Memorandum from the Royal Society for
the Protection of Birds
1. EXECUTIVE
SUMMARY
The "Plan of Implementation" resulting
from the World Summit on Sustainable Development in Johannesburg
makes various commitments, but it contains very little detail
on how commitments will be delivered. In this sense, there was
a failure of governments to face up to how their aspirations should
be translated into action. Under these circumstances, we would
suggest that the most effective ways to make real progress towards
sustainable development are:
— to ratify, implement and strengthen
existing conventions;
— to make sure that individual governments
and coalitions of governments commit to driving the sustainable
development agenda further forward singly and in partnership,
at home and abroad. For both the UK and EU, it is now domestic
and international action that is essential.
Both the UK and the EU clearly have a potentially
important leadership role in this regard. The performance of the
UK delegation in Johannesburg itself was generally excellent,
especially given the constraints of negotiating as an EU member
state. UK communication with civil society was also very impressive
in Johannesburg, but much less satisfactory before and since the
Summit.
2. THE RSPB AND
THE WSSD
2.1 The RSPB believes that the sustainable
development agenda is a key to achieving both poverty alleviation
and biodiversity conservation. We believe that this agenda must
be shaped by all constituencies, including government, business
and civil society. We have therefore been active both in our own
right and as a contributor to the dialogue with government departments
and other NGOs, prior to, during and after the World Summit. Our
collaborative contributions were made through the Green Globe
Task Force and the Development and Environment Group, as well
as through the dialogues coordinated by Stakeholder Forum, for
which we provided some financial support. We also participated
in numerous meetings with government officials from most of the
relevant departments and were represented on the UK delegation
in both Bali and Johannesburg.
2.2 In terms of our direct contribution,
the RSPB sent six delegates to Johannesburg and two representatives
of RSPB Phoenix, our teenage membership wing, also attended. We
also collaborated closely with BirdLife International, which was
represented by partner organisations from 17 countries, many from
Africa and the South.
2.3 In addition to working generally to
strengthen both the negotiated texts and Type II partnerships,
the RSPB and BirdLife prepared three major projects for the World
Summit. In collaboration with BirdLife South Africa and with funding
from DEFRA, the RSPB produced a curriculum book for teachers to
explore the major themes of the summit with South African schoolchildren.
This Teacher's Guide to the World Summit was sent to every
school for 11 to 14 year-olds in the country—over 28,000
in total. Also with funding from DEFRA, the RSPB brought together
an international team of economists and ecologists to make an
assessment of the economic costs and benefits of protecting wild
nature. Their findings were published in the journal Science[1]
immediately prior to the summit and this attracted much interest
in Johannesburg. The RSPB also conducted a joint project with
Oxfam and the New Economics Foundation to encourage world leaders
to commit to adopting a small set of social, economic and environmental
indicators to monitor national and international progress towards
sustainable development.
3. WSSD 2002: TURNING
RHETORIC INTO
REALITY
(a) The overall performance and strategy of
the UK delegation at the Summit and the degree of involvement
and influence of non-governmental stakeholders at the event.
3.1 The UK delegation performed well at
the summit and the degree to which it involved NGOs is to be commended.
Ministerial time, commitment and effort in communicating with
civil society were impressive. Daily briefings held by the UK
delegation with NGOs were well attended by both ministers and
officials who engaged fully, even when the delegation was under
extreme negotiating pressure. Input from NGOs was substantial
and there were detailed question and answer sessions at the briefings.
There was a genuine sense that the government was consulting civil
society and that the detailed points raised were being taken on
board. This was a marked improvement from Bali. Given that formal
negotiations were conducted through the EU, it would have been
desirable if the EU's daily NGO briefing had been equally open
and substantive.
3.2 The quality of the performance of the
UK delegation in Johannesburg was based on the expertise of individual
civil servants, pre-summit Whitehall coordination, and the relationships
of trust they built with NGOs and other governments, both inside
and outside the EU. Unfortunately, it seems that many key players,
especially at DEFRA and FCO, have already moved on. The loss of
these individuals will undoubtedly affect the UK's capacity to
take the sustainable development agenda forward. Special provisions
for regaining capacity, institutional memory and inter-departmental
communication will need to be made if the UK government is to
retain its effectiveness in this field.
3.3 The fact that the UK delegation included
representatives from NGOs is to be highly commended. This collaboration
could become even more effective in the future if trust between
the UK government and NGO delegates grows, as it appeared to do
with each PrepCom leading up to the Summit, enabling a more complete
exchange of information. The nature of the relationship between
government and business seemed less clear from an NGO standpoint.
Business delegates on the UK delegation did not play a prominent
and active role in communications between government and civil
society.
3.4 We can only really measure the UK's
performance as a negotiating party in the context of the overall
performance of the EU. The UK delegation did appear to be better
informed and coordinated than other member state delegations.
However, although both the UK and the EU are to be commended for
having been prepared to recommend more ambitious targets and timetables
than many other negotiating parties, their negotiating leverage
for obtaining them was weak. With commitments on trade reform
and increased funding for development already made in Doha and
Monterrey, and with a domestic review of the Common Agricultural
Policy under way, the EU was unable or unwilling to make concessions
sufficiently attractive to win over some members of the G-77,
including OPEC, and the US was opposed to specific actions, targets
and timetables generally.
3.5 The failure to reach agreement on a
renewable energy target is the clearest example of this strategic
weakness, but it affected other aspects of the negotiations as
well. When asked at both UK and EU NGO briefings about this weakness,
neither the UK government nor the EU had a satisfactory answer.
There was also evidence of poor internal EU negotiating coordination,
and unfortunate decisions by the Presidency. At one point in the
negotiations, the Presidency, apparently without the consent of
EU member states, acquiesced to a clause which would have subordinated
Multilateral Environmental Agreements to the World Trade Organisation.
This would have been a regrettable outcome. In the end, it was
left to smaller states, with NGO support, to lead the effort which
resulted in the clause being removed.
(b) How far the UK Government capitalised
on the Summit to raise awareness of sustainable development issues
at home.
3.6 The Government has seemingly not prioritised
public awareness raising in the UK about issues debated at the
summit, or provided much funding or capacity for it. The public
communications strategy of the government about the summit itself
was also generally weak, in spite of some limited discussion with
civil society on how to make improvements. It appears that public
perceptions of the summit in the UK have been largely informed
by journalists who tended to emphasise the lack of focus in Johannesburg
and highlighted the contrasts between wealth and poverty, some
of which the Summit itself demonstrated. One suggestion for the
future might be to second someone with campaigning experience
from an NGO to government specifically to work on public awareness.
(c) How the commitments made at the summit
could/should reshape existing UK policies/strategies or act as
the catalyst for new initiatives.
3.7 Clearly, commitments made in Johannesburg
on specific policy issues, including biodiversity, fisheries,
marine protected networks, water, energy, sustainable production
and consumption and corporate accountability will require UK and
EU action, both domestically and internationally—suggestions
for specific actions are detailed in Section 4. However, it is
the vagueness of the international commitments made in Johannesburg,
and the absence of commitments in so many areas of importance,
that make undue reliance on the outcomes of Johannesburg to deliver
sustainable development problematic.
3.8 However, the failure of the global community
in Johannesburg to produce a blueprint for action offers an important
opportunity for individual countries, or groups of countries,
to take action of their own. Such action could be on either a
voluntary or a more formal, legal or negotiated basis. Such action
has the potential not only to make a substantive contribution
to sustainability in its own right, but also to provide leadership
for the rest of the world. The EU, and the UK within the EU, is
well placed to play a leadership role of this kind.
3.9 The so-called "Coalition of the
willing" declaration, strongly supported in Johannesburg
by the UK and EU, to move forward aggressively on regional renewable
energy development, is a good example of a voluntary initiative,
as is the UK's own Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency Partnership
(REEP).
3.10 The other initiative which offers great
potential for further international cooperation, are the so-called
"WEHAB" papers, commissioned by Kofi Annan from the
UN. Although these papers have no legal standing, they are the
most concrete blueprints available for action on water, energy,
health, agriculture and biodiversity, and provide an excellent
framework on which to build.
3.11 The extent to which voluntary partnership
initiatives (so-called `Type IIs') will make a difference for
sustainable development has yet to be demonstrated. While these
are welcome in themselves, they should not become a substitute
for action at the formal governmental and intergovernmental levels.
For this reason, the EU and UK must also push the global community
to implement and strengthen existing international environmental
and social conventions that do have formal status, such as that
on biodiversity, and to build sustainability into all international
economic negotiations, particularly those on trade, which must
eventually acknowledge the integrity of multilateral environmental
agreements.
3.12 It is equally important for the UK
and other EU member states to take corresponding formal action
within their own borders, both by implementing existing international
commitments and EU environmental laws, and by integrating sustainability
into other EU sectoral processes, including reform of the CAP,
the Common Fisheries Policy, Structural Funds, and accession.
As a recent OECD report notes, in spite of progress and leadership
on some issues, the UK still lags behind its European colleagues
in implementing EU law in areas such as waste management, pollution
control and designation and protection of important wildlife areas.
3.13 It is the EU level that also offers
the best platform for new legislation that would lead and contribute
to progress on sustainable development, by effecting large-scale
change without compromising the economic competitiveness of member
states whose trading activities fall mainly within the EU. Current
examples include the liability and emissions trading directives,
the possibility of an EU-wide carbon tax, or the use of VAT for
environmental purposes. Again, rather than dragging its feet on
these and similar EU initiatives, the UK could and should be taking
a lead. Finally, continued progress on the purely domestic agenda
is essential, including both environmental measures per se, and
the integration of sustainability considerations into all economic
activity. With reform of the planning system, decisions on airport
expansion and the large-scale development of offshore wind, as
well as reviews of energy and agricultural policy all under way,
there will be ample opportunity for the Government to confirm
its commitment to sustainable development at home.
(d) How far the Government has maintained
stakeholder dialogue post-Johannesburg to inform its implementation
of Summit commitments
3.14 Although Government dialogue with stakeholders
was excellent at the Summit itself, it was less impressive before
and, especially, since. The summit was certainly an all-encompassing
event for those involved and it is fair to expect a period of
recovery—as long as momentum starts to pick up again and
is translated into concrete action. It may still be too early
to judge on both communication and implementation. On the positive
side, it is important to note that Mrs Beckett and Mr Meacher
held a follow-up meeting with representatives of business and
civil society. There have also been, or are planned, meetings
between civil society and most of the key departments, to discuss
the way forward. At the same time, it is of concern that many
key civil servants have already departed, that ministerial responsibilities
have already changed, that some departments are restructuring,
and that the WSSD follow up meeting with the Secretary of State
was restricted to a relatively small group. To avoid the perception
or reality that communication is deteriorating, and that little
concrete action is planned to meet commitments made, the UK government
needs to reaffirm at the highest political level its commitment
to take the sustainable development agenda forward and make robust
and transparent institutional arrangements and links with NGOs
in order to achieve this.
(e) The particular changes to the EU strategy
for sustainable development which the UK Government should be
advocating when the strategy is reviewed at the Spring European
Council in 2003
3.15 Although it is important for the EU
Sustainable Development Strategy to take account of the particular
outcomes from Johannesburg, it is equally important, for the reasons
identified in section c), that reliance is not placed exclusively
on either Johannesburg, or the EU Sustainable Development Strategy
alone. With regard to the strategy itself, the review should be
conducted at least partly in light of the commitments made in
Johannesburg, with the possibility of modifying the strategy where
it fails to take account of those commitments. For example, with
regard to the recognition in Johannesburg of the need for increased
funding for biodiversity conservation, the UK should push for
the Natura 2000 network to be funded adequately at the European
level. In a global context, the EU pledged specific amounts of
funding for water, energy, health and overseas aid in Johannesburg
but has so far failed to produce specific funding targets for
biodiversity protection. This should be redressed in its Sustainable
Development Strategy. Again, in view of the Johannesburg commitment
to have in place a network of marine protected areas by 2012,
the UK should press for member states, itself included, to expedite
the EU process of designation and protection itself. The UK should
also emphasise that EU-funded infrastructure developments, for
example for transport and especially in EU accession countries,
must not impinge on areas of high biodiversity value. To measure
progress on these issues, it will be important for the UK to push
the Council to ensure that the Commission includes a biodiversity
indicator as it conducts its review and produces its annual synthesis
report between now and next spring, and increases the overall
number of environmental indicators against which progress is judged.
Similar modifications will be necessary to reflect the other commitments
made in South Africa.
3.16 Beyond the sustainable development
strategy itself, there are other important vehicles and processes
for delivering sustainable development within the EU, including
the Sixth Environmental Action Programme, and the so-called Cardiff
integration process. The thematic strategies within the Environmental
Action Programme are currently under development and must be made
as strong as possible. The Cardiff sectoral integration strategies,
particularly that for agriculture, should be revisited and strengthened.
In addition, as indicated in section c), there are many opportunities
for EU action both on environmental and sustainability issues
in their own right, and on sector-specific reform. We regard the
Liability Directive as being especially important.
4. RECOMMENDATIONS
FOR ACTION
IN SPECIFIC
POLICY AREAS
POST-WSSD
Biodiversity
4.1 The recognition that additional resources
are necessary to reduce biodiversity loss by 2010, although weaker
than some previous formulations of the target (notably that adopted
in the Ministerial Declaration of the Hague Biodiversity Convention,
which refers to "reversal" rather than "reduction"),
nevertheless has potentially significant national and international
implications for UK policy. We must still stress, however, that
far greater commitments are needed (see Balmford et al. 2002 in
Science 9 August 2002, Vol. 297, pp 950-953 on economic reasons
for conserving wild nature—the result of the RSPB study
mentioned above). Little will be achieved either domestically
or internationally without adequate funding and effort. The recent
increase of funding for the Darwin Initiative is to be welcomed
but even at the enhanced level it will be wholly inadequate to
meet even the commitment set out in the Johannesburg Plan of Implementation.
Problems in conserving biodiversity and in managing protected
areas effectively, both in the UK and globally, stem from a lack
of resources. This funding gap makes conflict with local communities
much more likely, since it forces them to shoulder the costs of
not exploiting a resource that they otherwise could and would.
The burden of preserving a global public good (such as global
biodiversity or tropical forests) is thus being forced upon what
are often the poorest communities and those who are least able
to shoulder the cost. A radical rethink of policy is required
if we are to support the livelihoods of poor communities and conserve
biodiversity for this and future generations.
4.2 In the EU itself, there is a pressing
need for Natura 2000 sites to be designated and the UK is behind
on this. Here too, public funding for biodiversity protection
must be increased, or conflict with local communities will continue
to slow or prevent the listing of Important Bird Areas. Another
measure the UK government should take is to increase funding for
conservation in the UK Overseas Territories because of their biodiversity
importance.
Water and Sanitation
4.3 The commitment to halve the number of
people without access to water and sanitation by 2015 is to be
welcomed. It must also be recognised that the safe and sustainable
supply of water is reliant on healthy catchments where ecosystem
integrity is respected. In the long term, integrated river basin
management will be required to achieve this. Any new initiatives
should encourage integrated river basin management, and ensure
the full participation of local people. This is as true in the
UK and the EU as the developing world, and must be reflected in
the way the Water Framework Directive is transposed and implemented
in the UK.
Fisheries and Marine Policy
4.4 The UK government and the EU should
show leadership to restore as a priority depleted fish stocks
well before 2015 and should also eliminate subsidies that contribute
to unsustainable fishing, not only in Community waters but also
in third-country waters fished by Community vessels. The commitment
to establish marine protected areas and no-take zones will help
achieve this as well as benefiting small-scale local fisheries,
while also protecting marine species, habitats and features that
presently fall outside current UK/EU designations. High priority
should be given to integrating environmental protection into fisheries
management in pursuit of implementing an ecosystem approach.
Forests
4.5 The Johannesburg Plan of Implementation
makes commitments to reduce deforestation, to "halt the loss
of forest biodiversity," to "endorse . . . [sustainable
forest management] as a priority on the international political
agenda," and to take "immediate action at the national
and international levels" to promote sustainable timber harvesting
(paragraph 43). The new committee of forest ministers of England,
Northern Ireland, Scotland and Wales has been set up to work on
crosscutting and international forestry issues. This will be the
key body in the UK for implementing the Johannesburg commitments
on forests and taking them further forward.
4.6 Prior to the WSSD, the UK government
convened the UK Forest Partnership for Action—a partnership
of government, business and environmental groups to which the
RSPB is a signatory. This could also be a key driver for implementing
the Johannesburg commitments though it must not be regarded as
a substitute for strong leadership from government and intergovernmental
processes. Specific actions that the UK Forest Partnership for
Action has committed to include the following: Certification of
all UK woodlands should be increased to 60 per cent in five years,
complying with the UK Woodland Assurance Standard (UKWAS), the
UK's standard approved by the Forest Stewardship Council. UKWAS
certification of all UK woodland production should be increased
to 80 per cent within five years. There is also a commitment to
encouraging certified procurement—we would suggest that
the government should set specific targets and timetables for
achieving this.
4.7 The British government should ultimately
be held accountable for the implementation of the targets agreed
under the partnership. If this leads to delivery (at least to
the level of the targets set out), it could be an exemplary case
of a government-led initiative to take both policy and action
further than the commitments made in Johannesburg. The points
of focus for action in the partnership—restoration and protection,
certification, illegal logging and timber procurement—are
welcomed. The British government should be expected to deliver
on all fronts and it should strive to achieve implementation through
devolved governments and local authorities throughout the UK.
The government should also work at both the domestic and international
levels to combat illegal logging, focusing on procurement, sustainable
production and certification.
Energy
4.8 On energy, the UK government should
continue to show leadership at the domestic and international
levels. Internationally, the UK has not only launched its own
Renewable Energy Efficiency Partnership but has also subscribed
to the Coalition of the Willing commitment to bring about a "substantial
increase in the global share of renewable energy sources".
Hopefully, the Energy White Paper will take domestic energy policy
much further forward as well. This is a large area of policy on
which the RSPB has made specific recommendations to previous inquiries.
Sustainable Production and Consumption
4.9 The UK should take a leading role in
developing the ten-year plan on sustainable production and consumption
agreed in Johannesburg. The Department of Trade and Industry has
already been working on ways to achieve greater resource efficiency,
which should now be translated into concrete policy measures including
ambitious targets. Measures should include price signals for more
sustainably produced goods, incorporating the use of green taxes
and subsidies for more environmentally friendly products, in order
to achieve compliance with EU directives.
Corporate Accountability
4.10 The Johannesburg commitment to "actively
promote" corporate accountability, through both national
regulation and intergovernmental agreements (Plan of Implementation,
paragraph 45), should have far reaching implications for UK policy.
The UK government should establish a range of legal regulatory
mechanisms domestically to achieve this—from taxes linked
to producing social and environmental benefits to mandatory reporting
on consumption in businesses (focusing on a core set of variables
which might include waste, water, electricity and CO2 emissions).
The UK government should also push for similar measures to be
adopted at the international level.
November 2002
1 "Economic Reasons for Conserving Wild Nature"
Science Reprint, 9 August 2002, Volume 297, pp 950-953 Back
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