Select Committee on Environment, Food and Rural Affairs First Report


FIRST REPORT


The Environment, Food and Rural Affairs Committee has agreed to the following

Report:

REFORM OF THE COMMON FISHERIES POLICY

 

Summary

The European Commission has brought forward welcome proposals for the reform of the Common Fisheries Policy (CFP). We believe that they have some potential to make the CFP an instrument which conserves the marine environment and promotes a healthy fishing industry. But we argue for a more flexible approach to the limitation of fishing effort, and recommend that closer attention be paid to the problems of industrial fishing, discarding and enforcement. Reform of the CFP will come at some short- and medium-term cost to the fishing industry, and we support efforts to mitigate the blow through careful choices of the methods and timing of new measures, and the appropriate use of public aid. Our overall message is that fishing stocks and the fishing industry are in crisis, and significant reform of the CFP is long overdue.

Introduction

Our inquiry

1. The European Common Fisheries Policy (CFP) has been subject to review and reform during 2002. We decided in July 2002 to examine progress made, and appointed a Sub-committee to undertake an inquiry into the matter.[1] The terms of reference for our inquiry were:

"To examine the reforms proposed by the European Commission in May 2002 for the Common Fisheries Policy (CFP). Amongst other matters to address:

  • the effects of the proposals on the fundamental principles of the CFP;
  • to what extent the proposals will improve quota management and conservation - and what alternatives might be considered;
  • what will be the impact of the proposals on the structure of the British fishing industry;
  • whether the plans for social help for fishing communities are adequate;
  • to what extent the reforms will allow a more flexible system to develop, permitting short term adjustments to quotas to be made to react to changes in fish biology and fishing technology; and
  • whether enough emphasis has been placed on proper enforcement of the CFP."

8. In response to our invitation to submit written evidence we received eighteen memoranda. We held three evidence sessions in October 2002, hearing from the Joint Nature Conservation Committee on behalf of English Nature, Scottish Natural Heritage and the Countryside Council for Wales, the Royal Society for the Protection of Birds, the WWF, the National Federation of Fishermen's Organisations, the Scottish Fishermen's Federation, the Fishermen's Association Ltd and Mr Elliot Morley MP, Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State (Fisheries, Water and Nature Protection), Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs. During a visit to the European Commission in Brussels in November 2002 we also met Mr John Farnell, Director of Conservation in DG Fisheries. We are grateful to all those who gave evidence, either orally or in writing.

Background to the Common Fisheries Policy

9. The treaties that established the European Community stated that there should be a common policy for fisheries. But the first common measures were only introduced in 1970, immediately before the accession negotiations of the United Kingdom and Norway, the two nations with the richest fisheries in Europe, when it was agreed that there should be common access to a common resource. The Common Fisheries Policy (CFP) itself dates from 1983. It was intended to ensure a common approach across the European Union in four main areas: conservation to protect fish resources, structures to help the fishing industry to adapt to the constraints imposed by scarce resources and the market, common organisation of the market within Europe for fish and shellfish, and fishing relations with the outside world.[2]

10. The CFP has been subject to severe criticism, principally for failing to conserve fish stocks and because of increasing difficulties faced by the fishing industry. Previous Select Committee reports have addressed the CFP's limitations in depth. It is not our intention to reiterate those arguments here: those wishing to read in more detail about the Policy are referred to the most recent reports: the former Agriculture Committee's report on Sea Fishing,[3] and the Government's reply,[4] and the House of Lords Select Committee on the European Union's report on Unsustainable Fishing.[5]

11. The first review of the CFP was carried out in 1992. The current review is the second, which was originally scheduled for 2002, although in practice it is likely that negotiations will continue into 2003. On 28 May 2002, the Commission published the first of its proposals for reform of the CFP. These consist of a 'Roadmap' which describes the shortcomings of the existing CFP and sets out the Commission's overall approach to reform,[6] three proposals for new or amended Council regulations (on conservation and sustainable exploitation of fisheries resources,[7] amendments to the Financial Instrument for Fisheries Guidance Regulation,[8] and emergency measures for scrapping vessels[9]) and two non-binding action plans (on integrating environmental protection requirements into the CFP,[10] and on illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing[11]). This Report considers only these proposals, although a further strategy, for aquaculture, was published in October 2002.[12] It is also anticipated that the Commission will produce several more action plans as part of the overall reform package, including plans relating to discards, to countering the social, economic and regional consequences of restructuring and to cooperation in enforcement. These three issues are crucial to effective reform of the CFP and we await the Commission's communications on these subjects with interest.

12. It is beyond the scope of this Report to conduct a complete analysis of all the different measures outlined in the reform proposals. Instead, we have taken evidence from a wide range of fisheries stakeholders and experts, including fishermen's representatives, fisheries scientists, environmental groups and the Government and, drawing on this breadth of opinion, present a balanced and considered view of some of the more urgent or contentious aspects of the Commission's proposals.

The State of European Fish Stocks

13. On 25 October 2002 the International Council for the Exploration of the Seas (ICES) published its latest advice on commercial fish stocks in the north-east Atlantic.[13] In their summary of the ICES advice, the United Kingdom statutory nature conservation agencies wrote "the state of many fish stocks, particularly those of importance to the UK fishing industry, has deteriorated in the past year. The situation is so grave that ICES is now recommending closure of fisheries taking cod, whether as a targeted species or in bycatch ... in general, fish stocks are not able to support the fishing pressure being presently applied to them."[14] ICES has advised that North Sea stocks of cod are at an all time low and that whiting, hake, plaice and sole stocks are outside safe biological limits.

14. Fishermen's representatives, although also concerned about cod stocks, took a slightly more optimistic view. The chief executive of the Scottish Fishermen's Federation (SFF), Mr Morrison, told us that his organisation had recently published a North Sea stock survey that showed "there is definitely a regime shift at work in the North Sea ... the habitats of certain fish have lost their vitality, cod in particular, in the southern part of the North Sea it is hardly there at all but it is still quite strong in the northern North Sea."[15] Mr Deas, chief executive of the National Federation of Fishermen's Organisations (NFFO), agreed that cod was outside safe biological limits, but pointed out that the ICES assessments used 2001 data and had therefore not taken into account measures adopted in 2002, including a 20% reduction in the Scottish white fish fleet and increases in mesh size.[16] Referring to cod stock in the south west, Mr Lambourn, president of the NFFO, said "three years ago, things were on a downward trend. The last 18 months have seen considerable improvement across the board".[17] Both the SFF and NFFO felt that the situation was better for other stocks. Mr Morrison told us that the SFF's survey showed "the relative strength of species like whiting, haddock, saithe and plaice",[18] and Mr Deas said that pelagic stocks, some shellfish and nephrops were all reasonably healthy, although he went on to say that "what we are not arguing is that things are anything like as good as they could be ... I think it is very important not to over-react and that is precisely what our fear is about the way the advice has been expressed this year."[19]

15. Even before the ICES report, the Commission recognised that many fish stocks were in a poor condition, admitting in its Roadmap that "the first shortcoming of the CFP is the alarming state of many fish stocks that are outside safe biological limits. Stock sizes and landings have declined dramatically over the last 25 years. For many commercially important demersal stocks the numbers of mature fish were about twice as high in the early 1970s than in the late 1990s. If current trends continue many Community fish stocks will collapse."[20]

16. The Minister, too, told us that the severity of the ICES advice came as no surprise to him. It had been clear for some time that cod stocks were in trouble and he expressed concern that there was now a severe danger that North Sea cod stocks could collapse. He told us that a number of other key stocks were in "severe difficulty" and although the impact of recent conservation measures might not yet be reflected in the ICES data, he did not think that the current state of stocks could be ignored.[21]

17. We accept the scientific assessment that many European stocks have been depleted to dangerously low levels. We recognise that this overall picture can mask regional and species specific complexities, as evinced both by the ICES data from different regions and by fishermen's very different experiences of recent landings in the south west and North Sea. Nevertheless, the state of some stocks, particularly that of North Sea cod, is so poor that there can be no excuse for failing to act rapidly to reverse the declines.

The Science of Fisheries Management

18. Our predecessor committee's report on Sea Fishing discussed the strengths and weaknesses of fisheries research in detail and many of its conclusions apply now with as much force as they did then.[22] It remains true that

    "without accurate knowledge of the population of any particular species in any fishing ground at a particular time, it would be impossible to ... ensure that areas or stocks are not fished out. Equally, it is vital that the assessments made by scientists are seen to be well-founded by responsible fishermen in the light of their own experience or the latter will lose faith in conservation measures which require them to exercise an apparently arbitrary restraint".[23]

19. Although for the most part both scientists and fishermen feel that their mutual understanding and respect has improved in the three years since that report, fishermen still do not trust some of the scientific data. The president of the NFFO said "the science for many of the stocks is very thin and would not stand much scrutiny at all ... there is a fundamental problem with the credibility of the fisherman who is right at the sharp end in that he simply does not believe what he is being told".[24] Scientists have agreed that there is a need for more, and better, data. We were told of particular difficulties in assessing the impact of fishing on non-target species, including marine mammals and seabirds, and on the wider marine environment. We took evidence which argued that an important way of improving data gathering would be to have more independent scientific observers aboard fishing vessels.[25] Nevertheless the Joint Nature Conservation Committee (JNCC) said that current understanding of fish stocks was good enough to develop sound fishery management systems. It pointed out that although fishermen may challenge the results of mathematical models of fish stocks, they have not challenged the models themselves.[26] The Minister said it was not reasonable to dispute the overall trends reflected in the scientific advice, even if fisheries science could never be exact.[27] While accepting that the broad downward trends in many stocks revealed by current scientific assessments are undeniable, we support the call for better data for fisheries management models. In particular, we recommend that the Government take steps to increase the number of scientific observers aboard fishing vessels, and we urge in the strongest terms that these observers should have an independent status entirely unconnected with enforcement.

20. An area where assessments by scientists, such as those provided by ICES, and those of fishermen and fishermen's organisations diverge most widely is in the determination of the causes of fish stock declines. ICES, the UK statuary nature conservation agencies and the Royal Society for the Protection of Birds consider excessive fishing effort as the principle cause, and that other factors such as climate change have only a contributory role.[28] By contrast fishermen do not accept that fishing pressure is great enough to cause severe decline by itself. The SFF expressed the view that cod is in a particularly bad state because it is a cold water fish which has been affected by seas warming under the influence of climate change.[29] The Fishermen's Association pointed to the influence of industrial fishing for species on which cod feeds, and the South Western Fish Producer Organisation told us that "fishing for human consumption is responsible for only 10 per cent of the mortality experienced by fish stocks. The other 90 per cent results from industrial fishing, pollution, predation by seals, other fish, marine mammals and birds, mechanical devices such as power station intakes and aggregate dredging".[30]

21. In order to overcome these grave differences and mistrust, fisheries scientists and fishermen should work much more closely together and scientists should take more account of the considerable knowledge and experience of fishermen. Evidence submitted to this inquiry shows some encouraging steps in this direction,[31] but it is clear that still more effort is needed.

22. We accept that there is much about marine ecosystems that is still not well understood and that even our knowledge of the true state of fish stocks cannot be absolutely precise. We also accept that the time needed to produce models of fish stocks and the resulting advice means that information is a year or more out of date by the time it is published. Nonetheless, the long-term declines in stocks since the 1970s are dramatic and irrefutable and we concur with the view that we have reached a crisis point in the management of Europe's fisheries. Courageous and decisive action is needed to safeguard both stocks and the fishing livelihoods that depend upon them.

23. In the past, there has been a lack of political will to take such action. While the Minister appears to accept that this can no longer be allowed to be the case, he faces intimidating challenges.[32] The Treasury is reluctant to provide money for an industry which is small, and which is to it less important than other priorities, and the Government generally is loath to sour relations with the European Union through intransigence on fishing. The industry does not trust either the Government or the European Union, and the processes of the CFP have become so politicised that a common will to rebuild the stocks to sustainable levels and share out the catches fairly is difficult to foresee. We nevertheless urge all parties to recognise that Europe, having brought fish stocks to this dangerous level, has a collective responsibility to rebuild them to sustainable levels and shape a healthy marine environment.

Effort Limitation

24. Despite the differences of opinion outlined above, most fishermen, scientists, environmentalists, the Government and the Commission agree that fishing mortality (that is, the number of fish killed due to fishing activities) must be reduced if depleted stocks are to recover.[33] Where opinions of these groups diverge again is on the matter of how to achieve such a reduction. The Commission favours limits to fishing effort, which it defines as the time spent at sea by a vessel of a given engine power. It argues that limiting effort, whether by reducing the number of days vessels spend at sea or decommissioning some vessels, is vital, although catch limitations (quotas) and technical measures to limit catches of non-target species and young fish should also be considered.[34]

25. Fishermen's representatives have reacted angrily to the Commission's proposals to limit fishing effort. The NFFO told us that it believed that the Commission had already decided on the approach of setting mandatory limits on days spent at sea, and that its mind was closed to alternatives. It expressed its intention to resist any such scheme vigorously.[35] The South Devon and Channel Shellfishermen argued that a combination of limited days at sea and quotas would drive boats out of business and that if that was the intention it would be better to pay fishermen to decommission boats than to let them go bankrupt.[36] The Fishermen's Association told us that although it accepted that there might be a need for conservation measures, it did not think that the solution was necessarily a reduction in fishing effort. The Association advocated technical measures such as separator trawls until there was "genuine evidence that over-fishing is responsible [for difficulties]".[37]

26. Others take a different view. The JNCC and the RSPB told us that a sustainable and vibrant fishing sector is an objective desired by everyone concerned. But they argued that the current fleet is too large for the stocks to bear, and it is too large to provide a good living for the whole fleet. They tended to favour decommissioning as the mechanism to achieve a reduction in the size of the fleet.

27. All of our witnesses accepted that there were a range of measures (a 'tool-box'[38]) that could be used to reduce fishing mortality. The Minister viewed them all as forms of effort limitation because all aim to reduce the number of fish caught.[39] We outline the main options that have been presented to us below, along with what we see as their advantages and disadvantages.

  • decommissioning is a process through which vessel owners are paid to scrap their vessels or otherwise remove them from the fishing fleet. It can help to reduce the size of the fleet, particularly when subsidies for new or modernised vessels are removed. Decommissioning can avoid some of the pitfalls of tie-up schemes but decommissioning will only be taken up if the financial incentive is great enough. This is more likely to be the case for owners of old and inefficient vessels than for those with modern high capacity ones. This can mean that a certain percentage reduction in fleet size does not correspond to an equal reduction in fleet fishing capacity. Moreover, reducing the overall size of the fleet, of course, has consequences for on-shore jobs.

  • tie-up schemes, or mandatory limits on days spent at sea. Uncompensated tie-up schemes are deeply unpopular with fishermen, who say that many of them are already operating at the limits of economic viability and any reduction in income will drive them out of business. Given adequate compensation, fishermen will accept tie-up as it means they can return to fishing once stocks have recovered. Given the level of effort reduction needed and the fact that it is not clear when, or even whether, stocks will recover, compensated tie-up schemes are potentially extremely expensive and are not favoured by Government. Tie-up schemes also have two more subtle drawbacks. First, fishermen will initially stay in port during the least profitable and productive periods, so again for any given limitation of effort, a greater degree of tie-up is required. Second, experience in Canada and the United States shows that the presence of fishermen who are not allowed to go to sea puts great pressure on governments to re-open recovering fisheries as soon as possible, which threatens the full recovery of the stocks.

  • the CFP has so far largely relied on setting limits on catches, or quotas, to conserve fish stocks. This has not worked, partly because political negotiations have often meant that total allowable catches have eventually been set higher than the scientific advice suggested, partly because of illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing and partly because it is inevitable that in mixed-species fisheries a particular species will continue to be caught as by-catch even after the quota has been exhausted.

  • closed areas and closed periods can be very beneficial to fish stocks, although more research is needed into their application in mixed-species temperate fisheries. Closed areas often need to be large in order to be effective, which we were told can prove unpopular with fishermen.[40] Closed periods may need to be declared very quickly, for example to protect an aggregate of juveniles or spawning stock: the current system is not sufficiently responsive. Closed areas and closed periods both depend on adequate enforcement, which can be very costly, but must be provided if either is to be effective.

  • technological conservation measures, such as increased mesh sizes, square mesh panels and separator trawls, might be able to make a valuable contribution to more benign fishing, as might a one net rule. However, the effect of such measures is questioned by some, and it may well be that more stringent limitations on effort are needed in many areas and for many stocks.

33. We agree with the Commission that fleet capacity must be brought in line with the stocks. But we also recognise the complex regional nature of European fisheries, and so we reject the Commission's apparent 'one-size-fits-all' approach to effort limitation. We applaud the more open-minded 'tool-box' approach, advocated by the Minister and by the NFFO. We recommend that the Government advocate effort reduction policies tailored to the specific problems of different areas and different sectors of the industry. However, given the extent of the stock crisis we urge all parties to recognise that a reduction in overall fleet capacity will be necessary in some, if not all, sectors. Given that there are regional differences in the health of fish stocks and that Member States have already made differing contributions to fleet reduction, we recommend that fleet capacity reduction be shared equitably between Member States and between fishing sectors, and that decommissioning be concentrated on the most damaging forms of fishing, particularly industrial fishing and beam trawling, or on larger and more efficient vessels which take the bigger catches. We also urge a moratorium on new entrants to areas such as the North Sea while pressures are at their most acute.

New Approaches to Quota Management

34. Until now, quotas, or total allowable catches, have been set on a yearly basis. The process begins when the European Commission receives advice from ICES and its own Scientific and Technical and Economic Committee on Fisheries. It then analyses the options and puts its proposals to the Council of Ministers, which is responsible for setting the TACs for each species. The process has been open to accusations of 'horse-trading' between Member States, with the result that TACs have too often been determined by political factors rather than science. The fact that it happens annually has also led to large, unpredictable, fluctuations in the TACs, which has made planning difficult for fishermen.

35. In the light of these difficulties the Commission has proposed that management plans for commercial stocks or groups of stocks are in future determined on a 'multi-annual' basis, with a view to ensuring the recovery of depleted stocks, adopting a precautionary approach and making the best use of available science. It is intended that the plans will set out targets for fishing mortality and stock population sizes. They will also determine harvesting rules (that is, limits on effort and catches) to meet those targets. It is proposed that once a multi-annual management plan has been agreed, the Council of Ministers will set the catch and fishing effort limits for the first year of the plan and that thereafter the operation of the plan will be managed by the Commission, assisted by a Management Committee.[41]

36. Broadly speaking, our witnesses welcomed the move towards a multi-annual approach as a move away from "a perpetual cycle of crisis management",[42] and from "short term, politically-motivated adjustments to TACs",[43] towards the longer-term goal of sustainable fisheries. However, there was disquiet over how the plans would be agreed and managed. Fishermen felt that the plans may transfer too much power away from the Council in favour of the Commission, which, the NFFO believes,[44] takes too narrow a view of effort limitation. The Natural Environment Research Council was concerned about the lack of detail provided about the proposed Management Committee. They said that

    "the proposed Management Committee needs further explanation. For example, how will this Committee be made up and what resources will it have, especially to balance stock management and economic considerations with environmental concerns? ... There needs to be some explicit link between this proposed committee and at least the Scientific, Technical and Economic Committee for Fisheries (STECF) and the proposed Regional Advisory Councils (RAC). It is important that it has access to expertise in all appropriate disciplines. The Commission and its Committees may not be set up to access all significant information at present".[45]

37. We welcome the move towards multi-annual management of fisheries. If it is managed well it could be an invaluable tool for promoting stock recovery, reducing fishing's impact on the wider marine environment and fostering a more predictable and stable framework for fishermen to work within. However, it is imperative that multi-annual plans should not be seen as another distant bureaucratic measure, decided without taking account of the needs and experiences of fishermen themselves, otherwise the plans will not be accepted and will not work. Therefore the procedures for arriving at the plans must be transparent and inclusive. In our view, this is an area where stakeholder bodies such as the proposed Regional Advisory Councils, will play a vital role, though they can only be effective if they have power to take and enforce decisions for those areas for which they are responsible: they must have the authority and ability to manage such areas.

Enforcement

38. Adequate enforcement is central to proper functioning of the CFP. At present there are grave problems with, amongst other things, discarding unwanted or over-quota fish, illegal landings and mis-reported catches. We took evidence that last year 40,000 tonnes of haddock was landed in the United Kingdom, but that at the same time 120,000 tonnes was discarded.[46] Changes must be made to the economic pressures which lead to a greater number of fish being discarded than landed. Moreover, urgent scientific study is needed to gain a proper understanding of the reasons for discards.

39. There is also a view among United Kingdom fishermen that rules are enforced more rigorously for them than for their counterparts in other Member States. Attitudes towards enforcement are shaped by attitudes towards the fisheries management regime as a whole. The Joint Nature Conservation Committee pointed out that greater involvement of fishermen in drawing up management plans would increase their sense of ownership, understanding and confidence in the rules they are expected to abide by. In turn this would mean most fishermen would be more willing to comply with the rules, which would in turn reduce demand on enforcement bodies.

40. One of the most potent factors acting against willing compliance is the belief that other fishermen are getting away with breaking the rules. In order to address such concerns the European Commission intends to put forward a proposal for a cross-Community Joint Inspection Structure. Although we have not yet seen the proposals in detail, we welcome the principle of a Joint Inspection Structure as a step towards ensuring that not only is enforcement applied evenly across the European Union, but that it can be demonstrated to be so.

41. We welcome the proposal that technological monitoring measures such as satellite monitoring and electronic log-books should be more widely adopted. That said, we recommend that the Government accept that installation of them should be funded either by the United Kingdom or the European Union, so that British fishermen can install them on the same basis as their European competitors. We also support the use of more fisheries protection vessels as well as greater use of inspection and monitoring both on board vessels and onshore at landing ports.

42. We have already argued that the number of scientific observers on board fishing vessels should be increased. We strongly recommend that these individuals not be charged with enforcement duties as to do so might very well compromise the quality of data they collect, and their relationship with fishermen.

Improving decision-making

43. A key failure of the CFP has been the extent to which fishermen have felt alienated from the management of fisheries. Many fishermen have felt that important decisions affecting their livelihood have been made by remote figures who do not take account of the fishermen's own knowledge and experience. In general, the different players in fisheries management have distrusted one another and blamed each other for the failure of fish stocks.

44. Another drawback of the CFP has been its failure to take fully into account the degree of regional variability in the Community's waters. The Commission wants to address both of these problems by creating Regional Advisory Councils (RACs) "to ensure greater stakeholder involvement in the development of fisheries management at regional and local level". The Commission envisages that "RACs should be composed of representatives of all parties with an interest in fisheries management in a given sea area or fishing zone and shall be transnational in nature. They should advise the Commission and, where appropriate, Member States, on fisheries management in the area".[47]

45. Our witnesses all welcomed the proposed introduction of Regional Advisory Councils, and supported the principles of a greater regional aspect to fisheries management and increased stakeholder involvement. However, many feared that unless matters such as the membership, funding, organisation and role of the RACs were clarified, the Councils risked degenerating into "talking shops".[48] There was also a concern that they should not cover too great a geographical area, since if they did only high level representation would be feasible, and 'grass-root' stakeholders would lose out. Witnesses were also sceptical about the Commission's willingness to devolve any real power to the Councils: again, it was argued that if they lacked credible influence the Councils would "evolve into discussion groups"[49] which would fail to attract "key players and responsible participation".[50]

46. English Nature told us that both nature conservation groups and the fishing industry "preferred that Regional Advisory Councils remain advisory, as opposed to executive ... we have to be careful not to impose more complications on top of the system that already exists".[51] However, the SFF and NFFO told us that although RACs should be advisory at first, it was their "joint determination that they will in the end have executive power".[52] The Minister agreed that "they must have real influence in relation to fisheries management decisions".[53] Regionalisation of fisheries management is a key step to improving the CFP. We strongly welcome the proposed Regional Advisory Councils but consider that rather than being mainly advisory they should have real authority for the management of the stocks and fishing effort in their areas. With overall policy set in Brussels it is important that stakeholders in each region be given the power and authority to manage fishing, apply conservation measures and enforce all necessary means so as to ensure that fishermen in that region are effectively running fishing policy within it.

47. RACs will be meaningless unless their recommendations are given full weight. We recommend that, after a very short initial period during which their membership, remit and relationship with other bodies are clarified, the RACs should be given real decision-making powers over fisheries management within their areas. The Council should set only the overall parameters and targets for each region, and it should be up to the RACs to decide in detail how to achieve those aims. Powers could be returned to the Council and Commission if the RACs fail to live up to expectations.

Six and twelve mile limits

48. All witnesses to this inquiry welcomed the proposed retention of national limits, as do we, though we consider that it would be more rational to have a consistent twelve-mile limit all round the British coast.

Public Aid

49. Our inquiry addressed three types of public aid for fisheries and fishing communities: aid for modernisation and building new vessels; transitional aid to help fishermen stay in business until stocks have recovered; and aid to fishing dependent communities to help them to diversify into new industries.

50. We agree with the Minister that European Union funds should not be used for increasing vessels' catching capacity or for obtaining new vessels and that this rule should apply across the Union.[54] But it has been put to us that modernisation is necessary if United Kingdom vessels are to be competitive once stocks have recovered.[55] The problem of older vessels should be addressed if and when stocks recover, and we recommend that the matter be addressed in a later review of the CFP. However, we do support the provision of public aid to smaller vessels (those less than 12 metres in length) to improve safety measures on board.

51. Given that the capacity of the European fleet as a whole will have to be reduced in order to bring it into line with stocks and that it may take several years for stocks to recover, we do not think that a compensated tie-up scheme covering all fishermen uniformly is feasible. However we do anticipate that some transitional aid should be made available to fishermen to ensure that the United Kingdom has a vibrant and competitive industry that will be able to profit from recovered stocks. We urge the Government to adopt a flexible approach drawing on a spectrum of measures to address the diverse needs of different parts of the fishing industry in this country.

52. The WWF told us that it is currently undertaking a joint project with the fishing industry, called Invest in Fish, "which is about what sort of management measures we need to put in place and what the cost of that would be".[56] Whilst we have some sympathy with the Minister's view that "one person's subsidy is another person's investment",[57] it would be invidious if competitor fishing industries were in better shape than an unsupported British industry once catches improve. We therefore endorse the view of the WWF that support for fishing which helps it through from the present situation to the brighter future of sustainable catches once the new measures bear fruit should be regarded as an investment. A healthy fishing industry could make a return both to the Treasury and to the national economy rather than being a drain. We therefore applaud the fishing industry and WWF for collaborating on this issue to develop a cost-benefit analysis of the case for support. Their conclusions should be considered seriously by both DEFRA and the Treasury.

53. Broadly, we support the shift of fishing subsidies away from production and towards measures that make fishing more environmentally benign and towards support for fishing dependent communities.

The Marine Ecosystem

54. Fishing for human consumption is one of a number of activities that have the potential to damage the marine environment. Industrial fishing, aquaculture, dredging and drilling for oil are other examples. Fishing itself does not just affect commercial fish species: by-catch kills other fish species, marine mammals, seabirds and turtles, and some fishing activities can damage habitats. Decreases in the biomass of commercial species will affect other parts of the ecosystem, although we do not yet know to what extent.[58] We support the Commission's move towards an 'ecosystem-based approach'[59] to fisheries management that looks at human activities and the marine environment in the round. As the RSPB told us, "we cannot continue to think of the North Sea and the rest of our community waters as just a production unit for fish".[60]

55. We welcome the Commission's Action Plan to Integrate Environmental Protection Requirements into the CFP.[61] We recommend that more work is undertaken to assess the impacts of industrial fishing on commercial and non-commercial species.

Political Negotiations

56. We welcome the Commission's proposals for reform of the Common Fisheries Policy which, on the whole, we believe have the potential to make the CFP, at last, an instrument that conserves the marine environment and promotes a healthy fishing industry. That said, we would argue for a more flexible approach to effort limitation than the Commission seems to have adopted, and we note that many of the proposals need to be clarified or worked up in more detail. However, the continuation of any industrial fishing at all in the North Sea is unacceptable at this moment of crisis. Nor is it sensible to admit new fishing effort, particularly from Spain, which from 2002 has the right to fish for non-quota species, or other new entrants, when stocks are endangered. Such moves should be suspended and only phased in once stocks recover. Allowing others to build up a track record and increase discards until that improvement occurs is unacceptable to fishermen and makes little sense. We also recognise that reform of the CFP and safeguarding stocks will come at some short-term cost to the fishing industry, although we share the Government's optimism that the scale of the impact can be mitigated by careful choice of the methods and timing of new measures to reduce effort.[62] The blow can also be softened by appropriate use of public and European Union aid. The British fishing industry has received less fiscal support from both its own Government and the European Union than most other countries - and far less than Spain. It is also clear that the devolved Scottish Executive and Parliament is prepared to be more generous to its fishing industry than DEFRA has been. It is important that the finance for fishing should be seen to be fair and equitable.

57. Previous attempts to reform the CFP have foundered on a lack of political will on the part of Member States to sacrifice the interests of national fishing industries, viewed as more important to their countries than our industry is to ours, to the general good of effective conservation. The argument has always been a political one about shares rather than about stocks and their health. The result is a legacy of mistrust which remains strong. We believe that the Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs, and in particular Mr Morley, has accepted that European fisheries management has reached a pivotal point and that profound and far-reaching reform can no longer be delayed. The Minister has adopted a sensible and realistic approach to the key issues of the proposed reform but these reform proposals coincide with a major conservation crisis, arising, in large part, from the failure of the CFP to do its basic job of conserving fish stocks at a sustainable level. In negotiating the British Fisheries Minister has one vote and voice among several, so what he can achieve depends on building coalitions and making concessions with the powerful alliance of the Friends of Fishing often against him.

58. It will be a difficult negotiation. Yet it would be invidious and deeply damaging to any faith in the European Union if the nation which contributes the great bulk, possibly over two-thirds, of European fish stocks ended up facing the deepest cuts in its fishing industry, and with a shrunken fleet which is unable to seize the opportunities which should arise when, and if, new conservation measures work and viable European and British fishing fleets are able to thrive on sustainable catches. The United Kingdom needs to be a major part of that renaissance. So as the Fisheries Minister sets out to achieve that end we give him our support in the difficult negotiations ahead.

List of conclusions and recommendations

1.  We accept the scientific assessment that many European stocks have been depleted to dangerously low levels. We recognise that this overall picture can mask regional and species specific complexities, as evinced both by the ICES data from different regions and by fishermen's very different experiences of recent landings in the south west and North Sea. Nevertheless, the state of some stocks, particularly that of North Sea cod, is so poor that there can be no excuse for failing to act rapidly to reverse the declines (paragraph 11).

2.  While accepting that the broad downward trends in many stocks revealed by current scientific assessments are undeniable, we support the call for better data for fisheries management models. In particular, we recommend that the Government take steps to increase the number of scientific observers aboard fishing vessels, and we urge in the strongest terms that these observers should have an independent status entirely unconnected with enforcement (paragraph 13).

3.  We have reached a crisis point in the management of Europe's fisheries. Courageous and decisive action is needed to safeguard both stocks and the fishing livelihoods that depend upon them (paragraph 16).

4.  We nevertheless urge all parties to recognise that Europe, having brought fish stocks to this dangerous level, has a collective responsibility to rebuild them to sustainable levels and shape a healthy marine environment (paragraph 17).

5.  We recommend that the Government advocate effort reduction policies tailored to the specific problems of different areas and different sectors of the industry. However, given the extent of the stock crisis we urge all parties to recognise that a reduction in overall fleet capacity will be necessary in some, if not all, sectors (paragraph 22).

6.  We recommend that fleet capacity reduction be shared equitably between Member States and between fishing sectors, and that decommissioning be concentrated on the most damaging forms of fishing, particularly industrial fishing and beam trawling, or on larger and more efficient vessels which take the bigger catches. We also urge a moratorium on new entrants to areas such as the North Sea while pressures are at their most acute (paragraph 22).

7.  We welcome the move towards multi-annual management of fisheries. If it is managed well it could be an invaluable tool for promoting stock recovery, reducing fishing's impact on the wider marine environment and fostering a more predictable and stable framework for fishermen to work within. However, it is imperative that multi-annual plans should not be seen as another distant bureaucratic measure, decided without taking account of the needs and experiences of fishermen themselves, otherwise the plans will not be accepted and will not work. Therefore the procedures for arriving at the plans must be transparent and inclusive. In our view, this is an area where stakeholder bodies such as the proposed Regional Advisory Councils, will play a vital role, though they can only be effective if they have power to take and enforce decisions for those areas for which they are responsible: they must have the authority and ability to manage such areas (paragraph 26).

8.  Changes must be made to the economic pressures which lead to a greater number of fish being discarded than landed. Moreover, urgent scientific study is needed to gain a proper understanding of the reasons for discards (paragraph 27).

9.  Although we have not yet seen the proposals in detail, we welcome the principle of a Joint Inspection Structure as a step towards ensuring that not only is enforcement applied evenly across the European Union, but that it can be demonstrated to be so (paragraph 29).

10.  We welcome the proposal that technological monitoring measures such as satellite monitoring and electronic log-books should be more widely adopted. That said, we recommend that the Government accept that installation of them should be funded either by the United Kingdom or the European Union, so that British fishermen can install them on the same basis as their European competitors (paragraph 30).

11.   We also support the use of more fisheries protection vessels as well as greater use of inspection and monitoring both on board vessels and onshore at landing ports (paragraph 30).

12.  We have already argued that the number of scientific observers on board fishing vessels should be increased. We strongly recommend that these individuals not be charged with enforcement duties as to do so might very well compromise the quality of data they collect, and their relationship with fishermen (paragraph 31).

13.  Regionalisation of fisheries management is a key step to improving the CFP. We strongly welcome the proposed Regional Advisory Councils but consider that rather than being mainly advisory they should have real authority for the management of the stocks and fishing effort in their areas. With overall policy set in Brussels it is important that stakeholders in each region be given the power and authority to manage fishing, apply conservation measures and enforce all necessary means so as to ensure that fishermen in that region are effectively running fishing policy within it (paragraph 35).

14.  We recommend that, after a very short initial period during which their membership, remit and relationship with other bodies are clarified, the RACs should be given real decision-making powers over fisheries management within their areas. The Council should set only the overall parameters and targets for each region, and it should be up to the RACs to decide in detail how to achieve those aims. Powers could be returned to the Council and Commission if the RACs fail to live up to expectations (paragraph 36).

15.  All witnesses to this inquiry welcomed the proposed retention of national limits, as do we, though we consider that it would be more rational to have a consistent twelve-mile limit all round the British coast (paragraph 37).

16.  We agree with the Minister that European Union funds should not be used for increasing vessels' catching capacity or for obtaining new vessels and that this rule should apply across the Union (paragraph 39).

17.  The problem of older vessels should be addressed if and when stocks recover, and we recommend that the matter be addressed in a later review of the CFP. However, we do support the provision of public aid to smaller vessels (those less than 12 metres in length) to improve safety measures on board (paragraph 39).

18.  We do not think that a compensated tie-up scheme covering all fishermen uniformly is feasible. However we do anticipate that some transitional aid should be made available to fishermen to ensure that the United Kingdom has a vibrant and competitive industry that will be able to profit from recovered stocks. We urge the Government to adopt a flexible approach drawing on a spectrum of measures to address the diverse needs of different parts of the fishing industry in this country (paragraph 40).

19.  It would be invidious if competitor fishing industries were in better shape than an unsupported British industry once catches improve. We therefore endorse the view of the WWF that support for fishing which helps it through from the present situation to the brighter future of sustainable catches once the new measures bear fruit should be regarded as an investment. A healthy fishing industry could make a return both to the Treasury and to the national economy rather than being a drain. We therefore applaud the fishing industry and WWF for collaborating on this issue to develop a cost-benefit analysis of the case for support. Their conclusions should be considered seriously by both DEFRA and the Treasury (paragraph 41).

20.  We support the shift of fishing subsidies away from production and towards measures that make fishing more environmentally benign and towards support for fishing dependent communities (paragraph 42).

21.  We support the Commission's move towards an 'ecosystem-based approach' to fisheries management that looks at human activities and the marine environment in the round (paragraph 43).

22.  We recommend that more work is undertaken to assess the impacts of industrial fishing on commercial and non-commercial species (paragraph 44).

23.  However, the continuation of any industrial fishing at all in the North Sea is unacceptable at this moment of crisis. Nor is it sensible to admit new fishing effort, particularly from Spain, which from 2002 has the right to fish for non-quota species, or other new entrants, when stocks are endangered. Such moves should be suspended and only phased in once stocks recover. Allowing others to build up a track record and increase discards until that improvement occurs is unacceptable to fishermen and makes little sense (paragraph 45).

24.  The British fishing industry has received less fiscal support from both its own Government and the European Union than most other countries - and far less than Spain. It is also clear that the devolved Scottish Executive and Parliament is prepared to be more generous to its fishing industry than DEFRA has been. It is important that the finance for fishing should be seen to be fair and equitable (paragraph 45).

25.  Yet it would be invidious and deeply damaging to any faith in the European Union if the nation which contributes the great bulk, possibly over two-thirds, of European fish stocks ended up facing the deepest cuts in its fishing industry, and with a shrunken fleet which is unable to seize the opportunities which should arise when, and if, new conservation measures work and viable European and British fishing fleets are able to thrive on sustainable catches. The United Kingdom needs to be a major part of that renaissance. So as the Fisheries Minister sets out to achieve that end we give him our support in the difficult negotiations ahead (paragraph 47).


1   The press notice can be viewed on our website, at http://www.parliament.uk/commons/selcom/efrapnt28.htm. Back

2   For more information see the European Commission's website at http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/fisheries. Back

3   Agriculture Committee, Eighth Report of Session 1998-99, Sea Fishing, HC 141-I. Back

4   Agriculture Committee, Seventh Special Report of Session 1998-99, Reply by the Government to the Eighth Report from the Agriculture Committee, Session 1998-99, "Sea Fishing" (HC 141-I), HC 853. Back

5   House of Lords Select Committee on the European Union, Third Report of Session 2000-01, Unsustainable Fishing, HL Paper 12. Back

6   Communication from the Commission on the reform of the common fisheries policy ("Roadmap") (COM(2002)181). Back

7   Proposal for a Council Regulation on the Conservation and Sustainable Exploitation of Fisheries Resources (COM(2002)185). Back

8   Proposal for Council Regulation amending Regulation (EC) No 2792/1999 laying down the detailed rules and arrangements regarding Community structural assistance in the fisheries sector (COM(2002)187). Back

9   Proposal for a Council Regulation establishing an emergency Community measure for scrapping fishing vessels (COM(2002) 190). Back

10   Community action plan to integrate environmental protection requirements into the Common Fisheries Policy (COM(2002) 186). Back

11   Community action plan for the eradication of illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing (COM(2002) 180). Back

12   A strategy for the sustainable development of European aquaculture (COM(2002) 511).

 Back

13   See http://www.ices.dk. The key points of the advice are also summarised in K8a. Back

14   Ev 13. Back

15   Q.71. Back

16   Q.84. Back

17   Q.77. Back

18   Q.71. Back

19   Q.86. Back

20   Communication from the Commission on the reform of the common fisheries policy ("Roadmap") (COM(2002)181). Back

21   Qq 162-163. Back

22   HC (1998-99) 141-I, chapter III. Back

23   Ibid para 16. Back

24   Qq 80-81. Back

25   For example, see Ev 82, para 12 and Ev 3. Back

26   Q.25. Back

27   Q.165. Back

28   Q.5, Ev 16. Back

29   Q.71. Back

30   Ev 86. Back

31   For example, see Q.26. Back

32   Q.174. Back

33   Qq 5, 9, 40, 88-92, 173. Back

34   COM (2002) 185, p.3. Back

35   Ev 29. Back

36   Ev 97, para 3.1. Back

37   Qq 146, 148. Back

38   Q.190. Back

39   Q.191. Back

40   Q.191. Back

41   COM (2002) 181, pp 6-7. Back

42   Ev 31. Back

43   Ev 5. Back

44   Ev 30. Back

45   Ev 81, para 7. Back

46   Q.12. Back

47   COM (2002) 185, p. 7. Back

48   See Ev 31, Ev 18 para 15, Ev 83 para 21. Back

49   Ev 62, para 8. Back

50   Ev 96. Back

51   Q.20. Back

52   Q.121. Back

53   Q.166. Back

54   Q.178. Back

55   Q.161. Back

56   Q.49. Back

57   Q.207. Back

58   Q.25. Back

59   For a brief discussion of the ecosystem approach see Qq 25, 27, 44. Back

60   Q.41. Back

61   COM (2002) 186. Back

62   Ev 66 para 21, Q.204. Back


 
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