Select Committee on Environment, Food and Rural Affairs Appendices to the Minutes of Evidence


APPENDIX 7

Memorandum submitted by the South Devon & Channel Shellfishermen (K15)

INTRODUCTION

  1.1  In order to understand the problems of the fishing industry it is necessary to go right back to Regulation 2141 of 1970 and also to our Treaty of Accession. Reg 2141 (later replaced by 101/76) decreed that fish stocks would be a common resource to be exploited by all member states without discrimination.

  1.2  When we joined in 1973 we accepted this, but obtained a derogation for our 6 and 12 mile limits for 10 years.

  1.3  In 1983 a management regime was brought in covering two 10 year periods (Regs 170/83 and 3760/92) which, among other things, renewed the 6/12 mile limits, allocated fish quotas to member states and control of fleets through MAGP (Multi Annual Guidance Programme). It is this management regime which is being changed/reformed while leaving the central principle of equal access to a common resource unchanged.

  1.4  No clear aim/policy (eg sustainable fisheries) has ever been enunciated and decisions have been made by 15 managers (the Council of Ministers) for political reasons (votes back home) and not for fisheries or conservation reasons. All the evidence proves that the CFP has been an unmitigated disaster for both fish stocks and fishing communities.

  1.5  When reviewing the new proposals it is necessary to keep in mind the fundamental principle of the EU—no discrimination between citizens of member states (Articles 7 and 40(3) of the Treaty of Rome). Indeed, the Commission has made it abundantly clear in both its Green Paper and in its Road Map (and also when explaining its proposals) that the principles of the Treaties will be complied with.

  1.6  We have examined the proposals in accordance with the terms of reference for the Inquiry ("To examine the reforms proposed by the European Commission in May 2002 for the Common Fisheries Policy") and will cover the bullet points listed during our examination of the major components of the proposals.

SIX AND 12 MILE LIMITS

  2.1  This proposal is most welcome, although it is not clear if these limits are to be retained permanently or through another derogation. It is our view, though, that they should be made permanent as they are of such importance to local communities and are the nursery area of about 90 per cent of all species.

  2.2  It is also an improvement that the host nation is to be allowed to enforce its own legislation on visiting boats, although it is not clear if this can only be with the consent of the other nation. It is our view that the host nation should be able automatically to enforce its own laws on visiting boats.

  2.3  However, it is clearly discriminatory to allow some nation's boats to fish between the 6/12 mile limits and not others. The only way to avoid such discrimination is to have an exclusive 12 mile zone for every state. The original dispensation given to some states was to allow for historic practices (not rights). Since then the efficiency of boats and gear has improved beyond recognition enabling the boats concerned to catch many times what they did 30 years ago—yet there is still no control on gear, numbers or size. Quite clearly this has a huge (and detrimental) effect on local fish stocks and communities. The only way to avoid both this and discrimination is to reserve the 12 mile limit for the nation state.

DAYS AT SEA

  3.1  It is inequitable to have days at sea and quotas as this becomes a "double whammy". Franz Fischler's explanation that his aim is to make boats uneconomical and thus drive them out of the industry is immoral. If this is the aim, then we feel it is more appropriate to have some form of "tie up" scheme. After all, if, as intended, these proposals lead to an increase in stocks, then it is only right that those fishermen who have "taken the pain" should be available to benefit from the cure.

  3.2  If the Government is not prepared to assist in financing a tie up scheme, then money should be made available for those driven out of business and taking early retirement.

  3.3  In any event, it is imperative that the UK draws down on funds available from Brussels.

  3.4  Days at sea are not appropriate for fishing with crab pots as the pots are left in the water all year round and are too many to be brought ashore.

EU INSPECTORS AND ENFORCEMENT

  4.1  It is generally accepted that the British carry out more rigorous control than any other nation. Indeed, in over 30 years landing into France our boats have never been checked even once.

  4.2  Whilst we agree the need to have a uniform inspection and enforcement policy, we do not accept the need, and we certainly do not want, foreign inspectors enforcing policy on British boats and fishermen on British soil or our EFZ. We are sure that this will lead to unnecessary friction. There is also concern at the legal implications of inspectors from one country having jurisdiction over fishermen in another country.

  4.3  In the same way that British police police Great Britain, German police police Germany etc, so British fisheries inspectors should police all actions, including landings, from Britain's EFZ.

  4.4  If we have to share freely our EFZ with other EU countries, then the cost of enforcing EU legislation should be borne by the EU.

RACS

  5.1  Whilst we accept that it is important for fishermen working the same grounds to liaise, we believe the proposals for RACs to be too cumbersome and unwieldy.

  5.2  If, as proposed, all those with an interest in a particular region are entitled to sit on the committee, who is going to decide who should and should not be represented. The different methods have different needs, and, even within the same fishing method, we have different organisations. They will all want their say, as will each country.

  5.3  The same will apply to the many different environmental groups.

  5.4  It is highly unlikely that they will ever be given any power as the Amsterdam Treaty specifically excludes any power being returned to the nation states.

  5.5  All that will happen is that the RACs will end up as huge great talking shops with little chance of concensus.

  5.6  We believe that it is far more appropraiate to do as we have been doing for 23 years—that is meeting with those who fish a particular area (in our case, the mid-Channel grounds) and agreeing a modus operandi. We, as potters, meet with fishermen from Normandy, Brittany, Belgium, the Channel Islands and the SWFPO once a year to agree potting and trawling areas. Agreement can be hard to achieve, but any larger meeting would never get agreement.

  5.7  RACs should not get involved inside 12 miles and Sea Fisheries Committees powers should be extended to 12 miles.

NEW BUILDS

  6.1  We agree that there should be no more grants for new builds.

NORTH SEA AND OTHER RESTRICTED AREAS

  7.1  We accept that under her accession Treaty, Spain becomes entitled to equal access on 1 January 2003 (as do other recently joined members).

  7.2  Even if initially Spain (and others) is restricted to just non TAC species, there is bound to be a bye-catch of pressure stock fish—and in order to increase the bye-catch boats will try and maximise the non TAC species.

  7.3  There will, therefore, be an increase in mortality, greater discards and even more pressure on all species.

  7.4  Our members fish almost exclusively for crustacea—non TAC. If Spain were now to target these species it could have a very serious effect on our members—not only on extra fishing, but, as Spain is one of our main markets, in our outlets as well. (It should also be remembered that, as wet fish boats have come under pressure, more and more boats have recently switched to crabs/lobsters, putting strain on both stock and markets).

RELATIVE STABILITY

  8.1  Relative stability as currently practised is discriminatory. Indeed, in December 1996 the Government of the time wrote in its Supplementary Memorandum on Quota Hopping to the Intergovernmental Conference "The Court of Justice has itself recognised that the quota system, as a system of national quotas, is a derogation from the general rule of equal conditions of access to fishery resources (see Jaderow judgement) and the principle of non-discrimination laid down in Article 40(3) of the Treaty".

  8.2  Without unanimity, it can not, therefore, continue much longer in its present form. In fact, it has been made abundantly clear in various Commission documents that Treaty requirements will be implemented.

  8.3  In his address to the Spanish Parliament Franz Fischler said "From 1st January onwards Spain will have access to the North Sea. We will re-examine the quota allocations made during the period when Spain was excluded from these waters. . .the Commission will apply Community law to Spain in just the same way as to other Member States" (our italics).

  8.4  The proposals also state that any new fishing opportunities will be made available to Spain (increased quota, non quota species being turned into quota?) and that ITQs will be discussed. Indeed, in order to comply with the Treaty, non discrimination and equal access principles, some form of freely tradeable fishing opportunities will have to come in. These can either be in the form of ITQs or, as Regulation 1627 of 1994 requires, EU fishing permits.

  8.5  Such trade will have serious repercussions on the British industry. Quota/permits will eventually end up in the hands of those who can afford to pay. We will therefore see most fishing opportunities going to Spain, Holland and France and Great Britain's finest natural renewable resource will end up in the hands of foreigners and out of the control of the British Parliament and people. Even now almost 70 per cent of our North Sea plaice quota, 60 per cent of our hake quota, 30 per cent of our megrim quota and 55 per cent of our Dover sole quota belong to "quota hoppers".

REGISTRATION OF BUYERS

  9.1  In those countries where enforcement is poor, registering of buyers will have no effect on curbing the landing of over-quota fish. However, if such measures are introduced and enforced, they will enable the authorities to trace fish from catcher to retailer and thus cut down on the landing of "black fish".

  9.2  They should benefit the inshore shellfishermen, though, for, at present, he suffers from unregistered fishermen selling (and undercutting) to hotels and restaurants. This measure will assist in cutting out the illegal trade.

SATELLITE MONITORING

  10.1  This will undoubtedly assist in overcoming mis-reporting of where a vessel has been fishing, although it adds yet more bureaucracy and expense for fishermen.

  10.2  To bring the size down to 10m is going to make monitoring the several thousand boats difficult and complicated. Perhaps a higher cut off point would be more appropriate and make monitoring easier.

  10.3  An advantage for static gear fishermen is that VMS may be able to assist us in identifying those boats which deliberately tow through our gear causing thousands of pounds of damage.

ENVIRONMENTALISTS

  11.1  We welcome the proposed involvement of responsible environmental groups (we are members of the Marine Conservation Society) as we should all have the same aim.

  11.2  However, many such groups are too radical and their involvement may well exacerbate problems.

  11.3  Who will select and how will numbers be limited?

CONTROL

  12.1  Too many decisions are made for political reasons and fish stocks do not understand politics! It is not possible to effectively manage one huge fishery with 15 managers each with his own political agenda.

  12.2  We therefore favour each nation state controlling its own EFZ.

  12.3  However, if one accepts the pooling of resources, then (unfortunately!) control needs to be pooled as well.

  12.4  Much as we object to more powers going to the Commission, we can see the logic of it under the present pooling system.

SUMMARY

  13.1  The 6/12 mile limits should be made permanent and exclusive to each nation.

  13.2  Quotas and days at sea should not run together—we should have either one or the other.

  13.3  If Treaty obligations are to apply, then some form of tradeable quota or permit will have to come in. Whilst this will benefit those already in the industry (they will have security and something to sell on retirement), it will mean that, eventually, much of the quota/permits will end up in the hands of the few.

  13.4  The Government must draw on all EU funds available.

  13.5  The problem of equitable enforcement has not been properly addressed.

  13.6  Politics need to be taken out of the management and control of fishing.

  13.7  Greater access by other member states to our EFZ will put more pressure on all stocks and therefore on British fishermens' jobs.

  13.8  The end result of the proposals will be fewer British boats, fewer British fishermen and the disintegration of fishing communities.

29 September 2002



 
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