Supplementary memorandum submitted by
The Fishermen's Association Ltd (FAL) (K4 (a))
1. The Chairman of the Committee has invited
FAL to submit an additional Memorandum following the Evidence
provided to the Committee on 31 October 2002, by FAL Director,
Mrs. Sheryll Murray.
2. Accordingly the following is an addendum
not only to FALs original Memorandum but also to that oral evidence.
USE OF
THE ICES
REPORT TO
THE ACFM
3. The scientists have a long tradition
of calling for excessive cuts in the TAC for certain stocks. The
Commission then uses this as a lever to obtain agreement by qualified
majority in the Council for smaller cuts. It is not the scientific
advice that is necessarily at fault in these situations, but the
horse-trading exercise that follows not only at the December Council
of Ministers Meeting, but during the preceding meetings that take
place under the authority of the Presidency with the different
Member States and also within the Committee of Permanent Representatives.
4. The situation now faced by the Industry
centres around the Cod and Hake Recovery Programme, first tabled
by the Commission in December 2001. Whilst the original concept
might appear to offer a credible solution, the devil is in the
detail.
Details that have failed to be brought to the
public arena include:
— The system of management is not isolated
to cod or hake and may be introduced for any stock considered
under threat.
— The days at sea are Kilowatt Days
( engine power x time at sea) and are then set globally each member
state.
— Unlike the previous system, there
is NO facility to increase the number of Kilowatt Days to allow
a vessel to take its full allocation of quota.
— Once an allocation for Cod or Hake
is fully utilised, the vessel must tie up or move to another area
outside the area of the programme.
— Whilst the Council sets the TAC for
Cod and Hake in the first year, the Commission will set it for
each of the following years to the end of the programme based
on the scientific advice.
— The Commission will therefore have
the ultimate power over and above that of the Council of Ministers.
5. There was very little support in the
October 2002 Council for "days at sea" in the Cod and
Hake recovery programme. The Commission will now make political
use of this scientific advice in order to "scare" other
member states into accepting the draconian cuts in days at sea
that are on the table.
6. A cut of 50 per cent or a maximum allocation
of 150 days (to be used where there is no historical reference
data for a vessel between 1998-2000) will be just as devastating
to the industry.
7. Past decommissioning schemes have not
worked. The most efficient effort remains.
REGIONAL ADVISORY
COUNCILS
8. Under the Treaty Obligations accepted
by the UK and other Member states, there is no possibility of
these Councils receiving full management responsibility let alone
full control over the area. The Amsterdam Treaty explicitly rules
out any decentralisation of power from "Brussels" back
to member states so Regional Advisory Councils can never get the
power required. Once the European Union acquires power from a
member state, that power remains in the EU, and is never relinquished.
They will evolve into "discussion groups" providing
a report from time to time to the Commission. This is evident
when one looks at the amount of influence on Commission proposals
presently enjoyed by the Committee of the Regions and the European
Parliament. Furthermore, after the initial setting of the TACs
in the first year of a multi annual management plan, it is envisaged
that even the Council of Ministers will lose power to the Commission.
9. For these Committees to have real power,
one Member State (ie the flag state) must have autonomy although
of course the full consultation process must take place and the
views of all interested parties taken into account.
ACCESS TO
THE NORTH
SEA FOR
SPAIN
10. It must always be remembered that this
has been on the cards since Spain acceded in 1986.
11. Spain and Portugal, in the same way
as every other member state accepted the acquis communautaire
as part of their accession terms.
12. This means that they accepted equal
access to a common resource without discrimination.
13. Access to the North Sea will be the
main bargaining point for the Spanish during the review of the
EU fisheries policy. You only have to look at the negotiations
that took place in relation to the access to the Irish Box to
see how clever the Spanish are in obtaining what is after all
their rights under their Treaty of Accession.
Spain will get access to the resources in the
North Sea, if only by virtue of the Amsterdam Treaty which demands
the rooting out of all discrimination, whether based on nationality,
race or religion, and which is one of the basic objectives of
the European Union.
14. This press article of 17 October 2002
says it all
"Minister of Agriculture and Fisheries Miguel
Arias Canete said Spain would turn to the EU Court of Justice
if necessary. He called on the other Member States to stop denying
Spain the right to equality in European fishing grounds and to
adhere to the principle of relative stability.
The principle of relative stability determined
access to fishery resources and allocated a fixed percentage of
the commercial species to each Member State before Spain and Portugal
became members of the European Union.
On 31 December 2002 the restriction period, established
by the Adhesion Treaty of Spain to the EU, is due to end giving
Spain free access to the North and Baltic seas. But Spanish fishermen
won't be able to access the resources unless the current quota
allocation system is modified.
If Members States are unwilling to end the `discrimination'
that the Spanish industry has been suffering for the last 10 years
because of the Treaty, said Arias Can¥ete, then Spain would
ask for the necessary legal reports to resolve the issue."
15. The ECJ ruling would be based on the
terms of the Treaties.
16. Spain has in the past conducted quota
swaps with other Member States in order to obtain the required
access to resources. There is no reason that this should not happen
again.
17. The precedent has been set—Council
Regulation (EC) 685/95 of 27 March 1995. Article 11. Annual transfers
of Cod, Monkfish, Haddock, Whiting and Hake are available to Spain
for areas Vb, VI, VII, VIII, IX, XII and XIV in exchange for Anchovy
in area VIII.
18. This agreement is subject to change
with an agreement between the Member States at the time that the
TACs are set although the Regulation states that a multi-annual
prospect is envisaged.
19. The agreement with Belgium has no such
stipulation and the exchange of quotas for Cod, Haddock, Monkfish
and Whiting to Spain for Megrim has taken placed each year between
1995-2002.
20. Portugal also conducted an exchange
of quota which again stipulated that this exchange would take
place annually from 1995-2002.
21. It is clear from the above that placing
quota restrictions on every species in the North Sea would not
necessarily prevent Spain from gaining access to the resources.
22. The introduction of trading in quotas
between the Member States will also provide the facility for this
to happen.
RELATIVE STABILITY
AND THE
1983 ALLOCATION KEYS
23. As has been previously demonstrated,
Spain fully expects and is determined to obtain equal access without
discrimination after 31 December 2002.
24. One problem faced by UK Fishermen is
that some leaders, encouraged by UK Fisheries Departments officials,
have failed to differentiate between the principle of relative
stability and the discriminatory allocation keys.
25. This actually worked against the UK
in the Deep Water species allocations. On one hand the Industry
was pressing our Minister to defend the discriminatory allocation
keys that benefited them in areas such as the North Sea and on
the other they wished to move away from this system in the Deep
Water Species negotiations. It is almost laughable that some representatives
of the industry were arguing in such a contradictory manner.
26. The proposed Cod Stock Recovery Programme
is a clear indication that the discriminatory allocation keys
will not continue. When days at sea allocated on the basis of
fishing for Cod has been used up, no other species linked to Cod
such as Haddock or Whiting can be harvested. This in itself undermines
the allocation keys.
27. The Minister and his officials clearly
do not understand the Treaties and the Regulations. The following
examples show the intention to change the reference period:
(1). John Farnell, Director for markets
and horizontal measures—European Commission DG XIV—to
Scottish Parliament Rural Development Committee—September
2002—pointed out the need to "clearly fix" relative
stability allocation keys in an EU regulation, "so that all
parties would know how we would propose to allocate fisheries
resources for the foreseeable future". He said that allocation
keys should be reviewed every five years "in order to ensure
that they correspond to real fishing interests, as opposed to
interests on paper". That could signal an unwelcome degree
of flexibility in the quota share out system between Member States.
(2). Communication from the Commission on
the reform of the Common Fisheries Policy ("Roadmap")
Brussels, 28.5.2002 COM(2002) 181 final—The European Parliament
adopted in January 2002 a resolution calling for "a fisheries
policy based on rational and responsible management of resources
which has as its rationale the preservation of fish stocks and
the maintenance of the way of life of those traditionally dependent
on the sea and preserves the fundamental principle which derives
from these objectives, namely relative stability; a policy which
facilitates a fair and equitable regime for distributing fisheries
resources tailored to the specific needs of fisheries dependent
regions and which is impartial, stable, enforceable and under
Community control".
(3). Proposal for a council regulation on
the conservation and sustainable exploitation of fisheries resources
under the Common Fisheries Policy Brussels, 28.5.2002 COM(2002)
185 final—The Commission proposes that the allocation of
Community fishing opportunities among the Member States, based
on the principle of maintaining relative stability of fishing
activity, should be maintained. It is proposed, however, that
a method of allocation for each stock be decided by the Council
in order to make the application of this principle more transparent.
(4). Preamble paragraph 14 Proposal as per
3 above—In view of the precarious economic state of the
fishing industry and the dependence of certain coastal communities
on fishing, it is necessary to ensure relative stability of fishing
activities by the allocation of fishing opportunities between
the Member States, based upon a predictable share of the stocks
for each Member State.
Much is made by Fisheries Ministers that the
UK has a "national" quota of the various species of
fish prosecuted by UK fishermen. This is to preserve the illusion
that the UK has still some sovereign power over the control and
management of these fisheries.
The reality is that once the EU through the
Council of Ministers (and after agreement with Third parties for
joint stocks) has decided upon the Total Allowable Catch for the
various species subject to quota, the UK receives in terms of
the Relative Stability principle and the agreed allocation keys,
a share of the EU TAC. The present quota system and the TAC and
quota regulations adopted at the end of each year is a derogation
from the non discrimination rules of the EU.
FINANCIAL AID
FOR THE
INDUSTRY
28. There is a very limited amount of financial
aid available for the catching sector. However, it must never
be forgotten that any Government aid provided for the Industry,
should it be tied up, would be governed by the EU State Aid rules.
Some aid given by other Member States to their industries to compensate
for the increased fuel prices a few years ago was subsequently
deemed illegal. A similar conclusion will more than likely be
the outcome of the Commission's investigation into the quota purchasing
scheme in Orkney and Shetland.
12 MILE LIMIT
29. It should be noted that after all of
the shouting over the past months of the great victory in making
this limit permanent, the Council conclusion in October stated
that these limits would probably only be for a further 10 year
derogation period. One reason of course is because it requires
the unanimous agreement of all 15 Member States in order to achieve
this, in much the same way as it requires the unanimous agreement
to change the principle of equal access to a common resource.
EMERGENCY MEASURES
30. Great faith has been stored in the fact
that Member States can initiate emergency measures. Unfortunately,
yet again the devil is in the detail such as Commission approval
must be sought or that the Council could make a different recommendation.
31. It should also be noted that these measures
are seen as a one way street. There is no mention of short time
increasing fishing opportunities should there be a recovery of
stocks.
1 November 2002
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