Select Committee on Environment, Food and Rural Affairs Minutes of Evidence


Memorandum submitted by the Joint Nature Conservation Committee (K8)

  The attached response is from the Joint Nature Conservation Committee on behalf of English Nature, Scottish Natural Heritage and the Countryside Council for Wales. We would be happy to elaborate on any point should you or your Committee wish.

  We feel that the broad content of the first package of CFP reform proposals is encouraging. Significantly, the environmental dimension of the CFP has been given a much higher profile than in the past. This is a necessary and welcome move toward a policy capable of delivering conservation and sustainable exploitation of fishery resources within EU waters. We are keen to ensure that the UK Government supports these positive aspects of the reforms against the opposition that is likely to arise from some other Member States. The state of Europe's fish stocks and fisheries has declined dramatically since the last review of the CFP in 1992. At that time, the Commission also brought forward reasonably progressive proposals, but these foundered on the unwillingness of Member States to take tough economic decisions that would have moved fisheries onto a more sustainable basis. Consequently, the situation has deteriorated. We do not believe that such "compromises" can be allowed to occur again without running a strong risk of the complete collapse of both fish stocks and fisheries.

  For the past four years we have worked closely with a network of environmental advisory organisations across Europe in order to promote the integration of environmental considerations into the CFP. We consider the following to be essential requirements of a reformed CFP:

    —  measures to reduce fleet capacity and effort to bring them in line with available resources;

    —  effective and full implementation of the precautionary principle;

    —  decentralised management in order to provide greater stakeholder involvement and better integration of wildlife policies into the decision making process;

    —  progressive development of an ecosystem-based approach to management, including the use of indicators to monitor environmental performance of the CFP.

  The contents of the current reform proposals as outlined in the various Commission Communications and proposed Council Regulations are broad in scope and diverse. Therefore, in our response to the terms of reference listed in your letter, we have attempted to highlight issues of particular relevance to fisheries conservation and biodiversity protection within EU waters.

RESPONSE OF THE UK NATURE CONSERVATION AGENCIES

  This response is from the Joint Nature Conservation Committee on behalf of UK's statutory nature conservation agencies: English Nature, Scottish Natural Heritage and the Countryside Council for Wales.

  To help guide and formulate our response to this consultation, we have broadly interpreted the Committee's terms of reference in the form of a question regarding CFP reform. That is, if the European Commission's current reform proposals were accepted, resulting in a "new" CFP, then what would the effects of these be?

  While this is a useful exercise, we are well aware that negotiation will likely alter any proposals that may actually be implemented. It is therefore problematic to predict what the effects of any final changes will be. Further, we note that at the time of writing this response, the Commission has only published a part of the full set of proposals relating to the CFP reform. Although these proposals include the core draft Regulation and a Roadmap outlining the nature of proposals yet to come, our response with respect to the reform can only be partial at this time.

1.  The effects of the proposals on the fundamental principles of the CFP

  One of the difficulties of the existing CFP is that it has had no separate fundamental principles aside from those governing the European Union as a whole. Several aspects of the CFP have in fact been derogations from those fundamental principles. Furthermore the objectives, where stated in the current CFP, are derivations from Common Agricultural Policy objectives rather than specifically taking account of the needs of fisheries management. It is this lack of specificity, in combination with a lack of clarity surrounding the objectives of the CFP that has contributed to its failure to manage fisheries in EU waters in a sustainable manner.

  We are therefore pleased to see that a more coherent set of objectives has been proposed for the CFP that, if adhered to, is much more likely to deliver a CFP that is sustainable biologically, environmentally, socially and economically. In particular we support:

    —  the intention to give the management process a more long-term, strategic outlook;

    —  the intention to limit fishing capacity to a sustainable level consistent with availability of resources;

    —  the removal of funding for new capacity and a mechanism for progressively reducing the size of the fleet, thereby tackling the issue of over-capacity;

    —  the intention to integrate environmental considerations by moving towards an ecosystem-based approach to fisheries management;

    —  the intention to act to eliminate IUU fishing (see Section 6);

    —  the continuation of the inshore limits; and

    —  the improvements in governance and thereby encouragement of more responsible fishing that may arise from the establishment of Regional Advisory Councils.

  We note that the "principle" of relative stability has been maintained, along the derived implications of access to waters by the various fleets. These principles are derogations from the free market fundamentals of the EU, but we believe that they are necessary, at least at present.

  We are less sure that some of the inherent conflicts among the objectives of the reformed CFP have been fully explored and resolved. Some of these are carry-overs from the existing CFP. For example, we note that there remain tensions within the aspiration to deliver both sustainable fisheries and high yields. Since the aim of sustainability and an aim of achieving high yield are likely to pull the policy in opposite directions it would be better if sustainability was understood to imply a limit to the quest for high yields. A fundamental principle of the CFP should be to seek sustainable fisheries in the environmental (biological), social and economic senses, and to explicitly resolve any conflicting tensions between these aims.

2.  Improvements in quota management, conservation and possible alternatives

  The Commission clearly recognises that the EU fisheries management system has failed in the past. This failure may have been for a variety of reasons such as inadequacy of scientific advice, inability of politicians to take the advice and act on it, cheating by fishers and inadequate enforcement. Whatever the real reason (and it is likely to be due to a mixture of factors), it is plain that EU fisheries management has failed systematically B and it is therefore hardly likely that reinforcing the present system will work. The Commission has thus proposed a bold new approach that we broadly support. A key issue from the environmental point of view is the currently unsustainable amount of fishing effort being applied to the marine ecosystem. B Therefore, we are particularly pleased to see the proposals for significant effort reduction. We would prefer that environmental (as well as fish stock) considerations were taken into account in setting substantially lower effort levels, but whatever reduction levels are achieved, it should reduce some of the unwanted environmental effects. From an economic point of view it would make much more sense to decommission vessels in order to reduce overall effort, rather than tie vessels up in harbour. This latter option will only act to impose tremendous pressure on managers to again allow increases in fishing effort, if and when stocks begin to show signs of recovery. Such a phenomena is in part to blame for the failure of groundfish stocks to recover a decade after a moratorium was imposed on the inshore and Grand Banks fishery of eastern Canada. Fisheries managers can, and should avoid re-enacting the same scenario here in EU waters.

  We note that the proposals hardly touch on issues relating to the exploitation of species in deep-sea environments. Stocks of most deep-sea fish are particularly vulnerable to over-fishing, as these fish are long-lived, slow to reach maturity, and exhibit low fecundity. In addition, the habitats fisheries are occurring within are particularly sensitive to fishing activity, as many have not been previously disturbed by towed gear. Management of deep-sea fisheries is thus a particular challenge in terms of sustainability of both fish stocks and of their environment. Successful management will mean striking the balance between the need to maintain sustainable stocks and a sensitive environment, and the aspirations of the fishing industry. While this is a formidable challenge, it should not be outside the realm of possibility for fisheries management providing that the current reform process results in a CFP with clear objectives and a long-term strategy for all exploited stocks, including deep-sea species.

  We were thus very disappointed with the recent decisions by the Fisheries Council, and their acceptance by the Commission, in relation to these fisheries. It has long been widely recognised in the scientific and policy community that deep-sea stocks are particularly vulnerable to over-exploitation, and that there is strong evidence that over fishing has already occurred on many species in EU waters. It is also well recognised that TACs (whether precautionary or analytical) are entirely inappropriate in these fisheries. We are certain that the current proposals will do little but help better monitor the further decline of these stocks. We note that the Commission have indicated that these proposals were only the first step in better management of deep-sea fisheries. However, the recent setting of TACs, while deemed an interim measure by the Council and the Commission in order to offer a degree of protection for deep-sea species, is a myopic vision and hence exemplary of much that is wrong with current fisheries management in the EU. Explicit commitments by the Commission to continue to press for full and proper regulation of these fisheries, including capacity and effort regulation, and the consideration of large closed areas, are missing from the proposals seen so far.

  Further, there appears to be scope for improvement in the TAC and quota management/allocations process for EU fisheries in general, which is not just limited to deep-sea fisheries. There is a need across the board for EU fishermen to be instilled with a sense of ownership and responsibility for the resources upon which they depend. This is not the case at present, where TACs have been historically determined behind closed doors, with no opportunity for local/regional stakeholders to have a legitimate voice in fisheries management. A move towards a regional approach to fisheries management and the progressive development of a transparent process that will allow regional needs to be taken into account by the Commission and Fisheries Council (ie, via RACs) will be a step in the right direction.

  Finally, in terms of improvements that more specifically relate to the ability of managers to conserve resources, there are several options to consider. Firstly, it is important that scientists and managers make best use of the fisheries and environmental data that is currently available. There is also scope for improvement in the amount and reliability of data to inform fisheries management decisions. In particular, consistent information to reflect spatial and temporal fishing effort in EU waters is severely lacking. There is also a paucity of data to accurately reflect important biodiversity considerations such as catch composition, bycatch rates, physical damage to habitats and species, seasonal fluctuations, and other fisheries interactions with the wider marine environment. Such information will be essential in order to gauge the performance of a reformed CFP as it attempts to take account of these wider environmental considerations, and move toward an ecosystem-based approach to fisheries management. Collecting this information may seem a formidable and expensive task to impose on a fisheries management system in crisis. However, we feel that there are reasonable and cost-effective ways of meeting these challenges.

  We consider that observer programs need to be further developed and expanded in order to address these information gaps. Extensive observer programmes are already in operation in the other parts of the world, for instance USA and Canada, and guidance may be drawn from these existing schemes. Broadly speaking however, there are several key pieces of information that can be derived from comprehensive observer schemes, which fisheries managers should consider as the basis for an expanded programme across EU waters, including:

    —  discarding and high grading information;

    —  foreign and domestic vessel activity information;

    —  data to feed into quota monitoring/management;

    —  information for production and conservation rate adjustment;

    —  data for fisheries environmental impact assessment (EIA);

    —  data/information to provide input into the stock assessment process and to examine a variety of biological and technical problems;

    —  real-time information on the impacts of management decisions.

  There are potential benefits to the industry as well, which will help to achieve industry agreement to expanded observer coverage for the EU fleet, including:

    —  potential fisheries development opportunities;

    —  reduced industry reporting requirements;

    —  potential fisheries expansion resulting from availability of timely data;

    —  using data to determine fisheries openings as well as closures;

    —  access to independent data on gear and effort effectiveness;

    —  prolonged economic opportunity due to enhanced resource sustainability in the long-term.

  The last point is perhaps the most important. If the new objectives of a reformed CFP are to truly embrace a long-term strategic vision for fisheries and their future sustainability, expanded and comprehensive observer programmes will be essential in helping to ensure these objectives are met. Of course, short-term cost to the industry and government managers will be required to get such a program off the ground. As well, there are significant political challenges between Member States that will need to be overcome. However, such costs must be borne if the CFP and the EU as a whole are to see the objectives for sustainable fisheries come to fruition. We are pleased that statutory observers have been included in the new proposals for deep-water fisheries.

  While observer programmes must be made distinct from enforcement activities (see below) in order for the industry to embrace them as a fisheries management tool, there are some obvious benefits in terms of industry compliance with fisheries regulation. The presence of fisheries observers can act as a deterrent to committing fisheries violations. This is particularly important in remote fishing areas where more formal enforcement mechanisms may be less reliable. They cannot however, be underpinned by, or replace formal enforcement mechanisms, but may be able to compliment them.

  The proposal to ban shark finning is very welcome, and is hopefully a first step towards full and proper management of shark and other elasmobranch fisheries. Some of these species are becoming rare and endangered in European waters.

3.  The impact of the proposals on the structure of the British fishing industry

  We consider that the proposed overall reduction in effort of 8.5 per cent is not sufficiently large to meet the target of sustainable catching opportunities. The Commission, in some cases, has recognised the advice of the scientific community, who have estimated that reductions in effort of up to 60 per cent will be required on the most depleted stocks. It is difficult to see how these two figures can meet, especially when there is a background of continuing annual "improvements" in fishing efficiency. One recent estimate of the annual "improvement" in catching efficiency placed this at 8 per cent. Thus, the Commission's proposed 8.5 per cent reduction in effort could be negated within two years. In many other areas, the proposed reforms should meet the Commission's aims, but the chances of success overall will be severely reduced without a substantially greater reduction in fishing capacity and effort. If catching efficiency continues to improve, then reductions will need to continue annually into the future. This is not in the best interest of an industry, which is in dire need of increased stability. Further, we do not agree with statements that UK has decommissioned enough of its fleet. UK may, pro-rata with other Member States, have met its obligations so far, but we do not believe that fishing by the remaining fleet can be sustainable without further reductions in capacity right across the EU, including the UK fleet.

  The Commission proposes that no public funds be made available for improvements in capacity or fishing efficiency. We support this proposal, but note the importance of safety considerations within the EU fleet. It will be important to ensure that improvements in the safety of vessels do not lead to fishermen taking greater risks (eg with weather). In addition, there appear to be no mechanisms built into the reforms to minimise the effects of privately funded improvements in efficiency.

  We note, of course, that any decommissioning is of little use unless there is also a reduction in licences, track record and other indicators of effort. We would expect these reductions to also occur.

  We are broadly in favour of the proposals for structural aid and scrapping of vessels. However, we are concerned that in a few instances, the measures do not provide sufficient incentive for permanent withdrawal from the fisheries sector. We expand on this in Section 4.

  We note that economic support is proposed for measures that improve selectivity. In fishery terms this is welcome, but it is not made explicit that such support should also be available for measures (beyond catch selection) that reduce impact on the marine environment. Support could also usefully be provided for the development of mechanisms to integrate environmental considerations into management.

4.  Adequacy of plans for social help for fishing communities

  It is difficult to comment at present on this aspect of the reform for two main reasons. First, the manner by which the Member States meet their proposed obligations under the reformed CFP are a responsibility of the Member States and not laid down by the Commission. Thus a Member State can chose from a variety of approaches that would have differing social implications. Secondly, the Commission has yet to publish their Action Plan to counter the socio-economic consequences of fisheries restructuring.

  However, a few social implications are obvious, and require immediate attention from both the Commission and individual Member States. The CFP has repeatedly failed to account for the fact that many of the conservation measures that we, and others, maintain as being necessary to ensure resource sustainability in the long-term, will undoubtedly result in reduced industry earnings in the short term. The inevitable pressure that government will feel to take measures to counter this could undermine all attempts at resource sustainability and the entire CFP reform process.

  In part, the management response (by both the EU and the Member States) in the past has been to introduce or allow perverse subsidies, which have artificially inflated resource availability, and available employment opportunities in the sector. Hence, too many people have remained tied to an industry that has been altogether unable to support the demands placed on the resource upon which they depend. This has only acted to force the industry to respond to the resulting financial pressures arising from stock declines by finding ways around legislation, regulation, etc., which are designed to conserve these resources. Unless the Commission's plans for social help accounts for this, current plans for effort control, and sustainability through environmental integration will be doomed to failure.

  To a very large extent, Government mismanagement through an ineffective CFP has contributed to this current set of circumstances (too many fishermen and not enough fish). Hence we contend that government, both national and EU, should commit to helping the industry participants out of this situation in the short term with the longer-term objective of an industry that is self-sustaining and not reliant upon government hand-outs.

  Hence, we fully support the Commissions proposal for socio-economic measures to be used to reduce fishing effort by funding fishermen (and other allied trades) to retrain or diversify their activities away from the sector. However, the proposal to allow beneficiaries of diversification measures to continue fishing on a part-time basis, but with reduced fishing effort, is again, a potential perversity. There is a risk that funding under such circumstances acts merely as income support, rather than permanent withdrawal. This approach failed in Canada following stock collapse in the northwest Atlantic. We would prefer firmer measures to ensure that fishers leave the sector entirely here, rather than measures that could provide incentives for them to remain tied to the fisheries sector. Permanent removal from the industry and the support to do so, should form part of the Commission's social aid proposals.

5.  Flexibility of reformed system, including short-term adjustments to quota

  The core of the CFP reform is a new multi-annual framework for the conservation of resources and management of fisheries. The multi-annual plans envisaged under this framework are designed to ensure sustainable exploitation. These plans are specifically designed to reduce the short-term, often politically-driven, adjustments to TACs and quotas that have occurred in the past. Instead they will be designed on a more precautionary basis using the best available science. Processes for enhancing this science with evidence from fishermen are already being implemented. We thus would not want to see a system that allows easier short-term changes to quota. An exception to this would be in cases of emergency when there is serious unforeseen risk to stocks (or non-target species or habitats). Emergency measures to conserve fish stocks are already permitted under the current CFP and there appears to be no proposal to change this. We consider that the power to close fisheries for reasons of significant unforeseen damage to biodiversity could also be included in the reformed CFP.

  We regard the strengthening of the CFP's regional dimension as a particular priority in allowing a more geographically-flexible CFP. Regional Advisory Councils (RAC) could, within limits, tailor local implementation of the CFP to regional peculiarities. Stakeholder integration will be a crucial component of a reformed CFP and of the RACs. We feel however that dialogue must improve between all stakeholders, not just between fishermen and scientists. While it is important that industry be given more ownership of fisheries policy in order to instil a sense of stewardship of the marine environment, we would advocate a broad approach to stakeholder integration into fisheries management and RACs. This will allow a more balanced debate and balanced integration of the many sectors that claim a legitimate stake in fisheries management and the future of our seas.

  There are immediate challenges to face with respect to regionalisation of fisheries policy. Striking a balance between the broad, and potentially conflicting interests in fisheries management within regions (eg the North Sea) will pose serious challenge with respect to the composition and function of the RACs. Conflicting interests between Member States will inevitably result in robust negotiation over what an RAC should be for any given region. Domestically, this will also be a formidable challenge. As a Member State, the UK would be wise to begin negotiation on RAC development from within, and in a timely manner. This will be necessary to ensure the UK is ready to engage with other Member States on the issue of RAC establishment with a clear consensus and agreed focus from within. We recommend that, as a priority, the fisheries departments should co-ordinate a debate within the UK on the establishment of RACs. We believe that there is a strong argument for the explicit inclusion of the nature conservation agencies in RACs owing to our statutory responsibilities in the marine environment. These responsibilities have already led to increased and constructive interaction with the fishing industry.

  We believe that regional fisheries management, which integrates wildlife conservation objectives and the views of all stakeholders, would lead to more responsible management of living resources. Indeed, RACs, if properly established within the regions, could provide the rational and practical basis required to develop and implement progressively an ecosystem-based approach. The UK statutory nature conservation agencies have examined the feasibility of applying this approach, and have specifically considered its application in an Irish Sea case study. We have held meetings with stakeholders to explore future options in the Irish Sea, and will produce further reports.

6.  Enforcement

  We support the concept of a joint fisheries inspection structure as this should help in the move toward a "level playing field" for Community fishermen. However, we note that the Commission proposes further deployment of observers with the twin aim of scientific data collection and compliance reporting. We cannot emphasise enough that observer schemes must be for scientific data and general "at sea" fisheries information collection, while enforcement must be strictly for imposing compliance with fisheries regulation. We advise strongly against any "hybrid" observers as we feel it is likely that any scientific data gathering is likely to be hindered or biased if a dispassionate position for the observer on board EU vessels is not guaranteed.. We note that the Commission indicate that observer schemes will be proposed on a case by case basis, however, we would like the principle of separation between scientific observation and enforcement of fishery regulation to underpin any proposals. As stated above (section 2), observer scheme data can help inform enforcement needs, and can hence be complimentary. However, observer schemes will only succeed as long as their distinction from enforcement is maintained.

  On its own, enforcement is necessary for several important reasons and distinct needs:

    —  to report and prevent illegal fishing activity;

    —  to initiate legal action where fisheries violations occur;

    —  to enforce compliance with catch rates and landing requirements;

    —  to enforce compliance with gear restrictions;

    —  to enforce compliance with closed seasons and other license restrictions/conditions;

    —  to enforce reporting requirements;

    —  to enforce fishing activity with regard to Member State's territorial waters derogation;

    —  to ensure uniform compliance with EU fisheries regulation in all Member States.

  We support all of the proposed Community level measures to eradicate illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing. We would like to see measures that prevent, rather than "discourage" such fishing. In particular, the Commission should implement the International Plan of Action on IUU fishing (IPOA-IUU), developed by FAO within the framework of its Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries.

30 September 2002


 
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