Select Committee on Education and Skills Memoranda


Memorandum submitted by John Fitz, Chris Taylor and Stephen Gorard,

Cardiff University School of Social Sciences

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

1) Admission policies can be characterised as a mosaic of practices. They represent local attempts to balance the sovereignty of parental rights to choose with the statutory duty of LEAs to provide places for all secondary students in their boundaries.

2) While the 1944 Education Act established the principle of parental choice, the 1988 Education Reform Act and the subsequent Greenwich judgement effectively meant that parents can express a preference for any secondary school, regardless of LEA boundaries.

3) The creation of self-governing schools (GM schools, CTCs), alongside existing voluntary schools, all with control over their own admission policies, expanded choice and diversity but also made school choice more complex and more risky for parents. Some parents found they could no longer obtain places in their local secondary schools.

4) The School Standards and Framework Act 1998 attempted to ease the complex administration of admission polices and address parental concerns about access to local schools, but has not entirely succeeded in doing so. Indeed, some LEAs report it has made their task more difficult.

5) LEA guidance to parents on local admissions policies 'frame' and can also constrain parental choice in a variety of ways. The high proportion of parents (about 90%) reportedly achieving their first preference may therefore be misleading.

6) Appeals have risen dramatically. In the period 1993-99 the number of appeals more than doubled, from 24,581 to 60,454. The largest number of appeals occurred in the London area.

6) The prevalence of admissions via catchment areas suggest they are attractive because they appear to be fair and are relative easy to administer. The also lead to and consolidate 'selection by mortgage' and thus they can sustain and reproduce the social stratification of secondary schools.

7) Extending diversity, via specialist schools, city academies and language colleges, also expands the number of schools with control over their own admissions polices. However, schools that control their own intakes tend to segregate away from adjacent maintained schools by recruiting more advanced intakes.

8) Banding, where schools are allocated roughly equal shares of high , middle and low performing students, is an effective strategy for the reduction of the social stratification of schools. In LEAs where this occurs, levels of segregation or about half of what would otherwise be expected.

9) Alternatives to current prevalent admissions polices include:

a) Employing a single application form, and handling all responses on the same day nationally would help prevent multiple place allocation and wasted spaces, and it would reduce bureaucracy.

b) Given the limitation of residential segregation, and its interaction with school segregation, incentives, such as council-tax exemption, could be provided for high-attaining primary pupils to attend designated secondary schools in poorer areas (Schoon, 2001).

c) Schools in difficult areas could receive higher levels of preferential funding.

d) Authorities might be encouraged to fund surplus places, allowing popular schools to grow past their planned admissions numbers, rather than an increasing number of appeals, and rationalise their school provision through closures where necessary, rather than having a larger number of schools tied to rigidly defined residential areas.

e)The arrangements for free travel should be the same across Local Education Authorities and between different school types.

f) A return to all-school banding by ability in urban areas, whereby children are tested before entry to secondary school and each school is then constrained to admit students proportionately across the ability range, would help to further decrease socio-economic segregation.

1.  Introduction

1.1 The current system for secondary school admissions is the product of nearly a century of schooling - from the original conception of mass schooling to the comprehensive era and now to the current 'quasi-market' and the emphasis on 'diversity' in education provision. Each phase of major reform to school provision and organisation in the UK has brought about associated changes in the dominant form of school admissions. However, there has never been a single system of school admissions that has operated in every school, or even across an individual region or Local education authority) LEA. Instead, the history of school admissions in England and Wales can be characterised as a complex mosaic of practice and local interpretation. For example, while the comprehensive era is associated with the use catchment areas in the allocation of pupils to schools according to Dore and Flowerdew (1978) 27% of LEAs during the 1970s operated a system of 'parental choice'. By the early 1990s, the era of supposed 'parental choice', approximately 58% of English LEAs surveyed still allocated school places by catchment area (Morris 1993). Furthermore, throughout both periods of reform many schools and LEAs operated a 'feeder school' system whereby the allocation of places to secondary schools was determined by the primary school a child attended. Schools with powers to recruit their own intakes further frustrate the idea of parents freely choosing schools. The remaining 160 or so grammar schools have retained the ability to select their intake on academic aptitude since the origins of the tripartite education system, while more recently, CTCs, technology and language schools and specialist academies are also able to select a proportion of their students.

1.2 LEAs are pivotal in these discussions because they remain the arena within which the majority of parents choose maintained secondary schools for their children because they also frame the kind of choices that parents can make via organisation of secondary schools in their boundaries and because they have a statutory obligation to provide sufficient places for secondary pupils in their area. It is for that reason that we begin our discussion with an overview of LEAs and their responsibilities under successive pieces of legislation and how this relates to the development of admission policies. Drawing on our research which has looked at the impact of school choice policies over a 14 year period (1989-2003 we will then discuss the implications of some of the admissions policies found in operation (Fitz, Taylor and Gorard 2002; Fitz, Gorard and Taylor, 2002; Taylor and Gorard 2002).

1.3 There is insufficient space here to describe the methods used in this study of the impact of choice in England and Wales. It commenced with analysis of the annual school census returns for all secondary schools from 1989 to 2001 (supplemented with figures from PISA). From these, around 80 Local Education Authorities were selected for further consideration of their published and reported admissions policies. From these, 23 LEAs were selected in three contiguous areas for further intensive study, including interviews with LEA officials, and then schools within these. Representatives of all these bodies took part in taped interviews. The datasets were analysed using spatial models, and a segregation index, based on family poverty, ethnicity, first language, and special educational needs (Gorard, Taylor and Fitz, 2003).

2. School admissions policies and the LEAs

2.1 Since the 1944 Education Act parents have been able to express a preference for the school(s) they wish their child(ren) to attend. That legislative right has been balanced by the LEAs' statutory responsibility to provide places for all children of compulsory school age, and to manage their resources efficiently. Parents, historically, have been able to choose between state and private education, between LEA and church schools, between single sex and co-educational schools, and, in some areas, between selective and non-selective schools, and between LEA comprehensive and 'specialist schools', though not all parents have had the same degree of choice. Nevertheless, some form of allocation of children to school places has operated in LEAs in order for them to fulfil their statutory obligations. The allocation procedures have always varied across LEAs and they have shifted modes over time. For example, from 1944 until the late 1960s tests at 11 plus distributed secondary school children between schools on the basis of ability. With the development of all-ability comprehensive schools, which about 92% of all state secondary students in England and approximately 99% in Scotland and 98% Wales presently attend (Benn and Chitty, 1996), allocation has featured geographical proximity through school transport policies that generally encourage families to use the nearest schools. While these allocative procedures are very different in their educational values and in their consequences for families and for students they can both be interpreted as ways of balancing choice and the LEAs planning responsibilities. The balance between these modes has been shaped to a considerable degree by the political affiliation of the elected members making up city, borough and county councils, with Conservatives most closely associated with the retention of selective education.

Open enrolment

2.2 The 1988 Education Reform Act introduced the principle of more open enrolment which required schools to admit students up to their Planned Admission Number, which in effect meant up to their physical capacity. LEAs were also required to inform parents that that they could express a preference for a school and confirmed their right to appeal against LEA allocation decisions, a right first established in the 1980 Education Act. In addition, the legislation enabled schools to opt out of LEA control and become grant-maintained (GM) schools. These initiatives were designed to increase parental choice between diverse kinds of schools. Moreover, this legislation linked admissions to resources via an age weighted per capita funding formula that determined school budgets. GM schools controlled their own admissions and could, and did, ignore existing LEA admissions principles and procedures in pursuit of recruits (Fitz, Halpin and Power, 1993).

2.3 In some of our study areas, such as Brent, Gloucestershire, Essex and Hillingdon where the majority, if not all, the secondary schools 'opted out', LEAs were in effect left "minding the store" through the task of monitoring, as they were still required to do, whether new intakes of children had acquired secondary school places. As one official told us, because of the large number of GM and voluntary schools in the area, his LEA was composed of 192 admissions authorities. Not only did multiple admissions authorities diminish LEA capacity to match students to places, the 1989 Greenwich judgement enabled parents to express a preference for schools outside their own LEA and thereby made admissions policy more complex to administer. Key beneficiaries of the judgement were the GM and voluntary aided schools, who were given an unrestricted capacity to expand their catchments.

2.4 While most LEAs persisted with catchment areas as a primary means of allocation, there were visible hot spots, notably in Bexley, Bromley, Barnet, and Hammersmith and Fulham (among others) where local children were not obtaining entry into local schools as places were now going to out-of-borough families. These cases occurred most frequently in the London area where the LEA size and population density meant that boundary-crossing was relatively straightforward and cost effective. They also occurred in areas which still have selective schools and in areas where GM schools operated rigorous selection procedures, or both. Our evidence suggests that the Funding Agency for School (FAS) did not concern itself with admissions but only with the planning and provision of places.

School Standards and Framework Act 1998

2.5 This admission loophole was addressed in the School Standards and Framework Act 1998 (Sections 84 and 85) where an incoming Labour government determined that the problem was of such a scale that it was prepared to devote a part of its flagship legislation in order to curtail GM schools autonomy in the recruitment of students. We have discussed the Act in detail elsewhere (White et al 1999) but primarily it placed a duty on the Secretary of State to issue a Code of Practice on School Admissions. The subsequent Codes published in England and Wales contained measures to design to ease the admissions confusion. We deal with these briefly here as these have been discussed more fully in previous research reports (White et al 1999, White et al 2001).

2.6 The guidance contained in the Code sets out the duties and responsibilities of LEAs, the governing bodies of grant-maintained schools and appeals panels. It made similar prescriptions for admissions authorities (whether individual schools or LEAs) who must now publish their admissions arrangements for the benefit of parents. In addition to the Code, the legislation introduced three new elements into the schools admissions framework. Appeals Panels replaced appeals committees, LEAs were required to establish Admissions Forums to oversee and advise on local admission arrangements and the legislation also introduced ministerially-appointed Adjudicators with powers to consider and resolve admissions disputes between parents and admission authorities.

2.7 In general, the legislation confirms the duty of the LEA and other admissions authorities (foundation schools and church bodies) to publish details about the characteristics of their school(s) and their admissions procedures. It also requires all admissions authorities within an LEA, and, in cases where students cross borough boundaries, adjacent admission authorities, to consult with each other about their admissions procedures.

2.8 In other papers we reported that legislation is ambiguous in a number of key areas (White et al 1999, White et al 2001). First, we noted that there still remains in place the 1944 delicate balance between the sovereignty of admissions authorities and the right for parents to express a preference, laid down in the 1944 Act (White et al 1999). It remains the case that admission authorities can exercise a good deal of control over their admissions criteria, always provided these are published and available to parents and that they do not overtly infringe equal opportunities legislation. Second, measures to end the remaining fully selective systems of education are very muted. While parents may ballot for end to grammar schools, the Code at the same time promotes admissions criteria which include partial selection, based on specific aptitudes or abilities. This is in line with Labour's agenda of modernising the comprehensive ideal but may well also go against the grain of other desirable outcomes such as balanced intakes. And on this last point, there is no overall steer in that direction in the legislation or Code. Admissions authorities are permitted to work directly against that principle in their admissions arrangements and in the 'over-subscription' criteria.

Admission policies

2.9 One crucial aspect of admissions authorities - LEAs and individual schools - is the published guidance they offer to parents about their admissions arrangements and about their over-subscription criteria because this relates directly questions about the proportion of parents who secure their first choice school. While it may be the case that about 90% of parents nationally (but just over 70% in London) are said to achieve their first preference, this has to be placed in the context where admissions authorities lay down a variety of markers that indicate to parent where they are most likely to be successful in gaining entry to a school. 'First preference' , we argue may well not reflect parents 'ideal choice' because first preference is mediated by their assessment of the chances of getting into their version of a 'good school', based on factors such as the LEAs admissions policy.

2.10 For example, it is not unusual for LEAs to indicate both the size of secondary school in their areas, which were oversubscribed and the extent to which over subscription occurred. It is left to parent to assess the risk. LEAs also use the proximity criteria to signal which school catchment area applied to what household and then require parent to make a case in writing for an alternative to be considered. Some parents are more able to do this than others, and there are special difficulties here for those families whose first language is not English. It would be fair to conclude that many authorities published their intended allocation of schools and waited for objections, with a null response treated as approval. In the case of over-subscription in any school, a variety of discriminatory criteria were used (including medical and social reasons).

2.11 LEAs have adopted a variety of application procedures for children transferring to secondary school. Some use single form applications, others multiple form applications where parents are required to make a separate application to each school they wish to be considered for. Some LEAs require parents to state only one preferred school while others allow parents to nominate several school and state their order of preference. The overriding consideration here is that parents who state any kind of preference will be give priority over those parents who may accept the 'default' school but who do not state their preference. LEAs also set out their over subscription criteria. The same criteria are broadly used by all LEAs (parent/sibling connection, proximity, catchment area/feeder primary school, first choice, age, single sex or ethos, medical, social or special educational need). The order in which these are applied, however, varies and has important effects. Parental/sibling connection, for example, constrains choice and can also ensure that high and low performing schools retain their previous characters.

Can gauge levels of parental satisfaction with these general arrangements by reference to the numbers of those who appeal against the decision to allocate their child to a particular school?

Appeals

2.12 Parents frustrated at not achieving entry to their preferred secondary can lodge an appeal to the appeals panel associated with an admissions authority. Appeals over school places have risen dramatically since they were first introduced. In the 6 years between 1993 and 1999 the number of appeals lodged by parents for secondary school places has more than doubled, from 24,581 (4.2% of all admissions) to 60,454 (9.6 of all admissions). The numbers of successful appeals expressed again as a percentage of all admissions has risen in the same period from 1.36% to 2.08%. Not surprisingly, the number of appeals varies by LEA and by region, with London recording the largest number of appeals. It also provides an interesting illustration of our point about geographical variation.

2.13 Within London there would appear to be two particular 'hot-spots' for appeals and parental dissatisfaction: Enfield and Westminster. In the case of Enfield over half of all admissions end up in appeal. The most notable features of this authority are the presence of grammar and Foundation schools. Westminster, on the other hand, contains a large number of Voluntary-Aided schools. It has been shown elsewhere that the number of appeals is related to the combined effect of a large proportion of parents choosing an alternative to their nearest school and the number of schools that have autonomy in the organisation and design of their admission arrangements (Taylor et al. 2002). Even though the number of appeals lodged have generally increased over this period several LEAs in London have actually seen a fall. In particular, the number of appeals lodged has declined considerably in Newham and Islington. Inversely the number of appeals lodged has increased in Hillingdon, Kensington and Chelsea, Camden, Barking and Dagenham, and Redbridge.

2.14 It would also appear that parents in London are the least likely to get the decision overturned. In particular, parents in Inner London are very unlikely to be successful in their appeal. Whether this is a failing of the appeals process, a failure of the school admissions system or actually an indication that the original decision was the 'correct' one is unclear (see Taylor et al. 2002.). However, if the number of appeals upheld in the parents' favour is considered against the total number of admissions then London would be similar to the rest of the country.

2.15 While the rate of appeals can be interpreted as an indicator of market awareness - i.e the growing propensity of parents to act as consumers and thus attempt to 'exit' the system via the appeals process - they more likely reflect other underlying characteristics of the local educational system, namely urbanisation, travel networks, population density and the presence or absence of surplus places. In urban and metropolitan areas for example a larger numbers of schools, close together and with good transport networks mean that parents can realistically think about alternative schools to those allocated by the LEA. It is not surprising, therefore, that the rate of appeals is greater in these areas than in rural ones. There are other factors that contribute to the rates of appeals. Those LEAs which operate a 'first preference' system appear to have higher rates than those which privilege catchment area allocation. The larger function of appeals though is that they confirm and secure the parents' rights to express preferences in a system which can be interpreted as heavily bureaucratised.

An overview

2.16 Many of these earlier concerns that led to the introduction of the 1998 School Standards and Framework Act and the Code of Practice for School Admissions were isolated to London, providing some evidence that the situation in London may have been unique. Indeed, many rural local authorities outside London believed that these legislative changes only applied to a number of London Boroughs. One LEA officer explained "It does seem a lot of it is aimed at solving problems in London that don't exist in other parts of Britain" (Rural LEA Officer). Another noted, "Just because there is a problem with four London boroughs with different types of schools… why impose nationally a system to deal with that, and it has been a total and utter waste of money" (Rural LEA Officer)

2.17 However, reports of similar frustrations grew across many parts of England and Wales throughout the 1990s, particularly in urban areas. It is also worth noting that the introduction of these new measures coincided with the phasing in of new unitary (urban) authorities. Many such new local authorities took this opportunity to alter their admission arrangements from their County counterparts with great momentum (e.g. West Berkshire and City of Bristol LEAs). Even a number of long-established LEAs were quick to take the opportunity to address issues of inequality and injustice in admissions with the Admissions Adjudicator (e.g. Hertfordshire).

2.18 While the introduction of the 1998 Act and subsequent Code may have been an attempt to address the frustrations and organisational difficulties in London they have certainly been of some benefit in other areas of England and Wales. However, four years after the Government's attempt to intervene many fears and concerns still remain, particularly in London. Some Local authorities still have great difficulties in ensuring that they find a school place for their children. One interviewee noted, "People who are living 0.6 or 0.7 [miles], above half way [of a mile], aren't getting in […] and consequently have to travel 2 or 3 miles across the Borough to another school." (Inner London LEA Admissions Officer). In another LEA' "there are cases now you know where [school name] is full up in that year and we are phoning around other authorities and trying to get them in elsewhere." (Inner London Admissions Officer).

2.19 There is some indication that the interventions of the Labour Government have only added to the problems that local authorities have in the admissions process, even in London. For example, when discussing the introduction of admission forums, meant to alleviate tensions between the admission policies of local authorities and schools, a typical response was "oh that, the bureaucracy of it all?" (Inner London LEA Admissions Officer). Many LEAs felt that they have always had good relationships with schools with autonomy in their admissions, and had regularly met informally with neighbouring LEAs. The new legislation simply increased the administrative workload of LEAs without easing any of the limitations and problems of the open enrolment system.

3. Admission policies: problems and prospects

3.1 In this section review briefly the admissions policies and examine their effects. We also suggest alternatives that might be considered. In devising admission policies LEAs, under a statutory duty to be efficient, have to address on number of value, demographic and school organisational issues in order to decide what is appropriate in their situation. In our experience these include:

a)  achieving efficiency via reviews of the oversupply of school places and related issues such as the consideration of closure or amalgamation of schools and, matching the distribution of secondary school to the geographical distribution of the secondary school population

b)  consideration of selective or non-selective education

c)  achieving balanced intakes thereby evening out the social composition of schools and consequently school performance across the borough

d)  responding to demographic changes via the mix of religiously affiliated schools and in Wales determining the balance between English and Welsh language schools

e)  reviewing arrangements such as all-through 11-18 schools or 11-16 plus 6th form colleges, encouraging specialist schools and the maintenance of single sex schools.

f)  Accommodating the existence of foundation schools in the area

Against this background some of the policies LEAs can adopt include:

Catchment areas

3.2 Deciding allocation by the proximity of family residence to schools, so that each school has a designated catchment area, is attractive because it is a transparent policy, seeming equitable, offers the possibility of 'local school for local children' and relatively straightforward to administer. These factors probably account for its prevalence. However, this approach is not unproblematic. For example, catchment areas, the most used form of allocating places in comprehensive schools during the 1970s can lead to a reinforcement of residential segregation and differentiation. One effect , for example, are cases where there is the strong social segregation of schools on peripheral housing estates from other schools in the same LEA . It also leads to what is known as 'selection by mortgage', the use of catchment areas in the allocation of school places into popular schools has led to inflated house prices since demand for housing in these areas increased. In a recent study in Coventry it was estimated that the 'premium' for house prices in the catchment areas of popular and high-performing schools ranged between 15% and 19% (Leech and Campos 2000). This is still relevant to the current admissions system since Coventry, for example, continues to use designated areas in the allocation of oversubscribed schools (see Taylor and Gorard 2001 for further discussion on this). Where the housing market and the educational is mutually reinforcing, LEAs wishing to move, say, to balanced intakes in their schools will find it difficult to achieve. Pre-conditions would include political will and changes to, or investment in, low cost transport policies that would enable students to travel more freely across the borough.

3.3 Catchment areas work in a number of ways, via nominated feeder primary school, where attendance is automatically linked to priority access to a designated secondary school, but now more frequently via measured distances from the family home to the nearest secondary schools. One overall effect however, is that LEAs that employed catchment areas have levels of school segregation (that is concentrations of socio-economically disadvantaged students in particular schools) 20% higher than would be expected.

Guided parental preference

3.3 Hertfordshire typified admissions policies based on the invitation to parents to nominate their preferred schools but at the same time offers strong guidance on where they are likely to be successful. In the case of community schools, families in Hertfordshire are required to complete the Secondary Transfer Form (STF) and name three preferred schools. Published admissions criteria for all schools give parents a clear indication of which schools they are most likely to gain admission. The LEA admission brochure (Hertfordshire, 2000) provides parents with considerable information about the number of applicants to all secondary schools, postcode data of successful applicants to schools, vignettes of families choosing schools, and fairly straight forward advice on maximizing chances of obtaining a place at a preferred school. It explicitly advises them to list their local school amongst their preferences.

3.4 The current admissions rules, which apply to oversubscribed LEA community and voluntary schools, prioritise children with statements of special educational needs, children with medical or social reasons for attending a particular school, siblings in the school at the time of application, and geographical proximity, determined by the shortest designated a route. In the case of single sex schools, priority for secondary schools is determined by postcode and by what is called the 'traditional area', identified by proportions of families who have in the past selected that school as their first choice.

3.5 Hertfordshire is distinctive in its proactive employment of the School Standards and Framework Act. This arose from the legacy of the former grant maintained schools and voluntary schools creating their own admissions policies, and recruiting out-of-county students. The result of this was that local families were unable to obtain secondary school places in local schools. Ofsted noted in its inspection report, for example, that in 1998 nearly 1000 children had not secured a place by February for the coming academic year. As a result of its new co-ordinated admissions arrangements this figure had fallen to just over 100 in the following year, and most of these were in the south (Ofsted, 2000). Under the new arrangements, foundation schools feed back to the LEA which applicants they have admitted to their schools and this then allows the LEA to inform parents of unsuccessful applicants of alternative places. Hertfordshire has also vigorously challenged foundation and voluntary schools admissions' policies before the Schools Adjudicator. It has applied to the Adjudicator on 26 occasions to seek changes to the admissions policies of foundation schools. It succeeded in forcing them to add geographical proximity to their admissions criteria, and, in some selective schools, force those schools to admit fewer children by academic selection than had previously been the case.

Diversity and selection

3.6 Although diversity has been achieved via policies that have promoted different kinds of state secondary schools since 1988 (inter alia, GM schools, CTCs, technology and language schools, specialist colleges and city academies and through area based interventions such as Education Action Zones), in policy terms it is a viable option for LEAs to consider. It may be answer, for example, to the seemingly intractable social stratification of school within LEAs operating catchment areas. Our research however suggests that this would displace the problem rather than solve it. The evidence is that where individual schools have autonomy over their own admissions policies - and this includes religiously affiliated foundation, former GM foundation and specialist schools - the trend is to segregate away from, or, take fewer socio-economically disadvantaged students than adjacent schools. In 2000, for example, 16.5% of the total school intake was eligible for frees school meals (FSM). For specialist schools the figure was 14.4%, though specialist language schools it was 10.2%, and for selective schools it was 2.1%. Segregation is high and is increasing however in the great majority of LEAs that have persisted with selective education.

3.7 The implications of this for the current expansion of specialist and faith-based schools should be immediately apparent. Whatever merits these schemes have (and the evidence for these merits is far from conclusive), they also present a real danger of creating greater socio-economic division in the education system. However, the same argument applies to areas with relatively high proportions of Foundation (opted out) schools (and to Welsh-medium schools in Wales), even where these schools are not specialist, faith-based or selective. What all of these minority school types have in common is the ability to act as their own admission authorities, and perhaps it is this, rather than their marketing identities, that is the chief determinant of increased segregation in their local areas. The presence of fee-paying schools is also related to increasingly segregated Local Education Authorities. This may be related to their admission arrangements, such as the use of selection and the ability of some parents to express their commitment to a particular religion. Diversity drives segregation by giving people a reason other than perceived quality, rightly or wrongly, to use a school other than their nearest. That is, diversification of schooling can override fairness in the distribution of school places.

3.8 If a policy of increased diversity is deemed desirable in the U.K., and that is present government policy (Smithers 2001), then our analysis argues that it should be organized fairly. If advocates of diversity and specialization are convinced that this is best route to raising standards then in all fairness, to test whether their policy options are the right ones, specialist and the faith-based schools should not receive preferential funding. Nor should they be allowed to select, or to use a different admissions process to the schools with which they are in competition. Then we will be able to see the strength of their advocates' arguments. Two Local Education Authorities in our sub-sample have specialist schools that are based on catchment areas just like the remaining schools in the Local Education Authority (Gorard and Taylor 2001). These specialist schools take approximately their fair share of disadvantaged students, and they do not have superior public examination results.

Banding

3.9 Banding involves the allocation of students so that secondary schools each have a fair share able and less able students as measured by primary school assessments. In the former ILEA, for example, a large LEA that adopted this policy over a considerable period of time, students were placed in three ability bands, and theoretically, each secondary school admitted approximately equal number of students in each band. We have no evidence of the extent to which an equal spread of abilities was actually achieved in that authority. However, the policy has the merit of explicitly aiming at balanced intakes and thus aiming fro some evenness in school performance. Our research suggests that LEAs which operate some form of banding (e.g. Greenwich, Hackney, Lewisham and Tower Hamlets) have levels of segregation running at half of that which would be predicted. On this evidence banding would appear to overcome the stratification of the schooling system driven by residential segregation and catchment area policy.

4. Alternative Futures

4.1 Given that the genie is out of the bottle, it is very likely that some measure of parental choice of school will remain part of any future policy. Nevertheless, it is worthwhile giving consideration to alternative to the admission policies prevalent in the system. These include:

a) Employing a single application form, and handling all responses on the same day nationally would help prevent multiple place allocation and wasted spaces, and it would reduce bureaucracy.

b) Given the limitation of residential segregation, and its interaction with school segregation, incentives, such as council-tax exemption, could be provided for high-attaining primary pupils to attend designated secondary schools in poorer areas (Schoon, 2001).

c) Alternatively, schools in difficult areas could receive higher levels of preferential funding. d)Authorities might be encouraged to fund surplus places, allowing popular schools to grow past their planned admissions numbers, rather than an increasing number of appeals, and rationalise their school provision through closures where necessary, rather than having a larger number of schools tied to rigidly defined residential areas.

e)The arrangements for free travel should be the same across Local Education Authorities and between different school types.

f) A return to all-school banding by ability in urban areas, whereby children are tested before entry to secondary school and each school is then constrained to admit students proportionately across the ability range, would help to further decrease socio-economic segregation.

References

Benn, C. and Chitty, C. (1996) Thirty Years On, London, David Fulton,)

Dore, C. and Flowerdew, R. (1981) Allocation procedures and the social composition of secondary schools, Manchester Geographer, New Series 2, 1, 47-55

Fitz, J. Halpin, D. and Power, S. (1993) Grant Maintained Schools: Education in the marketplace (Kogan Page: London)

Fitz, J., Gorard, S. and Taylor, C. (2001) School admissions after the School Standards and Framework Act: bringing the LEAs back in? Oxford Review of Education, 28, 2-3, 373-393

Fitz, J., Taylor, C. and Gorard, S. (2002) Local education authorities and the regulation of educational markets: four case studies, Research Papers in Education, 17, 2, 125-46

Gorard, S. and Taylor, C. (2001) Specialist schools in England: track record and future prospect, School Leadership and Management, 21, 4, 365-381

Gorard, S., Taylor, C. and Fitz, J. (2003) Schools, Markets and Choice Policies, London, RoutledgeFalmer,.

Leech, D. and Campos, E. (2000) Is comprehensive education really free? A study of the effects of secondary school admissions policies on house prices, University of Warwick Economic Research Paper 581

Morris, R. (1993) Choice of School: A survey 1992-93 London, Association of Metropolitan Authorities

Schoon, N. (2001) Making the best of the worst, Times Educational Supplement, 5/10/01, p.15

Smithers, R. (2001) Church plan for 20 new schools, Guardian, 15/6/01

Taylor, C., Gorard, S. and Fitz, J. (2000) A re-examination of segregation indices in terms of compositional invariance, Social Research Update, 30, 1-4

Taylor, C. and Gorard, S. (2001) The role of residence in school segregation: placing the impact of parental choice in perspective, Environment and Planning A, 33, 1829-1852

Taylor, C., Gorard, S. and Fitz, J. (2002) Market frustration? Admission appeals in the UK education market, Educational Management and Administration, 30, 3, 243-260

Taylor, C., Gorard, S. and Fitz, J. (2003) The modifiable areal unit problem: Segregation between schools and levels of analysis, International Journal of Social Research Methodology, 16, 1

White, P., Gorard, S., Fitz, J. and Taylor, C. (2001) Regional and local differences in admission arrangements for schools, Oxford Review of Education, 27, 3, 317-337

10 September 2003


 
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