Select Committee on Environmental Audit Appendices to the Minutes of Evidence


APPENDIX 6

Memorandum from the Quarry Products Association (QPA)

SUMMARY

    —  The Treasury Review "Tax and the Environment: using economic instruments" sets out policies and principles to be used in the development of environmental taxes. The process leading to the implementation of the aggregates levy provides a case history to assess the practical application of these polices and principles.

    —  Following the introduction of the aggregates tax concept in 1997, through the consideration of the QPA's alternative proposals, to the decision to introduce a tax announced in March 2000, Government did not identify criteria to be used in assessing the most appropriate policy option.

    —  The research basis for the aggregates tax was a contingent valuation analysis to derive monetary values for the negative environmental impacts of aggregates. The QPA raised significant concerns about the conduct and interpretation of this research which the Treasury/DETR failed to respond to. The Treasury Review continues to repeat misleading interpretation of this research.

    —  During the process of aggregates tax/levy policy development, the QPA submitted to Government the results of two research projects commissioned by the QPA from eminent environmental consultancies. Both research projects examined the likely environmental impact and efficiency of aggregates taxation, and concluded that aggregates taxation would be a highly inefficient policy option. The lack of Government criteria for assessing policy options was also highlighted in the research. Government took little account of this research, while remaining uncritical of its contingent valuation research. At best this demonstrated a lack of openness and objectivity in policy analysis. At worst it suggests that the outcome of policy assessment was pre-determined in favour of a taxation option.

    —  Following the implementation of the aggregates tax in April 2002, based upon the policy decision announced in March 2000, Government has yet to announce any criteria, benchmarks, or targets with which to assess the environmental impact of the aggregates levy.

    —  The recent results of ODPM-commissioned research into the use of recycled and secondary aggregates has confirmed that the historic (and pre- aggregates levy) use of these materials has risen much more rapidly than previously recognised by Government. The scope for further marginal increases in the use of these materials is very limited relative to existing utilisation and the overall size of the UK aggregates market. Hence the aggregates levy is demonstrably not a cost-effective means of generating further recycling in the sector.

    —  The experience of the policy development and implementation of the aggregates levy has highlighted basic shortcomings in the process, the most apparent being a consistent inability or unwillingness on the part of Government to identify in any detail the purpose and expectations of the levy/tax. Government continues to rely on very general and unsubstantiated statements about environmental impacts to justify the aggregates levy.

    —  There is little evidence that the basic policies and principles for the development and implementation of environmental taxes set out in the Treasury Review have been followed in respect of the aggregates levy.

INTRODUCTION

  1.  The Quarry Products Association (QPA) is the major trade association representing the UK quarrying industry.

  2.  QPA members include major national and international quarry companies, and many small and medium sized businesses significant in regional and local markets. QPA members account for 90% of the output of aggregates in the UK. The scope of QPA membership includes supply of crushed rock and sand and gravel aggregates—both land won and marine dredged—recycled aggregates, asphalt, ready-mixed concrete, lime, mortar and silica sand.

  3.  The QPA evidence will focus on the aggregates levy, and issues associated with the development and implementation of the levy. The prospect of an aggregates tax or levy was introduced in the July 1997 Budget, the levy was announced in the March 2000 Budget and implemented in April 2002, therefore providing an appropriate case history to test the policies and principles set out in the Pre-Budget Report and associated review, "Tax and the environment: using economic instruments".

  4.  The Treasury review sets out a process of policy consideration and development, and the principles associated with this process. The development and implementation of the aggregates levy, however, raises serious doubts as to the credence that can be given to the review. These issues are detailed under the following two headings:

    —  Environmental Tax—Policy development

    —  Environmental Tax—Policy implementation

Environmental Tax—policy development

  5.  The Treasury Review defines the process of policy development as follows (paragraphs 24 to 29).

    —  First, the Government will identify the environmental policy objective.

    —  Second, the Government will assess the rationale for becoming involved in helping to achieve the objectives.

    —  Third, the Government will evaluate the benefits and costs of intervention.

    —  Fourth, the Government will determine the most efficient instruments for achieving the objectives.

    —  Finally, the Government will take forward the process of policy development and implementation.

  6.  The July 1997 Budget, in raising the possibility of an aggregates tax, identified environmental costs associated with the extraction of aggregates and other quarrying as "impacts on landscape, on local residents and effects of noise and dust" (1997 Financial Statement and Budget Report para 2.22). These impacts were again listed and extended in the November 1998 Pre-Budget Report, which described the environmental impacts of the potential aggregates tax as "possible reduction in noise, dust, visual intrusion, damage to wildlife habitats and other environmental impacts" (November 1998 Pre Budget Report Table 5.1).

  7.  The other principal rationale for an aggregates tax was articulated by Treasury Financial Secretary Stephen Timms MP in evidence to the Environmental Audit Committee in January 2000.
332So what is the point of a tax?
(Mr Timms) A tax would be a very direct incentive for increasing recycling


333
So you would see the object of a tax as improving recycling rather than reducing demand directly?
(Mr Timms) I think both of these would be effects of a tax, but I suspect that increasing the use of recycled and secondary materials would be the larger of them, given that there is only limited scope for varying the amount of aggregates used or equivalents.



  (Minutes of evidence to EAC Tuesday 18 January 2000—witness Stephen Timms MP, Financial Secretary, Treasury).

  8.  In general terms, therefore, Government identified the major potential impacts of aggregates tax/levy policy as:

    (i)  The reduction in environmental impacts of quarrying, notably noise, dust, visual intrusion, damage to wildlife and other (unspecified) impacts.

    (ii)  Increasing the use of recycled materials in aggregates markets.

  9.  However, at no time leading up to the implementation of the aggregates levy did Government attempt to detail or quantify these general policy objectives. This failure to identify policy objectives created real problems in the discussions between the QPA and Government relating to the environmental package proposed by the QPA as an alternative to an aggregates tax. The QPA proposal was eventually rejected by Government as inadequate, but in over 12 months of discussions the QPA was never advised as to what would constitute an "adequate" proposal.

  10.  In addition to the details of the environmental package, the QPA commissioned two independent reports on the environmental efficiency of aggregates taxation. These reports concluded:

CONCLUSION

  In conclusion, the positive environmental effects associated with an aggregates tax seem to be rather limited. The tax would offer no incentive to producers to reduce the environmental impact of their operations. The only impact of the tax would be to reduce demand (which seems relatively price inelastic), and yet the linkage between output and the external costs associated with aggregates supply may be rather weak. Furthermore, the environmental impact of a change in demand depends both on the way in which the (more or less) marginal reduction in output occurs, and on the way in which these changes are reflected in changes in external costs.

  In terms of its potential for encouraging recycling of construction wastes, the effect is unlikely to be strong unless the differential between a tax on primary sources and recycled materials is set at a very high level. It would be better to address (though administratively difficult since this would require valuable Parliamentary time) the primary legislation which allows those handling construction wastes to employ them for somewhat superfluous purposes which are exempt from waste management licensing.

  There would appear to be alternative ways of addressing, within the planning system, both the issue of demand and the environmental impacts of aggregates supply. As mentioned above, there are also better ways of encouraging re-use of construction wastes. The case for an aggregates tax is therefore highly questionable."

  Source:   Environmental Effectiveness of a tax on the supply of aggregates—Ecotec Research and Consulting Ltd 1998.

  "We conclude that an aggregates tax is an extremely inefficient way to try and secure an environmental target: (a) because the demand is inelastic and (b) because the tax is a products tax rather than an externality tax. This suggests that a package of measures directly targeted at the environmental impacts will be more effective than an aggregates tax."

  Source:   The Economic Benefits of Environmental Awareness and Training Programmes in the Aggregates Industry—Professor David Pearce/EFTEC Ltd 1999.

  11.  These two reports, both produced by individuals and organisations with considerable experience and reputations in the field of environmental economics, highlighted very significant concerns about the environmental efficiency of aggregates taxation, and the lack of clarity of Government policy objectives.

  12.  The QPA commissioned the research and submitted it to Government because of our concerns that Government had produced no assessment of the potential environmental effective of aggregates taxation, yet was clearly moving in that policy direction. We were therefore extremely disappointed that there was never any response from Government on the two research projects, nor any apparent wish to discuss the research findings.

  13.  In contrast, the Treasury Review identifies only one research process used in the development of the aggregates levy. This is set out in Box 5.1 of the Treasury Review, and refers to contingent valuation (CV) work commissioned by the (then) DETR to calculate a monetary valuation of the environmental impacts of aggregates supply. Box 5.1 is not, however, an objective assessment of that research. The annex to this evidence is a detailed QPA assessment of the contingent valuation research which highlights significant concerns about the conduct of the research and the interpretation of the results.

  14.  Not least of these concerns is the persistently erroneous claim repeated in Box 5.1 that the CV analysis produced an average external cost of aggregates supply of £1.80 per tonne, and the Government "set the rate of aggregates levy at a more cautious £1.60 per tonne."

  15.  In reality, the CV research results (The Environmental Cost and Benefits of the Supply of Aggregates—London Economics—May 1999, Page 3, Table1) identifies an environmental cost equivalent to £1.33 per tonne, and not £1.80 per tonne. The annex to this memo details this and other concerns.

  16.  The purpose of these observations about the questionable weight and faith accorded by Government to the DETR research on external costs, and the lack of interest in significant independent research commissioned by the QPA, is not to whinge about events which have now passed us by, but to highlight the reality of policy development in respect of the aggregates levy. This reality was neither as objective nor rational as the process described in the Treasury Review.

Environmental Tax—Policy Implementation.

  17.  We would like to highlight two issues, again based upon the practical experience of aggregates tax implementation.

  18.  First, the Treasury Review emphasises that a policy decision is followed by "further consultation on the design of measures . . ." (para 2.9). Following the introduction of the aggregates tax legislation in the 2002 Finance Bill, there were long discussions between the industry and Customs and Excise leading up to the tax implementation in April 2002. The industry welcomed the process, which succeeded in making the tax implementation more consistent and workable. However, such consultation-while welcome-cannot disguise the fact that the aggregates levy legislation is extremely complex. To put this in context, the legislation introduces a tax for crushed rock and sand and gravel. It then identifies four potential tax points, sets out a range of materials which are exempt from the levy, lists 19 minerals which are not subject to the levy, and also lists 45 uses of aggregates minerals which are entitled to tax relief.

  19.  The assimilation of this legislation into company systems and commercial relationships with customers, including the detailed discussions and monitoring requirements on a site by site basis with Customs and Excise officials, has added another significant tier of bureaucracy and regulation into the business. This burden of administering and collecting the new levy has been added to business when there is little indication that the levy is having any significant environmental benefit. No amount of "consultation" or "stakeholder dialogue" has altered this fundamental inefficiency.

  20.  Second, and the key outstanding issue, there are in place no criteria, no benchmarks, and no targets with which to make any environmental assessment of the impact of the aggregates levy.

  21.  In the 2002 Pre Budget Report the environmental impacts of the introduction of the aggregates levy were listed as (table 7.2):

    —  Reductions in noise and vibration

    —  Reductions in dust and other emission to air

    —  Reductions in visual intrusion

    —  Reductions in loss of amenity

    —  Reductions in damage to wildlife habitats.

  22.  The Pre-Budget Report also (para 7.72) states that the levy "promotes greater efficiency in the use of virgin aggregate and the development of alternative materials. . ."

  23.  With regard to the environmental benefits listed in table 7.2, there is no attempt to quantify (even approximately) the levy effect on these impacts. The rationale appears to be that the levy will reduce demand for virgin aggregates, with a corresponding reduction in the environmental impacts.

  24.  However, as identified in the research results of Ecotec and Pearce/EFTEC, this is a very weak relationship. This weak relationship between aggregates output and environmental impacts/external costs is described by Pearce/EFTEC as follows:

  But the fact that the "product" is taxed rather than the externality, has formidable implications for the effectiveness of the tax. For it means that the industry has no incentive to reduce the environmental impact of each tonne of aggregates. Were it to do so, it would reduce the environmental impact, but it would not reduce its tax burden. The only way a product tax helps is by reducing the quantity of the product and, as we have seen above, this will not happen on any significant scale because of the inelasticity of demand for aggregates. This feature of product taxes for environmental control is well known9. Environmental taxes should, as far as possible, always be targeted at the externality itself, not the product embodying the externality10.

  Source:   Para 2.5 The Economic Benefits of Environmental Awareness and Training Programmes in the Aggregates Industry-Pearce/EFTEC 1999.

  25.  Since the decision to introduce the aggregates levy in the March 2000 Budget, Government has had nearly three years to define in more detail the actual impacts of aggregates supply, and the differences the levy will make to these impacts, but it has failed to do so.

  26.  To use one issue as an illustration, the Treasury claims that the levy will reduce "damage to wildlife habitats." To the best of our knowledge, however, there is no available assessment of the impacts of aggregates supply on wildlife habitats. Aggregates extraction has the potential to damage habitats, although this will be very much a site-specific issue. On the positive side, the restoration and afteruse of quarries will often produce habitats which are more valuable to wildlife than the pre-quarry landscapes. English Nature, for example, estimates that over 700 current Sites of Special Scientific Interest have their origin in quarry and mineral workings.

  27.  An assessment of the net effect of quarrying activities on wildlife habitats requires a whole life analysis of the quarrying cycle, from extraction through to afteruse. We believe such an analysis would be as likely to demonstrate a net benefit in terms of wildlife habitats as a net loss.

  28.  Therefore, in spite of the assertion made in the Treasury Review, the Treasury has produced no evidence of the net impact of quarrying on wildlife habitats, nor the extent to which the levy will improve these impacts.

  29.  The other major justification for the aggregates levy—to increase the use of recycled materials in the sector—is easier to quantify.

  30.  Once again, neither the Pre-Budget Report nor any related documentation has included any targets for the impact of the levy on increasing recycling. However, speaking in a Westminster Hall debate on aggregates tax on 13 March 2002, Treasury Financial Secretary Panel Boateng MP said:

    "The Department of Transport, Local Government and the Regions estimates that 10 million tonnes of construction waste could be recycled . . ."

  This is the nearest the Treasury has come to identifying a recycling target for the tax.

  31.  Assessing the scope for the use of recycled materials has since been clarified by the publication in November 2002 of two reports commissioned by the Office of the Deputy Prime Minister.

    —  Survey of Arisings and Use of Construction and Demolition waste in England and Wales in 2001.

    —  Survey of Arisings and Use of Secondary Materials as Aggregates in England and Wales in 2001.

  The construction and demolition waste survey concludes that "38.02 million tonnes of hard C and D and excavation waste was recycled as aggregates," and that a further 2.68 million tonnes of C and D waste had "varying potential for recycling as aggregates." The survey results related to England and Wales.

  32.  These results indicated that the level of recycling of construction and demolition waste in aggregates markets is significantly higher than previously assumed, and the scope for further recycling relatively low.

  33.  This relatively high level of recycling in the sector is confirmed in the Mineral Planning consultation paper issued by the ODPM in August 2002 "Consultation Paper—Draft National and Regional Guidelines for Aggregates Provision in England 2001-2016." Paragraph A15 of the consultation paper reads:

    "The available evidence suggests that there has been a rapid increase in the use of C and D waste (construction and demolition waste) since 1990. This means that most of the C and D waste that is easy to recycle is now being recycled and therefore it is likely to become progressively more difficult to increase the use of C and D waste further. While there is potential for increased supply from some mineral wastes, a number of other sources of alternatives to primary aggregates are decreasing as a result of industrial changes."

  This recorded increase in recycling pre-dates the introduction of the aggregates levy.

  34.  In general terms the latest information on recycling, if extrapolated to the UK as a whole, indicates the following market breakdown:
UK Demand for Aggregates (2001) million tonnes
Primary aggregates240 MT
Recycled/Secondary Aggregates60 MT
Total Market300 MT

  The evidence suggests that most recycling is now taking place, and that the potential for further increase is no more than 10mt, increasing the UK use of recycled/secondary aggregates from c. 60mt to c. 70mt pa.

  35.  If the main purpose of the aggregates levy is—as indicated by Stephen Timms MP when Financial Secretary-to increase recycling, the scope for further increase would appear to be up to 10mt pa.

  36.  The aggregates levy, at £1.60 per tonne, will increase the annual cost of supply of aggregates in the UK by c. £460 million pa. (this assumes that the cost of both primary and recycled aggregates will increase by £1.60 per tonne on average, and taking into account the partial and diminishing aggregates levy derogation for specified products in N. Ireland).

  37.  Consequently each additional marginal tonne of recycled aggregates supplied as a result of the levy will, in effect, receive an average aggregate levy subsidy of £46 per tonne (£460 million divided by 10 million tonnes). The average ex works selling price of aggregates is around £7.00 per tonne—subject to significant product and geographical variations.

  38.  Bearing in mind that there are environmental costs and issues associated with the supply of recycled as well as primary aggregates, we would question if the levy represents an environmentally or economically effective means of encouraging a relatively small marginal increase in recycling in the sector. There is no evidence that such assessments have been made by the Treasury or elsewhere in Government.

December 2002


 
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