Examination of Witness (Questions 360-379)
WEDNESDAY 6 NOVEMBER 2002
SIR WILLIAM
STUBBS
360. Under what circumstances would you have
expected there to be an inquiry?
(Sir William Stubbs) They were telling me about the
average increase across three awarding bodies—and, by the
way, we are talking about an average increase because if you look
at individual subjects it varies significantly—and I was
saying if the increase was as significantly different as they
thought it would be from previous years we would have to as QCA
satisfy ourselves that that was justified on the basis of the
evidence. I said we would have to have an inquiry and they said,
"We don't want a public inquiry, can't you do it as part
of your continuing studies?" Not at the meeting but subsequently
we agreed that was probably the better way to do it, but we did
not have a fixed view in mind about X% or Y%. We wanted to be
sure that increases were justified.
361. There was subsequently an internal inquiry?
(Sir William Stubbs) No there was not because I was
not there to do it!
362. But there would have been?
(Sir William Stubbs) But of course there would have
been!
Mr Simmonds
363. If you say you successfully maintained
standards as you stated and the problem was a small one, why do
you think you were dismissed?
(Sir William Stubbs) I thought you might come to that.
I think this is, Chairman, sailing a little bit close to the wind
but it is a fair question to be asked and I am prepared to answer.
Chairman
364. You answer it in the way you wish.
(Sir William Stubbs) I do draw on notes because I
want to be careful on the record. On 25 September when the inquiry
was called, on two occasions I had informed the Secretary of State
directly that there was no evidence to doubt the results from
two of the awarding bodies, and that with OCR the number of students
affected was relatively small. That advice was not accepted. I
was speaking as the regulator on the basis of the evidence. On
19 September I had complained directly to the Secretary of State
about the continuing damaging references that were being made
by her staff about QCA to the press, and asked her to take action
to stop them. Notwithstanding that request, during the period
from the setting up of the Tomlinson inquiry until Wednesday 25
September, the Secretary of State herself made direct reference
to QCA as a possible cause of "the crisis" and her officials—and
I have mentioned them already—were directly briefing the
press that QCA was "dead in the water" and that by the
end of that week I would be gone as Chairman. When I gave evidence
to Tomlinson he specifically asked if QCA had been in contact
with the exam boards since the inquiry started. So he was alert
to the possibility of compromise. On being informed that I had
written a minute requesting all my meetings with QCA staff on
Tomlinson matters to be witnessed by the Chief Executive, which
I did as soon as I heard there was an inquiry, he asked to see
a copy of that. In other words, he was concerned about the integrity
of the process. Having given evidence at Tomlinson on the Wednesday,
that evening I was informed by Ken Boston that officials at the
department had approached chief executives of exam bodies to ask,
amongst other matters, if they would be prepared to accept the
recommendations of chief examiners which they had previously rejected.
I agreed with Ken Boston that this was improper and that he should
inform the Permanent Secretary. When the Permanent Secretary not
only confirmed that this was happening but it had been done on
the express instructions of the Secretary of State we were concerned.
I recommended he check to see if Tomlinson knew of the approach.
When he contacted Tomlinson, Tomlinson said he did not know and
asked Ken Boston if he thought the inquiry was compromised and
he should resign. Ken Boston, correctly in my judgment, although
he did not ask me when he made it, advised against that and said,
"You should press on." So we faced a situation where
(i) the Secretary of State had instructed her officials to contact
the exam boards without informing the Chairman of the inquiry;
(ii) the exam regulator had been bypassed; (iii) the Secretary
of State had become directly involved in suggesting possible grade
outcomes to awarding boards; and (iv) the Secretary of State clearly
had in her mind a possible outcome that involved widespread re-gradings
in bodies for which there was absolutely no evidence. So what
should be done? I had no confidence by that time in the DfES in
the light of continuing press briefings. We considered informing
the Secretary to the Cabinet, given his overall responsibility
for the Civil Service, but Sir Richard Wilson had just retired
and we did not know that evening whether a successor was in post.
Time was of the essence. The draft of the Tomlinson report was
due the very next day and I did not know who Tomlinson still had
to meet. I concluded that it was my responsibility as Chairman
of the regulator, not Ken Boston as Chief Executive, to bring
this action into the public domain. I had been due to speak that
evening on my appearance before the Tomlinson inquiry and chose
to do so then. I was a chairman independent of politics. You asked
me last time, Chairman, if there are occasions when I should be
banging the table more when unsatisfied with the Secretary of
State's decisions. I said that was not my style after 30 years
in education administration. However, on this matter I felt so
strongly that the integrity of the whole independent process was
being carried out in a way that was not impeccable and exceptionally
I considered I should speak out in this instance. I would be surprised
if that is not a factor in the Secretary of State's decision.
The other factor that she took into account—the perception
by the awarding bodies—the more the spotlight is turned
on those, the less we need to say about that, but she deemed I
was unfit and unable to be Chairman of the QCA. That is where
I now disagree and, as you know, a separate course has been taken
on that. I hope you find that helpful.
365. That is a very thorough answer to quite
a simple question but I appreciate the answer. Can I follow up
on one or two of the points you made there. Do you feel, bearing
in mind the evidence we have heard, both on a previous occasion
and earlier on this morning, where it seems to me most people
are saying that the problem or the "crisis" as it was
then called was no more than a storm in a tea cup, that you have
been dismissed and used as a scapegoat to try and divert attention
from perhaps pressure put on various areas from elsewhere?
(Sir William Stubbs) I do not like using the phrase
"storm in a tea cup" because for any young person to
get an A-level result that was invalid is for them no storm in
no tea cup; it is about their life. But when running national
affairs one has to keep things in perspective and there is no
doubt, as I said at the outset, there was no crisis, the system
had not failed overall and the perception was given that it had
failed. I believe that was wrong and as a result many young people
were worried unnecessarily.
Chairman
366. You are suggesting, to use your term earlier,
that the department `buckled' under pressure?
(Sir William Stubbs) I am in no doubt about it. In
fact, not only did they buckle under pressure, they did not ask
for the evidence before they called the second independent inquiry.
We had one called on the Monday, 16 September. Ken Boston was
asked to do one and by the Friday he had produced it. On Wednesday
18 September the Secretary of State had decided to have a second
inquiry and she had not seen the evidence because HMC, SHA, and
the girls' association said they would give it only to an independent
inquiry. At least I am assuming that is the case. If that evidence
was given to the Secretary of State and not to the regulator,
it would be a scandal. I do not think it was given to the Secretary
of State. So the Departmenty did panic, they lost their nerve
in the light of a storm of hostile press criticism, when I think
those responsible for national affairs should keep their mind
on the facts and behave calmly and steer the ship home, but they
did not do that.
367. Earlier I think you named specific people
who used what I found at the time to be offensive the term that
you at the QCA were "dead in the water". Can you repeat
to the Committee who you think said that?
(Sir William Stubbs) Yes. I am of the view that that
was said in briefings given to the press by Chris Boffey, the
political media adviser, I am not sure what his correct title
is, and the civil servant who is head of news, D J Collins, must
surely have taken a lead in this. Those were the ones I asked
the Secretary of State the week before when there was malign briefing
taking place, particularly during an independent inquiry, would
she act to stop it. If she did act, they did not stop. If she
did not act, I think that was abominable. But, of course, subsequently
Estelle Morris has said that handling media matters was an area
she was not very comfortable with. I believe that was a significant
part of the problem, the idea you could close down an issue quickly
by finding there is where all the action should be, there is where
the problem is, we have dealt with it, there is going to be decapitation,
and now we can move on and resume normal life. That is just a
panic reaction. The facts, as you now see, do not support it.
Mr Simmonds
368. Can I ask on a slightly different topic,
how independent did you feel your Chairmanship actually was?
(Sir William Stubbs) It is really how you approach
the job in some ways and what you bring to it. I felt if there
were things I wanted to speak out on and matters of principle
I could do it but I was required to do it behind closed doors,
notwithstanding the Chairman's encouragement last time we met
to maybe do it more vigorously. The flaw in much of the arrangements
over the first five years of the QCA's existence is Secretaries
of State requiring that advice was given to them privately. Indeed,
they used to keep it private for four months whilst they were
talking publicly about developing policy and our advice was now
being overtaken by events and would be published six months later
and looked very dated. I do not think that is healthy. I think
it should have been much more open. I never felt under the thumb
of the Secretary of State. I felt I was under considerable pressure,
and quite reasonably so in some cases. Estelle Morris was exceedingly
worried about the likely going down of Edexcel. If that had happened
this summer we really would have been in deep, deep trouble. So
she and her officials were on my back about that in regular meetings.
I think it is the way in which the meetings with the advisers
were private. There were lots of meetings with officials and they
drift from being formal, minuted meetings to informal discussions.
I do not think that is wise at times because it drifts into impressions
and non-minuted advice. So I believe the system would gain from
being more independent of the Department in any event, but particularly
now that the political ambitions or political success of the Department
is being judged by the outcome of key stage tests and examinations—not
only as political targets, there are school targets based on them
and indeed even teachers' own pay rises are based on these matters
to an extent—these examinations are being used for purposes
for which they were never intended and never constructed. Under
those circumstances I think there should be, to use Ken Boston's
phrase, clearer blue water between the Department and the QCA.
It happens in other regulated industries, if you will forgive
that phase being used for education, and I think it would be much
healthier in education.
369. There seems to be a general perception
that we should have that clear water between the DfES and the
QCA. Who would you like to see the QCA reporting to if it is not
into the department?
(Sir William Stubbs) I am not sure there can be anybody
but Parliament.
370. This Committee, for example?
(Sir William Stubbs) I assume that you are part of
the majesty of Parliament in some way or other. In other words,
I see it that way rather than the Privy Council because I do not
think that is a public body.
Chairman
371. Like the HMC you would like Parliamentary
accountability to be there. We were puzzled by that. Were they
suggesting some sort of constitutional innovation of which we
were unaware. Would you be happy to have the parallel with Ofsted?
Ofsted is accountable to Parliament through this Committee.
(Sir William Stubbs) This is probably my swan song,
I suspect, before bodies like this.
372. Sir William, I think we will have you back
again.
(Sir William Stubbs) I have reported to Parliamentary
committees over a number of years, both this Committee and other
committees, and I have found it the most rigorous form of examination
and accountability that I have ever had. Certainly reporting to
ministers is not like that. Ministers' diaries press in and they
have got things to do, they do their best but they have got a
lot to do. With officials it is not the same relationship, but
appearing before a select committee, either this or others, is
something that officials, whether it be permanent secretaries
or NDPBs or whatever, take very, very seriously and evidence is
gathered. You know when you say something it has got to be right
or you have got to correct it very quickly. To me that is proper
accountability and I think we would be in a much healthier state
if QCA had that through a body such as yours. I cannot see any
other show in town—sorry that sounds very demeaning, Chairman,
but it seems to me you are the appropriate body. I have no difficulty
with that at all.
Chairman: Time is getting on and there
are three colleagues who have not had a bite at this questioning.
Jonathan?
Jonathan Shaw
373. Could I ask you to fill in a gap from Dr
Boston's evidence last week when he told us that in the discussions
with yourself and the Deputy Chief Executive that he did not think
that the action taken (where you responded to a question from
my colleague) by the Secretary of State was inappropriate. You
talked about minuted meetings. Was that a minuted meeting?
(Sir William Stubbs) That was not a minuted meeting.
We had had Tomlinson's evidence, I think it finished about 7 o'clock
and we went upstairs and then this news broke through a phone
call and then we were into, frankly, an emergency meeting.
Chairman
374. News broke about?
(Sir William Stubbs) An official from the department
phoned up to say they had been in touch with the awarding bodies
and this was right out of a blue sky. It was not an organised
meeting but I am perfectly clear what happened.
Jonathan Shaw
375. Your new Chief Executive Officer whom you
had waited months to appoint, internationally renowned, did not
think the Secretary of State acted inappropriately?
(Sir William Stubbs) So I see last week.
376. So you see last week? He did not say to
you at the time, "I think the Secretary of State has acted
appropriately. I do not think there is anything wrong with what
she has done"? You did not say, "I disagree and I am
off to tell every media outlet who will give me an interview"?
(Sir William Stubbs) I gave only one media outlet
an interview. It happened to be the BBC News at Ten. Let's
not create a crisis again. I was quite measured and I was quite
reflective. We had a discussion. There was no doubt that Ken Boston
concluded, I think it is in your evidence, that what happened
was improper.
377. But he did not say—
(Sir William Stubbs) I am answering your question.
He said that what happened was improper, that the Department should
have gone through the regulator and not directly to the awarding
bodies.
378. He did not say?
(Sir William Stubbs) He did say to you that he did
not think the Secretary of State had behaved improperly; there
I disagree.
379. Did he give you that advice? At this stage
of a very delicate situation, and there are issues about a crisis
in confidence, you yourself said that, was that going to help
the confidence or would it create a further crisis if the Chairman
went on the television—just the BBC—and publicly criticised
the Secretary of State? Was that going to help the process?
(Sir William Stubbs) I think it was exposing the deficiencies
of the process. I am in no doubt about that. I have spelt out
quite clearly this morning why I think there are deficiencies
in it. I believe in the integrity of administration, and have
over many years, and I did not want to see it sullied so that
is why I acted.
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