APPENDIX 4
Memorandum submitted by the South Western
Fish Producer Organisation Ltd (K10)
INTRODUCTION
Since 1970 the Fisheries Policy of the European
Union has cost the British fishing industry the loss of more than
7,000 catching sector jobs and countless ancillary jobs. This
has been done falsely in the name of conservation and sustainability.
Since 1992 more than 2,000 UK fishing vessels have been scrapped.
Fishing has become the most heavily regulated of all British industries
and the signs are that things are going to get much worse before
they improve. The quota system of the CFP has been in existence
since 1983. It was designed to regulate the amount of fish taken
from the sea and yet, year on year, the quotas have been reduced.
This has not aided conservation because the vessels continue to
catch the fish, much of which then has to be discarded, dead,
back into the sea. Yet, ironically, fishing for human consumption
is responsible for only 10 per cent of the mortality experienced
by fish stocks! The other 90 per cent results from industrial
fishing, pollution, predation by seals, other fish, marine mammals
and birds, mechanical devices such as power station intakes and
aggregate dredging.
The quota system has also given rise to another
unpleasant side effect. Although the national quotas were intended
to ensure a stable share of the fishing opportunities for the
coastal communities of the Member States, those quotas have fallen
easy prey to foreign owners who desire to catch more fish than
they would otherwise have access to and to provide jobs where
otherwise they would have been lost through industry restructuring
under the MAGP's. However, the European Court in the case known
as "Factortame" has ruled such "quota-hopping"
to be perfectly lawful. Now, under single market rules, more than
£40 million worth of British fish quotas are lost annually
to the quota-hopping vessels of Spanish and Dutch ownership. Spanish
operators now own 56 per cent of UK Hake quotas, 36 per cent of
the Megrim and 31 per cent of the Anglerfish. Dutch interests
own more than 66 per cent of UK North Sea Plaice quotas and 55
per cent of our N Sea Dover Sole quotas. In effect British fishing
quotas are being used to provide employment in Spain and Holland
to the detriment of UK fishing communities. This is contrary to
the intentions of the CFP quota system based, as it is, on "relative
stability" of opportunities.
The British government spends more than £45
million each year to police and administer the CFP and its inherent
quota system. Alarmingly, that's more than 10 per cent of the
value of the fish landed by British fishermen into UK ports. This
amount increases each year despite the fact that the industry
is in decline. Interestingly the Minister of Fisheries admitted
recently "I often think that one of the problems of European
fisheries management is that we spend too long enforcing complicated
regulations and not enough time on making sure we adopt the right
regulations—that fishermen are happy to follow—in
the first place." Yet policing the CFP remains a growth sector
for jobs and technology! If the proposals contained in the "roadmap"
come to fruition it will not be long before we have a fully integrated
and incredibly costly European fisheries inspection service.
The price per kilo paid to fishermen for their
catch is much the same now as it was 30 years ago, yet operating
costs for the fishermen have risen inexorably. Profitability is
marginal at best and the recent surge in the price of fuel has
driven some vessel operators into bankruptcy and many more are
on the brink. The European Parliament has recently approved a
piece of legislation that will outlaw "red" diesel as
used in fishing boats. Fuel will increase in price by 9 per cent.
Fishermen will incur expense in converting their trawler engines
to take the new "low sulphur" fuel. Fish merchants and
fish processors are also suffering and quitting the industry in
droves. Hitherto there have been mechanisms designed to deal with
the social consequences of fisheries policies. However, these
seem now to be taking a poor second place to so-called conservation
in the name of the precautionary principle.
The Fisheries Commission, in the introduction
to the "roadmap" for reform, laments the economic fragility
of the industry and regrets the loss of 66,000 catching sector
jobs across Europe between 1990 and 1998, but then advises readers
that a further 26,000 jobs must be shed by the end of 2006!
All of the regulation and bureaucracy associated
with the CFP might have been accepted if sustainability had been
achieved over the past 30 years, but the opposite is true. Fish
stocks continue to decline and available quotas are much lower
now than when they were established in 1983.
These facts are hardly the symptoms of a successful
policy and of a vibrant industry. But the saddest fact of all
is that the long-term fate of the British fishing industry effectively
was decided many years ago when Britain joined the European Community.
The questions we should now be asking are "When
will the job cuts end? When will the fleet be small enough? When
will British fish quotas be reserved for the benefit of British
fishing communities? When will somebody with authority realise
that commercial fishing is one of the lesser contributors (only
10 per cent of all fish killed are for human consumption) to mortality
in fish stocks and that it is now time to impact on the other
factors, such as seal, mammal and bird predation or industrial
fishing?".
REFORM OF
THE CFP, WHAT
REFORM?
When the founders of the CFP sat down together
in the late 1960's to discuss and set out the principles by which
the fisheries of the European Community would be regulated and
fostered, the states of both the fleets and the fisheries were
somewhat different to those with which we are now faced. Those
politicians made certain decisions and took the fishing industry
in a certain direction, convinced in their own minds that the
fisheries would thrive and the market in fisheries products would
get stronger. Their strategy was a failure, although their motives
and objectives were probably honourable.
The Fisheries Commission is now asking us to
endorse their "roadmap" for reform. We are told that
it contains a revised set of objectives and a new framework designed
to deliver sustainability and economic viability. We have studied
those revised objectives and can see that they barely differ from
the original ones. In itself that is not surprising, as it was
not the objectives that were at fault, but the method of achieving
them.
The big question is whether or not the new framework
can deliver a better result than the previous one? As an Organisation
of Fish Producers, we have yet to be convinced that it is wise
to take the same route now to achieve the aims of the CFP as was
taken then. This is especially as the present state of the fish
stocks is the result of a combination of factors, most of which
have resulted from taking that route. Does the Commission deserve
our trust to get it right this time?
In those early days of fisheries policy, the
emphasis was on the market in fisheries products and not so much
on the conservation of the stocks. It was then, after all, a Common
Market, not a European Union. The aims of those who sought to
manage the fisheries in 1970 were 1) to obtain the maximum economic
benefit for the fishermen, 2) to stabilise the markets, 3) to
assure the availability of supply and 4) to ensure that supplies
reached consumers at reasonable prices. Conservation of fisheries
was limited to simple technical measures aimed at minimising the
bycatch of juveniles of the species targeted. Such measures were
not new to the industry and were generally respected as being
worthwhile.
It was not until more than 10 years later, in
1983, that "the protection of the fishing grounds, the conservation
of the biological resources of the sea and their balanced exploitation
on a lasting basis and in appropriate economic and social conditions
by the restriction of fishing effort, in particular by limits
on catches", became further guiding principles within the
finalised CFP. In that year the concept of a Total Allowable Catch
was realised and the national quota shareout began. From that
date the "Control Measures" became much more complex
and sophisticated. They also became much less respected and certainly
no more effective in delivering the goal of sustainability of
the stocks.
These two clear and separate sets of principles,
established at different stages of fisheries policy, have led
to different practices. On the one hand, maximising the market
inferred higher fishing effort and greater efficiency. The fleets
grew, often with cash incentives from Brussels and national governments,
over the first 10 years of fisheries policy. On the other hand,
ensuring the supply and conserving the resources implied a lowering
of fishing effort and fleet capacity. The MAGP's have sought to
rein in fleet development through decommissioning and effort limitation,
reversing the trends of growth and expansion.
The principles of the CFP are therefore self-cancelling.
Either the stocks suffer or the fishing communities. Both cannot
thrive under such contradictory conditions.
This inherent contradiction in fisheries policy
has been a significant contributory factor, amongst many others,
which have brought about the decline in fish stocks, which is
now a feature of European fisheries. The problem is that dealing
with the catching element cannot alone bring about a reverse in
the state of the stocks. A strategy aimed at reducing the mortality
of fish stocks must deal with all elements contributing to that
mortality.
The Commission is now attempting to give the
conservationist objectives priority. Economic viability may remain
an objective, but on an individual rather than community basis.
Social, economic and regional consequences are foreseen as a necessary
consequence of sustainable fishing. Dependence on fishing is no
longer acceptable in the new CFP! Another 28,000 jobs are to be
sacrificed over the next 4 years. Is this a sign of a rational
coherent strategy or of panic?
Furthermore, the present drive for reforms has
been motivated by other expedients, the desire to complete the
"single market" and the prospect of enlargement to,
perhaps, 30 Member States. The problem is, however, that the fisheries
have been so damaged over these past 30 years that they are even
less ready for an integrated Community policy than they were at
the start of the transitional period in 1972. The essential aim
of Treaty negotiators has always been to conclude, through integration,
the "single market" providing "equal conditions
of access to and use of the fishing grounds." Imagine how
much worse things would be if the CFP had existed without derogation
for these 30 years?
The derogations from the principle of equal
access were designed to fulfil two objectives. Firstly to enable
the Member States' fishing industries to make the transit from
National to Community Control. However, fishing communities were
to be protected and fish stocks were to be conserved. Secondly
to enable the Member States to adapt their legal systems to match
the needs of the Community. The present system of national quotas
is an integral part of that transition process.
We now know that the extended transition has
been far from smooth with outcomes far from successful, yet there
are those who seek now to justify the conclusion of the derogations
and the immediate completion of the CFP within the single market.
We believe that such an outcome would, at this juncture, be premature
and would also have far more damaging consequences for the fish
stocks and the fishing communities that rely on them. Although
the legal systems of the Member States may have been prepared,
the Communities and the fish stocks have not.
The Commission states that the CFP has reached
a "turning point", yet their proposals amount to no
more than a re-iteration of the originally stated objectives.
Although we have no fundamental argument against those objectives,
we believe that the adoption of a policy that demands the priority
of conservation of the stocks over the survival of the fishing
communities, will lead to the destruction of those communities
and to the polarisation of the remaining fleet into the hands
of a small number of owners.
We agree that the CFP has reached a "turning
point". But the "roadmap" does not offer a change
of direction it merely signals an acceleration towards a blind
bend!
WHAT ARE
THE PRACTICAL
EFFECTS OF
THE PROPOSALS?
If it is accepted that the fundamental principles
behind the CFP are derived from and inextricably linked to the
Treaty establishing the European Community, then the current proposals
fall far short of those principles. However, if it is also accepted
that such a shortfall is inherent in the practical application
of fisheries policy and that the ends (sustainability) justify
the means (derogations from the principles), then the "new"
CFP should be as acceptable to Member States as was the original.
The effectiveness of the new CFP compared to the old one is another
issue.
The fundamental principles demand a common policy
in the sphere of fisheries. Such a common policy should be guided
by a legal process and structure and should lead to the acquis
communautaire.
However, such a situation does not exist at
the moment because of a series of dispensations, whose justification,
we would argue, has not disappeared through the passage of time.
A transition period was envisioned in 1970.
It was considered to be 10 years, but was extended at the end
of that period to 30 years, ending on 1 January 2003.
Most observers and commentators acknowledge
that the fisheries and the corresponding fishing industries are
not yet in a condition to allow for equal access. Others suggest
that the legal process must prevail, regardless of the state of
the stocks. Ultimately the Council of Ministers must decide, but
the proposals suggest a continuation of the derogations for the
foreseeable future. The six and 12-mile limits, the Shetland Box
and the relative stability shares of national quotas, all have
their place, at least at the start of the new CFP.
Thus, insofar as the legal status of the European
fisheries is concerned, there will probably be no change between
the present CFP and that which will come into being on 1 January
2003. There are a few Member States that do not like such a prospect
and they may impede the process, but common sense and not a common
resource must prevail.
WILL THE
PROPOSALS IMPROVE
QUOTA MANAGEMENT
AND CONSERVATION?
One thing that should be clear to any observer
is that it is not helpful to consider quota management in the
same context as conservation. Although the one was intended to
be coincident with the other, quota management has become synonymous
with discarding, overfishing and generally greedy conduct.
Quotas were designed to ensure stability for
fishing communities during the restructuring of fishing fleets
that was considered to be a necessary evil of the CFP. Tragically
and with disastrous consequences, there were those who were willing
to exploit any weaknesses of the system.
In the period between 1980 and the end of 1982
a number of "joint ventures" were established as "brass
plate companies" in the UK to enable 61 Spanish vessels to
fish in Community waters as though they were British. These vessels
added to the limited number of Spanish vessels allowed to fish
in Community waters under the 1980 agreement between the Community
and Spain. From 1983 these 61 vessels partook of a share of the
UK quotas established under relative stability.
In 1985 these vessels were awarded UK fishing
vessel licenses when the UK government established the restrictive
licensing scheme in order to ensure that the quotas were not exceeded.
In 1988 the government attempted to rid the
fishing vessel register of the "flagships" through the
Merchant Shipping Act. The owners successfully challenged the
legitimacy of that Act through the European Court, thereby driving
a coach and horses through relative stability and the quota system.
In effect fishing communities cannot be afforded the protection
intended by those that designed and distributed the national quota
shares. Yet relative stability is still held by many to be a success,
indeed as a "principle" at the core of the CFP and not
to be abandoned at any cost.
In our view, the national quotas are no more
than a deeply discredited opportunity distribution system. They
are the "rotten core" of the CFP.
WHAT ARE
THE ALTERNATIVES?
1. The first step has to be the repatriation
of foreign-owned vessels to their beneficial flag-state. The Member
States that have exported parts of their fleet to other fishing
registers have done so in order to appear to have complied with
fleet restructuring targets, yet their boats are still working
and their crews are still employed. Alternatively, the national
fleet targets should take into consideration the "flagships"
when assessing compliance with those targets. Economic and beneficial
compliance is more significant than the physical size of the registered
fleets.
2. Discards of over-quota fish must be banned.
This phenomenon is a symptom of the system. The quota is a 12-month
allowance that the fishermen start to catch from January 1. Each
fisherman makes his own decision as to when to draw from the quotas.
He will discard the fish that he doesn't want to count so that
he can keep fishing until Christmas. It is his duty to his dependants
to make the maximum for his landed catch within those quota limits.
3. Because the discards are of dead fish
they contribute nothing to conservation. The quantities involved
should be added to the calculation of Total Allowable Catch, which
should be established for a rolling multi-annual period of three
to five years, especially for the vulnerable species.
4. With the fleets re-established at their
"true" levels, after taking the quota-hoppers properly
into account, an effort limitation or "days at sea"
scheme can be created for the protection of species at greatest
risk. These would be national limits and those fleets that are
not within their re-structure targets would be penalised by having
appropriate amounts of effort deducted.
5. Conservation would be achieved by having
proper regard for technical measures designed primarily to stop
immature fish from being caught. If the penalty for landing such
fish was very heavy and if anyone handling such fish was also
subject to similar penalty, then there would be greater incentive
to rig fishing gear in more selective ways.
6. The sea areas used to designate the boundaries
for fish stocks should be reviewed so as to reflect better the
locations of the commercial concentrations of fish. At the moment,
for example, Western waters are divided into such small areas
that fishermen experience difficulty when searching. They often
move from one stock area to another, yet the fish they catch may
have also moved, such are the migrations and meanderings of fish.
WHAT WILL
BE THE
IMPACT OF
THE PROPOSALS
ON THE
STRUCTURE OF
THE UK FISHING
INDUSTRY?
Because the present proposals will do nothing
to restore British fish quotas to the benefit of British fishing
communities and because the relative stability shares are to be
continued for the time-being, the British fishing industry will
continue to suffer from the inequities that have dogged it for
the past 20 years.
The MAGP's 1 to 4 have set fleet targets based
on the available quota opportunities and the state of the fish
stocks. These have never taken "flagships" into consideration.
British fishing communities have been stripped of far more vessels
than they should have. More British fishermen have lost their
jobs than was necessary. The structure of the British fishing
industry has been made to crumble unnecessarily.
The proposals are going to make matters even
worse. There is to be more decommissioning, more policing and
extended satellite monitoring and VMS. The quota system will be
supplemented with effort limitation. It will become increasingly
difficult to make a reasonable profit under these strict conditions
and many owners will be forced to withdraw from the industry.
Many more of our fishing ports will become "ghost" towns.
ARE THE
PLANS FOR
SOCIAL HELP
ADEQUATE?
Absolutely not.
Member States should not be allowed to opt out
of using public aid to provide the necessary support to enable
our fishing communities to cope with the strains associated with
fishing and infrastructure job losses.
Better still, restore the British fishing jobs and
export back to Spain and Holland the Spanish and Dutch jobs we
have been saving on the quota-hoppers!
WILL THE
PROPOSED REFORMS
ALLOW A
MORE FLEXIBLE
SYSTEM TO
DEVELOP?
The proposal to introduce a new multi-annual
framework for conservation of resources and management of fisheries
is broadly welcomed. However, there has been a tendency for the
"precautionary" approach to be used as a stick to beat
the industry with. This has been far from helpful.
The Commission's proposals are intended to ensure
that the Community's fisheries management makes "the best
use of harvested resources and avoids waste." Strict adherence
to the precautionary principle, however, results in lower than
necessary quotas and greater than necessary levels of discards.
The only way of actually reducing discards and aiding conservation
is with the implementation of appropriate technical measures combined
with a fair system of effort limitation as described earlier.
The use of "boxes", to close off areas where juvenile
fish concentrate, may also have a part to play.
It may be possible to develop a more flexible
system of fisheries management if all options are explored and
if fishermen themselves are included in the investigation and
consultation process. In any event there has to be a move away
from decisions that are politically motivated and towards a firmer
science base. We do not believe that the quota system has aided
conservation and we feel that there are better ways to achieve
sustainability in the stocks and viability in the fishing fleets.
For so long as the TAC and associated quotas remain a measure
of fish landed and not of fish mortality, they will be an unreliable
mechanism in the field of fisheries conservation.
HAS ENOUGH
EMPHASIS BEEN
PLACED ON
PROPER ENFORCEMENT?
Regulations are relatively easy to enforce if
they have the respect of the subjects of that enforcement. If
the regulations are discredited and have fallen into disrepute,
then compliance will be minimal.
Compliance with the quotas is proportional to
availability of the fish itself. Simply putting a limit on the
amount a fisherman may land is not the same as stopping him from
catching that fish in the first place. This is especially so in
the mixed fisheries experienced in the English Channel and the
Southwest approaches. If a man has caught a high value fish for
which he has no quota, he will argue that it is dead and, "What's
the point in discarding it to feed the birds?" Whether it
is one fish or several tonnes, the logic applies. That is the
reason why the Commission is spending so much time and money investigating
the discarding of fish that has been caught for any number of
reasons.
Should enforcement of the quotas be given such
priority? Or should the emphasis be on enforcing the technical
measures and on improving matters that can truly have a beneficial
effect on conservation?
The Commission certainly believes that going
"over quota" is a mortal sin. They have even vetoed
Member States from engaging in swaps after the year-end to cover
even the most minor infringements that must then result in a matching
deduction from that quota in the following year. This is rigid
inflexibility in the extreme!
We believe that the infringements that should
carry the heaviest penalties are those related to the technical
measures and the taking of immature fish. Many stocks now facing
difficulties would be in far better heart if the technical rules
aimed at their conservation had been adhered to since their creation.
Even now it is not too late to reverse the decline in most stocks
by implementing the technical measures fully from now on.
30 September 2002
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