, purely humanitarian way of operating, to all the constituencies. I think that it was picked up by the Iraqi population, from Radio Monte Carlo and other outlets. I think that it contributed to the fact that we were not deliberately targeted by any of the parties to the conflict.

Rachel Squire: You have made the point about neutrality. Also, trying to communicate that to a population, who may well have never heard of you before, is a lesson that has global application --- not just for the Iraq conflict.

Q474  Chairman: Has your organisation made some sort of assessment of the damage that was caused by the bombing, the looting, and other criminal activity? I know that it will not be an exact science, but has anybody tried to give some kind of notional figure of the damage?

Mr Staehelin: I am afraid that we have not been able to map the damage. Also, at the beginning of the conflict, we provided some of the figures on injured persons --- figures we established by visiting the hospitals. We quickly came to the conclusion that it was impossible. We did not have access to all the hospitals. For instance, we did not have access to the military hospitals in Baghdad. It was very difficult for us to assess whether the persons in hospitals were civilians or military. We did not know the circumstances, so we stopped providing figures. We rapidly came to the conclusion that we could not provide statistics on the war damage.

Q475  Chairman: So you will not have made any calculations of the cost of repairing the damage?

Mr Staehelin: No, we have not.

Q476  Chairman: Has anyone done that, do you think?

Mr Staehelin: Not to my knowledge, but it is absolutely possible that it has been done without my knowing.

Q477  Syd Rapson: On 11 April you made a very rare public statement, criticising the allies and pleading for more security to protect the infrastructure, the hospitals and the water supply against looting and destruction. We can understand that, but I wonder whether or not the security system did improve due to your pressure and the public statement, or whether it is just a natural evolution which will happen anyway? Has the security changed since 11 April?

Mr Staehelin: I would say that the statement has had an impact. The statement has followed bilateral dialogue. I would perhaps dare to disagree that it was a "rare statement". The ICRC has often put forward its humanitarian concerns in a public way. For us it was important. We felt that if immediate action was not taken to protect the hospitals, this would create a major humanitarian catastrophe, and that it was our obligation to ring the alarm bells. We have done so. I think that it was well understood, and it has had an immediate impact on a variety of medical structures which were subsequently protected.

Q478  Syd Rapson: Is the security system at the moment impeding the restoration of the infrastructure?

Mr Staehelin: There is still looting and it is an enormous challenge to protect all installations. We have constantly argued that, in addition to the hospital structures, the water system, and indeed the electricity system needed to keep the water system running, are also installations which are of priority concern. I agree that it is a challenging task. I am not myself of a military background, so I do not think that I am in a position to give advice on how it should be done. But we have constantly argued that it is extremely important that these installations be protected.

Q479  Syd Rapson: Is the humanitarian aid itself able to be supplied at a level you would want, or is it still held up due to the security system? We do not know. We just assume that the place is calming down. One wonders whether or not the security situation is impeding that humanitarian aid, as well as protecting the water supplies.

Mr Staehelin: In certain instances it can impede access. To give you but one example, ICRC still does not use the road from Amman to Baghdad and has not used it since the beginning of the war. We judge it as simply too dangerous. Part of our humanitarian relief arrives by plane. We were the first organisation to operate civilian planes in what is still military airspace over Iraq. For me that is another example of the support we have had for the accomplishment of our humanitarian mission. To give you but one example, on the very same day that I accompanied our president on a visit to Baghdad in early May we had a Hercules coming from Amman bringing in humanitarian relief. We came from Cyprus, and we also had a jet coming in from Teheran, bringing back Iraqi prisoners of war who were released by Iran --- prisoners of war dating back to the 1988 war. So we had three ICRC aircraft arriving on the same day. On the one hand, it shows the co-operation we have had to operate these aircraft, which is very positive; on the other hand, it shows that certain roads are still considered to be too dangerous for us, and that there is certainly still work to be done to secure the country, in order that everybody can operate safely.

Q480  Syd Rapson: Could I ask you to make a guess? There is obviously a difference between air-supplied humanitarian aid and the lorries.

Mr Staehelin: Yes.

Q481  Syd Rapson: The lorries are still vulnerable to attack. Is there a quantifiable difference between what is getting in by air and what could have come in by road? A guess that perhaps 80 per cent more could get through if it were by road? It is obviously not the same, is it?

Mr Staehelin: I am afraid that I would not be in a position to give percentages. ICRC is not really an actor in the food sector, so I do not want to elaborate on issues which I do not know well enough. The World Food Programme would be the appropriate one to pronounce. However, it would seem to be almost impossible to bring in all of the food supplies by air, and I think that it is operated by lorries. In our view, however, the major challenge today is not so much bringing in lorries of humanitarian relief goods, but to establish a functioning administrative system. That would perhaps have a more direct or rapid impact, because we do not have a humanitarian crisis which would need thousands of lorries. We really need a structure to run the country.

Q482  Patrick Mercer: Moving on to the vexed question of cluster bombs and the disposal of unexploded ordnance, the ICRC are quoted as saying that they believe that cluster bombs in particular should not be used in populated areas. Can you expand on that for us, please?

Mr Staehelin: That is correct. I am not myself a lawyer, but what we have seen is that the cluster bombs or artillery-delivered submunitions have had a negative impact in certain countries. Essentially, we present three questions. One is the question of targeting: that all ammunition targeting must be done in a way that it can distinguish between military and civilian objectives, and that it is proportional. Secondly, we have the issue of the explosion rate of this ammunition. Some figures I have seen suggest that up to 10 to 30 per cent of this ammunition does not explode upon impact and afterwards represent hazards to the population, but also to peacekeeping troops or humanitarian actors, or whoever moves on the field. The clearance is a third important issue, in terms of the ammunition which has not exploded and should be cleared. While the weapon as such is legal, it is not exempt from the rules applicable to all weapons. In this sense, the ICRC has suggested that one might consider regulating the use of this ammunition and not to use it in densely populated areas.

Q483  Patrick Mercer: We took evidence from one of the Defence Ministers a couple of weeks ago, where he confirmed that the British had not used cluster weapons in the populated areas but suggested that these weapons had been used in the periphery, in the outskirts of populated areas. Would you have a comment on that?

Mr Staehelin: We have already had, prior to this war, awareness campaigns for the population in the south, due to the concentration of explosive remnants of previous conflicts, which already represented a challenge. We have since stepped up these efforts to alert the population to the dangers, with the help of the Iraqi Red Crescent Society. Indeed, the first convoy coming into Basra on 4 April carried material, leaflets and posters, which we had produced previously because we were very aware in our contingency planning that this would be an issue. In our experience, without being able to pretend that we have an intimate knowledge of exactly which type of weapon was used where, we have rapidly informed the British forces of places where such unexploded submunitions were detected by our team, and they have immediately cleared these places. There was certainly a willingness to try to act swiftly and to clear these regions. Where we were under the impression that they were overstretched, in terms of resources, was with the perhaps even greater problem of enormous amounts of ammunition, and indeed weapon systems, scattering the south. We notified places which we found, with a request to try to secure these sites and actually to take out the ammunition, because children started to play with it and it was quite dangerous to the population. There, I think, there was certainly not a lack of will but perhaps a lack of resources to respond as rapidly as we would have wished.

Q484  Patrick Mercer: Have you discovered or been made aware of cluster munitions in populated areas?

Mr Staehelin: As far as I am aware, it was artillery-delivered submunitions which were used in the south and not air-delivered cluster bombs.

Q485  Patrick Mercer: In populated areas?

Mr Staehelin: I know that we have had one incident in which two persons were killed in or around Basra, which we immediately notified to the coalition forces; but I am not sure whether it was in the town or on the periphery of the town.

Q486  Patrick Mercer: This is probably impossible to answer, but do you believe that these are munitions from the recent conflict or from previous ones?

Mr Staehelin: Yes.

Q487  Patrick Mercer: From the recent one?

Mr Staehelin: I think that the ones which we notified for immediate clearance were of the recent conflict, but I do not know the precise location.

Q488  Patrick Mercer: You have already touched upon this, but how have your staff worked on the ground to avoid civilian casualties in the presence of unexploded ordnance?

Mr Staehelin: During the intense phase of the combat there was not much we could do; but, as soon as it was possible, we started to draw upon the persons we had previously trained of the Iraqi Red Crescent Society and have added volunteers, who were trained. It is now well over 100 who go round with this awareness material and try to inform the population of this danger. Of course, that does not solve the issue. It is important that the population is made aware that there is the issue of clearance, which will be a major headache --- clearance of the explosive remnants of war of the recent period, but also clearance of all of the explosive remnants of the last decades. Our regional adviser on this issue covering the Middle East, who is a man of military background and who has long been active in this field, has said that, if you look at the overall situation in Iraq, it is the worst situation he has seen in many years of experience. I think that it is a substantial problem, which will plague Iraq for a while.

Q489  Jim Knight: Continuing with explosive remnants but not specifically relating to cluster bombs, in a press notice of 1 May the ICRC stated that it had identified around 30 sites in Basra containing explosive remnants of war. Can you tell us how many of these sites have now been secured or made safe, to your knowledge?

Mr Staehelin: I would have to get back to you on that question. I do not have the information at my disposal right now.

Q490  Jim Knight: With any of these things, if it is better to give us a written note then that is fine and very helpful. Do you have any idea of how many more sites have been identified since 1 May?

Mr Staehelin: I would prefer to get back to you in writing on that also.

Q491  Jim Knight: The indication we have had is that it is substantially more. There is a Written Answer in Parliament, identifying 400 sites containing unexploded ordnance within the British area of control in Iraq. How do you believe that the disposal of those remnants should be prioritised?

Mr Staehelin: I think that certainly areas in which you have a lot of population movement would have to be dealt with as a priority, namely sites inside town. We have had ammunition found in primary and secondary schools, in kindergartens, and that would logically be a first priority. Sites which are perhaps outside of town --- the desert, et cetera --- could be dealt with as a second priority.

Q492  Jim Knight: Reports of ordnance amongst rubbish on the side of the roads --- would that be reasonable?

Mr Staehelin: That it would be mingled?

Q493  Jim Knight: Yes. Various garbage, detritus, of whatever description.

Mr Staehelin: In terms of booby traps? People had an enormous amount of ammunition and they basically dropped it wherever they were. In Baghdad I have seen relatively small positions, supposedly to defend a building. So it is absolutely feasible that you would find ammunition next to dust bags. That seems possible.

Q494  Jim Knight: To what extent does the presence of all of this unexploded ordnance impede the other work that you have been talking about --- the repair of essential infrastructure, the provision of humanitarian assistance and other matters? You have said that this is a really big problem, and particularly bad from this conflict. Is this something that we have to tackle first before we can hope to make great progress on the other hand?

Mr Staehelin: It really very much depends what type of explosive remnants you are talking about. Whether you are talking about mines from previous wars, which make whole areas inaccessible; whether you are talking about ammunition dumps in schools; whether you are talking about unexploded submunitions --- it is different types of explosive remnants of war, but they certainly have an impact on the possibility by the population to access certain regions and to develop economic activities in these regions. So I think that it would be a priority to map and mark the sites. Whenever we come across such sites, in the first place we informed the coalition forces with forms in which we gave all the details, and now we give them to the United Nations Mine Action Centre. We hope that a clear mapping and marking will emerge as a first measure, coupled with an awareness campaign for the population, to control the situation; and subsequently there must be clearance, according to a priority which experts are in a better position to define than myself.

Q495  Jim Knight: Finally, are the coalition forces giving enough priority to this issue?

Mr Staehelin: We in the field have always felt that there was an interest in trying to respond but that they were really overstretched --- terribly overstretched. They have a relatively small number of teams to deal with such matters and the sheer size of the problem is overwhelming.

Q496  Rachel Squire: Can I move to the obligations of the occupying power? You have already made some related comments that, in the view of the ICRC, the breakdown of law and order in some respects has had a greater impact on the civilian population than the conflict itself. I understand that the main sources of law on occupation are the regulations annexed to the Hague Convention and the Geneva Convention. You yourself have stated that, on the basis of that law, "the coalition forces, in their role of occupying power, have a key part to play in stabilising the situation and in enabling Iraqi civilian personnel and structures to resume their functions". Can I ask you about the fine balance in international law between the requirement for the occupying power to stabilise the situation in Iraq and the requirement for it to respect local laws, civilian personnel and structures? When is an occupying power, in your organisation's view, entitled to overturn local laws and dismiss local public servants? Would such action be a breach of international law?

Mr Staehelin: First, I have to admit that I am not myself a lawyer, so forgive me if I am imprecise. It is the view as I interpret it, as someone who has worked for over a decade with the ICRC. In my understanding, the Fourth Geneva Convention in particular tries to reconcile the need of an occupying power to impose itself, in a situation of belligerent occupation, with the essential rights of the population under occupation. In this sense it is not a human rights catalogue, but a carefully crafted reconciliation of the legitimate need to uphold security with the needs of the population. Essentially, occupation is a provisional state and the occupying powers are a caretaker for the authority of the country. They can take certain measures necessary for the implementation of the Fourth Geneva Convention and militarily to occupy territory. However, under the law as I understand it --- which does not confer sovereignty over the territory --- they should try as much as possible to leave the systems in place. In terms of dismissal of officials, I would say that if an official is seen as a threat to the security of the occupying power or as an obstacle to the implementation of the Convention --- which means establishing a system which serves the population efficiently --- I do not think that to dismiss that official would be a contradiction of the Convention.

Q497  Rachel Squire: I do not know whether you can comment on it, but do you or your organisation think that in that particular respect there has been any breach of international law in Iraq?

Mr Staehelin: In general, on the issue of possible observations of breaches of international law by any of the parties to the conflict, we would submit our findings to the authorities concerned in a bilateral dialogue, which would be of a confidential nature. In this sense, I would prefer not to start to pronounce on this issue because, afterwards, it would be too easy to induce --- when I do not answer! So I would prefer not to answer this question.

Q498  Rachel Squire: Can I ask you about UN Security Council Resolution No.1483, which was passed on 22 May and was very widely welcomed by anybody with an interest? It lifted the sanctions against Iraq and called on the coalition authorities "to promote the welfare of the Iraqi people" and also called for the formation "of an Iraqi interim administration", amongst many other things. Can you say whether there has been a practical effect in Iraq of the passage of that UN Security Council Resolution No.1483, or has it been high-sounding words which, practically, did not make that much difference?

Mr Staehelin: I do not think that I am really in a position to judge the direct impact of Security Council resolutions on the ground.

Q499  Mr Roy: Could I ask about the co-operation that you received from the Coalition Provisional Authority? How does that actually work --- or not?

Mr Staehelin: We certainly are in a dialogue with both the armed forces, in particular because we were there when they arrived, and it is true that we also had close contact with, first ORHA and then CPA, in the field of our interests. Our president met with Mr Garner at the time of his visit in early May, and our head of delegation met with Mr Bremer. We are in intense dialogue both with the armed forces and the CPA, mainly in Baghdad. In Basra in the south, operationally speaking, at this stage it is still predominantly the armed forces who are the main occupational interlocutor and, perhaps to a lesser extent at this stage, CPA.

Q500  Mr Roy: Could you give us some examples of where you have been able to co-operate?

Mr Staehelin: There are many examples. For instance, we have recently provided support to the central state pharmacy of Iraq because we feel that it is important that hospitals are not dependent just on ad hoc donations, which may or may not respond to their needs, but that we can again have a system of provision of essential drugs to all the hospitals in an organised and orderly manner. In this sense, we have argued very much for the re-establishment of a functioning central pharmacy for all the hospitals in the country. We have filled the gap , providing certain drugs mainly for the treatment of chronic diseases. For instance, we have an intense dialogue on this matter with the CPA, with a view to ensuring that this system can resume functioning. That would be a typical case. It is also important for us that the ICRC leads the efforts of the Red Cross and the Red Crescent movement and, in this sense, many of these national societies have an interest in deploying their activities in Iraq. What is important for us is that, for instance, if parts of the Red Cross and Red Crescent movement become active in the rehabilitation of health structures or water structures, we have interlocutors who remain stable, who are there for a sufficient time period, and who have the power to conclude agreements on such work and to establish policy. For the time being, we have seen a situation in which the system is emerging and in which it is not always easy to have a clear-cut policy on each and every issue. That has sometimes made it difficult to engage on issues, because we have also seen quite a change of officials on the Iraqi side --- persons who were appointed who then perhaps had to leave. It was not always easy to find the right interlocutors for the humanitarian organisations.

Q501  Mr Roy: Have the coalition forces granted you the space to carry out independent humanitarian actions?

Mr Staehelin: Absolutely. We have not, to the best of my knowledge, had any attempt to instrumentalise the ICRC or to use it in a political way. I felt that our independence was well understood. Operationally speaking, all parties to the conflict during the combat period realised that only by respecting the independence of the ICRC would it be possible for the ICRC to act. Contrary to some other conflicts where it is more difficult to explain why we operate as we operate in Iraq, to a certain extent people, having observed us either on the ground or perhaps indirectly, have been able to see how it makes sense operationally speaking and, hence, have a great readiness to respect that independence of the ICRC.

Q502  Chairman: Military personnel are increasingly doing what you would be doing and what the other NGOs have been doing by way of provision of humanitarian assistance. Does this trend have any effect on the way in which you are carrying out your activities? Is there any competition? Can you do things better than they do? Can they do things better than you can do them?

Mr Staehelin: What is important for us is that, in our reading of the situation and of the legal framework, there is a primary responsibility of the occupying powers for the well-being of the country. In this sense, I would not at all see operations to improve the situation on the ground by the coalition forces as something which is competition to us or to NGOs. On the contrary, I think that it should be welcomed. What is important --- and we have seen it in various contexts --- is that it is perfectly clear that there is no blurring of lines; that it is clear for Iraq that you have, on the one hand, a caretaker authority in this period of occupation which carries out certain tasks on its behalf --- as it should, and it is welcome --- and, on the other hand, the humanitarian organisations which operate independently. They can well coexist. However, what we resent is a blurring of lines which would entail perception problems, in that suddenly Iraqis would feel that the humanitarian organisations are in fact part of the coalition and, if they were opposed to the presence of the coalition, they would be opposed to the presence of these humanitarian organisations; that indeed the humanitarian organisations would perhaps at one stage even become targets of military action. In this sense, it is true that we are against the blurring of lines. In our recent experience, however, our head of the Basra sub-delegation has confirmed to me that he felt that, in the contacts with the British troops, there was no danger at all of a blurring of lines. He felt that they were clearly aware that ICRC did not wish to and could not have any blurring of lines. That is certainly something which is important to us.

Q503  Chairman: Quite understandably, your NGOs are unarmed and it might be dangerous, in the event of a war or the unclear termination of that war, for your people to be operating. Can you tell us what has happened? We were watching on television that the war had come to an end. We were expecting the NGOs who were waiting in Kuwait to charge in and deliver their expertise and their resources. Yet nothing happened for a while. We heard that you were all waiting for a signal from the military to say that the environment was now benign and you could move in. Can you give us a little background to that and how you felt? Did you or the other NGOs have to wait for an order to enter? Why was there this delay?

Mr Staehelin: I would not describe the ICRC as an NGO, because we have this status in international law. We are somehow not an international organisation, not an NGO, but something in between. The fact that we have this status in international law makes a difference and distinguishes us from the NGO community, also in terms of mandate, role and the possibilities of access. That said, it is true that, at a time when southern Iraq was considered not permissive by the coalition forces, ICRC deployed and worked in southern Iraq. For us it was very positive that, in the planned operation protocols which we concluded with CenCom, the Central Command, it was explicitly recognised that the ICRC has a task to operate in such an environment, and indeed should not be stopped from doing so. This was important. It allowed us, for instance, to cross from Kuwait into a combat zone in delicate circumstances. To a certain extent it is not easy for NGOs to operate in an environment in which insecurity is still a challenge to be managed. It is not easy to bring answers which perhaps do not correspond to the expectations of the Iraqi population. To a certain extent, if we perhaps have not seen a rush of NGOs into southern Iraq, it is partly due to security problems and it is partly due to the fact that the humanitarian organisations do not necessarily have the most appropriate answers; or that their answers would perhaps be consequent on other issues being solved. I think that underlines the point I made earlier, that I do not feel that we are in a post-conflict situation. Prisoners of war are not released; combats are still going on; the situation is volatile. We are not in a post-conflict situation in which the whole military dimension is over and we now, as NGOs, can go in and pick up the pieces. We are still in a different stage of this conflict.

Q504  Jim Knight: I have a final set of questions on prisoners of war, which were touched on earlier in questions from Mike Hancock, during which I understood that, on the whole, your organisation had had reasonable access from coalition forces to prisoners of war and that there were some problems with Saddam's regime giving you access to prisoners of war. Are there prisoners, beyond those you have talked about and in respect of those held by the Ba'athist regime, whom the ICRC were not able to visit --- held by the coalition?

Mr Staehelin: For years we have been able to visit detainees held by the Kurdish parties, linked to the inter-Kurdish conflict of the time. We were visiting persons held mainly in the camp near Umm Qasr, which was first run by the UK forces and later by the American forces. We conducted four visits. The first one lasted from 31 March to 6 April. That was a visit to 4,500 prisoners of war and civilian internees --- because it was a mix --- and the registration and interviews take time. We also visited, for instance, UK Field Hospital 34 in Az-Zubayr. We also visited UK field hospitals in north Kuwait and we visited a UK hospital ship. So it is true that our detention activities went beyond Iraqi territory and also encompassed two UK field hospitals and one UK hospital ship. We are now enlarging our operation. We have recently started, on 24 May, visits in the Baghdad region to new detention facilities. As we go along, this part of our work will become increasingly important.

Q505  Jim Knight: There is a report in a newspaper in this country that an ICRC spokesperson, who perhaps did not have the same views on the confidentiality of bilaterals on breaches of the Geneva Convention, said that there was a breach of the Third Geneva Convention in relation to a failure of the coalition authorities to grant the ICRC access to prisoners in the Baghdad area. Do you have any comment on that?

Mr Staehelin: My only comment is that the article was published a day after we started these visits. As far as I understand it, the interview took place a week beforehand. I do not regard it as a breach of confidentiality if a journalist asks us, "Do you have today access to all the persons protected by the Geneva Convention?" and we answer, "We have not yet access to all the persons". I would not regard that as a breach of confidentiality.

Q506  Jim Knight: Then if the journalist says, "If you are not given access immediately, is that a breach of the Third Geneva Convention?", you give a response?

Mr Staehelin: I do not think that the ICRC position, nor indeed the spokeswoman's position, was that the fact that we had not yet had access was a breach. I think that if we were to be refused access to a category of persons for a protracted period of time, that would amount to a breach. However, I do not think that the ICRC has ever qualified the delay of access as a breach.

Q507  Jim Knight: That was not the impression that we got from the article, but never mind. The number of prisoners of war held by coalition authorities in the south of Iraq has decreased dramatically, but increasingly these authorities are responsible for other prisoners --- many doubtless having committed criminal acts. Does the ICRC seek access to people other than prisoners of war who are held in custody by the coalition authorities? If you do, have you had any problems in gaining access to those people?

Mr Staehelin: We seek access to all persons protected either by the Third Geneva Convention or the Fourth Geneva Convention, which means prisoners of war but also civilian internees, administrative detainees --- persons who are interned and whose status must be reviewed at least every six months. Persons accused of common-law offences are also protected under the Fourth Geneva Convention, and we have a right to visit them. We have started visiting them in the Baghdad area.

Q508  Jim Knight: And access has been fine?

Mr Staehelin: We have now started to have access to these categories. There are new detention places emerging as we speak. We are committed to visit all of these detention places. All persons protected by the Geneva Conventions --- they are either protected by the Third or the Fourth and cannot fall between the two Conventions --- have the right to be visited by the ICRC. Of course that does not encompass if you had, for instance, American or British citizens being detained in Iraq. They would not be protected by the Convention, because they will be protected by the authorities governing the country.

Q509  Jim Knight: Are there any other circumstances, apart from that very last one you identified, where prisoners captured during the conflict might not be entitled to the protection of the Geneva Convention?

Mr Staehelin: The fact that a person is protected by either the Third or the Fourth Geneva Convention does not make subsequent criminal procedures impossible --- for instance, if a person committed a war crime. . The Geneva Convention does not shield a person from possible later criminal investigation. In this sense, for instance, every Iraqi person detained today in Iraq is either protected by the Third or the Fourth Geneva Convention and entitled to have ICRC visits.

Q510  Chairman: Thank you very much. That was very interesting. If there is any documentation that you have over the next few months --- because we will be continuing our inquiry into the autumn --- we would be very grateful to receive it. We appreciate your coming and talking to us.

Mr Staehelin: Thank you very much. I would also, if I may, refer to our website, www.icrc.org. I would also like to express my appreciation to all members of this Committee, not only for their interest but for their respect for the fact that I cannot pronounce on certain issues and for not having pressed me on issues on which I would not have been able to answer.

Chairman: If you had attended meetings of the Ministry of Defence, you would find that they had far more sections of policy that they are, for one reason or another, unable to talk about. We are well used to these restrictions. You are far from being the worst.